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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study is to analyze the incidence of Total Permanent Disability (TPD) 
pensions in Washington State’s workers’ compensation program. Concerns exist at both the 
legislature and in the Department of Labor and Industries as there appears to have been a sharp 
upturn in the number of pensions awarded since late in the 1990s. This report examines the 
factors that may be causally related to any upsurge in such awards. Our task is to evaluate 
pension incidence for both the state fund and the self-insured populations, with a view towards 
identifying causes of the trend in both sectors, although we concentrate more on the state fund 
claims due to data limitations. 
Interest in pensions arises both because of their costs and because of the widely held view 
that wherever possible injured workers should be enabled to return to productive employment. In 
total, TPD pension claims account for more than one-fourth of workers’ compensation costs for 
state fund insureds in Washington. Yet total permanent disability claims do not represent a very 
large share of overall benefit costs in other states because the incidence of such claims is low. At 
least two factors account for the importance of pensions in Washington. First, it appears that 
Washington has a higher incidence of total permanent disability cases than do other states. 
Second, these benefits are adjusted annually to reflect increases in the state’s average annual 
wage, and there is concern about the unfunded liability of the Supplemental Pension Fund. 
Inflation adjustments of this or similar kinds are found in 15 other state systems and represent a 
sizeable portion of the cost of these claims. In Washington, one-half the costs of such inflation 
adjustment are borne directly by the state’s workers. 
Our report can be summarized in five major sections which we treat as questions: 
• Are the rates of TPD pension award high in Washington State? 
• What factors are associated with claims that result in pensions? 
• Has there been substantial growth in pensions? 
• What factors are associated with the growth in pensions?  
• How can the future course of pension claims be predicted?  
 xi 
ARE TPD PENSION RATES HIGH IN WASHINGTON STATE? 
Making interstate comparisons in workers’ compensation is always challenging. State 
laws, practices, terminology, data availability and reporting all vary. The speed with which 
jurisdictions close claims can vary substantially. The problem of the “long tail” of claims 
increases the difficulty in making certain kinds of comparisons, and this is certainly true with 
regard to the incidence of TPD claims. In Washington it has not been unusual for claims to 
remain open and active for more than 10 years before they are resolved with the award of a 
pension. A special challenge for comparisons is that most states allow insurers to use 
compromise and release settlements to close claims and terminate liability. The problem with 
such agreements for purposes of a comparative analysis is that there are claims that might have 
resulted in TPD compensation in the absence of the settlement, but they are not recorded as such 
in other jurisdictions.  
The National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI) reports on the incidence of 
total permanent disability cases for 44 states and the District of Columbia. The number of 
pensions awarded per 100,000 covered employees is very high in Washington compared with 
other states; roughly four to eight times the 36-state average, and about two to four times as high 
as any other jurisdiction. Washington is also very high when evaluated in terms of TPD claims 
per 1,000 time-loss claims or the ratio of TPD awards to permanent partial disability awards.  
Because the broad structure of workers’ compensation in British Columbia is similar to 
Washington’s approach, we regard it as a valuable source of benchmark comparison. This was 
especially so before some legislative changes made in B.C. after a 2002 “Core Review.” 
Adjusting for the obvious differences in claim counts, examining the TPD experience in the two 
jurisdictions reinforces our conclusion that the incidence of pensions in Washington is very high, 
roughly two to two-and-a-half times as high as in British Columbia. 
WHAT FACTORS ARE ASSOCIATED WITH CLAIMS THAT RESULT IN 
PENSIONS? 
 
A Structural Source of Pensions in the Washington System 
In terms of TPD pensions, we believe that Washington’s approach is almost unique in a 
very significant way. Only one other state, Nevada, provides compensation in basically the same 
way as Washington does for total permanent disability.  
 xii 
First, Washington is different from most of the other states in that its workers’ 
compensation program does not allow for compromise and release agreements for indemnity 
benefits to decisively close claims. We believe that only eight states either do not allow such 
agreements or place important limits on their use (See Table 1). While 19 states including 
Washington pay PPD benefits for unscheduled injuries or illnesses solely on the basis of the 
extent of medically determined impairment resulting from the injury or illness, only six of these 
limit lump-sum settlements.  
Of these six jurisdictions only Washington and Nevada compensate total permanent 
disability based on (medical) impairment (for conditions specified in the statute) or for work 
disability. In Washington the worker is totally disabled for the purposes of a pension when the 
injury or disease permanently incapacitates the worker from obtaining and performing any work 
at any gainful occupation. As a result, the opportunity to return to work is central to the pension 
award decision, aside from those specific conditions listed in the statute which account for 
relatively few cases annually.  
Table 1 Arrangements for Permanent Disability Compensation among State Workers’  
Compensation Systems 
Limits on lump-sum 
settlements for indemnity 
benefits for permanent 
disability 
Permanent partial 
disability benefits based 
solely on impairment 
(unscheduled injuries) 
Total permanent 
disability benefits paid 
only for conditions 
listed in the statute 
Total permanent disability 
benefits paid based on 
impairments listed in 
statute or on incapacity 
from performing work 
Delaware X X  
Indiana X   
Nevada X  X 
New Mexico  X  
Tennessee    
Texas X X  
Washington X  X 
West Virginia X   
For explanatory notes, see Chapter 6 of the report.  
SOURCE: Barth and Niss (WCRI, 1999) 
 
Thus, among the states where permanent partial disability compensation is based on the 
degree of impairment, and where the use of lump-sum settlements for indemnity benefits is 
limited by law or practice, only Washington and Nevada use criteria other than the degree of 
impairment to evaluate and award total permanent disability pensions. Even where a work-
related injury causes a severe economic hardship, the law requires that only the degree of 
(medically determined) impairment be considered in the awarding of permanent partial disability 
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benefits. However, the impairment benefit may bear very little relationship to the actual degree 
of work disability. If it appears evident that the permanent partial disability benefit inadequately 
compensates for the work disability that the worker has experienced, the system has no 
flexibility to remedy this. The result of this combination of factors places the worker and the 
state fund or the self-insured employer in a position where the only possible source of additional 
compensation is the TPD pension.  
The Characteristics of Pension Claims 
This study undertook a detailed review of a random sample of over 900 workers’ 
compensation claim files, drawn from both the state fund and self-insureds, and including both 
those that culminated in pensions and others that did not. Our aim was to gain a detailed 
understanding of the claims management and pensioning processes, and to observe any 
differences from before and after the upswing in pension awards. It enabled us to obtain data 
elements that were not available in the Department’s data warehouse. It allowed us to achieve a 
qualitative understanding of trends and patterns as well as a consistent quantitative measurement 
of factors affecting pensioning. 
We took two different years, 1997 and 2002, comparing the total permanent disability 
claims awarded in those years, as well as selecting a comparison population from time-loss 
claims in each of those time periods. This way it would be possible to compare characteristics of 
pensions awarded in the two time periods, and also compare pension claims to non-pension 
claims in the two years. In choosing 1997 we are close to the beginning of potential changes in 
claims and pension adjudication, but we are confident that the choice of 1997 still allows for 
some significant “before and after” comparisons between the two time periods.  
Obtaining a suitable comparison group was difficult. Ideally we sought a group of claims 
that had a high probability of TPD by virtue of their characteristics, but had not received a TPD 
award by the time of our analysis. The selection of self-insured claims was conducted in a 
similar fashion, but the data on time-loss-only claims among the self-insured were very 
incomplete. We believe that we have a representative selection of self-insured claims for review, 
but we are not satisfied with the quality of the time-loss data among the self insured. Our 
analysis of self-insured claims is also limited by the small sample numbers. Because of these 
data limitations, our analysis of self-insured claims is also limited.  
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The claim file review allowed us to consider many different variables. Very succinctly, 
comparing state fund pension cases in 2002 with those awarded in 1997, we found the following 
to be significant differences between the two years. The 2002 pension claims show a slightly 
higher age at injury, and a lower proportion married; they also show a lower number of hospital 
admissions and surgical procedures than 1997 pensions. They are more likely to demonstrate 
opioid use, to have preexisting conditions, and to be from economically distressed counties. They 
are less likely to show any return to work than 1997 pension claims. 
 State fund comparison time-loss claims from 2002 are less likely than 1997 claims to 
involve back injury, have much lower hospital admission rates, and fewer surgical procedures. 
They are older at injury and are more likely to have at least a high school education. They show 
less opioid use, are much less likely to have used a pain clinic, and have significantly less 
psychological involvement. They are also less likely to have preexisting conditions, far less 
likely to be a reopened case, and are less likely to show a return-to-work attempt. They are more 
likely to have had their claim contested by their employer, but are far less likely to have been 
involved in an appeal to the BIIA.  
 Self-insured pension claims from 2002 are less likely than those from 1997 to involve 
back injuries and less likely to be female. Fewer of them had prior claims, but they are much 
more likely to have had a contested claim. Fewer of these 2002 pension claims show appeals. 
Comparison time-loss claims from 2002 are quite similar to those from 1997. They involve 
fewer back injuries, are slightly older, and less likely to show opioid use. There were no 
significant differences in the number with prior claims or return-to-work attempts. There was 
also no difference in the number whose claims were contested by the employer.  
There were major differences between our two multivariate estimates that presumably 
indicate changes in Washington’s workers’ compensation system between 1997 ad 2002. The 
largest increases in estimated effects were found in psychological conditions, agricultural 
employment, and preexisting conditions. Other variables that showed rising influence on the 
likelihood of pensions in 2002 included opioid drug use, reopened claims, and claims from 
economically distressed areas. These all seem to be consistent with what we heard from 
knowledgeable observers in Washington. In addition, the effect of the number of VR activities 
and prior PPD award both became less negative from 1997 to 2002.  
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Among those variables that declined in influence between 1997 and 2002 were gender, 
marital status, age at injury, and less than high school education. Thus the demographic 
characteristics of the injured worker seemed to be less important in 2002. In addition, the 
influence of pre-injury earnings, use of pain clinics, and legal representation were all less 
positive than they had been in 1997. Small declines were recorded for employer contested 
claims, prior claims, and the number of medical procedures. No change was seen in the effect of 
employer accommodation, the number of independent medical examinations, or self-insured 
status of the employer. 
HAS THERE BEEN SUBSTANTIAL GROWTH IN PENSIONS? 
Figure 1 shows the number of TPD pensions awarded annually over the past two decades 
in Washington. It is evident that a sizeable upturn began in the mid 1990s and continued at least 
through 2003 along with a considerable jump in awards in 2007. Also, although pensions 
awarded in 2004 and 2005 fell from the previous peak in 2003, the number of pensions awarded 
in those years were higher than levels reached before 2000. The figure makes it clear that this 
upturn was more characteristic of state fund claims than of self-insured claims, although self-
insured pensions rose substantially also. Perhaps the most remarkable thing about the growth in 
pension awards, at least among state fund employers, is that it occurred in the face of a steadily 
declining number of workers’ compensation claims for time-loss benefits since reaching a peak 
in 1990–91.  
We are persuaded that pension awards have been growing over time though the rate of 
increase may have been somewhat less dramatic than it initially appears to be. Consider that in 
the five years 1988–1992, there were an average of 682 pensions awarded per year; or that in 
1989 to 1991 under a previous push to close claims at L&I, there were 735 pensions awarded per 
year. Then consider that in the years 1993–1998 there were only 499 pensions awarded per year. 
The 1989–91 spike was likely accounted for by the “Yes-We-Can” push, and that was followed 
by a decline in pensions from 1993 to 1998, with an inventory buildup that was then pared down 
over the next few years. This view would suggest that a portion of the jump in pensions after 
1998 actually was a pipeline or inventory adjustment linked to the decline in the average number 
of pensions awarded in the 1993–98 years.  
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Figure 1  Number of TPD Pensions Awarded by Fiscal Year 
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SOURCE:  L&I Research and Data Services 
If we consider the years 1999 to 2006, the average number of awards is indeed higher 
than the 1989–91 baseline. That is hardly surprising in the light of time-loss claims that began to 
increase after 1982 and peaked in 1990. Claims from this peak period were the raw material for 
pensions in the late 1990s and going forward. From 1998 to 2001 the median length of time for 
pension awards made in those years was eight years from date of injury. That the number of 
pensions is correlated with the number of time-loss cases with a lag of six to 10 years is both 
intuitive and indisputable.  
Based on the peak of time-loss claims in 1990, pensions would have been growing for 
that reason alone in the late 1990s and early 2000s, even aside from the working down of the 
excess inventory that built up from 1993–1998. There was indeed an upsurge in pensions around 
1999, at least for the state fund. But the view of the size of the upswing must necessarily be 
shaped by the baseline used to measure it. There is little doubt that there has been a continuing 
increase in the ratio of active or open claims to all compensable claims from the mid 1990s to the 
present. As duration continues to increase, the raw material for future pensions does as well.  
Aside from the issues of a claims inventory adjustment and of the lag from the peak years 
for time-loss claims to the awarding of pensions, one other factor adds to the puzzle. Beginning 
early in the 2000’s the median time from claim origination to allowance fell from approximately 
eight years to about six years. That is equivalent to saying that claims that once would have 
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remained in open or active status for some additional years were now pensioned earlier, boosting 
the number of pensions that L&I awarded. Had this change in practice or policy not occurred, it 
is likely that the pension counts would have been lower in the mid 2000s, though very likely 
most of these would have become pensions a few years later.  
We conclude that the growth of pensions was not due solely to the inventory adjustment 
resulting from claims management processes in the agency. The rate of pension awards relative 
to lagged time-loss claims has also grown. And there has been continuing growth in the 
proportion of time-loss claims that remain open or active, both for relatively short durations and 
for long ones, suggesting that the agency is encountering difficulty in closing claims as quickly 
as they have in the past. 
WHAT FACTORS ARE ASSOCIATED WITH THE GROWTH IN PENSIONS? 
Major Cause: Claims Management Practices  
In our view one of the factors that led to the upsurge in pensions was the result of three 
conditions that occurred in combination. These conditions are: 
• a build-up of open (or active) long-duration time-loss claims; 
• a high probability that a long-duration time-loss claim will evolve into a pension case; 
and 
• a concerted push to clear out the long duration time-loss claims. 
In 1998 about one in seven open claims at L&I had been open for at least six years; many 
of them were a good deal older. This proportion began to decline slowly thereafter, yet one in 
every eight time-loss claims that were open had been open for six or more years in 2001. Each 
year from 1996 to 1999 there were close to 6,000 open time-loss claims that had been open for 
six or more years. This is compared to a range of 600 to 1,000 pension awards per year. 
A large share of the pensions awarded in any year goes to claims where the work accident 
occurred 10 or more years previously. In 2000 a high water mark was reached as over 38 percent 
of the pensions awarded that year went to claims that had been open for 10 or more years. The 
number of these 10-year-old or older cases that were pensioned peaked in 2002 and 2003.  
The data suggest that there is a continuing problem with long-duration claims in 
Washington. The percent of compensable claims from each calendar accident year that are active 
five years after the injury year began to rise in 1996, increasing nearly 60 percent by 2002. This 
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growth of long-duration time-loss claims provides the base for pension growth in the future. 
Additionally, the linkage between long-duration cases and the increasing probability that this 
results in pensions seems incontrovertible. 
Steps to shorten average duration have been taken at various points for more than two 
decades at L&I. One such major push was made in 1998 when money was made available to 
fund 24 additional Claim Managers, with the proviso that time-loss duration be reduced by five 
percent by June 30, 2000 and an additional 2.5 percent by June 30, 2001. This added 
considerably to the workloads of the Pension Adjudicators, both because of the increased number 
of pension determinations that were needed to be made by them, and because the average 
experience level of the Claims Managers was less due to the presence of newly acquired staff.  
We conclude that the concerted push to reduce time loss and close claims during the 
period from 1998 to 2001 contributed to a lumpiness in the year-to-year number of pensions 
awarded, thereby precipitating a portion of the increase in the number of pensions awarded.1 This 
administrative action accounts for a significant share of the pension growth. However, the 
administrative push and the resulting upsurge of pensions were built upon a foundation of 
increasing durations. This push to resolve claims also led to some decisions by the agency that 
disappointed some claimants and fostered an increased number of appeals. 
Major Cause: Poor Labor Market Conditions 
Difficulty in the labor market is likely to increase the probability that an injured worker 
cannot return to employment and the earnings level that existed before the injury or illness. That 
difficulty may be the result of economic weakness in the injured worker’s community or region, 
and/or it may result from personal characteristics that contribute to difficulty in finding and 
retaining employment, except perhaps when the labor market is very strong. We believe the 
evidence shows that labor market conditions have played a significant role in the pension 
upsurge in Washington.  
Labor markets that provide substantial job opportunities reduce some of the barriers that 
injured workers face in seeking and retaining employment. Such labor markets also cause 
employers to have a greater need to reemploy their injured workers. Strong labor markets also 
tend to generate wages that encourage workers to return to and to remain in employment. Since 
                                                 
1  Not only do such special efforts contribute to year-to-year volatility, there is considerable variation in the 
number of pensions awarded on a quarter-to-quarter basis. This seems particularly pronounced since 2000. 
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the early 1990s the labor market in Washington has been weak, though some geographic areas 
have been strong for most years. Not surprisingly, those with the least education or other 
disadvantages have been disproportionately at risk for having their work injuries evolve into 
pensions.  
Other Possible Causes of the Increase in Pensions  
There is no doubt that a worker’s age is associated with receiving a pension. It is also true 
that Washington’s population, and likely its labor force, have grown older in recent years. Did 
this contribute to the growth in pensions? Our analysis finds that the aging of the workforce is 
not a significant contributor to the year-to-year growth in pensions. Age undoubtedly has an 
impact on pension likelihood but not on short-term swings. The impact of age does manifest 
itself over longer periods of time and it has likely had some effect when viewed over the period 
of a decade or more. As the state’s labor force continues to age, it will tend to raise the rate of 
pensioning.  
Back injuries are often the focus of concern in workers’ compensation studies because of 
their frequency, their cost, and the difficult diagnostic, etiological and treatment issues they 
present. From 1993 to 2004, accepted back or spinal injury claims fell by 29 percent in 
Washington and the number of denied claims over the same period fell by 48 percent. When we 
examined the proportion of back or spinal injury claims that were accepted as a proportion of all 
time-loss claims in each accident year, the rate fell over the 12 years, albeit slightly.  
Could changing treatment for back injuries be responsible for the upsurge in pensions? It 
was suggested to us that increased use of lumbar fusion surgery in Washington State, especially 
with intervertebral cage devices, may have made a significant contribution to the increase in 
pension awards. The data on such procedures lead us to conclude that this type of surgery could 
not have been responsible for more than a small percent of the increased number and rate of 
pensions during calendar years 1996 to 2003. 
By contrast, claims with psychological involvement have clearly increased and may have 
played a role in the increasing number of pensions. However, the rates of increase are not 
sufficient to account for a major share of the increase in pensions during the period under 
question. These medical conditions often develop after another disabling injury has occurred. 
They may be the result of disability as much as the cause. We identify this factor as one that 
warrants some further attention. 
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The use of opioids to treat the disabled has also grown considerably over the period we 
considered in this study. It is difficult to sort out the causal relationship between the use of these 
medications and long-term disability and pensions. Is their continuing use a function of the 
degree of pain and impairment for the worker? What is cause and what is effect? Even if this 
treatment is responsible for increasing the numbers of pensions, our analysis suggests that it 
could not be a major cause of these cases. 
In seeking to explain the upsurge in pension awards beginning in the late 1990s, we also 
ruled out some sources that theoretically could be responsible. Among those factors that were 
investigated, but did not prove to be strongly related to the upsurge were the following: an 
increase in the number and/or the severity of occupational injuries and illnesses, changes in the 
legal environment in which workers’ compensation cases are evaluated, including certain judicial 
decisions (e.g. Leeper 1994) operation of the Vocational Rehabilitation (VR) program, and 
appeals to the BIIA by injured workers. None of these factors appear to be causally involved in 
the increase in TPD pensions.  
HOW CAN THE FUTURE COURSE OF PENSION CLAIMS BE PREDICTED? 
 We used information from the L&I data warehouse to estimate a model that would 
predict pension receipt among claims that had already received between three and 10 years of 
time-loss payments. Our model predicted the probability that these claims would be granted a 
pension in the following six years based upon their characteristics. The data included such 
factors as time-loss duration, age at injury, gender, county of injury, industry of employment, 
PPD receipt, Social Security offset status, number of appeals, vocational rehabilitation plan 
development, hospital admissions, surgical procedures, opioid prescriptions, neck and back 
conditions, psychological treatment, and prior claim status.  
 In our predictive model, the most important determining factor in the likelihood of 
pension is the length of time from the date of the injury. Each additional year of time loss since 
injury increases the odds of a pension by 30 percent. Age at injury was also a very significant 
factor. Each additional year beyond the mean is associated with a nine percent increase in the 
odds of pension, holding other factors constant. Translating this to predicted probabilities, a 
worker who is less than 30 years old and has between 3 and 10 years of time loss has a 15 
percent predicted probability of pensioning, while a worker with the same characteristics, but 
between 60 and 65 years of age has a 78 percent predicted probability of TPD. 
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Claims from economically distressed areas had a 16 percent increased likelihood of TPD, 
holding all other factors constant. Claims with psychological treatment within the first three 
years of injury had a 40 percent increased chance of pension outcome. Accepted back and neck 
conditions (as defined by ICD-9 codes) were associated with a 30 percent increase in the odds of 
pension over other conditions. Claims with opioid use showed a 21 percent greater likelihood of 
pensioning.  
A case with a vocational rehabilitation plan approved is 56 percent less likely to receive a 
pension than a case without such a plan, other things equal. This estimate does not mean that VR 
treatment will reduce the likelihood of pension by 56 percent, but it does indicate that claims 
selected for VR referral that proceed to VR plan approval are much less likely to end up as 
pension claims.  
If a worker’s benefits are offset due to Social Security payments, the worker is more than 
twice as likely to receive a pension. Receiving a permanent partial disability (PPD) award within 
the first three years of a claim lowers the probability of pension by 17 percent, holding all other 
factors constant. Appeals to the BIIA are associated with an increased likelihood of TPD by 10 
percent. 
Industry of employment can be an important factor. In this model we included agriculture 
and construction as two major industries tending to have seasonal employment and relatively 
high workers’ compensation claim incidence. Our model estimates that an agricultural worker 
was 25 percent more likely to receive a TPD than other workers, but that construction workers 
were not statistically different from other workers with regard to TPD benefit receipt.  
Our model correctly predicts pension outcomes approximately 70 percent of the time 
based upon the available variables. Our predicted pension probability is somewhat lower than the 
ultimate probability of pension predicted by L&I Actuarial Services for claims three or more 
years old. But it is important to note that our pension probability model misses many of those 
likely to be identified by the actuarial models, especially claims that get awarded pensions more 
than 10 years from date of injury. The actuarial models use a different method, employing 
projections of ultimate counts based on the number of active claims and past claim closure rates 
rather than individual claim characteristics, and their numbers are not directly comparable to 
ours.  
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In essence, actuarial methods use a “macro” or systems approach, while our model uses a 
“micro” or individual approach. In addition, our model only explains a portion of the overall 
variation in pension rates due to its restricted range and limited variable set. Our model is not 
meant to be a substitute for the methods or the estimates of the actuarial staff at L&I. The value 
to the Department of Labor and Industries of our model is that it could be used to identify cases 
with a high probability of pension so that a claim management intervention could be applied 
earlier in the claim to reduce the probability of pension award.  
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1 Overview of Report 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 In the autumn of 2007, Washington State’s Department of Labor and Industries (L&I) 
entered into a contract with the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research to undertake a 
study of the incidence of Total Permanent Disability (TPD) pensions in its workers’ 
compensation programs. The contractor was asked to explore the trend of such claims for both 
the state fund and the self-insured populations, with a view towards identifying causes of the 
trend both within and outside the state’s system. In addition, using the results of the inquiry, the 
contractor was asked to develop a model that would predict the future levels of TPD pensions. 
This report responds directly to the Department’s request. 
The Issue 
 The Department made clear the single most important factor that prompted the need for 
this study. During the late 1990s a sizeable upsurge in the number of TPD awards occurred, 
causing concern about the financial implications of such a development. These awards, on 
average, are very expensive and if the upward trend in pensions continued on that track, serious 
problems could result for the funding of the system. The Department did not ask the Upjohn 
Institute to prepare projections of these costs, nor did it request that policy recommendations be 
made to cope with the possible future developments. Instead, the Department simply wanted to 
learn what had caused the growth in such awards and what their future incidence might be. 
The Research Team 
 In order to fulfill its agreement the Upjohn Institute organized a research team which 
included five senior members with considerable relevant experience: 
Professor Peter Barth, Emeritus, The University of Connecticut; 
Professor Heather Grob, St. Martin’s University; 
Professor Henry Harder, University of Northern British Columbia; 
Dr. Allan Hunt, W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research; and 
Dr. Michael Silverstein, The University of Washington. 
In addition, L&I provided two support staff for the team. Russ Redding was our data 
contact person providing us with analytical support from the L&I data warehouse. Sandra 
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Torstenson was our policy contact. Because of the requirement of a claim file review as part of 
this project, we also hired five retired L&I Claims Managers and Pension Adjudicators to 
abstract the data from the actual claim files. This strategy took advantage of the enormous depth 
of experience that such individuals accumulate. Because of this experience, we were able to push 
beyond the usual data collection and call for expert judgments on complex claim characteristics. 
A group from Saint Martin’s University, under Dr. Grob’s leadership, entered and edited the data 
from our claim reviewers. We also asked retired workers’ compensation expert, Roger 
Thompson, to review our data collection plan and give us suggestions for improving it.  
THE RESEARCH PLAN AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION 
 Our research plan consisted of four distinct modules, each of which was designed to 
provide an independent point of view from which to assess the surge in pensions. We briefly 
describe each one below. 
1.  A Program Assessment 
The team carried out an assessment of the TPD pension program including elements from 
a broader operational context having a significant bearing on TPD pensions. Its purpose was to 
allow the team to understand the current system and to formulate some hypotheses regarding 
possible causes for the apparent sudden growth in pensions. The review of the program included 
developing an understanding of the legislative and regulatory design as well as its administration.  
 Further, we reviewed some operational aspects of the system to see how policies and 
practices changed over time to look for possible explanatory factors that could be evaluated in 
the quantitative analysis. Case law that had developed in the courts and significant decisions by 
the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals (BIIA) were considered. Additionally, trends were 
assessed in a variety of areas including demographic changes, regional economic differences, 
injury and illness incidence and other factors that could shed some light on the core issue under 
examination. These efforts were supplemented by a review of the relevant literature as well as 
reports and materials made available by L&I. 
In order to conduct the program assessment the research team undertook interviews with 
knowledgeable individuals both within and outside of L&I. Aside from meeting staff in many 
different units of the agency, interviews were conducted with the leadership of the BIIA, 
attorneys experienced in workers’ compensation in Washington, health care and rehabilitation 
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service providers, self-insured and other employers as well as the organizations that represent 
them, officials from organized labor, and staff from the Attorney General’s office.  
A wide range of information from the L&I data warehouse was also made available to the 
team. Although some of these data were only of relatively recent vintage, this source proved to 
be very helpful and access to it was greatly simplified because of the assistance from L&I 
personnel.  
2.  A Comparative Analysis 
The emphasis of this second module was to compare Washington’s program with those 
of other jurisdictions. While the central focus was the recent upsurge in TPD awards in 
Washington it was necessary to consider the approach used by the state’s program in evaluating 
and compensating all permanent disability cases. In certain specific respects Washington’s 
concerns are not commonly found in the other state workers’ compensation systems. For several 
reasons most states find that total and permanent disability awards are seldom encountered.  
Indeed, while many states find that their permanent disability benefit programs are 
unsatisfactory from a number of perspectives; this customarily applies to compensation for 
permanent partial and not for total permanent disability. At least one state, West Virginia, has 
had a very similar concern that eventually forced the state to entirely recast its workers’ 
compensation program in 2005. However, West Virginia’s situation differs from Washington in 
several respects including the dimensions of its permanent disability problem, its long-term 
insurance pricing practices, and the state’s very heavy reliance on an industry in long-term 
economic decline (coal mining). 
Finding other jurisdictions against which we could compare Washington on the incidence 
of TPD awards was challenging. Washington is different from most of the other states in barring 
private insurance and in that its workers’ compensation program does not allow for compromise 
and release (lump sum) settlements to decisively close claims. Though a few other states also 
severely limit the use of such agreements, compared to those states Washington’s approach is 
complicated by its law which pays permanent partial disability benefits strictly on the basis of 
the degree of medical impairment. The number of states that limit such compromise and release 
agreements and that also compensate permanent (partial) disability exclusively on the basis of 
the degree of medically determined impairment is very small.  
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Possibly making Washington unique among this already very small set of jurisdictions is 
that total permanent disability is not evaluated on the basis of the degree of impairment. Instead, 
the worker’s ability to return to work is considered in the total permanent disability pension 
eligibility decision. The result is that even where a work-related injury causes a severe economic 
hardship, the law requires that only the medical impairment be considered in the awarding of 
permanent partial disability benefits. Yet the impairment benefit may bear very little relationship 
to the degree of economic disability. This places the seriously disabled worker in a position 
where the only possible source of additional compensation is the TPD pension. Combining this 
with the limits on lump-sum settlements, we believe makes Washington’s approach almost 
unique in the United States.  
Ultimately, we used the neighboring jurisdiction of British Columbia, Canada as one that 
could be compared in some detail with Washington. In a number of respects that system 
approaches permanent disability compensation similarly to Washington. Interestingly, the 
province also experienced important concerns with the awarding of total permanent disability 
benefits and undertook a “core review” of its program and subsequently modified its scheme.  
We also compared the experience of a number of U.S. jurisdictions to evaluate the 
comparative incidence of permanent disability awards. However, we recognize the inherent 
difficulty of comparing Washington’s experience with that of states where compromise and 
release agreements are allowed. For those states, there are severe problems in evaluating how 
many total permanent disability benefits are paid because of their confusion with permanent 
partial benefits through the compromise and release process.  
3.  Claim File Review 
The research team was obligated under the contract to undertake a review of claim files. 
The purpose of the review was to “determine the key claim characteristics that lead to a 
determination of a pension by the courts, appeals board, and department pension adjudicators.” 
One of the reasons for the review was to obtain data that could be extracted from the files but did 
not exist in the data warehouse. For certain purposes we also merged data from the warehouse 
with those from the review. 
Undertaking such a review necessitated speedy action by the team to be able both to gain 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval for such a study, and to locate and employ 
experienced personnel who could rapidly, knowledgably, and accurately review an adequate 
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sample of files. The research design that we followed called for us to select a number of 
pensioned cases awarded in 1997 and a roughly similar number awarded in 2002. Comparing the 
two groups would allow us to determine if the characteristics of those with a pension awarded at 
the outset of the upsurge were similar to those whose awards were made in 2002 at its peak.  
We also drew two comparison groups of individuals with long-term disability who had 
not received pensions by 1997 or 2002, but who had some characteristics in common with those 
who had received pensions. This enabled us to check whether changes between the pension 
samples of 1997 and 2002 were unique to pensioned cases, or whether they were more general in 
application. There were many challenges in identifying appropriate cases to be included in the 
comparison groups. In order to ensure that the claim reviewers were able to extract information 
that could plausibly point to the causes of pensions being awarded or not awarded, we also 
retained a highly experienced insurance industry consultant to review actual claim files and our 
proposed review plans. Ultimately, the claim file reviews were useful both to identify the factors 
that differentiated pensions awarded in 1997 from those in 2002, as well as establishing the 
specific correlates of pension claims.  
4.  Predictive Model 
As noted above, one of the primary goals of the study was to develop a predictive model 
of future TPD awards. We present such a model in chapter 5 of this report. It uses only variables 
from the L&I data warehouse, since those data are available for all claims. Of course such a 
model is tied to the assumption that most of the conditions that currently exist will continue into 
the future. Therefore, the predictive accuracy of the model cannot be evaluated simply on the 
basis of the numbers that we project. 
What we have observed in Washington, and in other jurisdictions, is that workers’ 
compensation systems are dynamic. Changing conditions not included in the model undoubtedly 
will affect the forecasts made here, and we expect both dramatic and subtle changes will be 
occurring in the future. One obvious change which we believe will have important impacts on 
the system is the new approach to vocational rehabilitation undertaken as a pilot program with an 
implementation date of January 1, 2008. The ever-changing economic landscape in the state of 
Washington and in its regions is also certain to impact the number of pensions that will be 
awarded.  
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Another cautionary note should be observed about the predictive model that is developed 
here. This is a quantitative model. As such it is dependent on using only those factors that are 
quantifiable, and depends upon data that are accurate and available. This creates several 
challenges. First, the number of years for which data are available is limited. If for example we 
have data that extend back only 10 years, this is a relatively short time to use for time series 
analysis.  
Consider a situation where some seemingly significant change occurred in the workers’ 
compensation program five years ago. Determining the impact of that change is made more 
difficult if other changes were made in that same year, possibly enhancing or weakening the 
impact of either one of these changes. Simply as an example, consider attempting to discern the 
impact of a change in the organization of claims management units, in a year when an important 
decision was made by the BIIA, following several years of poor economic performance in the 
state, and a large layoff by the state’s largest private sector employer.  
Further, such a set of changes may not begin to show effects immediately. An important 
decision by the Supreme Court may only impact the system with an “implementation lag,” as 
L&I, BIIA, attorneys, claim managers, and others begin to understand the operational 
significance of the decision. Reorganizing internal L&I claim management practices may be 
disruptive initially and yet be productive as the new system becomes familiar to staff.  
Secondly, we recognize that there are qualitative factors that affect the incidence of 
pension awards. Some of these factors can be quantified, albeit crudely at times, through proxies, 
while others cannot. Because a variable cannot be quantitatively measured and inserted into a 
model does not render it unimportant. It does require that it be noted and that the results of the 
model be appropriately qualified. 
THE STRUCTURE OF THIS REPORT 
 Our report consists of five additional chapters. Chapter 2 contains the assessment of the 
program. Much of it is directed to the question, “could the upsurge of pensions in the late 1990s 
be accounted for by certain specific factors?” It also asks the question, “was there actually an 
upsurge in pensions, or simply lumpiness in the awarding of pensions?”  
Chapter 3 focuses on the comparative analysis of permanent disability frequency in 
Washington. Though difficult to pin down, due to the unique Washington environment that 
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creates several comparability issues, it seems evident that the number of TPD pensions awarded 
in the state is considerably higher than in other states or in British Columbia. 
 Chapter 4 presents the findings of the claim file reviews. It does so using bivariate 
analysis (cross tabulations) to consider a large number of variables that might be causally tied to 
pensions. Then a multivariate linear probability regression analysis is presented which considers 
the impact of many of these variables simultaneously. This analysis is performed separately for 
1997 and 2002 claims, and clarifies relationships among potentially causative variables and 
provides additional insight into the determinants of pensions in Washington. In part it also serves 
to “set the table” for the predictive model that is found in chapter 5. 
 Our predictive model estimates the probability that individual workers’ compensation 
claims with three years of time loss will turn into total permanent disability pensions at some 
point in the following six years. This is a somewhat contrived simulation of the real-world 
situation and we do not offer our model as an alternative to current L&I actuarial procedures, but 
as a supplement that has the potential to assist in identifying those claims that are likely to turn 
into pensions and that might justify additional intervention to prevent that eventuality.  
 Chapter 6 contains a summary of the entire study. Our methods and findings are 
summarized there for the reader who cannot take the time to digest the entire presentation. We 
also provide an Executive Summary for those who just want to focus on our conclusions.  
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2  Program Assessment 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The primary focus of this study is to determine the reasons for the significant growth in 
the number of total permanent disability awards and to project what the Department of Labor and 
Industries can anticipate in the future.2 In this chapter our direction is twofold. First, we consider 
the system that L&I uses to process claims, along with the appeals process, to see if any clues to 
the causes for the upsurge in pension awards can be found there. A brief description of the use of 
vocational rehabilitation in the Washington system is included also. Second, we consider a 
variety of other possible drivers of this growth, recognizing that there may be several factors that 
are responsible for it. 
A Summary of the Claims Flow Process 
In order to evaluate possible drivers of the growth of pensions, it is necessary to provide a 
brief summary of the claims flow process, from the origins of a claim to its resolution. 
State fund claims 
The process begins when a health care provider sends a Report of Industrial Injury or 
Occupational Disease (form ROA) to L&I.3 The ROA is reviewed in the Claims Initiation unit 
by a data entry worker who decides whether the claim will be initiated as a medical only or time-
loss claim and then enters the ROA information into LINIIS (the automated claims management) 
system.  
The claim is routed electronically to Employer Services where an account manager 
determines whether there is an employer-employee relationship with an employer who is covered 
by the state fund. The employer’s Uniform Business Identifier (UBI), account number and risk 
class are assigned to the claim and the employer is sent a claim arrival notification letter. If L&I 
does not have jurisdiction the claim is rejected.   
LINIIS then assigns the claim to a claim unit and determines the level of the adjudicator 
who will manage the claim using an algorithm that takes claim complexity into account. The 
                                                 
2  Terminology is also specific to jurisdiction. Most states (and the NCCI) refer to permanent total disability 
(PTD). But we will follow Washington’s practice of referring to such claims as total permanent disability (TPD). 
3  Washington State’s practice is unlike most states where claims are initially filed by employees or 
employers. However, in 2006 the legislature directed L&I to undertake a pilot project on employer reporting (RCW 
51.28.015). This pilot project expires in July, 2009.  
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claim is electronically routed to the assigned Claim Manager (CM) for adjudication. The CM 
makes an initial decision to allow the claim, reject the claim, or place it in undetermined or 
provisional status. Allowance or rejection orders of the CM may be protested to L&I or appealed 
directly to the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals (BIIA) (see below for details).  
CMs continue to gather and assess information on undetermined or provisional claims. If 
disability is certified by a medical provider, provisional time-loss payments may be made 
pending determination of claim allowance. If the claim is rejected, the amount of provisional 
time-loss benefits paid is assessed against the worker as an overpayment.  
Claims that have been allowed continue to be managed by the CM who monitors 
progress, authorizes treatment, and pays time-loss compensation as long as this is certified by the 
medical provider. The CM may call upon several internal resources for assistance, including 
nurse consultants, higher level adjudicators, vocational services specialists or the office of the 
medical director. All workers receiving time loss after two weeks are referred for an early return-
to-work assessment (described elsewhere in this chapter). The CM may also utilize external 
resources such as an IME (Independent Medical Examiner) evaluation or vocational 
rehabilitation providers in the course of ongoing claim management.  
Claims Consultants (CCs) 
These Level 4 staff are considered within L&I to be the “last level” of the claim. They 
review claims where there is a protest to an “appealable only order,” and they review appeals 
filed with the external appeals board, the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals (BIIA). 
Frequently their review will cause them to reassume jurisdiction on an appeal and return the 
claim back to the CM if the CC finds that the appeal appears to be warranted or if evidence is 
inadequate to support L&I’s decision. They may request that a CM seek to clarify facts or 
strengthen the evidence in the file before a further appealable order is issued.  
Pension Adjudication 
CMs decide if a claim needs assessment for a possible pension and refer these claims to 
their assigned Pension Adjudicator (PA) for review. A pension referral can require a substantial 
commitment of time by the CM in order to assure that all issues have been addressed and the 
claim is ready for referral to the PA. The PA decides whether a pension should be awarded or 
denied. If more information is needed before a decision can be made the PA may obtain the 
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information personally, or may return the claim to the CM with specific instructions and 
guidance.  
In resolving claims, the PAs have the authority to enter into comprehensive settlements 
that may address a variety of issues including claim validity, accepted and/or denied conditions, 
payment for diagnostic tests or medical treatment, travel expense, time-loss compensation and 
PPD. Some settlements require coordination with or agreement by another section, such as 
modification or reversal of an administrative fraud order, waiver of an overpayment, or approval 
of an over-seven-year reopening with payment of accident fund benefits. 
There are several other ways that claims may be referred to the pension unit. Pension 
eligibility may be the issue on protest or appeal. Upon review, a Claims Consultant may refer 
claims directly to the pension unit if they feel the worker is unable to work or to benefit from 
vocational services due, at least in part, to the accepted industrial injury or disease. In addition, 
any of the following parties may directly request the pension unit to review a claim for pension: 
the injured worker, the worker’s legal/lay representative, the employer or the employer’s 
representative, an attending physician, the Vocational Dispute Resolution Office (VDRO), an 
Assistant Attorney General or their paralegal, L&I management, or a worker’s beneficiary. 
Claim Closure 
When the worker has reached maximum medical improvement and is no longer receiving 
curative medical treatment, the adjudicator will review the claim for possible closure. Claims can 
be closed by Claim Managers, Claim Consultants, and Pension Adjudicators. Claims are closed 
by a “determinative order” sent to all parties informing them when medical and/or time-loss 
compensation will cease and/or whether a permanent disability award (PPD or pension) has been 
granted. The closure may be protested to L&I or appealed to the BIIA. When a claim is closed, 
medical and time-loss compensation stops even if the closure is protested or appealed. However, 
if the claim is closed with a PPD schedule or pension award, these payments continue even if 
claim closure is appealed. Benefits would only be held up if the employer is the appealing party 
and the employer’s request for a stay of benefits is granted by the BIIA. 
Protests to claim closing orders are reconsidered by the CM, CC, or PA who issued the 
closing order. The CM, CC, or PA is encouraged by L&I management, but not required by law 
or rule, to complete the first cursory review within 15 days, making one of four decisions. First, 
they must review the protest to ensure that it was timely filed. Second, they may conclude the 
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closure was correct and affirm with a further determinative order. This further decision may also 
be protested to L&I or appealed to the BIIA. Third, they may conclude the closure was incorrect 
and reverse it with a further determinative order. This further decision may be either protested to 
L&I or appealed to the BIIA. Fourth, they may decide that more information is needed, in which 
case an abeyance order is issued while evaluation of the claim proceeds. The abeyance order also 
may be protested to L&I or appealed to the BIIA.  
When a protested claim is in abeyance there is no statutory or regulatory deadline for 
issuing the further order. The speed at which the claim proceeds depends in part on the issues 
being examined by the adjudicator. These may include medical questions (impairment or 
allowance of conditions), vocational questions (ability to perform or to obtain gainful 
employment), and disability issues (PPD ratings, medical stability, pension referrals). When a 
further determinative order is issued it may again be protested to L&I or appealed to the BIIA. 
This cycle may continue indefinitely as long as new issues are raised for subsequent protests or 
appeals.  
Appealed claim closures may be reassumed by L&I for further consideration within 30 
days of receipt of the appeal and before the BIIA takes any substantive action. The process for 
reconsidering an appeal differs in two major ways from the way protests are addressed. First, 
reassumed appeals are handled by CCs rather than CMs. Second, there is a statutory 90-day 
deadline for issuing a further order (with a possible 90-day extension for good cause). Within 
this timeframe the CC must take one of three actions on the reassumed order; affirm, 
modify/change, or reverse.4 The further order issued by the CC can be protested or re-appealed. 
If re-appealed by one or more of the parties the appeal will then either go directly to the BIIA, 
where mediation is typically the next step or L&I may reassume on the appeal, but only if the 
appellant has raised new issues.  
Claims are eventually closed in a limited number of ways, either when no timely protest or 
appeal is filed and the closing order becomes final, or when all protests and appeals have been 
exhausted. The paths to closure include the following:  
• determination of maximum medical improvement by the attending physician, a medical 
consultant or an IME; 
                                                 
4  When reviewing an appeal on claim validity (either allowance or rejection) but not on claim closure, the 
CC has a fourth option—to place the claim into provisional status where it receives further consideration. 
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• return to work (with or without vocational rehabilitation; with or without permanent 
restrictions; with or without modified work);  
• determination of employability following maximum medical improvement based upon 
the opinion of the attending physician, medical consultant, IME, vocational provider or 
forensic vocational assessment; 
• finding that the continued inability to work was not related to the injury or illness for 
which the claim was allowed (e.g. pre-existing conditions that naturally progressed post 
injury or an unrelated post-injury condition); 
• a PPD award, after a determination of maximum medical improvement; 
• settlements resolving issues such as back time loss, medical bills, travel expenses or 
accepted conditions. Settlements may include PPD, but only insofar as this is adequately 
supported by documented medical opinion; and 
• determination of total and permanent disability leading to pension. 
There are numerous barriers to claim closure, sometimes delaying definitive action, and these 
can extend time loss for many years. (Later in this chapter we consider the implications of these 
long-term claims.) A partial list of these barriers would include the following. 
• Actions taken by injured workers, employers, attorneys, medical or vocational providers. 
o Protests and appeals, sometimes repeated with new issues. 
o Slow response to requests for information, opinions or services. 
o Providing new information that requires assessment by L&I. 
o Move to different labor market or out of state. 
o Injured worker disappears or is incarcerated. 
o New conditions or treatments presented. 
o Recurrence of symptoms. 
o Slow, incomplete or minimal compliance with the claims process. For example, 
missed medical appointments, non-adherence to medical recommendations, 
delays in selecting retraining goals, spotty attendance in training programs.  
• L&I issues  
o Consideration of complex medical or vocational issues that require gathering and 
evaluating voluminous and frequently inconsistent or inadequate records, reports 
and data. 
o Difficulty in scheduling examinations or other services and in receiving timely 
reports. 
o Technology changes that create disincentives to complete file review or timely 
and comprehensive claim management (e.g. change from fiche to imaging; 
change to ongoing, automatic 14-day time-loss payments). 
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o Personnel changes that delay adjudication (e.g. CM turnover). 
o Unstable, changing caseloads that make it difficult to establish and carry out an 
action plan. Inexperienced CMs, CCs or Assistant Attorneys General (AAGs). 
o Detailed attention to narrow, step-by-step administrative processes with 
subsequent loss of the ability to see the whole pattern of a claim. 
o Uncertainty about how to resolve conflicting opinions and information (e.g. 
conflicting conclusions from vocational provider and IME physician). 
o Decisions about psychiatric conditions, especially those raised at the end of the 
process or during an appeal. 
o Decisions about occupational diseases, such as the identification of acceptable 
conditions, the chargeable employer(s), and the percentage of liability. 
o Limited time available to review and prepare full file for pension referral. 
o Problems with managing the vocational rehabilitation process (e.g. CM cannot 
refer for Ability to Work Assessment until there is a medical determination of 
permanent restrictions and doctors are increasingly reluctant to state that 
restrictions are permanent). 
o Many factors that prolong the vocational rehabilitation process, including failed 
plans, VDRO decisions, aggravation of accepted conditions, contentions of new 
conditions.  
o Changes in agency priorities and strategies that might lead to possibly disruptive 
administrative changes in procedures and responsibilities. 
o Ineffective use of deadlines. While there are few statutory deadlines that could 
create incentives to move long-term claims forward, there seems to have been, at 
least periodically, an abundance of supervisory and administrative actions that 
create incentives to close some claims so quickly that shortcuts are taken–for 
example selecting relatively simple, short-term claims for closure while delaying 
or postponing resolution of the more complex, long-term claims. 
o Claims in Washington State never close absolutely. As long as claims have been 
closed for seven or fewer years (or ten or fewer for loss of vision or function of 
the eyes) they may be reopened due to objective worsening in the accepted 
condition with recommendations for further curative treatment. Even when claims 
have been closed for more than seven (or ten) years they can be reopened for 
medical benefits by an adjudicator if there has been objective worsening or for 
time-loss compensation by the director if certain other criteria are met. These 
criteria include the worker having not voluntarily removed himself or herself from 
the work force and the worker being unable to work as a direct result of the 
workplace injury. But even when these criteria have not been met, “to serve the 
interest of equity and good conscience, the director may exercise his or her 
discretion in an individual case.”5 
                                                 
5  Industrial Services Policy 16.40, effective 11/1/96. 
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• BIIA issues 
o CMs can close some claims while appeals are pending, e.g. when time loss 
eligibility for a specific period is being appealed. However, claim closure is not 
permitted when claim allowance or segregation (denial of a condition) is on 
appeal because the appeal outcome can change the need to keep the claim open.  
CMs are encouraged to discuss claims with a CC before closing a claim with a 
pending appeal.  
Self-insured claims 
Self-insured employers manage their own worker compensation claims, either directly or 
through a third-party administrator. L&I exercises broad regulatory and oversight functions, 
becoming involved in specific claim adjudication only in limited circumstances. For example, 
L&I reviews and approves all claim rejections and most closures. (Medical only closures and 
employer closures, used in non-disputed claims, are not reviewed.) Only L&I staff may issue 
wage orders (which establish the worker’s conjugal status, number of dependents and gross wage 
upon which the rate of time-loss benefits is calculated) for self-insured claims. Also if an 
employer protests an allowed claim or a worker protests a rejection the claim is reviewed by an 
L&I claims consultant. The L&I self-insurance staff also reviews and approves vocational plans 
that have been developed by self-insured employers and/or their third-party administrators.  
Self-insured employers refer all potential pension claims to L&I where they are reviewed 
by a PA in L&I’s self-insurance program. L&I makes all initial pension decisions and second-
injury fund decisions for self-insured pension claims. L&I self-insured staff do not have funding 
to obtain additional medical or vocational workup or opinions. Their decisions are based upon 
the information provided by the self-insured employer/representative. Clarification of medical 
and/or vocational opinions may be requested through the self-insured employer/representative. 
Claim Managers and Pension Adjudicators Activity 
During the period 1993 to 2007 the number of time-loss claims open at the end of each 
year declined steadily, with more than 46,000 open at the end of 1993 and just over 31,000 open 
at the end of 2007, a reduction of more than 30 percent. During this same period the number of 
pensions allowed each year rose nearly threefold, with a sharp increase from 1997 to 2003 
followed by two years of decline before rising to an all time high in calendar year 2007. The 
pension allowance rate (expressed as the ratio of pensions allowed to open time-loss claims) rose 
from 1.2 percent in 1993 to 5.0 percent in 2007 (Figure 2.1).  
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Figure 2.1 
 
SOURCE: Data Warehouse, Department of Labor & Industries. 
During this extended period of gradually dropping time-loss claims, the numbers of CMs 
and their claim loads remained fairly steady, with fluctuations from year to year but no 
significant short-term changes or longer trends. (Figure 2.2) 6  
                                                 
6 While the average numbers of Claim Managers and their case loads remained fairly steady, there was 
considerable turnover in people filling the CM positions, and there was substantial instability in the caseloads for 
individual CMs from month to month. 
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Figure 2.2 
 
Note: Average caseload for Level 2 and Level 3 Claim Manager positions with caseloads as of the end of the fiscal 
year.  
Active time-loss claims are defined as open claims with a recent time-loss payment for a period beginning or ending 
within 60 days of the end of the report month. 
Count of positions excludes positions in specialized units such as the Out-of State Unit, the Hearing Loss Unit, and 
the Asbestosis/DRI unit staff, as well as those located in field offices (Units 5 and T). Positions and claims assigned 
to Supervisors, Claims Leads, Apprentices and Trainees are also excluded. 
SOURCE: Data Warehouse, Department of Labor & Industries. 
However, the number of pension referrals to the PA unit increased, especially from 1998 to 2003 
(from 998 to 2,201). The number of Pension Adjudicator FTEs also increased in several years in 
the 1990s and particularly in 2000–2001 as did the percent of reviewed claims resulting in 
allowed pensions; for example, from 51 percent in 1993 to 74 percent in 2007. (These data are 
shown on an annual basis later in the chapter in Table 2.13.) Also, even without growth in FTEs, 
immediately after 2001 there were additional staff dedicated (temporarily) to processing pension 
referrals. It is not surprising, therefore, that the number of pensions allowed also rose during 
these same years.  
Another feature of the workload in the pension unit is that claims can be referred directly 
by attorneys. From 1998 through 2004 the number of attorney referrals rose 2.5 times (Figure 
2.3) and their percentage of all pension referrals increased steadily from 7 percent in 1991 to a 
high of almost 30 percent in 2004 and 2005 (Figure 2.4). In response to this increase L&I 
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changed its practices regarding attorney referrals in December, 2005. Since that time most 
attorney requests for pension evaluation have been passed directly to a Claim Manager for initial 
review and have not been counted in the statistics from the pension unit.  
Figure 2.3   
 
SOURCE: Data Warehouse, Department of Labor & Industries. 
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Figure 2.4 
 
SOURCE: Data Warehouse, Department of Labor & Industries. 
Appeals of claims–The Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals and the Courts  
The Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals (BIIA) is an independent state agency whose 
three full-time members are appointed by the Governor. The BIIA hears appeals of decisions 
made by the Department of Labor and Industries. A large majority of BIIA cases are appeals of 
workers’ compensation decisions, most of which have been filed by injured workers. Before 
reviewing any appeals the BIIA gives L&I the opportunity to reconsider them, which L&I 
recently has done in about 30 to 35 percent of state fund appeals and 8 to 10 percent of self-
insured appeals. The re-assumption rate has remained steady for state fund appeals since at least 
19897, while the rate for self-insured appeals has been dropping since the mid 1990s from 
previous rates of 15 to 20 percent.  
The BIIA reviews the appeals not reassumed by L&I plus those that come back to the 
Board when the appellant is not satisfied with L&I’s further decision. Before any substantive 
review the BIIA determines whether it has jurisdiction. Of appeals not reassumed by L&I, the 
BIIA denies review in about 30 percent of state fund appeals and 15 percent of self-insured 
                                                 
7  Since 1989 the re-assumption rate has ranged between 25 percent and 40 percent with the exception of 
two outlier years. Since 2002 the rate has been between 33 percent and 36 percent.  
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appeals for jurisdictional reasons, these percentages having increased gradually since 1989 from 
9 percent and 5 percent, respectively.  
With very few exceptions, appeals for which the BIIA has jurisdiction and which have 
not been reassumed by L&I are referred to mediation, an informal process with a mediation 
judge. 8 Mediation is encouraged regardless of the issue on appeal; however parties can request 
that the case be referred for hearing if they feel the issue cannot be resolved with mediation. As a 
result of mediation, appeals can be voluntarily dismissed by the appellant or the parties can agree 
to a settlement.  
Cases failing to be resolved by mediation are scheduled for a formal hearing. This is a 
process before an administrative hearings judge in which the Rules of Evidence and Superior 
Court Civil Rules apply. The hearings judge makes a decision based on the evidence and 
testimony and issues a Proposed Decision and Order (PD&O). Any party disagreeing with the 
PD&O may petition for review by the three BIIA members. The full Board may deny the petition 
for review, or it may choose to consider the case and issue a final Board Decision and Order 
(D&O). With the exception of L&I, any party disagreeing with any part of the D&O may appeal 
to superior court. L&I may only appeal on points of law. Court decisions may be further 
appealed up to the Washington State Supreme Court. 
PROVIDING VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION SERVICES 
Washington State Department of Labor and Industries provides vocational rehabilitation 
services in order to assist workers’ return to work (RTW) after a compensable work injury or 
illness. If they have a permanent partial disability (PPD) due to the injury, the system attempts to 
assess their capabilities, and provide them with the ability to access employment within those 
capabilities. Failure in this endeavor likely will result in the awarding of a Total Permanent 
Disability (TPD) pension, which is designed to compensate workers for their economic loss. 
Figures 2.5 and 2.6 illustrate the extent of the State Insurance Fund’s commitment to 
providing Vocational Rehabilitation Services to the injured workers of Washington State. While 
there was rapid growth in expenditures in the late 80s and early 90s, a steady continued growth is 
evident with expenditures being just under $50 million in 2006 (Figure 2.5). (For a description of 
how these expenses were divided, see Appendix 2.1.) 
                                                 
8  In recent years the default action has been to refer cases for mediation; occasionally the BIIA exercises 
its discretion to bypass mediation, without specific criteria for this choice.   
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Figure 2.5 
SOURCE: Department of Labor & Industries. 
 
Figure 2.6 
SOURCE: Department of Labor & Industries. 
 
  2-14
As can be seen from these figures, Washington State clearly places a great deal of importance on 
assisting injured workers who want to return to work and has remained dedicated to this 
endeavor over the years, though with changing strategies. 
Table 2.1 provides a detailed breakdown of VR referrals by category since 1988. The 
waves of interest in  VR are apparent as the total number of referrals peaked in 1992, 1999, and 
2005. There were significant changes in VR during this last period, particularly with full 
implementation of the Early Intervention Program in 2001.  
Table 2.1  Breakdown of VR Referrals 
CY 
referral 
start 
Injured 
workers 
referred 
(unique 
SSNs) 
Claims 
referred 
(unique 
claim 
IDs) 
*Voc 
intervention 
referrals 
Early 
intervention 
referrals 
Ability to 
work 
assessment 
referrals 
Voc plan 
development 
referrals 
Voc Plan 
implementa-
tion referrals 
Total 
referrals 
1988 9,538 9,555 8,522 0 0 1,767 2,424 12,713 
1989 11,835 11,874 11,227 3 3 1,059 1,945 14,237 
1990 13,793 13,873 13,604 12 11 1,167 2,328 17,122 
1991 14,435 14,515 14,118 11 9 1,126 2,307 17,571 
1992 15,475 15,605 15,550 17 31 1,090 2,170 18,858 
1993 14,756 14,884 14,734 64 91 1,062 1,965 17,916 
1994 14,155 14,290 14,185 198 273 890 1,503 17,049 
1995 13,235 13,398 13,096 151 298 882 1,411 15,838 
1996 12,745 12,945 12,361 138 274 878 1,282 14,933 
1997 13,130 13,338 13,089 146 256 803 1,214 15,508 
1998 13,158 13,428 13,308 205 265 913 1,063 15,754 
1999 13,818 14,134 13,970 148 440 1,264 1,334 17,156 
2000 12,744 13,050 11,065 229 1,859 1,470 1,105 15,728 
2001 12,925 13,188 1,567 4,966 7,960 2,847 1,107 18,447 
2002 14,997 15,362 0 9,900 9,342 3,874 1,748 24,864 
2003 15,262 15,673 0 6,230 11,599 4,255 1,952 24,036 
2004 17,085 17,547 0 7,070 12,584 3,954 2,141 25,749 
2005 17,300 17,797 0 6,713 13,645 3,934 1,854 26,146 
2006 16,346 16,850 0 5,674 12,933 3,865 1,856 24,328 
2007 14,299 14,697 0 4,782 10,708 3,187 1,446 20,123 
SOURCE: Department of Labor & Industries. 
The Process of VR within the Agency 
Figure 2.7 illustrates the progression of a claim from Date of Injury (DOI) to closure. The 
CM manages the claim throughout and makes the referrals for other services. In this case we see 
a referral at 14 days to the Early Return to Work program (ERTW). If these services are 
successful the injured worker returns to work and once curative medical treatment is concluded 
the case is closed. If not, a referral can be made to the Early Intervention program (EI) if the 
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injured worker is medically able. EI services are provided with a RTW as the goal. However, if 
there is no RTW, then further assessment and vocational planning is usually the outcome.  
Figure 2.7  Claim Progression 
 
SOURCE: Prepared by Prof. Henry Harder. 
Many of the interviewees indicated that the two indicators, namely, “Is the injured 
worker eligible for retraining” and “Is the injured worker likely to benefit from retraining” have 
historically not been asked and answered consistently. If the answer to these questions is yes then 
VR services related to retraining can be provided. However, because these questions were not 
adequately answered many persons who “would not likely benefit” were referred for VR Plan 
Development. As a result the two parallel lines of CM and VR could run on virtually endlessly, 
frequently ending with a referral for pension assessment.  
During our review no automatic mechanism has come to light that would cause a review 
of such a claim, and given the current policies it is quite possible for such a claim to last for 
many years. Several claim file reviews revealed exactly such circumstances where the claim 
bounced back from VR to CM in a cycle of referral and re-referral that lasted, in a few extreme 
cases, for over 20 years. 
Mandatory to discretionary vocational rehabilitation 
Prior to 1982 Vocational Rehabilitation (VR) services were provided on a discretionary 
basis. In 1982, Resolution 35 of the State Legislature enacted Mandatory VR. Another important 
change during this legislative session was specific to time-loss provisions. Prior to 1982 an 
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injured worker was not entitled to time-loss payments if the worker was medically stable. After 
1982 time-loss payments could continue if the injured worker was receiving vocational 
rehabilitation assistance. It appears that as a result of these changes average time-loss duration 
increased from 3.5 months in calendar year 1979 to 7.1 months for calendar year 1984. The 
number of referrals to VR also increased from 2,767 or 7.3 percent of compensable claims in 
1979, to 17,020, or 48.8 percent of compensable claims in 1985.  
The Department had begun purchasing services from private VR companies in 1981. In 
1981, L&I spent $1,108,400, or 1.3 percent of the Medical Aid Fund on private VR. After 
mandatory VR was introduced this quickly rose to $22,400,000, or 13.7 percent of the Medical 
Aid Fund by 1985. Based on these alarming increases mandatory VR was repealed in 1985 
(Substitute House Bill #1984, C339L85). This change effectively established VR as it has been 
delivered from then until Dec. 31, 2007, with the new Vocational Initiative Pilot (VIP) 
operational as of Jan. 1, 2008. 
In 1985–86 the Department moved to a new approach, Total Claim Management (TCM), 
where it became the Claim Managers’ responsibility to decide both when to refer a worker for 
vocational rehabilitation services and to which provider the claimant would be referred. Prior to 
TCM these decisions had been left to the Vocational Rehabilitation Specialists (VRS) in the 
claims unit. In Washington, the VRSs are L&I employees and are employed to assist the Claim 
Manager and to monitor the work of the external vocational rehabilitation providers. These 
external VR providers offer a variety of services but focus mainly on initial assessment and 
vocational planning. L&I provides extensive guidelines on acceptable and appropriate vocational 
rehabilitation under Medical Aid Rules Chapter 296-19A.  
Under TCM, the VRSs were assigned to each claim unit and acted as advisors to the CM. 
Initially, one VR specialist was assigned to each claim unit. However, this ratio began to erode 
as it appears the role of the VRS in the claims unit was seen as less important. By 1997 the 
number of VRSs was cut in half and the ratio became approximately one VRS for three claim 
units. Eventually this was seen as inadequate, and has been modified over time until the ratio 
settled in at about 1 VRS to 2.5 claim units. There are approximately 10 CMs in each claim unit. 
This means that each VRS provides support to about 25 CMs.  
Even though the VRS does not provide any direct vocational services to any injured 
workers this is still a very high case load. Interviewees at L&I told us that they find it just barely 
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manageable as long as no crises arise. A metaphor shared with us was that it is like walking 
around with a completely full glass of water. If one more drop is added or if an obstacle is 
encountered, the water will be spilled. British Columbia experimented with a similar system in 
the mid to late 1990s, but eventually abandoned it. In B.C. today, vocational rehabilitation 
services are provided internally and only specialized needs, such as vocational assessments, are 
contracted with external providers. 
Based on interviews with both external and internal vocational rehabilitation 
professionals it is clear that they practice the traditional stages of VR namely: 1) RTW with the 
accident employer—no modifications required; 2) RTW with the accident employer with job 
modifications; 3) RTW in the same job but different employer; 4) RTW at new job with new 
employer; and 5) Formal retraining for new employment opportunities. Ideally, VR focuses on 
the first two steps in order to avoid long-term claims. In reality it seems that the external VR 
community is focused on getting the person into retraining as an outcome. This appears to be 
driven by L&I’s focus which concentrates on meeting performance indicators. These 
performance indicators appear to reward moving a claim into plan development as opposed to 
facilitating a direct return to work.  
Almost all external vocational rehabilitation providers interviewed indicated that 
focusing on RTW was not worth their time, as the performance indicators did not adequately 
reward such efforts. In fact, we were told by several sources that the provider with the best 
return-to-work rate in the state was placed on the conditional referral list, a list that restricts or 
halts referrals to that provider. The explanation for this anomaly was that arranging a RTW 
requires negotiating between the injured worker, the employer, and the medical provider; and 
this takes time which the department does not allow nor pay for.  
Internal interviews confirmed this allegation, indicating that the performance-based 
referral system has caused a great deal of difficulty over the years and that one of the unintended 
consequences of the system was this move to the plan development end of the VR services 
spectrum. This has had the indirect effect of increasing costs and not necessarily helping workers 
exit the system.  
It is not unusual to see multiple VR referrals on a single case; especially on claims that 
have been in the system a long time. Perhaps an example is helpful. The date of injury on this 
case is December 1991. In January 2008 this worker is still receiving wage-loss payments. Until 
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very recently there had been no referral for a consideration of a pension award. The injury itself 
was a back strain. The first referral to VR happened in September 1996. An Ability to Work 
Assessment (AWA) identified problems in that the Attending Physician would not clear the 
injured worker for a return to work of any kind, and therefore recommended a referral for VR 
Planning.  
Instead, the worker was sent to a pain clinic and no attempt at VR intervention was made 
again until December 1999 when retraining was recommended. The worker engaged in the 
training and did very well, but upon successful completion could not work because of pain. The 
worker was sent to another pain clinic and for a psychiatric Independent Medical Examination 
(IME) in 2000. Again nothing happened until March 2001 when an Ability to Work Assessment 
was completed and the conclusion was that the worker was able to work given the new skills 
acquired in the training. However, the worker refused to try, and nothing happened.  
In May 2002 another AWA was performed, and this time it was found that the worker 
was medically unstable and not likely to benefit from VR. Depression was also identified, and 
the worker was sent for another psychiatric assessment where no organic anomalies were found. 
Then there followed a four-year gap in any VR activity and the worker continued on wage loss 
until April 2006 when, based on the most recent medical information, it was determined that the 
worker had reached maximum medical improvement but was unable to return to work. However, 
rather then send the case for a pension review it was sent out to VR for another AWA which 
concluded that the worker was unable to work on a VR plan. This worker continues on wage loss 
as of this writing, more than 16 years after the original date of injury.  
A 2005 report found that the median time from the date of disability to the first referral 
for a development plan was 743 days with another 132 days required for the plan referral.9 An 
implemented VR plan resulted 46 percent of the time that there was a referral for plan 
development, and of those 57 percent resulted in either a return to work or an assessment that 
there was an ability to return to work. 
In order to get a better idea of how frequently VR was used in time-loss claims of 
extended duration and to learn what the results were of such referrals we examined time-loss 
claims that were open five years after the accident year. We asked, “How often is the claim 
referred either to plan development or to plan implementation five or more years after the 
                                                 
9  Government Management, Accountability and Performance Audit, Presentation June 28, 2005. 
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accident year?” We also asked, “For time-loss claims that are open at least five years after the 
accident year, do outcomes vary if vocational rehabilitation plan development or plan 
implementation occurs after that five-year period?” In this case, we considered only the five 
years following the five years post-accident period. As an example, for a worker who was 
injured in accident year 1988 and whose time-loss claim remained open in 1993, what outcome 
occurred if there was either a plan development or a plan implementation referral in the window 
from 1993 to 1998?10 
In Table 2.2 we see that for workers injured in accident year 1988, of the 2,658 time-loss 
cases that remained open in 1993, 21.4 percent had one or more vocational rehabilitation 
referrals made in the five years following 1993. In the five years following 1993, 3.2 percent of 
those with a VR referral were granted a pension. In the window between years 5 and 10 post-
accident , 46.8 percent of the claims were closed (excluding those that were pensioned or where 
the worker had died) and 48.8 percent were still open, compared with 12.6 percent that remained 
open where there had been no referral in the period 1994 to 1998. The same tendency exists for 
each of the subsequent accident years, namely, a VR referral in the 5- to10-year window is much 
more likely to be associated with a claim that remains open 10 years after the accident year. 
For most accident years, when a claim that is open for five years is referred to VR in the 
following year, there is a likelihood of about 30 to 50 percent that it will be open 10 years or 
more after the accident date. Table 2.2 also reveals that in the five years following the accident 
years 1989 to 1995 the probability of an open claim being referred to VR for a plan increased 
from a very narrow range (19 to 20 percent) to over 27 percent of open claims from the 1997 
accident year.11  
We separate referrals to VR into Plan Development referrals (Table 2.3) and Plan 
Implementation referrals (Table 2.4). Plan Development referrals were employed in 11 to 13 
percent of claims that were open for five years from accident years 1988 to 1991. Thereafter the 
proportion of open claims that were referred for Plan Development began to increase, reaching a 
peak of almost 25 percent in the five years following accident year 1997. The rate of this type of  
                                                 
10  We limited this period under review to be able to capture comparable data for a larger number of years. 
By limiting the analysis to the outcomes that occurred only in the period up to five years beyond the initial five 
years, we are covering a 10-year span. Thus, the latest accident year we can consider is 1997, with claims that were 
still open in 2002 and the post VR referrals outcomes until 2007. We also do not consider here an Ability to Work 
appraisal since some of these can precede a recommendation on the need for a pension. 
11  The rates of time-loss claims open five years where a VR referral was made in the subsequent five-year 
window remained relatively high in 1998, 1999, and 2000 (26.4, 25.5, and 23.1 percent, respectively). 
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referral declined slowly thereafter (not shown in the table) but remained at 20 percent or above 
through accident year 2000, and ultimately will be higher.  
For claims referred for Plan Development in the period following the accident year, 
claims remained open between 45 and 61 percent of the time for accident year 1988 to 1993 
claims. Thereafter, there was a substantial decline in the rate that remained open during the 6- to 
10-year window following the accident year. These trends are consistent with an increased effort 
to close older time-loss claims. 
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Table 2.2  Time-Loss Claim Outcomes 5 to 10 Years after Date of Injury–Plan Development or Implementation Referrals 5-Plus Years After Accident 
Accident 
year (CY) 
Voc 
rfrls 5+ 
years 
Time-loss 
claims open 
5+ years 
% of Time-
loss claims 
open 5+ years
TPD 
pensions 5–
10 years
% Pensioned 
5–10 years
Deaths 
5–10 
years
% of 
Workers 
dead 5–10 
years 
Claims 
closed
% of 
Claims 
closed
Claims 
open
% of 
Claims 
open
TPD 
deaths 5–
10 years
% TPD 
deaths 5–
10 years
1988 Yes 568 21.4% 18 3.2% 7 1.2% 266 46.8% 277 48.8% 4 0.7%
  No 2,090 78.6% 47 2.2% 19 0.9% 1,761 84.3% 263 12.6% 15 0.7%
  Total 2,658 100.0% 65 2.4% 26 1.0% 2,027 76.3% 540 20.3% 19 0.7%
1989 Yes 528 19.8% 9 1.7% 6 1.1% 257 48.7% 256 48.5% 3 0.6%
  No 2,134 80.2% 43 2.0% 17 0.8% 1,804 84.5% 270 12.7% 10 0.5%
  Total 2,662 100.0% 52 2.0% 23 0.9% 2,061 77.4% 526 19.8% 13 0.5%
1990 Yes 523 19.5% 11 2.1% 6 1.1% 285 54.5% 221 42.3% 2 0.4%
  No 2,160 80.5% 33 1.5% 18 0.8% 1,825 84.5% 284 13.1% 10 0.5%
  Total 2,683 100.0% 44 1.6% 24 0.9% 2,110 78.6% 505 18.8% 12 0.4%
1991 Yes 530 20.0% 14 2.6% 6 1.1% 308 58.1% 202 38.1% 10 1.9%
  No 2,124 80.0% 41 1.9% 16 0.8% 1,795 84.5% 272 12.8% 10 0.5%
  Total 2,654 100.0% 55 2.1% 22 0.8% 2,103 79.2% 474 17.9% 20 0.8%
1992 Yes 486 20.1% 14 2.9% 2 0.4% 275 56.6% 195 40.1% 4 0.8%
  No 1,931 79.9% 40 2.1% 22 1.1% 1,641 85.0% 228 11.8% 10 0.5%
  Total 2,417 100.0% 54 2.2% 24 1.0% 1,916 79.3% 423 17.5% 14 0.6%
1993 Yes 455 19.6% 11 2.4% 2 0.4% 269 59.1% 173 38.0% 3 0.7%
  No 1,871 80.4% 31 1.7% 13 0.7% 1,648 88.1% 179 9.6% 13 0.7%
  Total 2,326 100.0% 42 1.8% 15 0.6% 1,917 82.4% 352 15.1% 16 0.7%
1994 Yes 427 19.9% 7 1.6% 4 0.9% 281 65.8% 135 31.6% 2 0.5%
  No 1,721 80.1% 27 1.6% 23 1.3% 1,501 87.2% 170 9.9% 12 0.7%
  Total 2,148 100.0% 34 1.6% 27 1.3% 1,782 83.0% 305 14.2% 14 0.7%
1995 Yes 382 19.1% 5 1.3% 4 1.0% 235 61.5% 138 36.1% 2 0.5%
  No 1,613 80.9% 35 2.2% 13 0.8% 1,412 87.5% 153 9.5% 6 0.4%
  Total 1,995 100.0% 40 2.0% 17 0.9% 1,647 82.6% 291 14.6% 8 0.4%
1996 Yes 422 23.6% 9 2.1% 5 1.2% 272 64.5% 136 32.2% 2 0.5%
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Accident 
year (CY) 
Voc 
rfrls 5+ 
years 
Time-loss 
claims open 
5+ years 
% of Time-
loss claims 
open 5+ years
TPD 
pensions 5–
10 years
% Pensioned 
5–10 years
Deaths 
5–10 
years
% of 
Workers 
dead 5–10 
years 
Claims 
closed
% of 
Claims 
closed
Claims 
open
% of 
Claims 
open
TPD 
deaths 5–
10 years
% TPD 
deaths 5–
10 years
  No 1,368 76.4% 27 2.0% 14 1.0% 1,157 84.6% 170 12.4% 8 0.6%
  Total 1,790 100.0% 36 2.0% 19 1.1% 1,429 79.8% 306 17.1% 10 0.6%
1997 Yes 499 27.1% 5 1.0% 3 0.6% 375 75.2% 116 23.2% 7 1.4%
  No 1,345 72.9% 14 1.0% 13 1.0% 1,188 88.3% 130 9.7% 10 0.7%
  Total 1,844 100.0% 19 1.0% 16 0.9% 1,563 84.8% 246 13.3% 17 0.9%
SOURCE: Data Warehouse, Department of Labor and Industries. 
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Table 2.3  Time-Loss Claim Outcomes 5 to 10 Years after Date of Injury–Plan Development Referrals 5-Plus Years after Accident 
Accident 
year (CY) 
Voc 
rfrls 5+ 
years 
Time-loss 
claims open 
5+ years 
% of Time-
loss claims 
open 5+ years
TPD 
pensions 5–
10 years
% Pensioned 
5–10 years
Deaths 
5–10 
years
% of 
Workers 
dead 5–10 
years 
Claims 
closed
% of 
Claims 
closed
Claims 
open 
% of 
Claims 
open
TPD 
deaths 5–
10 years
% TPD 
deaths 5–
10 years 
1988 Yes 332 12.5% 16 4.8% 6 1.8% 121 36.4% 189 56.9% 4 1.2%
  No 2,326 87.5% 49 2.1% 20 0.9% 1,906 81.9% 351 15.1% 15 0.6%
  Total 2,658 100.0% 65 2.4% 26 1.0% 2,027 76.3% 540 20.3% 19 0.7%
1989 Yes 296 11.1% 7 2.4% 6 2.0% 102 34.5% 181 61.1% 2 0.7%
  No 2,366 88.9% 45 1.9% 17 0.7% 1,959 82.8% 345 14.6% 11 0.5%
  Total 2,662 100.0% 52 2.0% 23 0.9% 2,061 77.4% 526 19.8% 13 0.5%
1989 Yes 320 11.9% 9 2.8% 5 1.6% 136 42.5% 170 53.1% 2 0.6%
  No 2,363 88.1% 35 1.5% 19 0.8% 1,974 83.5% 335 14.2% 10 0.4%
  Total 2,683 100.0% 44 1.6% 24 0.9% 2,110 78.6% 505 18.8% 12 0.4%
1991 Yes 334 12.6% 14 4.2% 5 1.5% 156 46.7% 159 47.6% 8 2.4%
  No 2,320 87.4% 41 1.8% 17 0.7% 1,947 83.9% 315 13.6% 12 0.5%
  Total 2,654 100.0% 55 2.1% 22 0.8% 2,103 79.2% 474 17.9% 20 0.8%
1992 Yes 347 14.4% 13 3.7% 1 0.3% 162 46.7% 171 49.3% 4 1.2%
  No 2,070 85.6% 41 2.0% 23 1.1% 1,754 84.7% 252 12.2% 10 0.5%
  Total 2,417 100.0% 54 2.2% 24 1.0% 1,916 79.3% 423 17.5% 14 0.6%
1993 Yes 347 14.9% 11 3.2% 1 0.3% 173 49.9% 162 46.7% 3 0.9%
  No 1,979 85.1% 31 1.6% 14 0.7% 1,744 88.1% 190 9.6% 13 0.7%
  Total 2,326 100.0% 42 1.8% 15 0.6% 1,917 82.4% 352 15.1% 16 0.7%
1994 Yes 317 14.8% 5 1.6% 3 0.9% 187 59.0% 122 38.5% 2 0.6%
  No 1,831 85.2% 29 1.6% 24 1.3% 1,595 87.1% 183 10.0% 12 0.7%
  Total 2,148 100.0% 34 1.6% 27 1.3% 1,782 83.0% 305 14.2% 14 0.7%
1995 Yes 337 16.9% 5 1.5% 4 1.2% 194 57.6% 134 39.8% 2 0.6%
  No 1,658 83.1% 35 2.1% 13 0.8% 1,453 87.6% 157 9.5% 6 0.4%
  Total 1,995 100% 40 2.0% 17 0.9% 1,647 82.6% 291 14.6% 8 0.4%
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Accident 
year (CY) 
Voc 
rfrls 5+ 
years 
Time-loss 
claims open 
5+ years 
% of Time-
loss claims 
open 5+ years
TPD 
pensions 5–
10 years
% Pensioned 
5–10 years
Deaths 
5–10 
years
% of 
Workers 
dead 5–10 
years 
Claims 
closed
% of 
Claims 
closed
Claims 
open 
% of 
Claims 
open
TPD 
deaths 5–
10 years
% TPD 
deaths 5–
10 years 
1996 Yes 385 21.5% 9 2.3% 4 1.0% 237 61.6% 135 35.1% 2 0.5%
  No 1,405 78.5% 27 1.9% 15 1.1% 1,192 84.8% 171 12.2% 8 0.6%
  Total 1,790 100% 36 2.0% 19 1.1% 1,429 79.8% 306 17.1% 10 0.6%
1997 Yes 453 24.6% 5 1.1% 3 0.7% 331 73.1% 114 25.2% 7 1.5%
  No 1,391 75.4% 14 1.0% 13 0.9% 1,232 88.6% 132 9.5% 10 0.7%
  Total 1,844 100% 19 1.0% 16 0.9% 1,563 84.8% 246 13.3% 17 0.9%
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Table 2.4  Time-Loss Claim Outcomes 5 to 10 Years after Date of Injury–Plan Implementation Referrals 5 Plus Years after Accident 
Accident 
year 
(CY) 
Voc rfrls 
5+ 
Years 
Time-loss 
claims 
open 5+ 
years 
%of Time-
loss claims 
open 5+ 
years 
TPD 
pensions 
5–10 
years 
% 
Pensioned 
5–10 
years 
Deaths 
5–10 
years 
% of 
Workers 
dead 5–
10 years 
Claims 
closed 
% of 
Claims 
closed 
Claims 
open  
% of 
Claims 
open 
TPD 
deaths 
5–10 
years 
% TPD 
deaths 5–
10 years  
1988 Yes 261 9.8% 2 0.8% 1 0.4% 153 58.6% 105 40.2% 0 0.0% 
  No 2,397 90.2% 63 2.6% 25 1.0% 1,874 78.2% 435 18.1% 19 0.8% 
  Total 2,658 100% 65 2.4% 26 1.0% 2,027 76.3% 540 20.3% 19 0.7% 
1989 Yes 261 9.8% 2 0.8% 0 0.0% 159 60.9% 100 38.3% 1 0.4% 
  No 2,401 90.2% 50 2.1% 23 1.0% 1,902 79.2% 426 17.7% 12 0.5% 
  Total 2,662 100% 52 2.0% 23 0.9% 2,061 77.4% 526 19.8% 13 0.5% 
1989 Yes 260 9.7% 2 0.8% 1 0.4% 159 61.2% 98 37.7% 0 0.0% 
  No 2,423 90.3% 42 1.7% 23 0.9% 1,951 80.5% 407 16.8% 12 0.5% 
  Total 2,683 100% 44 1.6% 24 0.9% 2,110 78.6% 505 18.8% 12 0.4% 
1991 Yes 241 9.1% 0 0.0% 1 0.4% 160 66.4% 80 33.2% 2 0.8% 
  No 2,413 90.9% 55 2.3% 21 0.9% 1,943 80.5% 394 16.3% 18 0.7% 
  Total 2,654 100% 55 2.1% 22 0.8% 2,103 79.2% 474 17.9% 20 0.8% 
1992 Yes 210 8.7% 1 0.5% 1 0.5% 124 59.0% 84 40.0% 0 0.0% 
  No 2,207 91.3% 53 2.4% 23 1.0% 1,792 81.2% 339 15.4% 14 0.6% 
  Total 2,417 100% 54 2.2% 24 1.0% 1,916 79.3% 423 17.5% 14 0.6% 
1993 Yes 187 8.0% 0 0.0% 1 0.5% 118 63.1% 68 36.4% 0 0.0% 
  No 2,139 92.0% 42 2.0% 14 0.7% 1,799 84.1% 284 13.3% 16 0.7% 
  Total 2,326 100% 42 1.8% 15 0.6% 1,917 82.4% 352 15.1% 16 0.7% 
1994 Yes 204 9.5% 2 1.0% 1 0.5% 129 63.2% 72 35.3% 0 0.0% 
  No 1,944 90.5% 32 1.6% 26 1.3% 1,653 85.0% 233 12.0% 14 0.7% 
  Total 2,148 100% 34 1.6% 27 1.3% 1,782 83.0% 305 14.2% 14 0.7% 
1995 Yes 182 9.1% 0 0.0% 3 1.6% 105 57.7% 74 40.7% 0 0.0% 
  No 1,813 90.9% 40 2.2% 14 0.8% 1,542 85.1% 217 12.0% 8 0.4% 
  Total 1,995 100% 40 2.0% 17 0.9% 1,647 82.6% 291 14.6% 8 0.4% 
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Accident 
year 
(CY) 
Voc rfrls 
5+ 
Years 
Time-loss 
claims 
open 5+ 
years 
%of Time-
loss claims 
open 5+ 
years 
TPD 
pensions 
5–10 
years 
% 
Pensioned 
5–10 
years 
Deaths 
5–10 
years 
% of 
Workers 
dead 5–
10 years 
Claims 
closed 
% of 
Claims 
closed 
Claims 
open  
% of 
Claims 
open 
TPD 
deaths 
5–10 
years 
% TPD 
deaths 5–
10 years  
1996 Yes 206 11.5% 0 0.0% 2 1.0% 144 69.9% 60 29.1% 0 0.0% 
  No 1,584 88.5% 36 2.3% 17 1.1% 1,285 81.1% 246 15.5% 10 0.6% 
  Total 1,790 100% 36 2.0% 19 1.1% 1,429 79.8% 306 17.1% 10 0.6% 
1997 Yes 285 15.5% 1 0.4% 1 0.4% 224 78.6% 59 20.7% 2 0.7% 
  No 1,559 84.5% 18 1.2% 15 1.0% 1,339 85.9% 187 12.0% 15 1.0% 
  Total 1,844 100% 19 1.0% 16 0.9% 1,563 84.8% 246 13.3% 17 0.9% 
 
SOURCE:  Data Warehouse, Department of Labor and Industries. 
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Table 2.4 shows the claims that were referred for Plan Implementation for accident years 
1988 to 1997. For five or more years after accident years 1988 to 1995, about 9 to 10 percent of 
open claims were referred to plan implementation. Thereafter, the rate increased hitting a 
maximum rate of 15 percent for those injured in accident year 1997. (The rates in 1998 and 
1999, not shown in the table, were more than 13 percent.) For those workers whose cases were 
referred for Plan Implementation, a substantial proportion remained open by the end of 10 years 
following the accident year. For accident years 1988, 1992 and 1995, 40 percent or more of those 
referred to Plan Implementation remained open for 10 years since the accident year. 
The role of private vs. public counselors 
There has been something of an uneasy truce between the external VR community and 
L&I over the years. The state outsourced VR services in 1981 by developing contracts with VR 
firms. These firms in turn hired vocational rehabilitation professionals to perform the services. 
This system brought with it a certain amount of quality control in that the VR firms wanted to 
maintain their contract, so consequently had an incentive to insure that their staff was performing 
well.  
This arrangement remained in place until 2001 when WAC 296-20 and WAC 296-19A 
were introduced which eliminated the contract arrangements and allowed more counselors to set 
up business independently. According to those interviewed, both external and internal, this 
sometimes led to the practice of hiring unqualified or under qualified person or interns to do the 
work contracted to the VR Counselor.  
The existing larger VR firms had been large enough enterprises to have their own internal 
quality control provisions and L&I had only to interact with a limited number of these contract 
holders. Now a vastly larger number of VR counselors could all hold contracts, making it nearly 
impossible for L&I to insure an appropriate level of quality service provision.  
Apparently these VR counselors could take on almost any number of referrals at their 
existing billing rate and then subcontract out the service provision to another provider at a lesser 
rate. We have been told by several sources that these are sometimes interns who do not have the 
same level of knowledge or experience as the VR Counselor. Nothing in the system prevented 
this practice and it is alleged that some VR counselors profited greatly by accepting vast 
numbers of referrals.  
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As long as the referral was accepted, the CMs believed that their job had been done; and 
aside from speedy service indicators nothing in the system checked on the quality of the services 
being provided, or their eventual outcome. We are told that this frequently led to substandard 
work being performed. The private counselors see this differently. They point to unrealistic 
expectations on the part of the referral CMs and that they do the best they can given the tight 
timelines outlined in the performance indicators12 and the rather limited resources provided by 
statute.13 L&I officials expect that most or all of these problems will be solved by the new VIP 
which took effect on January 1, 2008.  
Total claims management (TCM) 
TCM began in 1985 and was fully rolled out by the end of 1986. There was a second 
phase of TCM in 1998–99 which created some new roles including more levels of Claim 
Manager, based on claim complexity. TCM had the impact of removing the decision-making 
ability vis-à-vis vocational rehabilitation services from the VRSs who were assigned to the 
claims units and giving it to the CMs where it has remained until recently. This was very 
demoralizing for the VRSs but also had the effect of placing a very important decision that could 
dramatically impact on the outcome of a claim with someone who was neither trained nor 
experienced in this professional field and had no reference point from which to make a decision 
beyond experience with other, similar claims.  
L&I did provide training for the CMs but this apparently was not sufficient to 
compensate for the extensive training and experience that the VRSs had brought to the system. 
As well, huge caseloads prevented the CMs from consulting with the VRSs assigned to each 
unit, and further administrative changes reduced the number of VRSs available for such 
consultation. The result of these changes appears to have been some degradation in the quality of 
case management decisions, resulting in lengthening time loss which created virtually 
irresolvable claims. In order to avoid sending these claims to the pension unit they were often re-
referred to VR, and it appears that many went on for years stuck in a loop of referral and re-
referral.14 
                                                 
12 See for e.g.: http://www.lni.wa.gov/ClaimsIns/Files/Providers/ProvBulletins/PbFiles/PB0312.pdf  
13 See discussion on CACO. 
14 This conclusion is based on a combination of case file reviews data and interview data 
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The role played by complexity–adjusted cost outcome (CACO) 
As a result of the failure to monitor the provision of external vocational rehabilitation 
services identified by the Joint Legislative Audit Review Committee in 1998, the Department 
hired William Mercer Inc. who developed a vocational purchasing protocol referred to as 
STAR.15 STAR used a mathematical formula based on certain specific criteria to develop a 
STAR score. This score was then used by the Department to determine which VR firms were 
qualified to receive further referrals. This system was severely criticized, and in 1999 a lawsuit 
was launched by a group of VR providers, (Thurston County Cause # 99-00320-6) alleging that 
its use was arbitrary and capricious.  
This lawsuit was settled by agreement that would see the rectifying of the provider’s 
concerns and the creation of a new system. The result of these revisions was the Complexity-
Adjusted Cost Outcome scale, commonly referred to as CACO, which was implemented in 2000. 
This new system was also considered by some to be flawed and it is interesting that the 
application of CACO was stayed by Judge Richard D. Hicks in the Superior Court on July 11, 
2006 (Superior Court # 05-2-01673-3).  
As outlined in Judge Hicks’ findings CACO created a great deal of damage to both the 
reputations and the profits of VR service providers. In fact the 2002 JLARC Implementation 
report, which was a follow-up on the 1998 recommendations, was quite negative on CACO as 
well16. However, the 2005 audit follow-up indicated that the auditors were satisfied that the 
Department was moving in the right direction on VR policies and procedures.17 
The basic issue with CACO was that it focused on time and cost of outcomes and not on 
the quality of outcomes. A vocational rehabilitation provider who closed cases quickly, even 
without a successful outcome, was rewarded with a good CACO score. It is alleged that someone 
who had great RTW outcomes, but did not meet the timelines, would receive a poor CACO score 
and their referrals would be reduced or curtailed. This had the effect of rewarding those who 
“played” the system and punishing those who went for the real desired outcome of RTW. Many 
of the former claims likely eventually ended up in the pension queue. 
CACO was clearly an area of friction between VR providers and L&I. In addition, every 
external provider interviewed mentioned CACO as a cause of increased pension awards. The 
                                                 
15  The meaning of the acronym seems to have been lost. 
16  See: http://www1.leg.wa.gov/Reports/03-10.pdf  
17  See: http://leg.wa.gov/reports/05-1.pdf  
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logic of this assertion can be summarized as follows: CACO rewards the wrong thing; speed 
over quality. As a result VR providers focus on speedy service at the cost of quality. This has the 
consequence of people not going back to work (as this is not a rewarded outcome). Instead they 
are placed in VR planning or retraining which they can complete quickly and successfully. 
However, if these services do not lead to an actual job, the injured workers eventually end up as 
pension referrals. 
The department is currently working on new guidelines that will replace CACO. Based 
on interviews with key personnel it appears that they have listened to previous criticisms and are 
working hard to design a fair and equitable system. By insuring that VR providers are 
appropriately measured on their performance L&I will also insure that the needs of workers and 
employers in the State are met in a timely and cost-efficient manner. However, the VR providers 
are very anxious over what is coming and hopefully communication strategies will be employed 
to deal with this anxiety as well as restore some good faith between the agency and its service 
providers. 
Disability Management at L&I 
Disability Management (DM) is a relatively new discipline that places the emphasis on 
maintaining the employee/employer relationship post injury or illness. It argues that all possible 
avenues of RTW with the existing employer must be exhaustively explored before attention turns 
to other solutions. DM also maintains that rapid, resourceful, and appropriate intervention is 
paramount if one is to successfully facilitate the RTW of the injured worker. Philosophically DM 
argues that work is central to all of our lives and an absence of work, or a lengthy delay in 
returning to work causes undesired consequences. In the recent book “Comprehensive Disability 
Management”18 the authors make this point when they state:  
Work is the center of the model as the premise of the model is based on the knowledge that work is central 
to life. Work is in fact a complete facet of all community life.  Societies are made possible and function 
through the division of labor and the integration of various forms of work. Everyone is interdependent on 
the productivity of others. Kielhoner (1992), p 53 states “Participation in occupation has an impact on the 
individual’s biological and psychological health. Occupation is essential to the well-being of the 
individual.” It is widely documented that individuals have a psychological need for occupation (Pearlin & 
Liberman, 1979; Jones, 1991; Feather & Bond, 1983). The occupation motive emerges from the 
biologically and culturally based desires to engage in activity to discover and create and to realize a degree 
of mastery (Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1967; Pearlin & Liberman, 1979). Through work people are able to 
discover new information and potentials for action, experience control, develop confidence and reaffirm 
their self worth. Occupation is recognized as having a role in creating, affirming and experiencing meaning 
                                                 
18  Harder, and Scott, 2005, p. 28. 
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in life (Dooley & Catalano, 1988; Winegarder, Simonetti & Nykodym, 1971). Many examples can be 
found where the absence of work has led to a downward spiral of functioning as a contributing member of 
society and has resulted in difficult psychological effects to the individual.  
It is this downward spiral that L&I, and VR in particular, seeks to prevent.  
Early intervention program 
Early Intervention is a service paid for by L&I and performed by external VR providers. 
Early Intervention (EI) is not a single program; it is a referral to external VR Providers that 
occurs if the Early Return to Work Program (ERTW) has not been successful. “Early” is a 
relative term. A recent report found that the median number of days from the date of injury to the 
claim manager referral to Early Intervention was 125 days, and another 62 days (median) for the 
Early Intervention referrals to result in any action.19 The report continued that it took 357 days 
from the date of disability to the date the claim manager made a referral for an ability to work 
assessment with another 93 days for the ability to work assessment to be completed.  
Early Intervention is focused on the injury employer and the VR must provide a Job 
Analysis20 of the pre-injury job. Based on this Job Analysis the VR, in conjunction with the 
employer, can provide interventions such as a Graduated RTW (GRTW) (increasing the number 
of hours as appropriate until the worker returns to the work pattern at the time of injury), 
Transitional RTW (a temporary job where the worker is expected to be able to go back to the job 
of injury during early intervention), Light-duty work (a job with less physical demands than the 
at injury job). This may be a permanent, temporary, or transitional job and temporary work in a 
different job. The VR can also request a period of Work Hardening to help prepare the injured 
worker for the RTW process.  
There are 21 possible Early Intervention outcomes.21 In a recent Government 
Management Accountability and Performance report, 17.5 percent of users of the early 
intervention had outcomes that indicated that they had returned to employment, while another 
21.9 percent were considered able to be employed though they had not done so.22 Another 23.6 
percent were considered to be medically unstable and the balance, 22.4 percent, was coded into 
other categories, e.g. injured worker declines VR services.  
                                                 
19  Government Management, Accountability and Performance Audit, Presentation June 28, 2005. 
20  See: http://www.lni.wa.gov/ClaimsIns/Providers/Vocational/Tools/JobAnalysis/default.asp  
21  See: http://www.lni.wa.gov/ClaimsIns/Providers/Vocational/Referrals/EarlyInt/default.asp   
22  Government Management, Accountability and Performance Audit, Presentation June 28, 2005. 
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Early return-to-work program (ERTW) 
The ERTW23 program was launched in 2004 in an effort by the Department to intervene 
early and identify claims that could be resolved quickly and efficiently with a return to work. 
The ERTW program is the closest that L&I comes to approximating a Disability Management 
intervention. ERTW is designed to intervene early to accomplish the goal of returning the worker 
to the at-injury job. Upon the accrual of over 14 days of time loss, and if the injured worker has 
not already RTW, a telephone contact is made with the injured worker, the treating physician, 
and the employer to determine if a RTW is imminent of if other options, such as light duty, exist. 
The ERTW staff consists of Vocational Services Consultant, Therapist Consultants, and Nurse 
Consultants. These professionals can provide expert advice to both the employer and the injured 
worker as they attempt to accomplish return to work as quickly and appropriately as possible.  
Other resources such as a safety consultant or a risk management specialist are also 
available as well. It may be possible to access some funds in order to modify an existing job so 
that the injured worker can return to that job. While this early phone call likely has a bearing on 
employer/worker behavior, an important factor in this program is the availability of the 
professional consultants who can often allay concerns of the employer or worker and thereby 
create greater willingness to engage in a RTW process that may otherwise have been blocked by 
these concerns. Most CMs do not have the expertise to answer such questions. 
Both internal and external interviewees spoke very highly of the ERTW program. Phrases 
such as “this is where our energy should be going” were common. From the pension perspective, 
every injured worker helped back to work at this stage will likely not have to be considered for a 
pension. The ERTW is one of the few programs offered by L&I that actually supports the injured 
worker in RTW. 
Preferred Worker Program 24 
L&I provides financial incentives to employers to hire workers who, because of a 
workplace injury or occupational disease, cannot return to their previous employment. It is 
stressed that while these workers may have some form of permanent disability they are able to 
work. Once in this program an injured worker can even change employers within a 36-month 
period and stay in the program. For self-insured and state fund employers incentives consist of 
                                                 
23  See: http://www.lni.wa.gov/ClaimsIns/Insurance/Reduce/Manage/Ertw/Default.asp  
24  Please see the brochure at http://www.lni.wa.gov/IPUB/280-021-000.pdf 
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relief of costs should the worker be injured. For state fund employers only, there is also accident 
fund and medical aid fund premium relief from the date of hire through the worker’s remaining 
preferred worker certification period. This period lasts for 36 months. However, our interviewees 
universally told us that while the idea is a good one it breaks down in implementation. VR 
providers told us that the financial incentives are not great enough to be a motivating factor for 
employers to hire such workers. However, the most problematic issue with this program is that 
no placement services are offered and the workers are left alone to find their own opportunities. 
THE INCIDENCE OF PENSIONS FOR PERMANENT TOTAL DISABILITY 
Table 2.5 lists the number of pensions awarded by the year that the awards were made. 
Figure 2.8 shows the same data graphically. The data are reported both for the state fund and for 
self-insured employers. The rates of growth for both are high though comparisons are tricky 
since the choice of the initial year and the terminal year substantially affect the rate of growth. 
For example, from 1988 to 2007 the growth for the self-insured market was 102 percent 
compared to 165 percent growth for the state fund. But from 1988 to 2005 the state fund grew by 
only 47 percent while the self-insured awards increased by 94 percent. 
Table 2.5  Total and Permanent Disability Awards by Year 
Calendar Year Self-Insured State Fund Total 
1988 127 588 715 
1989 122 751 873 
1990 147 814 961 
1991 137 640 777 
1992 169 616 785 
1993 179 545 724 
1994 162 574 736 
1995 162 455 617 
1996 174 403 577 
1997 237 484 721 
1998 181 534 715 
1999 208 779 987 
2000 213 1,126 1,339 
2001 211 897 1108 
2002 270 1,278 1,548 
2003 315 1,439 1,754 
2004 281 968 1249 
2005 246 866 1112 
2006 322 1,025 1,347 
2007 257 1,559 1,816 
SOURCE: Washington Department of Labor and Industries. 
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Figure 2.8  Pensions Awarded–State Fund and Self-Insured, 1988–2007 
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Year
N
um
be
r
Self-Insured
State Fund
SOURCE:  Data Warehouse, Department of Labor and Industries. 
The awards made in specific years depended in part upon the claim flow process and 
delays that led to some lumpiness in the timing of awards. In any case there can be no doubt that 
both classes of insurance experienced a substantial increase over the last 18 years. It is notable 
that the state fund awards actually declined for two years after 1994 and had not surpassed the 
level of awards for that year until 1999. A significant upsurge in awards for the state fund 
occurred in 1999 and, though the following years showed some choppiness in awards, the overall 
level for all years after 1999 were high when measured against historic levels. We can mark the 
upturn in the self-insurance market with the year-to-year jump of 36 percent from 1996 to 1997. 
For the combined awards from self insurance and the state fund, we can mark the upturn in 1997 
or shortly thereafter. 
How Much of an Increase Has There Been? 
Thus far in this chapter we have described the system for processing workers’ 
compensation claims along with the appeals process and the vocational rehabilitation scheme 
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used. Before we consider the variety of possible drivers of this growth, we ask how substantial 
this increase was. Although we believe that a significant increase in pensions has occurred, it 
may have been somewhat less dramatic than a first look at the data suggests. We need to be 
absolutely clear on our perspective. While some may disagree over the extent of any upsurge, 
there can be little room for disagreement on the evidence that both the level of pensions awarded 
and the rate at which they occur is considerably above those of earlier years. The year-to-year 
shifts in their incidence serve to make this observation only slightly less evident. 
A sharp increase in the number of pensions can be appropriately dated at around 1999 (if 
we exclude the self-insured sector where the data suggest that it began in 1997). Instead of 
treating the years beginning around 1999 as unusual, possibly we should acknowledge that our 
view of the increase is a product of the baseline period that we employ. Consider that in the five 
years 1988–1992, there were an average of 682 pensions awarded per year, or that from 1989 to 
1991 there were 735 pensions per year. Then consider that in the years 1993–1998 there were 
only 499 pensions awarded per year. Perhaps the anomalous period is the years 1993–98. It is 
also possible to argue that the period from 1988 or 1989 to 1991or 1992 were unusual and 
constituted an upsurge in awards. At the close of 1988, a major push was made by the 
department to reduce duration and to close some longer term, open cases. The “Yes We Can” 
Initiative sought to do this as did creation of Communication Care Action Resolution Effort 
(CARE) teams to focus on the most difficult open cases.(See Appendix 2.3) The elevated 
number of pensions awarded that followed these initiatives were likely a result, at least in part, of 
these special efforts. 
If the average number of pensions awarded in 1989–91 had been maintained in the 1993–
1998 years, 1,416 additional awards would have been made. Now assume that the “normal” 
period for L&I was 1989–91 (with 735 pensions per year). Then add the awards that might have 
been paid from 1993–98 but were not paid for one reason or other, and pay those over the 4 years 
1999–2002. In such a hypothetical world the “expected” average number of pensions per year 
would have been 735 + (1,416 / 4 =) 354= 1089. Contrast that with the average pensions 
awarded from 1999 to 2002 of 1,020 pensions awarded. Notice that there is even a higher 
“expected” number of pensions than were actually paid in the 1999–2002. This approach would 
suggest that the substantial increase in pensions awarded actually could have been an inventory 
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adjustment from an unusual decline in the average number of pensions awarded in the 1993–98 
years.  
If we consider the years 1999 to 2006, the average number of awards is indeed higher 
than the 1989–91 baseline and any possible inventory adjustment would suggest, though not by 
very much. Yet consider the data found in Table 2.6. The peak years in the number of claims 
open six or more years were 1997–99. The average number of claims of this vintage or older 
during each of the three years was about 6,000. By year 2000, the number of these old claims 
open fell to 5,000; by 2003 to 4,000; and down to 3,600 in 2006. This is consistent with an 
inventory adjustment from the underpayment of “expected awards” in years 1993–98, a catch up 
in awards beginning in about 1999 and a continued and substantial paring down of pension 
awards through 2006 and 2007.25.  
In addition to an inventory adjustment, there is another factor that needs to be added to 
the sizeable growth in pensions in the most recent years. Simply put there may have been an 
upturn in pensions due to the previous spike in time-loss claims. Time-loss claims trended 
upward from 1971 until the end of 1979. There then followed a downtrend until 1982, followed 
by increases again peaking in 1990. Claims from the peak period were the raw material for the 
“expected” pensions in the late 1990s and of those that were pensioned in 1999 going forward. 
That the number of pensions is correlated with the number of time-loss cases with a lag of six or 
more years is hardly disputable. Based on the peak of time-loss claims in 1990, give or take a 
few years around this point, pensions should have been growing for that reason alone in the late 
1990s and early 2000s; even aside from the working down of the excess inventory that piled up 
from 1993–1998.  
One way to evaluate this is to consider the number of compensated claims arising each 
year relative to the number of pensions. However, since the time lag between a new claim for 
compensation and the awarding of a pension is considerable, we need to factor that into our 
appraisal. Table 2.6 does this by calculating the rate of pensions awarded in a calendar year as a 
fraction of the number of new compensation claims (most of these are time-loss claims) initially 
paid six years earlier. As an example, the number of pensions awarded in 1980 was 1.6 percent 
                                                 
25  We are not suggesting that the sole reason for the decline in the inventory was an equal number of 
pensions. Cases were closed in a number of ways, shifting them to pensions being one of them. 
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of the number of newly compensated cases in 1974.26 The average rate over the period 1980 to 
2007 was 2.0 percent. Strikingly, the average rate from 1980 to 1998 was 1.5 percent, while the 
rate from 1999 to 2007 was 3.1 percent; or more than twice the rate for the earlier 19-year 
period. Calendar year 1999 appears to be an important point for the upward movement in rates. 
Clearly, the rate of pensions awarded in the most recent years was considerably above that of 
previous years. Also, note that rates from 1988 to 1991 had climbed above those of previous 
years, and the rates in some of the following years were below the long-term average, reflecting 
the inventory flow issues described earlier. 
Table 2.6  TPD Awards as a Percentage of New Claims,  
      Six Years Earlier* 
     State Fund Only 
Year of TPD award TPD rate (%) 
1980 1.6 
1981 1.4 
1982 1.7 
1983 1.6 
1984 1.2 
1985 1.3 
1986 1.4 
1987 1.2 
1988 1.9 
1989 2.3 
1990 2.4 
1991 1.9 
1992 1.7 
1993 1.5 
1994 1.4 
1995 1.1 
1996 0.9 
1997 1.1 
1998 1.3 
1999 2.0 
2000 3.0 
2001 2.5 
2002 3.6 
2003 4.0 
2004 2.7 
2005 2.5 
2006 3.0 
2007 5.0 
*TPD awards in a calendar year as a proportion of newly compensated cases six years earlier. 
SOURCE: Office of the Actuary and the Data Warehouse. 
There was indeed a substantial upturn in the number of pensions and in the rate of 
pensions awarded relative to time-loss claims six years earlier, at least for the state fund. One’s 
                                                 
26  We were not confident in using the data from before 1980 on the number of pensions awarded. The new 
awards for compensation, primarily new time-loss cases, are from 1974, six years before 1980.  
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view of the extent of the increase in numbers of pensions awarded must necessarily be shaped by 
the baseline used. And as the following chapter will demonstrate, the number of Washington’s 
pension awards in recent years is very high relative to other jurisdictions in North America. 
What Were the Primary Factors Responsible for the Increasing Numbers of Pensions?  
The processing of claims–long-duration cases 
Most persons familiar with workers’ compensation issues recognize the central role that 
claim management plays in determining the outcome of a claim. Claim management practices 
are considered the centerpiece by many insurers as they seek to return injured workers back to 
work. One area that all insurers focus upon is the cost of a claim, which includes among other 
things the indemnity payments for temporary and permanent disability, health care costs, 
rehabilitation expenses and administration and legal costs. The costs for any of these elements of 
a claim will vary depending upon many factors including the severity of the injury and the 
worker’s pre-injury wage rate. Yet another critical factor is the length of time for which periodic 
indemnity benefits are paid, which in most instances is the same as the period from the date of 
injury to the date when the worker is able to return to employment. If an insurer can shorten the 
duration of the claim, then the costs are likely to be lower. 
Duration 
The duration for which the claim remains open also can have a very significant impact on 
costs in other, less direct ways. In some jurisdictions the longer the injured worker is on time-
loss benefits, the higher the permanent partial disability benefit is likely to be. Though not true 
for jurisdictions such as Washington that evaluate the extent of disability exclusively on the 
degree of (medical) impairment, the size of the permanent partial disability benefit may reflect 
the perceived severity of the disability, that is, the economic effects resulting from a permanent 
impairment. And the length of time that a disabled worker receives temporary disability benefits 
can influence the decision maker who assesses the degree of disability. In theory at least, this 
should not affect the permanent partial disability evaluation in Washington. However, the 
duration of the period for which a claim has been open, or for which time-loss (temporary 
disability) benefits have been paid, can influence whether a claim will result in a pension award. 
If the work injury occurred many years ago and if there has been only very sporadic or no return 
to work since the accident date, it is less challenging for a worker to successfully claim that he or 
she is permanently and totally disabled.  
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It is not simply the agency that expects that the very long-term disability claims 
eventually become pension cases.  There have been instances when a dispute over some matter 
has resulted in its being taken to the BIIA or beyond and where the Board or the court has found 
that the case should be pensioned. If a pension is granted by the BIIA or a court order, L&I has 
no choice but to issue an order of compliance. L&I can appeal the decision, limited to points of 
law, but it must act on the BIIA or court order except in the rare case where a motion for stay is 
granted. The BIIA or the court entertains the worker’s eligibility for pension in response to the 
issue being raised on appeal. The longer the duration of the claim, the stronger the worker’s 
position is in contending for a pension. According to the interviews we have conducted, claims 
of rather long duration are viewed, both in the agency and at the Board of Industrial Insurance 
Appeals and in the courts as ones that are likely to become pension cases.  
What is the likelihood of a long-duration case resulting in a pension award? Estimates 
based on past experience can reveal this and are shown in Table 2.6. It shows the probability that 
a time-loss claim active at the end of a calendar year will become a pension at some time in the 
future. As an example, for a claim with an accident year of 1990, if it was active at the end of a 
single calendar year, there was a four percent likelihood that it would become a pension case. 
However, if a claim from accident year 1990 was active at the end of the second year, there is a 
16 percent chance that it would result in a pension. 
Table 2.7 demonstrates the importance of long-duration claims in the Washington 
system. A time-loss claim from accident year 1990 that was active after 5 years had a 54 percent 
probability of resulting in a pension, while a claim from that same accident year that was active 
after 7 years had a 75 percent probability of this outcome. Clearly, the longer a time-loss claim is 
open in Washington, the greater the odds that a pension will result. Any attempt to explain the 
frequency of pensions in Washington needs to begin with a consideration of the incidence of 
long-term duration. To state this in a parallel manner, for a reduction in the frequency of pension 
awards to occur, an important and very direct step would be to reduce the number of time-loss 
claims that extend for long periods of time.27 
 
 
                                                 
27 We are not suggesting that a reduction in the frequency of awarding pensions is our goal, but we 
recognize that it is for many with an interest in the State’s program. 
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Table 2.7  Duration and Accident Year—The Probability of Receiving a Pension 
Ultimate pension estimates as of 12/31/2007        
 Accident Year           
Age 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
1 4% 5% 5% 5% 5% 6% 6% 7% 7% 8% 10% 11% 
2 16% 18% 18% 17% 17% 21% 23% 23% 25% 29% 30% 29% 
3 27% 31% 30% 30% 31% 37% 39% 41% 44% 47% 46% 45% 
4 40% 45% 44% 45% 47% 54% 56% 59% 63% 60% 57% 58% 
5 54% 60% 60% 59% 62% 72% 76% 73% 72% 71% 68% 73% 
6 65% 73% 73% 71% 71% 86% 92% 80% 77% 76% 77% 82% 
7 75% 77% 83% 76% 85% 93% 88% 84% 85% 85% 83% 86% 
8 84% 88% 89% 94% 92% 94% 86% 85% 90% 88% 90%  
9 88% 97% 91% 94% 95% 94% 86% 88% 88% 89%   
10 95% 112% 102% 89% 91% 91% 92% 89% 92%    
11 105% 114% 101% 86% 95% 92% 97% 96%     
12 105% 108% 100% 90% 96% 99% 98%      
This reserve methodology is based on the assumption that active claims over 13 years old have a 100% probability 
of becoming pensions. 
Probabilities over 100% indicate that inactive claims are expected to reopen and become pensions. 
In this exhibit, the values over 100% also indicate that the number of active claims has increased at around age 10. 
SOURCE: Actuarial Services, Department of Labor & Industries. 
Two things need to be noted about Table 2.7. Prepared by actuaries, these probabilities 
reflect both claims that have resulted in pensions being granted a break, and a forecast of 
additional claims that can be expected to be awarded. For the older accident year claims, most of 
the pensions have actually been awarded and there are only a few that are expected to still 
develop. For the more recent years, more of the estimated probabilities would be based on 
forecasts and not on actual awards made. To avoid having to depend primarily on forecasts of 
pensions rather than actual pensions granted, we have limited the accident year data to the period 
1990–2001. We also need to note that some of the probabilities may exceed 100 percent. Some 
pensions can develop from claims that were not open at the beginning of a year but were then re-
opened and became pensions. 
At some point, if the Claim Manager needs to decide what to do with a claim where the 
worker has not returned to employment, has been exposed to one or more vocational 
rehabilitation options, and where additional medical expenses are not likely to be incurred for the 
condition that resulted from the work injury, the remaining options are either to “sit on the 
claim” or to move it to pension. The Claim Manager’s available alternative actions are somewhat 
limited. What creates the need to resolve the claim rather than let it continue to sit, and in most 
cases for the worker to continue to collect time-loss benefits? At least two factors may push the 
claim manager to move the claim in this direction. First, if there is a request by the worker or the 
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worker’s attorney to obtain a pension award, the Claim Manager will have to take some type of 
action, or simply have the decision taken away from them by the worker’s representative. 
Alternatively, there may be a “push” by decision-makers in the agency to reduce the number of 
open and longer standing claims. Several instances of this have occurred over the past two 
decades, motivated in some cases by pressures from the legislature or the governor’s office.  
In our view one source, though certainly not the only one, of a rapid increase in pension 
claims is likely to result when there are three conditions acting in combination.28 If these 
circumstances actually arose then it is likely that they can explain the rapid increase in pension 
awards beginning after 1996 and can serve as a guide to the future. These conditions are: 
• a build-up of very long duration time-loss claims; 
• a high probability that a long duration time-loss claims will evolve into a pension case; 
and 
• a concerted push to clear out the long duration time-loss claims. 
The Frequency of Long-Duration Claims 
The data in Table 2.8 show the number of claims active in the years from 1993 to 2007, 
by the number of years since the claims were opened.29 As an example in the last 90 days of 
2007, there were 27,379 time-loss claims in active status, 1,301 of which had been open for 10 
years or more. Table 2.8 shows that the number of active claims declined slightly from 1993 and 
1994 and then has hovered at around the 26,000 level.  
The majority of active time-loss claims in any year are less than one year old and the 
large bulk of active time-loss claims are those with durations of less than two years. From 1993 
to 2006 the number of accepted time-loss claims at year’s end declined steadily and was 22 
percent lower than it had been 14 years earlier. (We recognize that the count of time-loss claims 
attributable to the later years will grow over time.) As such the decline in the number of active 
claims with less than a full year of maturity is not surprising as it simply tracks the decline in the 
overall time-loss claims being experienced by L&I. However, the decline in the number of new 
time-loss claims is not consistent with the rather steady level of active claims over this period. 
                                                 
28  This is not meant to argue that there are no other sources of a sizable increase in pensions. Instead, it is 
to suggest the confluence of these three factors can be one source of such an increase in their number. 
29  Some analysts believe that open, rather than active claims should be used to demonstrate the material in 
this section. We accept that either metric has value and in Appendix 2.4 we replicate Tables 2.8 and 2.9 using open 
rather than active claims. 
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Table 2.8  The Number of Ultimate Claims Actively Receiving Time-Loss Benefits (within last 90 days) at   
Year End 
 Maturity (years)          
Payment 
Year >1 year 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years 6 years 7 years 8 years 9 years 
>=10 
years Total 
1993 14,469 4,095 2,544 1,631 1,106 804 563 428 372 334 1,262 27,608 
1994 14,817 4,112 2,434 1,671 1,132 804 639 484 360 309 1,315 28,077 
1995 13,342 4,059 2,308 1,577 1,157 849 664 520 433 274 1,387 26,570 
1996 13,381 3,631 2,249 1,484 1,083 920 688 559 454 329 1,401 26,179 
1997 14,078 3,747 2,052 1,448 1,064 861 796 562 484 375 1,523 26,990 
1998 13,583 4,026 2,175 1,381 1,021 832 702 638 493 423 1,647 26,921 
1999 13,442 4,055 2,242 1,441 967 821 708 571 522 400 1,737 26,906 
2000 12,693 3,879 2,229 1,449 962 711 576 477 462 376 1,546 25,360 
2001 11,978 4,143 2,305 1,443 1,055 694 559 451 402 339 1,457 24,826 
2002 12,107 4,468 2,656 1,704 1,138 826 613 464 370 322 1,451 26,119 
2003 12,610 4,472 2,702 1,912 1,247 891 618 472 351 284 1,325 26,884 
2004 12,075 4,139 2,685 1,896 1,404 1,019 697 515 401 299 1,280 26,410 
2005 12,288 4,292 2,592 1,864 1,374 1,087 808 572 425 323 1,309 26,934 
2006 12,448 4,396 2,613 1,857 1,397 1,102 900 687 509 371 1,385 27,665 
2007 12,498 4,514 2,602 1,760 1,274 1,021 838 651 530 390 1,301 27,379 
SOURCE: Department of Labor and Industries, Actuarial Service. 
 
The data shown in Table 2.9 simply show the percentages derived from Table 2.8, such 
that we calculate the proportion of active cases of different vintage for each year. As an example, 
in 2007, 3.4 percent of the active time-loss claims had been open for 10 or more years. Notice 
that in the critical time period 1997 to 1999, the proportion of active cases that were 10 years old 
or older were at their highest rates, from 4.2 percent to 4.5 percent. Thus, despite the drop-off in 
new time-loss claims, the Department was not experiencing a decline in the numbers of active 
claims. In fact, both the number and percentage of claims 10 or more years of age peaked in 
1999.  
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Table 2.9  Percentage of Ultimate Claims Actively Receiving Time-Loss Benefits (within last 90 days) at Year 
End 
 Claim Maturity         
Payment 
Year <1 year 1 year 2 years 3 years 4 years 5 years 6 years 7 years 8 years 9 years  
>=10 
years 
1993 39.0% 10.4% 6.2% 3.7% 2.6% 2.0% 1.5% 1.2% 1.1% 1.0% 3.6%
1994 40.3% 11.1% 6.2% 4.0% 2.5% 1.9% 1.6% 1.3% 1.0% 0.9% 3.8%
1995 38.7% 11.0% 6.2% 4.0% 2.8% 1.9% 1.6% 1.3% 1.2% 0.8% 3.9%
1996 39.1% 10.5% 6.1% 4.0% 2.7% 2.2% 1.5% 1.3% 1.2% 0.9% 3.9%
1997 40.6% 10.9% 6.0% 3.9% 2.9% 2.2% 1.9% 1.3% 1.1% 1.0% 4.2%
1998 39.5% 11.6% 6.3% 4.0% 2.8% 2.2% 1.8% 1.5% 1.1% 1.0% 4.4%
1999 39.3% 11.8% 6.5% 4.2% 2.8% 2.2% 1.9% 1.4% 1.3% 0.9% 4.5%
2000 38.6% 11.3% 6.5% 4.2% 2.8% 2.1% 1.6% 1.3% 1.2% 0.9% 3.9%
2001 39.1% 12.6% 6.7% 4.2% 3.0% 2.0% 1.6% 1.2% 1.1% 0.9% 3.6%
2002 41.6% 14.6% 8.1% 5.0% 3.3% 2.4% 1.8% 1.3% 1.0% 0.9% 3.5%
2003 43.4% 15.4% 8.8% 5.8% 3.6% 2.6% 1.8% 1.4% 1.0% 0.8% 3.2%
2004 41.4% 14.3% 9.2% 6.2% 4.3% 3.0% 2.0% 1.5% 1.2% 0.9% 3.2%
2005 41.4% 14.7% 8.9% 6.4% 4.5% 3.3% 2.4% 1.7% 1.2% 0.9% 3.3%
2006 40.5% 14.8% 9.0% 6.4% 4.8% 3.6% 2.7% 2.0% 1.5% 1.1% 3.6%
2007 41.2% 14.7% 8.8% 6.0% 4.4% 3.5% 2.7% 2.0% 1.5% 1.1% 3.4%
2007 increase 
over the 1993 to 
1999 average 33% 41% 52% 60% 67% 61% 47% 36% 24%
SOURCE: Department of Labor and Industries, Actuarial Service. 
 
Table 2.10 is key to understanding this process. We asked what the number of active 
time-loss claims was at the end of each year that had maturities of six or more years. The 
probability is high that many, if not most of these, would result eventually in a pension as shown 
earlier. Table 2.10 shows that at its peak in 1999, there were 3,938 (10.0 percent) active state 
fund claims that had been open for at least six years, and many of these were a good deal older. 
This number and proportion began to decline thereafter, until 2004 when the number and rate of 
active cases six years old or older, began to increase once again. In 2006, one in every nine 
recipients of time-loss benefits in the last quarter of the calendar year was drawing on a claim 
that had arisen six years or more before. The drop-off until 20003 in the number of active time-
loss claims with six or more years of maturity represented a promising opportunity to reduce the 
number of pension awards in the future. However, both the number and the rate of such “old”  
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claims are rising again and strongly suggest that there will be an increasing number of pensions 
in the future.30 
Table 2.10  The Number of State Fund Active Time-Loss Claims  at the End of Each Year  
                    that had been Open for Six or More Years 
 Number open Percentage of active claims 
Year 6 or more years open 6 or more years 
1993 2,959 8.4 
1994 3,107 8.6 
1995 3,278 8.7 
1996 3,431 8.8 
1997 3,740 9.5 
1998 3,903 9.8 
1999 3,938 10.0 
2000 3,437 8.9 
2001 3,208 8.4 
2002 3,220 8.5 
2003 3,050 8.2 
2004 3,192 8.8 
2005 3,437 9.5 
2006 3,852 10.9 
2007 3,710 10.7 
SOURCE: Data Warehouse, Department of Labor & Industries. 
In Tables 2.11 and 2.12 we see the distribution of pensions awarded by the age of the 
claim. The fundamental point here remains the significance of older time-loss claims in 
accounting for pensions and the growth of pensions from the late 1990s. The tables show that a 
large share of the pensions awarded in any year goes to claims where the work accident occurred 
10 or more years previously. In 2000 a high water mark was reached as over 38 percent of the 
pensions awarded that year went to claims that had been open for 10 or more years (Table 2.12). 
The number of these 10 year old or older cases that were pensioned peaked in 2002 (Table 2.11).  
After 2001 the proportion of claims pensioned that were this old fell sharply and by 2007, 
the rate of pensions awarded to this group had fallen to below 21 percent. However, the number 
of pensions granted to those with accident dates 10 years old or older did not fall immediately 
after 2001. Instead, the declining proportion reflected the growth in pensions for claims with 
shorter duration than existed before 2002. And the percentage of pensions granted to those with 
                                                 
30  If one focuses on long-duration open claims rather than older active claims, the period 1997 to 1999 also 
shows an increase over prior years. In those years the numbers of open claims that were six years old or older were 
6,005 (13.9%), 6,087 (14.0%) and 5,923 (13.7%) respectively. However, unlike the active claims six years or older 
that began to increase sharply after 2003 the number of open claims fell steadily after 1999. 
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injury dates of six or more years before, which accounted for over 70 percent of awards made in 
1999, has been falling and in 2006 was 51 percent.  
Table 2.11  The  Number of State Fund Claims Pensioned (TPD) in a Year that had been  
  Open for <1 to 10+ Years  
Years <1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 >= 10 Total 
1988 2 8 30 77 63 82 48 48 46 37 147 588 
1989 1 18 61 90 89 65 59 55 59 44 210 751 
1990 4 24 55 55 73 79 82 83 51 45 263 814 
1991 4 20 36 55 59 52 53 51 50 50 210 640 
1992 0 9 34 53 48 63 65 47 53 53 191 616 
1993 0 5 39 47 50 57 44 43 48 29 183 545 
1994 2 8 36 62 60 43 43 43 35 38 204 574 
1995 1 8 13 39 49 44 39 41 31 26 164 455 
1996 2 1 21 31 32 32 34 35 34 24 157 403 
1997 1 3 20 36 39 47 51 46 44 27 170 484 
1998 2 6 12 45 47 50 51 52 36 42 191 534 
1999 1 10 41 64 50 67 77 70 62 62 275 779 
2000 3 19 57 81 93 107 88 100 77 73 428 1,126 
2001 4 20 60 76 89 71 57 55 62 63 340 897 
2002 0 33 72 107 115 135 112 77 103 82 442 1,278 
2003 2 51 139 145 145 140 123 121 69 79 426 1,440 
2004 2 35 92 137 119 83 76 63 47 55 259 968 
2005 3 28 88 120 98 100 91 59 50 38 191 866 
2006 2 38 86 115 132 127 110 85 60 40 230 1,025 
SOURCE: Data Warehouse, Department of Labor & Industries. 
One of the very significant aspects shown in Table 2.11 is the growth in the number of pensions 
awarded to persons with open time-loss claims of substantially shorter durations. This is also 
demonstrated in Table 2.13 which lists the median number of years that a claim was open before 
a pension was awarded. From 1996 to 2001, the median number of years that a claim was open 
until the pension was granted was eight years or higher. By 2004 to 2007, the median had fallen 
to about six years. Obviously, something significant changed in the administration and 
adjudication of claims around 2002 such that relatively shorter (but not short) duration claims 
suddenly became an important source of the sizeable increase in pensions. Between 1996 and 
2003 pension awards for claims that were 2 to 3 years old jumped from 21 to 139 and those that 
were 3 to 4 years old increased from 31 awards to 145. We reiterate the central argument, that as 
the duration of open or active time-loss claims grow, pensions will follow.  
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Table 2.12  The Percentage of State Fund Claims Pensioned (TPD) in a Year that had been Open  
      for <1 to 10+ Years 
Years <1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 >= 10 
1994 0.35% 1.39% 6.27% 10.80% 10.45% 7.49% 7.49% 7.49% 6.10% 6.62% 35.54% 
1995 0.22% 1.76% 2.86% 8.57% 10.77% 9.67% 8.57% 9.01% 6.81% 5.71% 36.04% 
1996 0.50% 0.25% 5.21% 7.69% 7.94% 7.94% 8.44% 8.68% 8.44% 5.96% 38.96% 
1997 0.21% 0.62% 4.13% 7.44% 8.06% 9.71% 10.54% 9.50% 9.09% 5.58% 35.12% 
1998 0.37% 1.12% 2.25% 8.43% 8.80% 9.36% 9.55% 9.74% 6.74% 7.87% 35.77% 
1999 0.13% 1.28% 5.26% 8.22% 6.42% 8.60% 9.88% 8.99% 7.96% 7.96% 35.30% 
2000 0.27% 1.69% 5.06% 7.19% 8.26% 9.50% 7.82% 8.88% 6.84% 6.48% 38.01% 
2001 0.45% 2.23% 6.69% 8.47% 9.92% 7.92% 6.35% 6.13% 6.91% 7.02% 37.90% 
2002 0.00% 2.58% 5.63% 8.37% 9.00% 10.56% 8.76% 6.03% 8.06% 6.42% 34.59% 
2003 0.14% 3.54% 9.65% 10.07% 10.07% 9.72% 8.54% 8.40% 4.79% 5.49% 29.58% 
2004 0.21% 3.62% 9.50% 14.15% 12.29% 8.57% 7.85% 6.51% 4.86% 5.68% 26.76% 
2005 0.35% 3.23% 10.16% 13.86% 11.32% 11.55% 10.51% 6.81% 5.77% 4.39% 22.06% 
2006 0.20% 3.71% 8.39% 11.22% 12.88% 12.39% 10.73% 8.29% 5.85% 3.90% 22.44% 
2007 0.00% 3.08% 8.72% 13.60% 13.47% 10.78% 9.30% 8.85% 6.22% 5.26% 20.72% 
SOURCE: Data Warehouse, Department of Labor & Industries. 
 
Table 2.13  Median Years from Claim to Pension  
     Allowance–State Fund 
Year Pensions 
Median 
Years 
1989 751 6.8 
1990 815 7.5 
1991 639 7.8 
1992 616 7.8 
1993 545 7.7 
1994 574 7.8 
1995 455 7.9 
1996 403 8.5 
1997 484 8.0 
1998 534 8.1 
1999 779 8.1 
2000 1,127 8.2 
2001 897 8.3 
2002 1,279 7.8 
2003 1,448 6.8 
2004 969 6.2 
2005 869 5.9 
2006 1028 6.1 
2007 1,597 6.1 
SOURCE:  Data Warehouse, Department of Labor & Industries. 
That aside, a phenomenon that began later than the start of the rapid growth in the 
awarding of pensions, sometime around 2002, was the growth in pensions among shorter 
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duration open time-loss claims. This seems to represent a change in practice and may reflect a 
change in policy. If the pensions awarded to workers with claims open for two to four years had 
been granted in a number consistent with agency practice of previous years, there would have 
been several hundred fewer pensions awarded annually. Those searching for an explanation of 
the growth of pensions since around 2000 must look to this very significant change in L&I’s 
practices. 
A Note on Claims of Shorter Duration 
Because of the very strong tendency for longer duration cases to evolve into pensions, we 
believe they warrant considerable attention. Yet the simple fact is that long-duration cases evolve 
from those with a somewhat shorter duration and so we ask if there appears to be some reduction 
in the extent of those cases. The data provided by Actuarial Services suggest that this is not 
happening. Consider only those claims where any time-loss payments have been made in the last 
quarter of the year (active claims). For each single accident year 1993 through 1999, the rates of 
such claims as a proportion of time-loss claims from the same accident year were consistently 
lower than in the years since 2003 (Table 2.9). As an example, an average of 6.4 percent of those 
with claims of 3 years’ maturity were continuing to receive time loss in the years 2003 to 2007. 
By contrast, the comparable average from 1993 to 1999 was 4.3 percent.  
This tendency for duration to grow since around 2001 was repeated for all claim 
maturities, and much of that can be seen in Figure 2.9. As an example of how to understand the 
figure, the very top line in the figure indicates the proportion of claims that were still active two 
years since the date of injury. In the years shown, prior to 1980 less than six percent were active 
at two years since the date of injury. By contrast, over the latest five years, the proportion of 
time-loss cases active at two years from the date of injury was in the range of 14 percent.  
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Figure 2.9 
Active TPD and Timeloss Count Development as % of 
Timeloss Claims
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SOURCE:  Office of the Actuaries and the Data Warehouse, Department of Labor & Industries. 
Large and/or growing numbers of long-duration claims are dramatic as they certainly can 
be expected to have an impact on the number of pensions that will follow. Increasing rates for 
the shorter durations, even six months or one or two years, are not dramatic and therefore are 
likely to receive less attention. Yet to disregard increasing rates of claims that have not closed at 
these shorter durations can only serve as a red flag for what lies ahead. The linkages are clear. 
Higher rates of active claims of shorter durations, relative to new time-loss claims lead to higher 
rates of longer duration cases; and the latter are strongly associated with higher rates of pensions. 
As we shall see, the timing of when these awards are actually made are a product of the 
Department’s policies regarding closing claims but the raw material for these awards is the long-
duration cases. 
Efforts to Reduce Time-Loss Duration 
Steps to shorten average duration have been taken at various points for more than two 
decades and it seems fair to say that the problem has not been successfully or fully resolved. In 
Appendix 2.3 we show a time line of significant events that includes some of the efforts that 
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have been made by L&I to reduce the duration of time-loss claims. In the years before the 
pension upsurge began, the number of claims of six or more years’ duration were growing and 
the number of open time-loss claims from accident years 10 years or older was also very high. 
On the heels of various projects to reduce the average duration of time-loss claims, including 
pilot projects in Everett and Yakima begun in 1994, a total of 59 staff positions within L&I were 
reallocated to claims management in 1997. In 1998 money was made available by the legislature 
to fund 24 additional Claim Managers, with the proviso that time-loss duration be reduced by 5 
percent by June 30, 2000, and an additional 2.5 percent by June 30, 2001. The caseload for level 
2 Claim Managers was also expected to drop to approximately 190 by June 30, 2000. However, 
if substantial progress in attaining these goals was not achieved by June 30, 2000, the newly 
established positions and the funding for them would be discontinued.  
Following the earlier efforts and with the threat of the loss of some funding and positions 
if average duration was not reduced, yet another serious push was undertaken to remove long-
term time-loss claims from the roles. As has been noted above, one method of achieving this was 
to push the cases forward with the recommendation for a pension. Then it was up to the Pension 
Adjudicators to resolve the claim with a pension determination. Needless to say, this added 
considerably to the workloads of the Pension Adjudicators, both because of the increased number 
of pension determinations to be made by them, and because the average experience level of the 
Claim Managers was less due to the presence of newly acquired staff.  
The latter meant that Pension Adjudicators faced three choices. They could put in more 
work than customary to ready a claim for acceptance or rejection as a pension, though that would 
reduce the number of determinations that they could make. A second possibility was to send the 
file forward with less preparation than they were accustomed to doing. This option could result 
in more decisions made by Pension Adjudicators being overruled at the BIIA and/or in the 
courts. The third possibility was to send the file back to the Claim Managers and ask for more 
effort at that level in order to prepare the file better for the pension decision. However, this 
choice would lead to resistance from the Claim Managers and their supervisors, who were 
anxious to move claims out and not to have them bounced back from the Pension Adjudicator. 
Moreover, claims resolution by the Pension Adjudicators was encouraged in support of the time-
loss duration reduction efforts.  
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When efforts built up periodically to reduce backlogs the Department took several 
measures to resolve cases that were with the Pension Adjudicators. (Some of these specific 
measures are noted with their applicable dates in Appendix 2.3, the Timeline of Pension 
Relevant Events). In some instances overtime for the PAs was approved. At times, temporary 
assistance was provided by others in the Department who were tasked with preparing a file for 
review by the Pension Adjudicator. Also, Labor & Industries regularly turned to former Pension 
Adjudicators to return to work for portions of a year, as the budget allowed, to reduce the 
buildup of cases in that office.  
At various times the pressures to reduce the backlog of long-duration open claims created 
difficulties for the Pension Adjudicators. One of the results of that is the difficulty in evaluating 
when an upsurge was occurring in claims for pensions versus the awarding of pensions. Nothing 
may make this more evident than the data from 2007 in Table 2.14. The very large number of 
pensions awarded that year, 2,390, was actually 619 claims more than the number of pension 
referrals received by the Pension Adjudicators that year. In 2007, a very serious effort was made 
to reduce the PA’s backlog of pension referrals and the backlog dropped in that year by 599. The 
large jump in pensions awarded that year reflects a shortfall of awards in 2006 due to a buildup 
in cases to be resolved. Additionally, one should observe the very high rate of pensions granted 
as a percent of cases reviewed in 2007. It may be that in an attempt to clear out the backlog, 
some of the reviews were completed with less than the same degree of scrutiny than occurred in 
earlier years. It is notable that the ratio of pensions granted to pensions reviewed jumped from 
1998 to 2000 as the upsurge in awards occurred, and this rate has remained relatively high since 
then. 
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Table 2.14  Pension Adjudicator Pension Activity 1990–2007 
Year 
Pension 
referrals 
Referrals 
reviewed 
Pensions 
granted 
% of 
Reviewed 
cases 
granted 
Backlog 
change PA FTEs 
Pension   
referrals/  
PA FTEs 
Referrals 
reviewed/ 
PA FTEs 
Pensions 
granted / 
PA FTEs 
1990 637 1,349 799 59% -712 36 17.7 37.5 22.2 
1991 1,340 1,209 684 57% 131 36 37.2 33.6 19 
1992 1,236 1,264 659 52% -28 37 33.4 34.2 17.8 
1993 1,186 1,104 562 51% 82 36 32.9 30.7 15.6 
1994 1,044 1,101 605 55% -57 48 21.8 22.9 12.6 
1995 995 886 502 57% 109 54 18.4 16.4 9.3 
1996 896 842 447 53% 54 60 14.9 14 7.5 
1997 972 947 541 57% 25 63 15.4 15 8.3 
1998 933 993 597 60% -60 88 10.6 11.3 6.8 
1999 1,273 1,390 862 62% -117 81 15.7 17.2 10.6 
2000 1,956 1,949 1,349 69% 7 98 20 19.9 13.8 
2001 1,654 1,463 987 67% 191 143 11.6 10.2 6.9 
2002 1,757 1,904 1,381 73% -147 101 17.4 18.9 9.8 
2003 2,201 2,158 1,573 73% 43 119 18.5 18.1 13.2 
2004 1,689 1,613 1,090 68% 76 100 16.9 16.1 10.9 
2005 1,639 1,377 938 68% 262 103 15.9 13.4 9.1 
2006 1,696 1,575 1,131 72% 121 107 15.9 14.7 10.6 
2007 1,791 2,390 1,772 74% -599 99 18.1 24.1 17.9 
Notes:  
1. Data from monthly pension adjudicator unit reports. 
2. Attorney referrals forwarded directly to claim managers for review in December 2005. 
3. Backlog change: Referrals minus Reviewed. 
SOURCE: Data Warehouse, Department of Labor & Industries. 
Conclusion 
It seems likely that all of the strategies mentioned above were used during the period as 
the growth in pensions accelerated. Combined with the large number of very long-duration 
claims, with the established tendency for such claims to evolve into pensions, and various 
concerted efforts to remove these claims from the roles, the increase in pension awards was the 
natural consequence. It must be emphasized that we are not suggesting that policy and practice 
changes at L&I were the direct cause for open claims to become pensions. Instead, the concerted 
push to close claims is likely to have contributed to a lumpiness in the number of pensions that 
were awarded in certain time periods, thereby precipitating the rapid growth in the number of 
pensions actually awarded between 1996 and 2003. The increase in the number of pensions 
awarded to shorter term time-loss claims, say of three to four years vintage, has also contributed 
both to the lumpiness and to the growth in the number of pensions. We have not been able to 
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establish the reason for L&I’s movement to reducing the period of time before pensions are 
awarded. 
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LABOR MARKET CONTRIBUTED TO THE GROWTH IN 
PENSIONS 
Conditions in the labor market are of special importance to activity in the workers’ 
compensation system. For many reasons, labor shortages or surpluses along with other 
variations, impact on the frequency of claims, their duration, the types of disabilities for which 
claims are made and their costs. We briefly describe this relationship and then focus on 
Washington and its experience in recent years. 
Strong or Weak Labor Market Conditions 
Labor market conditions that we characterize as “strong” exist when the demand for labor 
is high relative to the supply. In such conditions employers encounter challenges in recruiting 
and holding on to their work force. “Weak” labor markets exist when the supply of available 
labor exceeds the demand, and workers have difficulty finding and retaining employment. Of 
course, some labor markets will be relatively stronger or weaker than others but it is convenient 
here to simply think in dichotomous terms. Strength or weakness in the labor market directly 
impacts both the likelihood of experiencing work injuries or illnesses and the utilization of the 
workers’ compensation program, as well as the likelihood of a successful return to work after 
injury.  
Where labor markets are very strong the impact on workplace injuries or illnesses will be 
affected by the following: 
• hours of work; 
• experience; 
• training; and  
• maintenance. 
Longer hours of work are correlated with strength in the labor market. As such, periods 
of relatively strong demand are associated with the likelihood that fatigue, haste, and lack of 
concentration by workers and supervisors can lead to accidents that result in injuries and 
fatalities.  
During periods of very strong demand for labor, employers are forced to be less selective 
as they recruit or employ workers. Digging deeper into the barrel, employers are forced to use 
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workers that they would otherwise not use in certain positions. During strong labor markets, 
employee quit rates increase as workers seek employment opportunities that provide better 
wages, benefits and/or potential future advantage. This churning in the labor market also results 
in less experienced employees at work in specific jobs. Recent labor market entrants are better 
able to find work and to take positions for which they would not normally be eligible. Workers 
with less experience in employment or in specific positions are more likely to suffer accidents at 
work. 
During periods of high demand for labor and high levels of production, employers tend to 
devote less time to training workers, both in the work that they perform and in assuring that safe 
practices are understood and utilized. Employers recognize that periods of very strong labor 
market demand will be followed by periods with more “downtime,” and sometimes will delay 
training until this can be provided with less loss of production. As with the case of employee 
training, maintenance of plant and equipment is frequently postponed until periods when less 
production is needed. And as in the case of training, less maintenance is associated with 
increasing rates of work accidents.  
While periods of very strong demand for labor are likely to contribute to accident 
frequency, they also impact workers’ compensation programs. In strong labor markets employers 
are more likely to re-employ workers that have been temporarily disabled as the need for them is 
great and alternative (experienced) labor is difficult to recruit. Employers will use a variety of 
inducements and workplace modifications to retain their workers when the need for workers is 
great and replacements are not readily available. Even if the work injury makes it difficult for a 
person to resume their pre-injury employment, modified or alternative opportunities may allow 
the injured worker to promptly find other employment. As such, the duration of time spent on 
time-loss is likely to be less when the labor market is strong. 
In a weak labor market, a worker may be reluctant to report a work accident out of a 
concern that it will result in the loss of income and possible job loss. As a result, weak labor 
markets will lead to some underreporting by workers of accidents and injuries. Moreover, if they 
are injured they may minimize the degree of injury fearing that this will lead to job loss and 
unemployment in an environment of job scarcity. Conversely, it is well known that employee 
layoffs often lead to a flurry of claims for workers’ compensation. Workers who have sustained 
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workplace injuries and illnesses can report them and seek compensation without fear of this 
causing job loss when employers have laid them off already for economic reasons. 
The above comments pertain to workers’ compensation systems throughout the U.S. and 
elsewhere and are not unique to Washington. However, we believe that Washington State’s 
workers’ compensation system may be more sensitive to some of these effects than most other 
states. In particular many workers’ compensation systems in the U.S,. and in other countries as 
well, provide permanent disability compensation strictly on the basis of the degree of medically-
rated impairment. In those jurisdictions the conditions in the labor market are unlikely to directly 
affect the permanent disability benefit to which a worker is entitled. Hence, no matter how strong 
or weak the labor market is in such states, the disability rating will not reflect this.  
Other states in the U.S. that do not rate disability strictly on the basis of the degree of 
impairment typically pay on the basis of the loss of wage earning capacity. This benefit 
customarily is strongly linked to the degree of impairment and on the judgment regarding how 
this is likely to affect the future earnings of the worker. Given the difficulty inherent in making 
such subjective forecasts, insurers and workers will typically use lump-sum settlement 
agreements to close the claim. Neither of these options exists in Washington.  
Our point is not to endorse or to reject this method of resolving claims. Instead, it is 
simply to point out that the incidence of total permanent disability in Washington is heavily 
dependent upon the job opportunities that exist in the period after a worker has sustained an 
injury that results in a permanent disability. Should a worker sustain a permanent impairment 
through a work injury or illness, the odds that this will result in a pensionable claim depends very 
heavily on the availability of job opportunities that are appropriate for this individual. In weak 
labor markets, relatively few such opportunities may exist for individuals with an impairment, 
and are especially problematic for individuals whose age, education, language limitations or 
experience make them of limited attractiveness to employers.  
Employment Growth and Unemployment 
One of the indicators of the strength of labor markets is the extent of growth in 
employment experienced over some time period. By that measure, Washington State has had an 
excellent record looking back as far as 1990. From 1990 through 2006 (non-farm) employment 
increased by a substantial 33.2 percent, far outpacing the national rate of employment growth of 
21.5 percent. (Table 2.15) Breaking that down into shorter periods, we find that Washington’s 
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employment grew from 1990 to 1995, from 1995 to 2000 and from 2001 to 2006 at rates of 9.5 
percent, 15.4 percent, and 5.7 percent, respectively. For the same periods the growth of 
employment in the U.S. was only 5.1 percent, 9.6 percent, and 5.4 percent. 
It needs to be noted however, that the period of especially active employment creation in 
Washington occurred in the 1990s but that a serious contraction followed. The employment level 
actually fell from 2000 to 2001, and it fell again between 2001 and 2002. From 2002 to 2003, the 
number of persons employed was unchanged. Although some employment growth resumed in 
2004, employment for the year was still below the level that had been reached in 2000. Clearly, 
after years of very substantial employment creation Washington’s labor market had run out of 
steam by 2001. 
Table 2.15  Washington and U.S. Employment 1990–2006,  
       in millions 
   
Year 
All non-farm 
employees 
Washington  
U.S. 
employment  
     
1990 2.15  118.8  
1991 2.17  117.7  
1992 2.22  118.5  
1993 2.26  120.3  
1994 2.30  123.1  
1995 2.36  124.9  
1996 2.41  126.7  
1997 2.52  129.6  
1998 2.60  131.5  
1999 2.64  133.5  
2000 2.72  136.9  
2001 2.71  136.9  
2002 2.65  136.5  
2003 2.65  137.7  
2004 2.70  139.3  
2005 2.77  141.7  
2006 2.86  144.4  
SOURCE: US Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Yet another conventional indicator of the strength of the labor market is the 
unemployment rate. In Table 2.16 we show this rate for Washington and the U.S. as a whole for 
the 1990–2006 period. Notice that although Table 2.15 indicated more substantial growth in 
employment in Washington than in the nation as a whole for the entire period and for sub-
periods, a very different picture emerges with Table 2.16. Washington experienced a rate of 
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unemployment that was lower than the national rate only in1990 to 1992. Thereafter, the 
unemployment rate in Washington has exceeded the national rate in every year through 2006. 
For many workers who sustained occupational injuries or illnesses in the early 1990s, 
they were challenged by a very weak labor market with an average unemployment rate for the 
state over the four years of almost 6.8 percent. Many of those who became pensioners in 1997 or 
thereafter began their time-loss benefits during the difficult economic times that began in the 
early 1990s. Clearly, job opportunities for those who lost their jobs for any reason could be 
scarce. After 1992, Washington experienced an unemployment rate that was consistently higher 
than the national average, and substantially higher in many of those years. Specifically, from 
2000 to 2003, the state’s unemployment rate exceeded the national rate by fully 1 to 1.5 
percentage points and a relatively wide gap has continued until recently.  
Table 2.16  Washington and U.S. Unemployment Rates 1990–2006 
Year U.S.% Washington%  
1990 5.6 5.1  
1991 6.8 6.3  
1992 7.5 7.2  
1993 6.9 7.1  
1994 6.1 6.5  
1995 5.8 6.3  
1996 5.4 5.9  
1997 4.8 4.9  
1998 4.5 4.8  
1999 4.2 4.8  
2000 4.0 5.0  
2001 4.7 6.2  
2002 5.8 7.3  
2003 6.0 7.4  
2004 5.5 6.3  
2005 5.1 5.5  
2006 4.6 5.0  
SOURCE: US Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
We briefly consider Washington’s labor market experience over the period of the pension 
upsurge, although the period before that played some role in the likelihood of injured workers 
finding employment.31 In 1997, overall employment growth in the state was relatively strong but 
almost 80 percent of this was centered in the Puget Sound region, and a much lower rate of 
employment growth occurred in the balance of the state. While 1998 began as a strong year there 
                                                 
31  Most of the data on which this section is based are taken from the annual Washington State Labor 
Market and Economic Reports. 
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were sizeable layoffs at Boeing in the second half of the year. The Puget Sound region continued 
to lead the state in employment growth. Computer software and the high tech sector were 
significant contributors to strong growth while the timber and natural resource rich parts of the 
state continued to experience high rates of unemployment.  
Although 1999 was the third year in a row that the state’s unemployment rate was below 
five percent, employment growth was selective. White collar employment in computer software, 
social services, finance, health care, and public and private education was strong. Weakness in 
the timber and agricultural areas and much of eastern Washington continued. The same 
conditions continued into 2000 as the unemployment rate drifted up to 5.0 for the state, and was 
between 7 and 8 percent in the timber and natural resource dependent areas of the state. Aircraft 
and parts continued its slide with 87,000 fewer jobs in the state in 2000 than less than two 
decades earlier.  
The year 2001 was a poor one for the labor market and total employment fell from the 
level of 2000. In 2001 and 2002 the entire nation experienced a recession but Washington’s 
unemployment rate in both years was 1.5 percentage points above the U.S. average. With 
continuing job losses in manufacturing, along with most other sectors, even King County 
experienced serious job losses in this period. Some weakness continued into 2003 so that from 
mid-1998 to September 2003 manufacturing employment fell by 26 percent.  
By 2004 the state’s employment level was still below the level achieved in 2000. While 
employment in the Seattle region bounced up in 2004, employment was still below that of 2000. 
And from mid-1998 to mid-2004 the aerospace sector had lost a total of 52,000 jobs. Years 2005 
through 2007 have been stronger years for employment in the state although job gains were 
strongest in professional and business service sectors. 
How well has Washington done compared to other states and the nation as a whole? The 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics has begun publishing a ranking of states based on the annual 
unemployment rates. Table 2.17 shows the comparative ranking achieved by Washington from 
2000 to 2006. In 2000 Washington’s unemployment rate ranked 44th out of 51 jurisdictions (50 
states and the District of Columbia), that is, only 7 states had a higher average unemployment 
rate for the year. From 2001 through 2003, Washington ranked 48th, 50th, and 49th respectively 
among the states in its unemployment rate. Clearly, by this measure Washington’s comparative 
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performance must be viewed as highly problematic and one of the worst in the nation, for this 
period. 
Table 2.17  States Ranked by Unemployment Rates 
Year 
Washington’s  
Ranking* 
2000 44 
2001 48 
2002 50 
2003 49 
2004 43 
2005 40 
2006 37 
Note: * The higher the number, the worse the comparative position of the state. 
SOURCE: US Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
How does one reconcile the relatively (and in some cases absolutely) high rates of 
unemployment that Washington has experienced since 1993 to the middle of this decade and the 
impressive rate of job creation that has occurred over much of the same time period? Clearly, an 
increase in the labor force participation rate could account at most for only a small portion of this 
seeming disparity. What can explain this are the relatively high rates of in-migration to the state, 
particularly by persons seeking employment in some of the higher paid and more skilled 
positions in certain industries. Washington has been a high growth state, population-wise, for the 
period under concern here. From 1990 to 2000 Washington’s population grew by 21.1 percent 
compared with the nation’s growth of 13.1 percent. This made Washington the 10th fastest 
growing state population-wise in the country for that decade. And Washington’s population 
continued to grow faster than the nation’s in the period 2000 to 2006, with a rate of 8.5 percent 
compared with 6.4 percent for the entire nation.  
While this movement of workers into the state was occurring, some regions in the state 
and some workers with lower skill levels were experiencing job loss and prolonged 
unemployment. A number of commentators have mentioned the issue of “the two Washingtons” 
with some areas of the state experiencing strong economic performance while others have done 
very poorly. Table 2.18 lists the reported unemployment rates for Washington’s 11 metro 
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statistical areas. The variations in experience are very large and do conform to a “two 
Washingtons” argument.32  
Table 2.18  Unemployment Rates (%) Washington, Washington MSAs 
    Kennewick    Seattle     
 Washington  Bremerton Richland  M. Vernon  Bellevue     
Year State Bellingham Silverdale Pasco Longview Anacortes Olympia Everett Spokane Tacoma Wenatchee Yakima
1990 5.1 5.1 4.0 7.0 6.7 6.7 4.8 4.0 5.4 4.6 8.1 10.7
1991 6.3 6.5 4.9 8.0 8.0 8.3 5.8 5.0 6.1 6.1 9.6 12.4
1992 7.2 7.4 5.8 8.1 10.2 9.9 6.4 5.9 6.6 7.2 10.1 13.1
1993 7.1 7.3 6.4 7.6 10.3 10.6 6.6 6.0 5.7 7.1 9.3 13.6
1994 6.5 7.6 6.2 6.2 8.5 9.4 6.4 5.6 5.1 6.7 8.2 12.0
1995 6.3 7.0 6.4 7.7 7.3 8.5 6.0 5.5 5.2 6.0 8.8 12.2
1996 5.9 6.5 5.8 8.1 7.4 8.3 5.7 5.0 5.0 5.4 8.5 11.7
1997 4.9 5.5 5.1 6.7 6.5 6.6 4.7 4.1 4.2 4.2 6.8 9.2
1998 4.8 5.0 4.5 6.5 6.7 6.2 4.2 4.1 4.2 3.9 7.0 9.1
1999 4.8 4.8 4.6 6.1 6.6 5.9 4.3 4.0 4.9 4.3 7.5 9.4
2000 5.0 5.1 5.0 5.4 6.3 5.8 4.6 4.2 5.2 5.0 6.3 7.6
2001 6.2 6.5 6.0 6.2 9.4 7.1 5.7 5.1 6.6 6.5 7.8 9.4
2002 7.3 6.9 6.7 6.8 10.7 8.3 6.5 6.3 7.7 8.0 8.3 9.6
2003 7.4 6.8 6.7 7.3 10.0 8.2 6.5 6.4 7.6 8.2 8.2 9.6
2004 6.3 5.8 5.8 6.3 8.4 6.9 5.8 5.3 6.5 7.0 6.7 8.5
2005 5.5 5.0 5.1 6.1 7.3 5.9 5.1 4.8 5.7 5.9 5.8 7.4
2006 5.0 4.6 4.8 6.1 6.6 5.2 4.6 4.3 5.0 5.2 5.1 6.9
SOURCE: US Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Consider the Yakima area which had double digit unemployment rates from 1990 until 
1996 and then experienced rates of nine percent or higher in six of the seven years following 
1996. Observe that the Yakima area had an unemployment rate of 13.6 percent in 1993. The 
Longview area had unemployment rates that averaged over 10 percent from 2001 to 2003. The 
Mount Vernon-Anacortes area had high rates of unemployment over much of this time as did 
Wenatchee. Spokane’s performance was relatively good through 1998 but since 1999, it has had 
consistently higher rates of unemployment than the balance of the state.  
By contrast with these areas the Olympia region has consistently had unemployment rates 
below the rest of the state, at or below five percent in most years after 1995. The Seattle-
Bellevue-Everett area has witnessed relatively and absolutely low rates of unemployment, 
although it was impacted by the national slowdown after 2001. It is an area that is highly 
dependent on the economic activity of some very large employers. Even if one of these 
                                                 
32  The “two Washingtons” is used to refer to large differences in the economies of separate parts of the 
state. It has been used to describe the difference between eastern and western portions of the state, or rural versus 
urban or metro versus non-metro portions.  
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businesses is forced to lay off workers temporarily, the region can remain strong if other large 
businesses retain their labor force. Over much of this period, down periods for some of these 
firms were counterbalanced by strength in others. However, the skills required to build aerospace 
products are not necessarily applicable to writing lines of software for other employers.  
Disadvantaged Workers and Work Injuries and Illnesses 
Some individuals have significant disadvantages in the labor market. In particular, 
categories of individuals including those with lower levels of education, limited English 
language skills, minorities, and the elderly are generally found to have higher rates of 
unemployment and/or face longer durations without finding work after leaving a job. That aside, 
individuals with a work injury or illness and resulting job loss—and possibly some degree of 
permanent impairment—also are known to face disadvantage in the job market. Strong evidence 
points to an unfortunate synergy for those who are otherwise disadvantaged in the labor market 
and also sustain a work injury. Given the approach used by Washington to compensate workers 
with permanent impairments or longer-term time-loss claims, it is very likely that a worker with 
a preexisting disadvantage in the labor market will become a candidate for a pension.   
The Workers Compensation Research Institute has undertaken a number of studies that 
follow up workers with workers’ compensation claims involving more than seven days of lost 
time. Among other issues relating to return to work, the interviewees in a nine-state study were 
asked the following question:33  
Have you ever been able to work 1 full month at a time before having to leave work again because of your 
injury? 
 
If a respondent answered “No,” the study classified them as not having had a “substantial 
return to work.” (A subset of this group indicated that they never had any return to work at all 
since their injury.) The workers interviewed had been injured from 2.5 to 3.5 years before the 
interview, so that a substantial amount of time had passed since the disabling injury or illness. 
Strikingly, the study reported that not having a substantial return to work was not correlated with 
the severity of the injury, according to the individual’s self-reported assessment. But there 
appeared to be a consistently strong association between never having a substantial return to 
work in the 2.5 to 3.5 years since the injury and with pre-injury attributes that are associated with 
disadvantage in the labor market.  
                                                 
33  Belton, Victor, Liu, and Fox, 2007. 
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Table 2.19 reports on several of these attributes. A much higher proportion of 
respondents never had a substantial return to work if their educational attainment level was low. 
For example, in California 38 percent of those with a grade school education or less never had a 
substantial return to work following their compensable work injury compared to 17 percent for 
those who had at least some college. While the ethnicity of the respondents was not asked, some 
individuals indicated that they preferred to be interviewed in Spanish rather than English. 
Although the numbers preferring to be interviewed in Spanish were too small to be meaningful 
in five of the states, in the other four states the “never returned to substantial employment rate” 
was considerably higher for those who responded in Spanish. In Texas, for example, 55 percent 
of those interviewed in Spanish never had a substantial return to work, compared with 26 percent 
who were interviewed in English.  
Table 2.19  Substantial Returns to Work among Workers with Pre-injury Attributes  
                    Associated with Disadvantage in the Labor Market 
  
Percentage with no 
substantial return to work     
           
  CA CT FL MA NC PA TN TX WI 
Highest school grade         
completed          
           
College grad or higher 17 12 17 12 15 9 18 18 6 
Some college 17 10 20 12 20 11 20 25 14 
High school 22 20 24 18 15 14 21 24 14 
Some high school 20 14 34 34 28 27 29 37 23 
Grade school or less 38 32 25 * 40 * 34 73 * 
           
Language of interview          
           
English  19 15 22 17 19 14 22 26 14 
Spanish  37 42 39 * * * * 55 * 
           
Age in years at injury          
           
18-34  15 14 11 10 19 10 14 22 8 
35-54  19 15 23 17 18 15 22 31 12 
55 and older 33 18 30 35 23 18 32 41 23 
Note: *  Cell size too small to yield reliable numbers. 
SOURCE: Belton, Victor, Liu, and Fox, 2007, Tables 4.4 and 4.9. 
Similarly, older workers, especially those aged 55 and above, reported far higher rates of 
never having had a substantial return to work than for younger individuals. The report also noted 
that in each of the nine states those who never had a substantial return to work had a pre-injury 
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wage that was lower than that of persons who did have a substantial return to work. The results 
from the nine-state study are likely to be consistent with the situation in Washington. In the 2003 
review of 100 claims conducted by the Pension Adjudicators, 46 percent of those who had 
recently been classified as permanently and totally disabled had less than a high school 
education. Additionally, the study found that 18 percent of the sample had a “language barrier.” 
If the strength or weakness in the local labor market affects the probability of a worker 
receiving a pension, then we would expect that the distressed areas of the state would account for 
a disproportionately large share of the pensions granted. One large-scale study of over 28,000 
injured workers in Washington State during the years 1987 to 1989 found claims were likely to 
be of longer duration for workers from counties with high unemployment rates.34The Department 
of Employment Security in conjunction with the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics periodically 
identifies economically distressed counties based on unemployment rates. Using the counties that 
were so identified for the three-year period of 1997–1999, we calculated the proportion of 
pensions awarded to time-loss claims for the entire 1995–2000 period for both the economically 
distressed counties and for all other counties in the state.35 The county in which the work 
accident occurred is the one of record here. Table 2.20 shows the results and they indicate that 
the distressed areas did account for a substantially higher proportion of the pensions to time-loss 
ratio. For the self-insured enterprises, the pension to time-loss rate was fully 50 percent higher in 
the distressed counties than in the rest of the state. For state fund claims, the rate of pensions was 
76 percent greater in the distressed counties than in the balance of the state. 
                                                 
34  Cheadle, Franklin, Wolfhagen, et al., 1994. 
35  1997–99 was selected as the three-year period to identify the distressed counties as this was the 
beginning of the upsurge period. Had we selected another three-year window many of the distressed counties would 
have been the same. The choice of the five-year period to consider the number and rates of pensions awarded was 
thought to be long enough to capture any affects of weak labor markets on pension rates. 
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Table 2.20  Pensions Awarded Relative to Time-Loss Claims, Economically Distressed  
and Other Counties, 1995–2000 
  *Economically Distressed Counties All Other Counties 
Liability 
TL claims 
with DOI 
1995-2000 
Pensions with 
DOI 1995-
2000 
TPD pension 
percentage 
TL claims 
with DOI 
1995-2000
Pensions with 
DOI 1995-
2000 
TPD pension 
percentage 
    
Self-insured 17,847 89 0.50% 84,551 312 0.37% 
State fund 47,218 1,386 2.94% 142,827 2,379 1.67% 
DOI = Date of Injury 
*Economically distressed counties: Adams, Benton, Chelan, Clallam, Columbia, Cowlitz,  
Douglas, Ferry, Franklin, Grant, Grays Harbor, Jefferson, Kittitas, Klickitat, Lewis,  
Mason, Okanogan, Pacific, Pend Oreille, Skagit, Skamania, Stevens, Wahkiakum,  
Walla Walla, Yakima. 
SOURCE: Washington Department of Employment Security. 
 
As noted above another source of difficulty in the labor market can be if the injured 
worker is also a member of an economically disadvantaged minority. With the same approach 
used in considering the economically distressed counties, we examined the rate of pensions 
awarded as a proportion of time-loss claims in those counties with a large minority group 
population and compared those with the experience of counties in the rest of the state. The 
results are shown in Table 2.21. The rates of pensions to time-loss claims for the period 1995–
2000 are higher by 47 percent for state fund cases in the high minority population counties than 
in the other counties in the state. For the self-insured, the rates in high minority population 
counties are about 40 percent above those in the other counties in the state. Clearly, the data for 
economically distressed and high minority counties are consistent with the notion that workers 
with labor market challenges are less likely to be able to resume gainful employment after a 
work injury or illness than those without such pre-existing disadvantages. These personal 
characteristics may also interact with the types of employment that are found in the worker’s 
region. 
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Table 2.21  Pensions Awarded Relative to Time-Loss Claims, High Minority Group Population and  
     Other Counties, 1995–2000 
  
Counties with a High Minority Group 
Population* All Other Counties 
Liability 
TL claims 
with DOI 
1995-2000 
Pensions 
with DOI 
1995-2000 
TPD 
pension 
percentage 
TL claims 
with DOI 
1995-2000 
Pensions with 
DOI 1995-
2000 
TPD pension 
percentage 
       
Self-insured 9,610 51 0.53% 92,788 350 0.38% 
State fund 23,984 662 2.76% 166,061 3,103 1.87% 
DOI = Date of Injury 
*Counties with a High Minority Group Population: Adams, Benton, Chelan, Columbia, 
Douglas, Ferry, Franklin, Grant, Okanogan, Walla Walla, Yakima. 
SOURCE: Census of Population and Housing, 1990, MARS files of Washington State,  
    U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1991. 
Conclusion 
To summarize, conditions in the labor market can have an impact on injury rates, on the 
level of workers’ compensation utilization, and on the success of return-to-work efforts by 
injured workers. Difficulty in the labor market for an individual is likely to increase the 
probability that an injured worker cannot return to employment and the earnings level that 
existed before the injury or illness. That difficulty may be the result of economic weakness in the 
injured worker’s community or region, and/or it may result from personal characteristics that 
contribute to difficulty in finding and retaining employment except when the labor market is very 
strong. Unlike that of most jurisdictions Washington’s approach to pensions in its workers’ 
compensation program likely is being used to provide income support for some of these 
individuals when they are injured and disabled. Thus, we conclude that labor market conditions 
have played an important part in the pension rise in Washington.  
 
THE SECOND-INJURY FUND WAS IMPORTANT IN THE GROWTH OF PENSIONS 
FOR THE SELF-INSURED  
At one time most states had one type or another of second-injury funds to encourage 
employers to employ or re-employ persons with some form of impairment. Many of these 
programs date from the aftermath of World War II, and in recent years some have fallen into 
disfavor in some jurisdictions and many are being or have been shut down.36 Although the 
second-injury funds all appear to support the same goal, their characteristics vary considerably. 
                                                 
36  “Workers’ Comp Second Injury Funds: Going, Going, Gone,” Insurance Journal, Feb. 9, 2004. The 
article notes that almost 20 such funds had been closed in recent years. 
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Washington’s system provides that the fund is to come into play:  
 
Whenever a worker has a previous bodily disability from any previous injury or disease, whether known or 
unknown to the employer, and shall suffer a further disability from injury or occupational disease in 
employment covered by this title and become (sic) totally and permanently disabled from the combined 
effects thereof…”37 
 
If the second injury or illness itself would have caused a permanent and total disability, second-
injury fund relief would not be granted: 
 
To qualify for second injury fund relief an employer must establish that the disability resulting from the 
injury would not have been total but for the pre-existing condition.38 
 
When these conditions are met the fund will be used to reduce the employer’s insurance 
costs in one of two ways, depending upon whether the employer is insured with the State Fund or 
if it self insures. In either case the employer bears financial responsibility for the disability 
resulting from the work injury that gave rise to the claim for compensation. However, for an 
employer insured through the state fund, the enterprise’s experience record is only affected by 
the extent to which the new injury has caused disability. Whatever portion of the cost of 
disability is attributed to the effects of the pre-existing disability is not charged to the employer’s 
experience record. When the claim of a worker with a work injury or occupational disease has 
been found to qualify for payments from the second-injury fund subsequent to the regular time 
for the computation of the employer’s experience record, the Department is authorized by law to 
make appropriate adjustments including cash refunds or credits to the employer. 
In the case of self-insured enterprises that participate in the second-injury fund, they too 
are liable for the cost of compensation attributable to the new work injury only.39 Where the 
worker’s permanent and total disability results from the combined effects of the new 
occupational injury or illness and the pre-existing condition, then some portion of the cost is 
apportioned to the second-injury fund. If the worker would not have had a permanent and totally 
disabling condition but for the preexisting condition, then the self-insured employer is relieved of 
the financial liability of the pension. In either the state fund insured or the self-insured enterprise 
                                                 
37  RCW 51.16.120 
38  Jussila v. Department of Labor & Industries 370 P.2d 582 (1962). 
39  Some public entities that self insure in Washington choose not to participate in the second-injury fund. 
In that case they do not make payments to the fund nor are they eligible to draw from it. 
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the determination of the degree to which the pre-existing condition contributed to the worker’s 
disability and to the resulting total permanent disability is made by “medical experts.” 
In the typical claim resulting in second-injury fund involvement, a worker is paid time-
loss benefits until the pension effective date. The pension effective date is typically one to two 
months after the worker is thought to have entered total permanent disability to allow for the 
processing of paperwork, e.g., option selection, which is necessary to establish the worker’s 
pension. For the worker, the precise date when he/she is found to have become permanently and 
totally disabled may matter not at all. However, for the employer, the date at which the worker is 
considered to have become permanently and totally disabled means that the responsibility for 
compensation shifts to the second-injury fund.40  
Payments made for time-loss benefits by the self-insured employer that are judged to 
have been after the date that total permanent disability occurred will be refunded. Any medical 
costs that are incurred for the work caused condition after the effective pension date remain with 
the self-insured employer as the second-injury fund is not funded to provide medical benefits 41 
Thus, an employer can save on its compensation costs both by having a worker found to be 
permanently and totally disabled which was the result at least in part of the workers’ pre-existing 
condition, and by identifying the earliest date at which this status occurred.  
Is there evidence that self-insured employers actually act on their incentive to have the 
total permanent disability status established as quickly as possible? Figure 2.10 is strongly 
suggestive of that as it shows that in many of the years covered by the figure, the time to pension 
allowance was far less than the median time for State Fund pensions. 
                                                 
40  See the BIIA decision, IN RE  Harold McCormack 90 3178 (1992). 
41  BIIA decision, IN RE Crella Boudon 98 17459 (2000). 
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Figure 2.10 
Median Years from Injury to TPD Pension Allowance
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SOURCE:  Office of the Actuaries, Department of Labor & Industries. 
In instances when self-insured employers have overpaid benefits, the Department is to 
reimburse the employer. In such cases L&I, not the employer, is to seek recovery from the 
worker.42 Decisions by the Department that were not favorable to the self-insured have been 
appealed, and there have been reversals of the agency by the BIIA that have saved additional 
compensation costs to employers.  
We have been told that both self-insured employers and some state fund insureds have 
become much more aware in recent years of their potential to save money by seeking relief from 
the second-injury fund. The data on the usage of the second-injury fund in pension cases appears 
in Table 2.22. Unfortunately, reliable data from the state fund’s cases are available only since 
2004. However, for these last four years where data are available, it is striking that the resort to 
the second-injury fund is so much higher for the self-insured than for the state fund claims. The 
number of pensions awarded in state fund cases is actually three times higher than in self-insured 
claims, but the utilization of the second-injury fund is higher for the self-insured employers than 
                                                 
42  BIIA decision, IN RE Frederick Cuendet 99 21825 (2001). 
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for the State Fund in three of the last four years. We presume that this reflects the greater 
financial incentive for self-insured enterprises to seek second-injury fund relief. 
Table 2.22  Second-Injury Fund Relief for Pensions, 1987–2007 
Calendar 
year 
SF pensions 
allowed 
SF pensions 
with 2nd 
injury fund 
relief 
Percent of SF 
pensions with 
2nd injury 
fund relief
SI pensions 
allowed
SI pensions 
with 2nd injury 
fund relief
Percent of SI 
pensions with 
2nd injury 
fund relief
1987       85 51 60.0%
1988       127 82 64.6%
1989       122 90 73.8%
1990       147 113 76.9%
1991       137 93 67.9%
1992       169 128 75.7%
1993       179 141 78.8%
1994       162 140 86.4%
1995       162 133 82.1%
1996       174 155 89.1%
1997       237 213 89.9%
1998       181 164 90.6%
1999       208 184 88.5%
2000       213 185 86.9%
2001       211 179 84.8%
2002       270 236 87.4%
2003       315 288 91.4%
2004 968 186 19.2% 281 241 85.8%
2005 866 162 18.7% 246 217 88.2%
2006 1,026 163 15.9% 322 282 87.6%
2007 1,584 224 14.1% 264 220 83.3%
SOURCE: Data Warehouse, Department of Labor & Industries. 
Time series data for the self-insured market go back more than two decades. They reveal 
that reliance by self-insured enterprises on the second-injury fund has increased from a rate of 60 
percent in the late 1980s to a peak rate of 90.6 percent in 1998, and then declined, though only 
slightly, since then. It appears that as the number of pensions awarded to workers from self-
insured enterprises increased, the rate of second-injury fund application increased as well. This 
would be consistent with a circumstance where increased usage brought a growing awareness of 
the significance of pension awards and their costs leading firms to learn of the financial relief 
that the second-injury fund could bring them.  
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With about 9 pension claims out of 10 from the self-insured sector using second-injury 
fund relief, there are a number of hypotheses, not mutually exclusive, that might account for this 
very large proportion. One possibility is that the self-insured have been very successful in 
avoiding the granting of pensions in claims where second-injury fund relief is not likely to be 
granted. It is well understood that larger establishments are more likely to re-employ their 
workers who have sustained work-related injuries and illnesses. They have greater opportunities 
than do smaller enterprises (less likely to be self-insured) to provide workplace modifications 
and multiple occupational opportunities.  
Larger employers are more likely to require that new workers receive pre-employment 
physical examinations and other screening. This makes it easier to demonstrate that a health 
condition or impairment existed at the time the worker was initially hired, thereby making 
second-injury fund involvement more likely. Self-insured enterprises also have a strong financial 
incentive to direct the longer-term disability claims toward pensions, thereby being able to avail 
themselves of the second-injury fund relief. And, as noted above, once a claim becomes eligible 
for second-injury fund support, it is in the self-insured’s best interest to have the worker found to 
be permanently and totally disabled at the earliest possible date. 
Note that not all self-insured enterprises are eligible to use the second-injury fund if they 
choose not to contribute financially to it. As such any pension claims emanating from these 
enterprises will show up in Table 2.22 as pensions allowed but they would not show up as claims 
receiving second-injury fund relief. Thus, the actual proportion of claims with second-injury 
fund support for eligible enterprises is likely to be even higher than the percentages shown in 
Table 2.22.  
Conclusion 
While the utilization of the second-injury fund in Washington increased dramatically 
among self-insured employers in the years immediately before the substantial growth in 
pensions, it seems unlikely that this could have been a cause of their overall growth. First, while 
data for state fund insured employers are not available for this period, more recent data that are 
available seem to indicate that this cost-shifting behavior is much less prevalent among state 
fund employers. Second, since almost 90 percent of self-insured pensions were already being 
transferred to the second-injury fund by 1996, it is hard to see where the growth would have 
come from. The presence of the second-injury fund plays a very important role in the number of 
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pensions given in cases of self-insured employers. That is almost surely going to change with the 
application of experience rating to self-insured assessments because of their workers receiving 
pensions from the fund. 
OTHER SUGGESTED CAUSES OF THE INCREASE IN PENSIONS 
In the sections that follow we consider other sources of the growth in pension awards. We 
recognize that various factors could account for this and we consider each of them. We are not 
able to rule out some influence for many possible causes but find the evidence for several of 
them to be weak and not persuasive. The factors that we shall consider are: 
• appeals to the BIIA; 
• the overall level of occupational injuries and illnesses during this time period; 
• the severity of injuries sustained from accidents; 
• changing demographics in Washington including the age and gender of the workforce; 
• the composition of impairments with a focus on back injuries and psychiatric 
involvement and possible causes due to changing treatments; and 
• the impact of legislative and regulatory changes as well as notable judicial decisions. 
The Role of Appeals in the Growth of Pensions 
The BIIA currently receives about 9,000 state fund appeals per year and issues decisions 
on about 6,000 to 7,000. (Figure 2.11) These numbers rose slowly from 1988 to 1999, then 
jumped significantly in 2000 and 2001 and have remained relatively flat since then. It is not 
possible to determine from existing BIIA or L&I records how frequently pension issues were 
either the main or secondary reason for appeals. Moreover, the BIIA’s reporting system does not 
separate out pension decisions. However, the L&I data warehouse provides a count of pensions 
awarded by the BIIA (Figure 2.12). The numbers rose sharply from FY 1988 to a peak of 149 in 
1992, then dropped back to 75 to 90 from 1996 through 1999, before rising sharply again to 207 
in 2002.  Since that high point the numbers have fallen back to the 70 to 90 range.  
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Figure 2.11 
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When considered as a percent of all BIIA decisions, the frequency of state fund pension 
decisions has dropped from a high of 4.8 percent in calendar year 1991 to 1.0 to 1.5 percent in 
recent years, with only a slight turn upward to 2.3 percent in 2002 (Figure 2.13). Also, state fund 
pensions awarded by the BIIA as a percent of all state fund pensions consistently dropped from a 
high of 24 percent in FY 1994 to recent levels of 8 to 10 percent, with the exception of a one-
year jump to 19 percent in 2002 (Figure 2.14).  
Figure 2.13 
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Figure 2.14 
 
SOURCE: Data Warehouse, Department of Labor & Industries. 
Self-Insured Appeals 
The BIIA currently receives about 2,600 to 2,800 self-insured appeals per year and issues 
decisions on about 2,700 to 2,800. (Figure 2.15) While there has been a gradual increase since 
1998, accelerating slightly around 1997, the time trend does not show the same sharp increase of 
the state fund appeals from the year 2000 to 2002.  
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Figure 2.15 
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SOURCE: Data Warehouse, Department of Labor & Industries. 
The number of self-insured pensions awarded by BIIA decision rose gradually from 1988 
to a peak of 63 in 2006, but without the steep state fund pension increases found in 1992 and 
2002. (Figure 2.12) The frequency of self-insured pensions, as a percent of all BIIA self-insured 
decisions, has consistently ranged between one and two percent since calendar year 1989, except 
for a one-year peak of 2.5 percent in 2006. (Figure 2.13) This pattern is substantially different 
from the trend downwards in state fund decisions.  
The pattern of self-insured pensions awarded by the BIIA as a percent of all self-insured 
pensions is also very different from the state fund trend. (Figure 2.16) For self-insured pensions 
the percent rose consistently from FY 1988 to a peak of 22 percent in 2006, with small drops for 
the years 1991 to 1993 and 1999 to 2000, almost opposite to the trend in state fund pensions.  
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Figure 2.16 
 
SOURCE: Data Warehouse, Department of Labor & Industries. 
 
Trends 
State fund appeals rose substantially during the years 1997 to 2003 when L&I was 
making its most concerted effort to reduce time-loss duration. The number of state fund pensions 
resulting from BIIA decision also rose during these same years. However, the percent of all BIIA 
decisions that these pensions represented increased only very slightly, and after 2002 this percent 
resumed a long decline. Also, and perhaps most important, state fund pensions resulting from 
BIIA decisions have never been more than 25 percent of all state fund pensions and this percent 
has been declining sharply since a peak in 1994 (with the exception of a jump from 10 percent to 
18 percent in 2001 after which the downward trend continued).  
State fund pensions experienced their sharpest increase during the fiscal years 2000 to 
2003 when the yearly total rose from 993 to 1,506. During these four years the total number of 
state fund pensions was 4,675. During these same years there were 556 state fund pensions 
awarded by BIIA decision or 12 percent of the total. From 2000 to 2001 the total number of state 
fund pensions increased by 72 with the BIIA state fund pension decisions increasing only by 6. 
From 2001 to 2002 the total increase was 46, but there was an increase of 94 in the BIIA state 
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fund pension decisions. From 2002 to 2003 the state fund pensions rose by 394 while the BIIA 
state fund pension decisions actually declined by 78.  
The pattern for self-insured pensions has been different. The number of self-insured 
appeals and the number of pensions by BIIA decision have been increasing since 1988 without 
the exceptional upsurge seen in the state fund pensions from 1997 to 2003. The likelihood of 
BIIA awarding a pension has remained steady since 1988. But, with some fluctuations, the 
percent of self-insured pensions that result from BIIA decision has been rising while it has been 
falling for state fund pensions. The most likely explanation for this difference is that self-insured 
employers and self-insurance staff at L&I were less inclined to award pensions during the period 
of time in which L&I became more likely to award pensions in state fund claims.  
Increasing numbers of appeals are not likely to cause the sizeable upturn in the number of 
pensions, but they are likely to be related.43 There is a very strong correlation between the 
number of appeals and the number of pensions allowed. If one correlates the number of pensions 
allowed with the number of appeals filed two years earlier for the years 1990 to 2007, the 
correlation coefficient is .82. Several reasons for this relationship are possible though the usual 
caution applies, that is, that a correlation does not mean that a causal relationship exists. 
A concerted push to resolve claims is likely to result in more pensions as well as more 
workers who are dissatisfied with a claim manager’s resolution of their claim. Additionally, as 
the numbers of appeals mount, the time available for claims staff to focus on managing claims is 
constrained. Large numbers of appeals and reconsiderations followed some significant legal 
decisions in 2000 and 2001 (including Avundes and Cockle respectively, both noted later in this 
chapter). A very large amount of staff time was needed to calculate or recalculate the appropriate 
amount of benefits that were being paid. The result is that such diversions, necessary though they 
may be, are associated with appeals and contribute to delays that distort the timing of pension 
awards. Additionally, more appeals may be symptomatic of changes in claim filing or legal 
behavior, or possibly a greater involvement by attorneys. 
 
                                                 
43 Thanks to Russell Frank of Actuarial Services for bringing this calculation to our attention. 
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Conclusion 
When these data are considered as a whole, we cannot conclude that changes in BIIA 
behavior can explain the changes in the rate of state fund pensions from the late 1990s to the 
present. But we are unable to rule out the importance of BIIA decisions in the years prior to the 
sharp upturn in the pensions granted by L&I. Increased BIIA pension decisions have contributed 
to the overall increase in pension numbers because of the increase in appeals reviewed by the 
BIIA, not because the BIIA has become more likely to award pensions at a higher rate. 
CHANGES IN THE NUMBERS OF ACCIDENTS, INJURIES, ILLNESSES, AND 
IMPAIRMENTS 
In seeking to explain the upsurge in pension awards beginning in the late 1990s we need 
to rule out some sources that theoretically could be in whole or in part responsible. One possible 
cause could be that there was an increase in the number and/or the severity of occupational 
injuries and illnesses several years before the surge.  
Injury Incidence 
Because consistent data series for Washington and the U.S. are not available for the years 
prior to 1996, we are somewhat restricted in the years we consider in Table 2.23. But the table 
makes three things very clear. First, the first two columns show that both the U.S. and 
Washington appear to have had consistent long-term downward trends in the incidence rates of 
non-fatal work injuries from 1996 forward.44 Second, the incidence rate for Washington is 
consistently higher than the corresponding annual rates for the nation as a whole. Third, column 
3 in Table 2.23 shows the ratio of the lost-time rate in Washington to the national rate. That 
column indicates that while Washington’s rate has declined from 1996 to 2006, the rate fell more 
rapidly in the country as a whole.  
                                                 
44 Incidence rates are reported annually by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. The rates are based on cases 
with days away from work per 100 full-time equivalent workers (employed 200,000 hours). 
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Table 2.23  Incidence Rates of Non-Fatal Injuries and Illnesses, Cases with Days Away 
                    from Work, for Washington and U.S., per 100 FTE Employees 
Year WA lost time rate US lost time rate 
Ratio WA/ 
US lost time rate 
WA rate if US 
distribution 
1996 3.05 2.19 1.39 2.99 
1997 3.09 2.10 1.47 3.00 
1998 2.81 1.89 1.48 2.74 
1999 2.68 1.86 1.44 2.62 
2000 2.50 1.77 1.42 2.45 
2001                         2.50                      1.70 1.47 NA 
2002                         2.50                      1.60 1.56 NA 
2003 2.24 1.48 1.51 2.22 
2004 2.16 1.39 1.56 2.14 
2005 2.01 1.33 1.51 1.98 
2006 2.14 1.26 1.70 2.09 
SOURCE: US Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Washington’s incidence rates may be higher than those of the U.S. because of the nature 
of the work done there. We asked, “what would Washington’s lost-time rate have been overall if 
the distribution of employment in Washington was the same as the composition of employment 
in the U.S?” We simply take the Washington incidence rates by industry, re-weight the average 
for the state using the composition of employment for the country as a whole and recalculate the 
state rate. The hypothetical rates are shown in the last column of Table 2.23.  
What we find is that the rate in Washington would be slightly lower than the actual rates, 
confirming that Washington’s lost time rate would be lower if its industrial composition were 
closer to that of the U.S. as a whole. Simply put, there is a concentration of industries in 
Washington that are associated with a high incidence of lost-time injuries and illnesses, but this 
accounts for only a tiny portion of the difference between Washington and the nation. While the 
rate in Washington is relatively high, its consistent decline (at least till 2006) suggests that there 
was not a sudden bulge in incidence rates in the early part of the 1990s that might have resulted 
in the upsurge in pension awards after 1997. The high rate could account for the levels of 
workers’ compensation time-loss cases and pension cases, but the long-term movement in the 
rate has been downward, consistent with the decline in time-loss claims for workers’ 
compensation. This suggests that the increases in pensions during the 1990s and early in the 
current century were not caused by more accidents and injuries.  
Data on occupational fatalities confirm these findings. From 1993 to 1998, the level of 
occupational fatalities in Washington stayed in a fairly narrow range (Table 2.24). After 1998 the 
number of these fatalities declined reaching its lowest point in 2000. It is important to keep in 
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mind that the size of the workforce in Washington was growing over much of this period, even 
as the number of fatalities was declining. For the U.S. the number of fatalities has also tended to 
decline with much of that occurring in the latter years of the range shown. In the third column we 
calculate the ratio of the numbers of occupational fatalities in Washington to those for the entire 
nation.45 Considering that Washington’s workforce grew more rapidly than did the country’s, the 
state’s relative safety performance record as judged by the number of fatalities has been stronger 
over this time.  
Table 2.24  Occupational Fatalities, Washington and U.S.,  
                    1992–2005 
Year  Washington  U.S.  
Washington/ 
U.S. Ratio 
1992  97  6,217  1.5  
1993  112  6,331  1.8  
1994  118  6,632  1.8  
1995  109  6,275  1.7  
1996  128  6,202  2.1  
1997  112  6,238  1.8  
1998  113  6,055  1.9  
1999  88  6,054  1.5  
2000  75  5,920  1.3  
2001  102  5,915  1.7  
2002  86  5,534  1.6  
2003  85  5,575  1.5  
2004  98  5,764  1.7  
2005  83  5,734  1.4  
SOURCE: US Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Level of Impairment 
Even if the incidence of injuries and illnesses may not account for the upsurge, is it 
plausible that the increase was the result of more serious impairments that somehow befell the 
state’s workers? We have no reason to expect that this happened but since it is a conceivable 
source of the upsurge, we need to consider this possibility. One way to analyze this is to examine 
the record for permanent partial disabilities over the time period in question. If the type of 
injuries and illnesses experienced by Washington’s workers was becoming more severe, we 
would expect to see the number of permanent partial disability awards and the degree of 
impairment associated with them to be increasing.  
                                                 
45 We are not using the ratio of fatality rates which would be a preferable metric to use. While we know the 
level of employment in Washington and in the U.S. for all the years shown in the table, we do not have estimates of 
full-time employment equivalents for each of these years.  
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Tables 2.25 and 2.26 shed some light on the severity and frequency of permanent partial 
disability awards. We separate the data by those who received awards without also receiving a 
pension, and those who were pensioned and also received a permanent partial disability award.  
Table 2.25  Permanent Partial Disability Awards for State Fund Claims 
 Non-Pension Recipients  Pension Recipients 
Injury 
Year Awards 
% of 
Body 
(Median) 
% of 
Body 
(Mean) 
% of 
Time 
Loss*  Awards 
% of 
Body 
(Median) 
% of 
Body 
(Mean) 
1985 6,287 7.5 9.0 19  218 11.3 16.1 
1986 6,385 7.5 9.2 19  214 11.3 14.8 
1987 6,780 7.0 8.8 19  236 10.2 13.4 
1988 7,692 6.0 8.3 20  295 10.4 15.8 
1989 8,680 6.0 9.0 21  295 11.4 15.9 
1990 9,641 5.7 8.6 21  267 11.7 16.4 
1991 9,724 5.5 8.5 22  299 10.2 15.9 
1992 9,971 5.4 8.3 24  316 10.1 14.3 
1993 9,713 5.4 8.1 25  274 10.1 14.4 
1994 9,522 5.4 8.1 25  245 10.1 12.6 
1995 9,197 5.4 7.8 25  249 10.1 12.2 
1996 8,852 5.4 7.8 25  220 10.1 12.3 
1997 9,400 5.4 7.8 26  215 10.1 12.1 
1998 9,267 5.4 7.8 26  227 10.1 12.3 
1999 9,081 5.4 7.7 25  221 10.0 11.4 
2000 9,443 5.4 7.6 27  218 10.0 12.6 
2001 9,287 5.4 7.9 28  183 10.0 11.7 
2002 8,969 5.4 7.7 29  143 10.0 11.4 
2003 8,723 5.4 7.5 29  105 10.0 10.6 
2004 8,479 5.0 7.2 28  60 10.0 10.6 
2005 8,011 5.0 7.0 26   30 6.0 7.1 
Hearing loss awards are not included. 
*Awards for non pension recipients taken to ultimate. Time-loss claims in % of time-loss claims estimated at 
ultimate.  
SOURCE: Data Warehouse, Department of Labor & Industries. 
For those who did not receive a pension, the number of permanent partial disability recipients 
has fallen, particularly in the last several years. However, the proportion of time-loss claims that 
resulted in permanent partial disability awards has steadily moved higher, from 19 percent of 
time-loss cases in 1985 to 29 percent in 2002 and 2003.46 By this gauge, we could conclude 
either that the rate of more serious injuries and illnesses (but not the level) has increased over 
time, or that the standards for awarding permanent partial disability benefits have been relaxed.  
                                                 
46 One reviewer has asked if this rate possibly reflects some non-reporting of relatively minor injuries. That 
would lower the denominator and explain the increasing rate. Though this is a logical possibility, nothing that we 
have heard or seen suggests to us that such a change has been occurring.  
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We cannot resolve this issue here with certainty though it is instructive to see that the 
average impairment rating—both the mean and the median—associated with awards has steadily 
declined. This is consistent with the data from Table 2.23 showing that the rate of injuries 
resulting in lost time has declined quite steadily. On that basis we are inclined to believe that the 
severity of injuries and illnesses resulting in permanent disability has not increased. Instead, the 
criterion for granting a worker a permanent partial award may have been relaxed, thereby 
allowing a larger proportion of time-loss recipients to benefit.  
For those disability pensioners who also received a permanent partial disability benefit, 
the median accepted impairment rating has remained within a remarkably narrow band from 
1989 to 2004 (Table 2.25). However, the mean value of impairment rating awards has been 
declining, particularly since the mid 1990s. At a minimum this suggests that the severity of the 
impairment associated with those who were eventually determined to be permanently and totally 
disabled has not increased and probably declined over the period when the upsurge in pension 
awards occurred. A note of caution is needed, however, because those who received a permanent 
partial disability award may have had a change in their condition—and the degree of their 
impairment—in the time after receiving the permanent partial disability determination and before 
receiving the pension. 
Table 2.26 shows a somewhat similar pattern for self-insured claims. From 1991 to 2005 
(and 2006 using estimates of ultimate losses) permanent partial disability awards were flat based 
on the reported counts, and rose slightly based on the estimated ultimate counts. However, both 
of these occurred in an era of declining time-loss claims. As a result, as was true for the state 
fund claims, the proportion of time-loss claims that became permanent partial disability cases 
steadily increased, though the proportions were still substantially lower than in state fund cases. 
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Table 2.26  Permanent Partial Disability–Self-Insured  
   
 
 
Accident 
calendar 
year 
PPD latest 
reported 
counts 
TL latest 
reported 
counts 
PPD/TL 
latest 
reported 
counts  
Estimated 
ultimate 
counts 
Estimated 
ultimate 
counts 
PPD/TL 
latest 
reported 
counts 
1991 3,478 17,989 19  3,480 17,989 19 
1992 3,594 17,728 20  3,597 17,728 20 
1993 3,540 17,703 20  3,547 17,703 20 
1994 3,590 17,562 20  3,599 17,562 20 
1995 3,313 16,512 20  3,324 16,514 20 
1996 3,591 17,397 21  3,607 17,409 21 
1997 3,782 18,554 20  3,804 18,584 20 
1998 3,926 18,748 21  3,960 18,801 21 
1999 3,956 18,245 22  4,011 18,327 22 
2000 3,897 17,859 22  3,984 17,982 22 
2001 3,937 16,747 24  4,079 16,931 24 
2002 3,775 15,754 24  3,992 16,035 25 
2003 3,456 14,529 24  3,787 14,959 25 
2004 3,284 14,158 23  3,870 14,910 26 
2005 2,860 13,020 22  3,954 14,433 27 
2006     4,039 14,328 28 
SOURCE: Actuarial estimate supplied by Department of Labor & Industries. 
Conclusion 
In summary, we have no reason to believe that injury and illness severity increased in 
Washington from the early 1990s until more recent years. A variety of improvements in health 
care and in safety and prevention practices over this period make it difficult to accept that 
severity of time-loss claims has increased over time. Still, we cannot rule out the possibility 
based on the data for permanent partial disability awards. 
DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES MAY HAVE PLAYED SOME ROLE IN THE INCREASE 
IN PENSIONS 
 
In this section we turn to the issue of the age of the Washington population and workforce to 
ask if this may provide any clues as to the upsurge in claims for total permanent disability. 
Aging and Work Disability 
Hardly surprisingly, social scientists have reported mixed results regarding the impact of 
age on workers’ compensation claims.47 Still, most of the literature on this subject tends to be in 
agreement on several ways that the aging of a workforce can affect workers’ compensation  
                                                 
47  A highly useful summary of this issue with special reference to Washington can be found in Joseph 
Jauquet and Heather Grob, The Aging Workforce: Implications for Workers’ Compensation, L&I Research and Data 
Services, 2005. 
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programs. 48 First, older workers are not more prone to being injured on the job. While a number 
of reasons for this seem evident, the age group that tends to have the highest rate of accidents 
and injuries are the youngest members of the labor force. However, Cheadle et al. in their 1994 
study of older workers (more than 45 years of age) in Washington reported that this group was at 
higher risk of having long-term disability result from work injuries and illnesses.49 Indeed, the 
authors concluded that older age is the most important and consistent influence on the duration 
of disability. Biddle et al. found that for workers above the age of 55, a larger proportion than 
other workers never returned to employment after a permanent disabling work injury.50 And in 
another study, Biddle et al. reported that older workers receive disproportionately higher rates of 
permanent disability benefits. Barth et al. reported that for employees with more than seven 
days’ lost work time due to a work caused injury or illness the lowest rate of permanent partial 
disability was for those below the age of 25, followed by those aged 25–34.51 It is hardly 
surprising then that Higdon and Collins report that according to their analysis one can add a 
constant $36.45 to the median cost of a workers’ compensation claim for every year of the 
worker’s age.52 
Gender differences in disability rates are more challenging to sort out. First, due to 
occupational segregation exposure to risks differ, as do the types of disabilities that are more 
likely to affect one gender or the other. For example, permanent partial disability rates for 
women drop more than for men if hand and wrist injuries are excluded from counts.53 The 
literature on the relationship between gender and disability rates and duration is mixed, with 
inconsistent conclusions.54 
The Aging of Washington’s Population 
Table 2.27 shows the changing age distribution of the state’s population from 1985 to 
2005. Consistent with the experience of many other jurisdictions, and the U.S. as a whole, the 
Washington population is getting older. From 1985 to 2000, the median age of the state’s 
population increased from 31.6 years to 36.3. And over the same time period the proportion of 
                                                 
48  One summary article on the findings on aging and work related disability is found in Michael 
Silverstein, Meeting the Challenges of an Aging Workforce, 2008. 
49  Cheadle, et al., 1994. 
50  Biddle, et al., 2001. 
51  Barth, et al., 2002.  
52  Higdon and Collins, 2004. 
53  Barth, Helvacian, and Liu, 2002.  
54  Stover, Wickizer, Zimmerman, et al., 2007.  
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the state’s population aged 50 and above increased from 18.7 percent to 21.1 percent. Viewed 
over a 15-year period these changes are substantial, but on a year-to-year basis they are hardly 
observable. 
Table 2.27  Washington State Population 
   
   
Years  
Washington 
population 20 
years and older  
Washington population as a percent of the 
population, 20 years and older  
Median 
age for all 
ages in 
years 
    25-49 50-54 55-59 60-64   
          
1985  3,121,059  53.3% 6.2% 6.2% 6.3%  31.6 
          
1990  3,461,045  56.0% 6.3% 5.5% 5.5%  33.3 
          
1995  3,873,804  56.4% 7.5% 5.6% 4.9%  34.9 
          
2000  4,211,102  53.9% 9.3% 6.8% 5.0%  36.3 
SOURCE: Office of Financial Management, Washington State. 
With the state’s population aging over this entire period, and the work force likely 
following the same pattern, one might attribute some portion of the growth in pension awards to 
this demographic change. However, were that to be a significant source of the upsurge, one 
should observe an increase in the average (mean) age of those whose injuries resulted in 
pensions. Yet, if there is any trend in the average age at the time that the pension was granted, it 
has declined, particularly for males. As shown in Figure 2.17, for males the average age at 
pension award declined from 1995 to 1998, spiked up for one year, and then fell for most of the 
following years.  
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Figure 2.17   
 
SOURCE: Data Warehouse, Department of Labor & Industries. 
While the experience for females is not exactly the same as for males, in large part it is 
consistent indicating that pensions are being awarded to persons, on average, at slightly younger 
ages. Moreover, the age at which injury occurred for males who ultimately were granted 
pensions also has tended to fall over time as shown in Figure 2.18. For females no trend seems 
evident in the average age at the time of injury for those granted pensions. An important 
contributing factor to the declining age at pension is the recent trend to award pensions to claims 
of somewhat lesser duration. However, this would not explain the decline in age at the time of 
injury. In Tables, 2.28, 2.29, and 2.30 below we present the data by age, gender and by state fund 
and self-insurance. 
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Figure 2.18 
 
SOURCE: Data Warehouse, Department of Labor & Industries. 
 
 
Table 2.28  Age Data for Pensions Allowed 1995–2005–State Fund and Self-Insured Combined 
  Age at allowance Age at Injury 
  Percentiles Percentiles 
Allowance 
Year  25% 50% 75% Mean 25% 50% 75% Mean 
1995 48.7 56.9 62.9 55.8 40.6 49.6 56.7 48.6 
1996 49.2 57.3 62.3 55.5 40.1 49.8 56.7 48.6 
1997 49.5 56.5 62.4 55.4 41.2 49.0 56.5 48.4 
1998 49.7 56.2 61.8 55.3 40.3 48.9 54.9 47.5 
1999 50.5 57.3 63.0 56.7 41.2 49.0 56.8 48.7 
2000 50.7 57.5 63.2 56.8 40.4 49.0 56.3 48.3 
2001 50.2 57.6 63.2 56.6 40.3 49.0 56.7 48.4 
2002 49.5 57.0 62.5 56.2 40.5 49.0 56.4 48.3 
2003 49.4 56.8 62.7 56.1 40.4 49.1 56.7 48.5 
2004 49.7 56.0 62.0 55.6 41.5 49.3 56.1 48.8 
2005 49.1 56.1 62.1 55.4 41.0 49.0 56.4 48.6 
SOURCE: Data Warehouse, Department of Labor & Industries. 
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Table 2.29  Average Age at Pension by Gender 
           State Fund           Self-Insured        Total 
Allow Year Male Female Male Female Male Female 
1995 57.0 57.2 56.0 58.2 56.8 57.6 
1996 56.8 57.8 56.4 56.8 56.7 57.4 
1997 57.3 58.1 55.6 56.6 56.8 57.4 
1998 57.3 58.4 55.0 54.3 56.8 57.0 
1999 57.9 59.8 56.5 55.4 57.6 58.4 
2000 57.5 57.3 55.4 57.1 57.2 57.2 
2001 57.2 56.1 56.9 57.4 57.2 56.4 
2002 56.4 56.8 55.7 57.7 56.3 57.0 
2003 55.7 56.7 56.4 56.4 55.8 56.6 
2004 55.5 55.9 56.1 56.2 55.6 56.0 
2005 54.6 56.7 56.4 56.8 55.0 56.8 
Grand Total 56.5 57.1 56.1 56.6 56.4 57.0 
SOURCE: Data Warehouse, Department of Labor & Industries. 
Table 2.30  Average Age at Injury by Gender 
           State Fund           Self-Insured        Total 
Allow 
Year Male Female Male Female Male Female 
1995 48.0 47.6 50.3 52.1 48.5 49.3 
1996 47.5 48.3 51.2 51.0 48.5 49.4 
1997 48.5 48.2 50.2 50.8 49.0 49.4 
1998 48.2 48.5 49.3 48.7 48.5 48.5 
1999 48.4 50.1 50.7 49.7 48.8 50.0 
2000 48.1 48.1 49.1 50.9 48.2 48.8 
2001 48.0 47.0 50.7 51.0 48.5 48.0 
2002 47.6 47.8 50.5 52.0 48.0 48.9 
2003 47.4 48.8 51.3 50.7 48.0 49.3 
2004 47.8 48.3 50.7 50.1 48.4 48.8 
2005 47.2 49.1 50.1 50.5 47.8 49.5 
Grand 
Total 47.8 48.3 50.4 50.7 48.3 49.0 
SOURCE: Data Warehouse, Department of Labor & Industries. 
Conclusion 
The conclusion that we draw from these data is that the average age of the workforce, 
though clearly increasing, is not a significant contributor to any sudden increase in the awarding 
of pensions. Age undoubtedly has an impact in the granting of pensions and there has been 
growth in the number and proportion of older workers. Since the aging of a workforce is not 
likely to change perceptively from one year to the next, it is not going to be the source of 
significant growth in the number of pensions awarded from one year to the next, or even over 
several years. Aging is likely to be a source of more permanent disability claims and longer 
duration time-loss claims and this can be important from perhaps one decade to the next, but we 
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do not see the link to any short-term increase in pensions. The effects of an aging workforce are 
likely to be felt more in economies that are experiencing higher unemployment levels and rates 
as has been the case in parts of Washington. 
CHANGES IN THE TYPES OF CLAIMS AND CERTAIN TREATMENTS DO NOT 
SEEM TO BE A LIKELY CAUSE OF RISING PENSION LEVELS 
One possible cause of the upswing in the number of pensions awarded for total 
permanent disability might be that there has been a change in the type of injuries and illnesses 
that are either occurring or being compensated. If that were to have happened and if these claims 
are ones that are more likely to result eventually in pensions being awarded, then we may have 
some explanation for the upsurge. In this section we consider three possible sources of such 
claims; back or spinal injuries and their treatment, psychological impairments and those injuries 
or illnesses that are being treated with certain pharmaceuticals that some have suggested are 
correlated with long-term disability.  
We consider the possibility that back or spinal injuries may have some linkage to the 
upsurge, simply because back cases always represent a very large share of permanent disability 
claims in most jurisdictions in the U.S.55  Moreover, it is well understood that injuries to the back 
and spine can be very disabling, particularly to those workers whose livelihood depends upon 
their ability to perform physically demanding labor. Difficulties in diagnosing the sources of 
back impairments and in evaluating the extent of the impairment create a variety of challenges 
for a workers’ compensation agency. 
Psychological injuries also pose difficulties for some workers’ compensation systems. 
Such injuries do not commonly constitute the proximate cause of the claim for time loss. Instead, 
such injuries are often a confounding source of disability, following on the heels of a work 
injury. Some have termed such claims “physical-mental” cases. When such injuries or illnesses 
occur, they can lead to a higher permanent partial disability rating than if the physical injury 
alone were rated. Conceivably, the psychological impairment can lead also to longer periods of 
time loss, especially if the condition continues after the physical injury has healed sufficiently 
that it would not prevent the worker from returning to the labor market.  
                                                 
55  This generalization is true in all American jurisdictions for which data are available. Strikingly, some 
countries including a number in Europe do not compensate back cases in the absence of some traumatic event on the 
grounds that such conditions result most often as ordinary conditions of life and are associated with the aging 
process.  
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If the worker is being assessed for a TPD pension the presence of the psychological 
impairment in combination with the residual physical impairment may be sufficient to make the 
worker seem worthy of the award. And perhaps even more than back injuries, the diagnosis of a 
psychological or psychiatric condition and the assessment of its extent are difficult to make and 
more subjective than many other impairments.56 
If the use of certain pharmaceuticals can create a drug dependence, and if this 
dependence contributes to long-term disability, then the linkage between expanded use of these 
treatments and TPD pension awards is relatively direct. Later in this section we consider these 
possible links to the growth in pensions. 
Back or Spinal Injuries 
In Table 2.31 we seek to determine if back and/or psychiatric injuries have shown some 
trend from before the surge to recent years. This table shows that while time-loss claims fell by 
26 percent from 1993 to 2004, accepted back or spinal injury claims fell by 29 percent and the 
number of denied claims over the same period fell by 48 percent. While more time-loss claims 
and accepted or denied back or spinal claims will ultimately develop with the passage of time, 
we consider here the experience only until 2004. This provides us with some confidence that the 
trend we observe will not disappear. Specifically, there is no blowout of back or spinal claims in 
the 12 years covered by this table. Further, if we consider the proportion of back or spinal injury 
claims that were accepted as a proportion of all time-loss claims from that accident year, the rate 
falls over the 12 years shown in the table, albeit slightly.  
                                                 
56  Psychiatric impairments that are primarily cognitive in nature or involve some other dysfunction of the 
central nervous system are evaluated in Washington according to the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent 
Impairment. Other psychiatric impairments are rated according to Washington’s Category Rating System. As is true 
in many jurisdictions, claims caused by stress are not considered to be compensable occupational diseases. 
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Table 2.31  Time-Loss Claims with Back/Spine and/or Psych Involvement for State Fund 
Accident 
year 
(CY) 
TL 
claims 
Accepted 
back or 
spinal 
codes 
Denied 
back or 
spinal 
codes 
Psych 
involvement 
Accepted 
back or 
psych 
involvement 
% claims 
with 
accepted 
back or 
spinal codes 
% claims with 
psych 
involvement 
% claims 
with 
accepted 
back or 
psych 
involvement 
1993 35,429 13,810 1,980 1,462 14,544 39.0% 4.1% 41.1% 
1994 35,685 13,982 1,916 1,590 14,798 39.2% 4.5% 41.5% 
1995 33,087 12,626 1,728 1,362 13,309 38.2% 4.1% 40.2% 
1996 32,334 12,402 1,723 1,462 13,166 38.4% 4.5% 40.7% 
1997 32,703 12,499 1,549 1,441 13,239 38.2% 4.4% 40.5% 
1998 32,261 12,250 1,512 1,381 12,941 38.0% 4.3% 40.1% 
1999 31,849 11,939 1,443 1,341 12,642 37.5% 4.2% 39.7% 
2000 30,581 11,238 1,418 1,350 11,967 36.7% 4.4% 39.1% 
2001 28,373 10,668 1,381 1,346 11,339 37.6% 4.7% 40.0% 
2002 26,783 10,123 1,237 1,325 10,781 37.8% 4.9% 40.3% 
2003 26,435 10,028 1,081 1,235 10,583 37.9% 4.7% 40.0% 
2004 26,503 9,888 999 1,114 10,424 37.3% 4.2% 39.3% 
Back/spine involvement is determined by Accepted, Accepted Temporarily, or Denied, ICD9 diagnosis codes into 
the L&I data base to control medical bill payment. Psych involvement is determined by billings for psychological or 
psychiatric evaluation or treatment as determined by specific service procedures, provider specialties, provider 
types, revenue codes and ICD9 or DRG codes. Accepted back or psych involvement indicates that a claim has either 
psych involvement or at least one accepted back or spine diagnosis code, or both. 
SOURCE: Data Warehouse, Department of Labor & Industries. 
We also consider the possibility that the treatment for back injuries may be responsible 
for the upsurge in pensions. It has been suggested to us that increased use of lumbar fusion 
surgery in Washington State, especially with intervertebral cage devices, may have made a 
significant contribution to the increase in pension awards. The number and frequency of lumbar 
fusion surgeries in the U.S. increased dramatically during the 1990s despite controversy about 
the effectiveness of these procedures for reducing pain and disability.57 For example, the age and 
sex adjusted rates of fusion surgery per 100,000 adults tripled from 19 in 1990 to 61 in 2001. The 
rates climbed 180 percent among adults aged 40 to 59. The increase in rate and numbers 
accelerated in 1996 following FDA approval of intervertebral cage devices. While the rates 
increased sharply for many types of chronic and degenerative back disorders, the increase in rate 
was particularly steep for patients with herniated discs, especially after 1996.  
Because of a concern that fusion surgery might have adverse outcomes in substantial 
numbers of injured workers, the Occupational Epidemiology and Health Outcomes Program at 
the University of Washington conducted a population based retrospective cohort study of injured 
                                                 
57  Deyo, Gray, and Kreuter, et al., 2005. 
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Washington State workers who underwent lumbar fusion between calendar years 1994 and 
2001.58 
The lumbar fusion incidence rate among Washington workers rose from 15 per 100,000 
workers in 1994 to 20 per 100,000 in 2001 with the highest single year rate of 24 per 100,000 in 
1998.59 The proportion of fusions with intervertebral cages climbed from 3.6 percent in 1996 to 
59.1 percent in 2001. Among the 1,950 injured workers with fusion surgery, 11.3 percent or 220 
were receiving pensions two years after surgery and another 52.6 percent were receiving some 
other work disability payments. Pension and other disability rates at two years following surgery 
among the intervertebral cage subgroup were only slightly higher than the group without cages. 
For all groups, if pensions were to develop they would most likely emerge more than two years 
after surgery. 
Conclusion 
While this study does raise important concerns about the possible contribution of fusion 
surgery to long-term disability, this type of surgery could not have been responsible for more 
than a small percent of the increased number and rate of pensions during calendar years 1996 to 
2003. There were 403 state fund pensions awarded in 1996. If the pension frequency had stayed 
unchanged from 1996 to 2003 there would have been 3,224 pensions over this eight-year period.  
Instead there were 6,940 or an increase of 3,716. There were 220 pensions from 1996 to 2003 
among injured workers who had fusion surgery between 1994 and 2001. Even if the surgery 
were responsible for all 220 of these pensions this would explain only 220/3,716 or 5.9 percent 
of the pension increase.  
Psychological or Psychiatric Claims 
Next we consider claims with psychological or psychiatric involvement, that is, where 
there was treatment given or health care provider payment that related to a psychological or 
psychiatric condition. Table 2.32 shows what we term “psych involvement” rather than psych 
claims since some of these psych injuries are not the primary injury. They frequently emerge as 
add-ons subsequent to the original injury, some of which include back or spinal injuries.  
The number of cases with psych involvement fell by 24 percent from 1993 to 2004, 
though we anticipate that the numbers for the later accident years will increase over time as 
                                                 
58  Maghout-Juratili, Franklin, and Mirza, et al., 2006. 
59  While the rates rose during the 1990s, they are still substantially lower than the rate of 31.5/100,000 
workers reported by Franklin in 1986–87.  
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workers with some of the longer-term cases eventually seek benefits for permanent partial 
disability or for a TPD pension. The percentage of allowed pension claims that involved a psych 
injury increased steadily until 2000, peaking at 50.5 percent in that year.60 Combining accepted 
back cases with pensions where there was a psych involvement meant that one or the other or 
both together were involved in 61 to 71 percent of pensions from 1988 to 2007.  
Unlike Table 2.31 which considered time-loss claims, Table 2.32 focuses on pensions 
and views them by the year in which they were awarded. The table indicates the following: 
• the number of claims with pension awards where back conditions were accepted or where 
there was psychological involvement grew from 1988 to 2007; 
• accepted back or spinal conditions declined as a percentage of all pensions awarded 
between the late 1980s until 2000, and then have begun to climb again though not 
reaching the rates seen in earlier years; 
• the number of pension award claims with psychological or psychiatric involvement rose 
from 178 in 1988 to 631 in 2003; 
• the proportion of pensions awarded that had some psychological involvement increased 
steadily and substantially from 1988 to 2000. After increasing from 30.3 percent in 1988 
to 50.5 percent in 2000 the rate declined rapidly; and 
• combining the separate trends in the rates of pension awards with a either a back or a 
psych involvement or both results in rates that have been quite level over the past two 
decades.  
                                                 
60  We recognize that this may represent an underestimate by us. In a 2005 study by pension adjudicators of 
100 awarded pensions a non-random survey found that 64 involved psychiatric issues. 
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Table 2.32  TPD Pension Claims with Back/Spine or Psych Involvement for State Fund 
Pension 
allow-
ance 
year 
(CY) 
TPD 
pensions 
Accepted 
back or 
spinal 
codes 
Denied 
back or 
spinal 
codes 
Psych 
involve- 
ment 
Accepted 
back or 
psych 
involve-
ment 
% pensions 
with 
accepted 
back or 
spinal codes 
% pensions 
with psych 
involvement 
% pensions 
with accepted 
back or psych 
involvement 
1988 588 314 127 178 378 53.4% 30.3% 64.3% 
1989 750 394 174 247 505 52.5% 32.9% 67.3% 
1990 814 423 192 302 557 52.0% 37.1% 68.4% 
1991 640 364 153 235 454 56.9% 36.7% 70.9% 
1992 616 324 145 236 428 52.6% 38.3% 69.5% 
1993 545 258 148 202 368 47.3% 37.1% 67.5% 
1994 574 264 175 208 371 46.0% 36.2% 64.6% 
1995 455 214 142 194 318 47.0% 42.6% 69.9% 
1996 403 162 153 178 270 40.2% 44.2% 67.0% 
1997 484 204 176 215 328 42.1% 44.4% 67.8% 
1998 534 207 191 247 356 38.8% 46.3% 66.7% 
1999 779 304 279 344 506 39.0% 44.2% 65.0% 
2000 1,126 415 443 569 753 36.9% 50.5% 66.9% 
2001 897 351 302 435 608 39.1% 48.5% 67.8% 
2002 1,278 526 426 585 866 41.2% 45.8% 67.8% 
2003 1,440 580 473 631 954 40.3% 43.8% 66.3% 
2004 968 377 307 379 590 38.9% 39.2% 61.0% 
2005 866 366 252 341 563 42.3% 39.4% 65.0% 
2006 1,025 435 283 380 653 42.4% 37.1% 63.7% 
2007 1,559 714 361 622 1,039 45.8% 39.9% 66.6% 
Back/spine involvement is determined by Accepted, Accepted Temporarily, or Denied, ICD9 diagnosis codes into 
the L&I database to control medical bill payment. Psych involvement is determined by billings for psychological or 
psychiatric evaluation or treatment as determined by specific service procedures, provider specialties, provider 
types, revenue codes and ICD9 or DRG codes. Accepted back or psych involvement indicates that a claim has either 
psych involvement or at least one accepted back or spine diagnosis code, or both. 
SOURCE: Data Warehouse, Department of Labor & Industries. 
Conclusion 
Claims with psych involvement have clearly increased and may have played a role in the 
growth of pensions.  However, the rates of increase are not sufficient to account for a major 
share of the increase in pensions during the period under question. We believe that psych 
involvement should be examined more carefully and will include it as one factor in our 
multivariate models. 
Opioid Utilization 
Next we consider the growing reliance on pharmaceuticals for pain management as a 
possible contributor to the upsurge in pensions. It has been suggested to us that the increased use 
of opioids in treating injured workers may be responsible, at least in part, for the increase in 
pensions. Opioids are pain relief drugs that have properties like morphine and other derivatives 
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of the opium poppy.  Other opioids include heroin, codeine, hydrocodone, oxycodone, fentanyl 
and methadone. Percodan, Percocet, OxyContin, and Dilaudid are some of the more common 
brand name drugs containing opioids. Opioids are regulated by the Drug Enforcement 
Administration as narcotics because of their potential for addiction, abuse, and risk.  
Over the past thirty years these drugs have become more commonly prescribed by 
treating physicians, with the prevalence of outpatient opioid prescriptions for musculoskeletal 
pain doubling from 1980 to 2000.61 Treatment prevalence rates for the more potent opioids have 
increased more than 4.5 fold. There has been considerable debate within the scientific 
community about the effectiveness of opioid therapy for relief of pain and improvement of 
function. One recent review of 16 published studies of moderate dose opioid therapy found that 
pain relief was achieved in 15 of the 16, but in 5 studies pain relief was not accompanied by 
improved functioning.62  
Despite several professional guidelines recommending opioids only for short periods in 
moderate doses for the treatment of significant pain that is resistant to other therapy, there is 
concern that many clinicians have become increasingly liberal in their use of opioids in high 
doses for prolonged periods. Ballantyne and Mao note “current guidelines recommend a cautious 
approach to dose escalation and the discontinuation of opioids if treatment goals are not met. 
However, in busy practice settings, the reality of dealing with patients who have complex 
problems often forces physicians to compromise. As a consequence, very large doses of opioids 
are prescribed for patients with chronic pain that is not associated with terminal disease, often in 
the absence of any real improvement in the patient’s pain or level of functioning.”  
Known and suggested adverse effects of long term, high dose opioid therapy include 
tolerance, increased pain sensitivity, hormonal changes affecting libido and drive, and 
dependence or addiction. These features of opioid use have raised the possibility that they may 
be counterproductive for many injured workers, prolonging recovery time, interfering with return 
to work and fostering long-term or permanent disability. One large-scale study found those with 
work-related low back pain had significantly longer disability duration where they had a 
combination of early imaging studies in the first month following the injury and prolonged 
                                                 
61  Caudill-Slosberg, Schwartz, and Woloshin, 2004. 
62  Ballantyne and Mao, 2003.  
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opioid use (>7 days) than those without either imaging or opioids.63 A recent study for the 
California Workers’ Compensation Institute concluded: 
The preponderance of evidence suggests that through its adverse impact on both activity 
levels and on self efficacy, prolonged administration of pain medication impedes, rather 
than facilitates, injured workers’ recovery from occupational back conditions.64 
 
For the past several years Dr. Gary Franklin and colleagues have been studying the 
effects of opioid use among workers’ compensation claimants in the State of Washington.65 66 
Their findings include the following: 
1. Overall opioid prescription use among worker compensation claimants increased only modestly from 1996 
to 2000, but prescriptions for the more powerful Schedule II opioids more than doubled (from 23,000 to 
57,000 annually) during this period. This increased frequency of use was accompanied by a 50% increase 
in the average daily dose of long acting opioids, especially OxyContin. A total of 32 workers’ 
compensation claimant deaths from definite or probable opioid overdoses were identified. 
2. About 34% of 1,843 state fund worker compensation claimants with a back injury and at least four days of 
disability from July 2002 through April 2004 were prescribed an opioid within the first six weeks of their 
first medical visit. Among this group the chance of being disabled one year after injury was more than 
twice as high for those prescribed opioids for more than seven days in the first six weeks compared with 
those not receiving any opioids.  
In addition to Dr. Franklin’s studies L&I staff evaluated opioid use in claim file reviews 
of 100 pensions awarded in 1995 and 100 awarded in 2003. Opioid use among the 1995 claims 
was 26 percent and among the 2003 claims was 34 percent. The sampling strategy was not 
recorded and these samples may not have been representative.  
These exploratory investigations raise the possibility of a relationship between opioid 
usage and disability, potentially including total permanent disability. However, evidence for a 
causal link is very limited. Although Dr. Franklin’s back injury studies did control for a number 
of potentially confounding variables, including injury severity and pain, it remains possible that 
opioid use did not cause or worsen disability but reflected changing medical treatment of 
disabled individuals. Thus, the familiarity and availability of opioid treatment may have led to 
the appropriate selection of the more serious injuries for this pain management therapy. 
Similarly, the increased proportion of pensioners being treated with opioids may reflect 
increased opioid use in all time-loss claims with severe pain conditions.  
                                                 
63  Mahmud, Webster, Courtney, et al., 2000. 
64  Swedlow, Gardner, Ireland and Genovese, 2008. 
65  Franklin, Mai, and Wickizer, et al., 2005.  
66  Franklin, Stover, Turner, et al., (unpublished). 
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Conclusion 
If a link between opioid use and disability pensions can be demonstrated, it is unlikely 
that this can explain more than a relatively small part of the increased pension rate that occurred 
from 1996 to 2007. The L&I claim file reviews of 1995 and 2003 pension files found an increase 
from 26 percent to 34 percent in claims for which opioids had been prescribed (see Chapter 4). If 
this review were representative of all pensions awarded in these years, the total number of state 
fund pensions with opioid use in 2003 was 489 (34 percent of 1,439 total 2003 pensions). If the 
percent of opioid use among pensioners had remained constant from 1995 to 2003 only 374 (26 
percent of the 1,439 pensions) would have had opioid use in 2003. There were therefore 489-
374=115 more pensions with opioids in 2003 than would have been expected based on the 1995 
experience. Since there was a total of 984 more pensions in 2003 than 1995, these 115 claims 
would account for only 115/984=11.7 percent of the upsurge in pensions over this period even if 
opioids were actually responsible for all of these claims. 
THE ROLE OF LEGAL DECISIONS AND LEGISLATIVE DIRECTIONS 
Individuals with work caused injuries or illnesses can be granted a pension under 
Washington’s law for one of two reasons. First, if the individual has sustained an extraordinarily 
serious impairment, one that is listed in the statute:  
‘Permanent total disability’ means loss of both legs, or arms, or one leg and one arm, total loss of eyesight, 
paralysis … 67 
A listing of specific conditions that would be presumed to leave a worker with a total 
permanent disability is not unusual. According to a 1999 study, 39 states, including Washington 
identify specific, catastrophic injuries in their statutes or specify rules that are presumed to 
establish total permanent disability.68 The impairments listed in Washington’s statute are very 
similar to those found in most of the other 38 states. However, those instances where total 
permanent disability is presumed because of the statute are relatively rare. In the 2003 Pension 
Adjudicators study of 100 pension awards only two were the result of statutory pensions. 
Of the 39 states that list such specific conditions, 11 limit total permanent disability 
claims to those that appear on the list. Even in those jurisdictions where the presumption is not 
irrebuttable, these catastrophic injuries are still frequently found to be total permanent disability. 
                                                 
67  RCW 51.08.160 (2008). 
68  Barth, and Niss, 1999. 
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Aside from the 11 that limit total permanent disability to their listed conditions, the other states 
either use no list or as is the case for Washington, will consider claims for total permanent 
disability for injuries that are not specified in statute or regulation. For Washington, aside from 
the specific losses noted above, total permanent disability is also defined as   
…or other condition permanently incapacitating the worker from performing any work at any gainful 
occupation.69 
Certainly, the law is not very explicit as to conditions that are pensionable and this 
absence of direction can create substantial uncertainties as to what will be treated as pensionable. 
The regulations that assist in the administration of the law also shed virtually no light on the 
meaning of total permanent disability. The Washington Administrative Code (WAC) does define 
“gainful employment” but does not go beyond that: 
Gainful employment for wages for the purposes of RCW 51.32.160 shall mean performing work at any 
regular gainful occupation for income, salary or wages.70 
 
While RCW 51.32.160 is not the section that defines total permanent disability, it does 
refer to pension claims for total disability. This is as close as the WAC or the statute comes to 
explicating the circumstances under which a pension claim will be accepted.71 The result is that 
the determinations have been made by the state’s courts and in turn by the Board of Industrial 
Insurance Appeals and by the agency in the light of previously rendered legal decisions.  
As the courts change and as public opinion gradually is modified the likelihood that a 
given claim might result in a pension being granted can change. However, though the courts 
and/or L&I may have changed their standards regarding the eligibility characteristics of claims 
for a pension, we see no evidence that the upsurge in pension awards is the product of any 
change in the underlying statute or the regulations. The statute’s definition of total permanent 
disability has been in place for many years. The upsurge in pension cases has occurred in the 
presence of an unchanging definition in the statute. Further, the regulations that assist in the 
administration of the law have not been modified in any way that sheds light on the upsurge 
either. Those considerations aside, adjudicators within L&I have told us that they are not aware 
                                                 
69 RCW 51.08.160 (2008). 
70  WAC 296-14-150. 
71  It should also be noted that the paucity of language in the legislation and the WAC does not apply 
similarly to permanent partial disability as can be seen RCW 51.08.150 or in several parts of the WAC including 
WAC 296-20-200. 
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of significant changes in the law that have affected their determinations of whether to 
recommend that an injured worker be given a pension for total disability. 
Significant Decisions 
If the rapid growth in the number of pensions is not attributable to legislative or 
regulatory changes, but instead to the law’s application, we need to look at any changes that may 
be the result of actions of the Courts. The following is a brief overview of some of the legal 
decisions that may have shaped or reshaped Washington’s treatment of pension claims. We begin 
with a decision that is still an important part of Washington case law despite its being more than 
65 years old: 
Kuhnle v. Department of Labor and Industries (1942)72 
Albert Kuhnle worked as a hook tender for Simpson Logging Company when an accident 
caused his neck to be broken. Following the injury he watched over his family farm with the 
considerable assistance of his wife and eight children. The doctors for the Department of Labor 
and Industry rated his impairment at 75 percent, that is, as a permanent partial disability. 
The Supreme Court held that where a work injury leaves the individual in such a 
condition that he can no longer follow his previous occupation or any other similar occupation, 
and is fit only to perform “odd jobs” or “special work” not generally available, then the burden is 
on the Department to show that there is special work that can actually be obtained. The court 
held that “sporadic competence, occasional, intermittent and much limited capacity to earn 
something does not reduce what is otherwise total to a partial disability” and that the court must 
make a “practical and reasonable interpretation” of the worker’s ability to obtain work. The 
Court indicated that for a worker to be permanently and totally disabled did not require that the 
individual be “absolutely helpless or physically broken and wrecked for all purposes except 
merely to live.” 
Pacific Car and Foundry v. Walter Colby, et al. (1971)73 
In this case the employer argued that the worker’s injury to his right arm entitled him 
(only) to a permanent partial disability award. A medical expert had found that the injury 
resulted in an impairment with a 30 percent to 50 percent loss of the arm. The trial court had 
affirmed a decision by L&I to grant the worker a total permanent disability pension and that 
                                                 
72  120 P. 2d 1003 (1942). 
73 489 P. 2d 176 (1971). 
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court’s decision was upheld in the Court of Appeals (Division 3). It found that the injury’s 
debilitating nature, coupled with the worker’s age, the extent of his education, and the prognosis 
for any occupational retraining clearly established that the worker was incapable of future 
gainful employment and was therefore entitled to a pension for total disability. Pacific Car and 
Foundry makes clear what factors need to be considered in evaluating the worker in deciding on 
the awarding of a pension. 
Graham v. Weyerhaeuser (1993)74 
In this decision the Court of Appeals used the distinction between “general work” and 
“special work” (see Kuhnle, above). General work, which can include light and sedentary work, 
is work that is reasonably continuous, within the worker’s range of capabilities training and 
experience and is generally available on the competitive job market. This court said that a worker 
is permanently and totally disabled under the statute only if the individual is unable to perform 
general work. 
James A. Adams v. The Department of Labor and Industries (1995)75 
In its decision the Supreme Court pointed out that it has long recognized the difficulty in 
applying the statutory language defining total permanent disability (shown above). As such the 
trial courts have had to supplement the language of the legislation with case law. The court found 
that the case law that has emerged has both a medical aspect—the extent of the physical 
impairment—and an economic aspect—the effect of the injury or illness on the individual’s 
wage-earning capacity. The two aspects are combined in the standard instructions to a jury that 
“a worker is totally disabled if unable to perform or obtain regular gainful employment.” (Note 
the presence of the words “or obtain” which are not directly found in the statutory language.) 
The court went on to say that the extent of physical impairment relates to the ability to perform, 
while the effect on wage earning capacity relates to the ability to obtain employment. Providing 
that the worker produces sufficient evidence of the loss of wage earning capacity along with 
expert medical evidence that the working causes the person serious discomfort or pain or puts his 
or her life in immediate danger, total disability is then a matter for a jury to determine. 
In this case Adams had been re-employed at his pre-injury job earning $13.72 per hour 
(the jury decision was in 1987). A vocational counselor testified that in light of his (work injury 
                                                 
74 856 P. 2d 11 (1993). 
75 Supreme Court of Washington, 905 P. 2nd 1220 (1995). 
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caused) physical condition, his educational limitations, his skills, his limited potential for benefit 
from retraining, and the conditions of the general labor market, Adams was not capable of 
gainful employment in the general labor market with any degree of success or continuity. The 
court observed that the purpose behind the law was to insure against the effective loss of wage 
earning capacity. Wage earning capacity means “sustainable wage earning capacity,” and since 
Mr. Adams had been able only to work in great pain, this was not sustainable. 
Pauline Young v. The Department of Labor and Industries, Sisters of Charity Providence 
(1996)76 
Following an award for a permanent partial disability and an appeal by injured worker, 
Pauline Young, superior court found that she was permanently and totally disabled as a direct 
result of her injury. Sisters of Charity Providence appealed the decision arguing that the findings 
and conclusion of the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals were not proven incorrect by a “fair 
preponderance of the evidence.” The Board’s findings and conclusions are prima facie correct 
and the burden of proof is on the party (Ms. Young) attacking them. The superior court is not 
bound by the Board’s findings, however, unless the court finds itself unable to make a 
determination on the facts because the evidence is evenly balanced. Appellate review is limited 
to the examination of the record to determine whether substantial evidence supports the findings 
after the superior court’s de novo review and whether the court’s conclusions of law flow from 
the findings. In this case the superior court gave special weight to the attending physician’s 
opinion and discounted the diagnoses of the orthopedic surgeons retained by L&I.  
The employer contended that the court had inappropriately found permanent and total 
disability without any testimony from a vocational expert showing Ms. Young’s employability in 
the competitive labor market. The appeals court agreed with the trial court . . . 
that the testimony of a vocational expert was unnecessary here because common sense, supported by the 
evidence, showed that Ms. Young’s limited employment skills and her physical inability to stand or sit for 
any consistent length of time prevented her from finding or retaining reasonably continuous gainful 
employment. In sum there is sufficient evidence to support the court’s finding that Ms. Young is totally and 
permanently disabled because she cannot perform work of a general nature. 
 
Catherine Leeper v. The Department of Labor and Industries (1994)77 
Although the individuals we interviewed could not point to any single decision or set of 
decisions that emerged from the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals or the courts that might 
                                                 
76 913 P. 2d  402 (1996). 
77  123 Wn.2d 803 (1994). 
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have accounted for the upsurge in pensions awarded, the case cited most frequently as having 
some importance is the Leeper case.78 In addition to concisely summarizing the Supreme Court’s 
thinking about total permanent disability in work injury claims, it does break some ground and 
clarifies (or extends) some previous decisions. However, it appears to us to fall well short of 
being an important source of the pension upsurge in the time period we are considering.  
Catherine Leeper was injured on the job on two separate occasions. In 1980 while 
employed at Western State Hospital as a licensed practical nurse a psychiatric patient struck her 
injuring her jaw, shoulder, and neck. In June 1984, she was serving as a union shop steward at a 
personal conduct hearing and was injured once again. A supervisor appearing at the hearing, 
apparently seeking to demonstrate the misconduct of another staff member, grabbed Ms. 
Leeper’s hair at the nape of her neck and yanked it backwards. These and some other 
circumstances forced her to stop working, and in April 1985 she was given a disability separation 
by Western State. She did not work after her termination. The Department of Labor and 
Industries and the Board of Industrial Insurance Appeals rejected Ms. Leeper’s claim for a 
pension—as they did the two other cases with a similar central issue that were to go before the 
Supreme Court at the same time. In Superior Court for Pierce County and in the Court of 
Appeals the findings in each of the three cases favored the worker’s appeals for total permanent 
disability pensions. 
Before 1989 the Washington Supreme Court Committee on Jury Instructions defined 
total permanent disability as a medical condition that made a worker “unable to perform a 
gainful occupation.”79 In 1989 the 2nd edition of the Committee’s jury instructions was replaced 
and the 3rd edition modified the language to read “unable to perform or obtain a gainful 
occupation.”80 The 3rd edition version was used in the jury instructions and as the judicial 
criterion for determining the presence of total permanent disability. The Department of Labor 
and Industries argued that the Committee’s recommended change was inappropriate, and that it 
did not conform to the law. However, in Leeper and the two other cases decided that day the 
Supreme Court held that the instructions were appropriate and that total permanent disability 
could be considered on this basis. The Supreme Court wrote that instructing a jury on the 
                                                 
78  Actually, the central issue in Leeper was settled in three consolidated cases that the Court decided, en 
banc, on the same day. Aside from Ms. Leeper, the plaintiffs in the other appeals were Janice M. Jones and Donald 
Taasevigen. 
79  6 Wash. Prac., WPI 155.07 (2nd ed. 1980). 
80  6 Wash. Prac., WPI 155.07 (3rd ed. 1989). 
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meaning of permanent and total solely by reciting the statute’s definition of permanent and total 
disability was inadequate. Instead, the jury should be instructed with language that was 
consistent with the language found in the Kuhnle decision. 
The court was saying that where a work injury left a worker with a permanent 
impairment and the result was that the particular worker was judged unlikely to be able to obtain 
employment, then the award of a pension was appropriate. This appeared to widen somewhat the 
standard for awarding total permanent disability. It certainly can be helpful in claims where the 
worker has some type of burden in the labor market, which combined with the work caused 
impairment makes re-employment highly unlikely. As an example, a person with a very poor 
work history—possibly a prison record—who loses his/her job as a result of the work injury is 
not likely ever to overcome the challenge imposed by both conditions. And the Leeper decision 
along with the other two decided that day did go farther than the Graham decision where the 
standard had been set by the Court of Appeals, i.e., that a worker is permanently and totally 
disabled under the statute only if the individual is unable to perform general work. Leeper now 
extends that to include the ability to obtain employment. However, as can be seen above, the 
difficulty in obtaining employment had been a factor in earlier cases that the courts held to be 
pensionable even if the matter was not addressed as explicitly as it was in Leeper. 
Impact on L&I 
Decisions by the BIIA and the courts affect L&I in two ways. The first is the direct effect 
on the outcome of specific cases whenever the BIIA or court does not affirm an L&I decision but 
modifies or reverses it. The second is an indirect effect on claim outcomes when a BIIA or court 
decision on a particular case (or series of cases) has an impact on the way L&I handles 
subsequent claims. This is the traditional way that judicial decisions have a broad impact on 
executive behavior. When legal decisions are published opinions of Washington Court of 
Appeals or the State Supreme Court, they have binding legal precedent for future situations and 
L&I has no discretion. All other legal decisions (Superior Court decisions, significant BIIA 
decisions, and non-significant BIIA decisions) carry no such binding legal precedent. However, 
in some circumstances if L&I agrees with a particular non-precedential decision (or a series of 
decisions) it may change its policy and practice to conform with the decision. Or if L&I 
disagrees with the non-precedential decisions they will continue with the current practice while 
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awaiting a similar case to appeal to a higher court, hoping to prevail and thereby achieve a 
precedential decision that is consistent with the Department’s interpretation of the law. 
While L&I executives and managers are very attentive to the outcomes of BIIA and court 
decisions it is not clear that the agency has a formal, systematic and consistent process for 
evaluating the potential impact of important BIIA and court decisions and for responding to them 
with appropriate timely changes in policies and/or procedures. Since the late 1980s or early 
1990s L&I has had a standing Policy and Litigation Control Committee (PLCC) that does review 
important court decisions, with senior representation from Claims, Policy & Quality 
Coordination, Legal Services, Self Insurance, Insurance Services, the Director's office, and the 
Office of the Attorney General. The PLCC’s primary function is to review cases that may 
proceed to higher level courts (beyond the BIIA) and to evaluate whether adverse decisions 
should be further appealed. Part of the Committee’s consideration is the impact of court 
determinations on L&I’s statutory interpretations and policies. The PLCC does not have a 
process to routinely evaluate the annually published list of significant BIIA decisions although 
members may bring up a particular case for discussion.  
The PLCC does engage in discussion of how precedential decisions may change L&I’s 
application of a particular statute. Although L&I executive managers are participants in these 
discussions, we are unable to identify a formal mechanism within the agency to move this 
informal process toward timely policy decisions and to ensure that communication and training 
is promptly and effectively implemented. Instead, it is assumed that senior managers 
participating in PLCC discussions will take their knowledge and understanding with them into 
the regular decision making processes of the Insurance Services Division and that these 
processes will sufficiently address the issues raised by the BIIA and court decisions.  
Two examples illustrate the apparent variability in the way L&I responds to precedential 
legal decisions. First, when a 2001 State Supreme Court decision found that an injured worker’s 
loss of employer-paid healthcare benefits should be included in the calculation of wage loss, L&I 
mounted an immediate and systematic effort to assess the impact of the decision on 
administrative systems and behavior and took formal steps to communicate with and train staff 
on new policies and procedures.81 Second, when the State Supreme Court issued its Leeper case 
decision in 1994, finding that total permanent disability is not limited to the inability to perform 
                                                 
81  Cockle v. Department of Labor & Industries 142 Wn. 2d 801, 16 P. 3d 583 (2001). 
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gainful work but also means being unable to “obtain a gainful occupation,” L&I apparently 
concluded that the decision did not call for a significant change in adjudicative policy and did not 
undertake a systematic, comprehensive effort for communicating instructions to staff.82 This was 
despite the fact that L&I and its attorneys expected trial lawyers to interpret the decision 
differently and to make new demands on the department regarding disability determinations. It 
was not until the vocational rehabilitation rules were rewritten in 2001 that definitive written 
direction was given about the implementation of the Leeper decision.83  
Conclusion 
The statute and the regulations were not changed in the time period under consideration 
in a way that accounts for the upsurge. The language of the statute itself has remained unchanged 
for decades. Of the many persons we have interviewed, no one has pointed to legislative or 
regulatory change as the reason that more pensions have been awarded. It appears that one would 
be hard pressed to make that argument. 
We are not able to conclude whether or not the upsurge in pensions awarded is a product 
of the Board or the Courts becoming more “worker friendly.” While this is a possibility, as is the 
possibility that attitudes favoring such determinations are the product of changing attitudes at the 
Department, there is no unambiguous way to show that there has been some changing standard 
for the granting of a pension. Though decisions such as Leeper undoubtedly favor applicants for 
pensions, the Kuhnle decision of 1942, among others, already shows a relatively tolerant 
standard by the courts. However, there are several observations regarding legal decisions and 
directions in the state that can be made with some confidence. 
We have four observations to offer as a result of this review. 
First, the language of the statute that defines total permanent disability provides precious 
little guidance to the Board or the courts. In the absence of very explicit language it has been left 
to the courts to determine what a pensionable claim is, and the Board and the Department have in 
                                                 
82  Memo from Thomas Chapman, Senior Counsel, to Mark Brown, Director, 4/26/94. Attorney Chapman 
noted the Court’s statement that “the inability to obtain work because of a workplace injury is relevant evidence at 
all stages of a disability hearing” and offered his opinion that “just what the Court means is not entirely clear. As I 
read it, the opinion seems to equate the inability to obtain with the inability to perform.” In other words, 
notwithstanding the fact that the Court specifically added the “ability to obtain work” criteria to the pre-existing 
“ability to perform” criteria, it was his view that the new language was equivalent to the old.  
83  In 2001 the VR rule was changed  in WAC 296-19A-010(1)(a) to define employability to 
“…necessary…to be capable of performing and obtaining gainful employment” from the previous definition of 
“…necessary…to be gainfully employed…”  
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turn had to follow the lead of the courts. This may lead some to be critical of the legislative and 
executive branches for their lack of clear guidance on the matter. There are several factors that 
ought to be considered before lawmakers are skewered for the very limited definition that the 
statute provides. First, if the legislature is unhappy with the way the courts have developed the 
case law, it has had the opportunity to change the statute’s language in every session. The fact 
that no such change has occurred for decades suggests that there is at least some general 
satisfaction with the way that the law is being carried out. Yet another possibility is that there is 
dissatisfaction with the application of the disability pension provision but there is no consensus 
about how to remedy that. No doubt there may be some who would prefer a more explicit 
definition in the hopes of liberalizing or tightening up the granting of pensions. However, if that 
is so the movement for change has not been very evident in recent years, though there is some 
concern about finding the source of the upsurge. The request for this study indicates that. 
Second, it is clear that total permanent disability pensions are granted in some cases 
where the extent of impairment is relatively low. This sets Washington apart from many, but not 
all states. In Washington total permanent disability results from the combination of the functional 
loss due to the injury, and the impact of the injury on the worker’s future wage earning capacity. 
In cases where the impairment is evaluated as less severe, a pension is still possible depending 
upon the impact on the person’s earning capacity in the light of the person’s age, educational 
attainment, literacy and language skills, their likely ability to benefit from a rehabilitation 
program, and possibly other factors as well.  
Third, it appears to us that Washington has sizeable numbers of pension cases relative to 
other jurisdictions in part because of the potentially large gap that can exist between a permanent 
partial disability award and a total permanent disability pension.84 Washington’s permanent 
partial disability benefit is based on the rating of impairment-done by a medical assessment, 
without consideration of the economic impact that the injury might have for the worker. 
Washington is not unique in doing this. Though the state’s benefits for permanent partial 
disability are not exceptionally low, they can appear that way when the economic consequence to 
the worker of a work illness or injury is severe. Restated, the gap between the permanent partial 
and the total permanent benefit is large, and where the impairment causes serious economic 
                                                 
84  A longer discussion of the linkage generally between permanent partial and total permanent disability 
and the approaches taken by the different jurisdictions is found in chapter 3. 
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dislocation the permanent partial disability benefit can appear to some to be inadequate. Since 
there is no way under the law to increase the partial disability benefit above what the medical 
impairment dictates, virtually the only alternative is to consider granting the worker a pension. It 
is not difficult to imagine that juries among others are sensitive to this gap and are moved to 
award the larger benefit, that is, the pension. The alternative, not available in Washington’s 
system, is to award a partial disability benefit that takes some account of the special 
circumstances that can make an impairment particularly costly to certain workers. Several 
variations of this approach are being used by other states. We are not endorsing these alternatives 
but are simply pointing out that the large gap can be reduced by measures that are not currently 
available under Washington’s approach to disability determination. 
Fourth, there are indirect ways that the legal system can impact the incidence of pensions 
that could not be measured by us. Court decisions such as Cockle or Avundes, led to increases in 
compensation benefits for injured workers.85 To the extent that this affects the return-to-work 
behavior on the part of injured workers, this could be related to the number of pensions. We do 
not doubt that enhancing the value of compensation benefits can affect the return-to-work 
behavior of some workers, as it also can induce employers to strengthen their return-to-work 
strategies. However, Cockle and Avundes were decided only in 2001 and 2000, respectively, and 
were not factors in the growth in pensions that occurred in the late 1990s. Further, it is 
reasonable that any impact these decisions had on the awarding of pensions would have taken a 
number of years, considering the typical length of time between an accident date and the pension 
decision. It is true that these decisions required substantial commitments of time by the state fund 
and self insurers’ staff to recalculate the wage basis and deal with large numbers of appeals by 
workers. Some of this effort required of the state fund staffers undoubtedly contributed to a 
backing-up of unresolved claims. 
 
 
                                                 
85  Cockle v. Department of Labor & Industries 142 Wn. 2d 801, 16 P. 3d 583 (2001) where the basis for 
the average monthly wage was modified to take account of health care benefits that workers received at the time of 
injury, Department of Labor & Industries v. Avundes, 140 Wn.2d 282 (2000) where the basis for the average 
monthly wage for purposes of compensation was modified for seasonal workers. 
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Appendix 2.1  Breakdown of Vocational Rehabilitation Expenses 
 
Voc Expenses 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Job Analysis $146,937 $18,651 $571 $121 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
Job Modification $755 $12,675 $40,843 $85,085 $92,346 $103,703 $79,228 $46,084 $71,989 $446,826 
Other $49 $34 $0 $0 $108 $1,146 $27,486 $61,222 $120,105 $462,731 
Professional Services $10,896,741 $20,332,722 $20,516,254 $20,891,977 $25,550,683 $28,190,506 $32,131,913 $33,354,605 $35,941,137 $37,863,648 
Retraining Expenses $1,331,838 $2,123,950 $3,161,919 $3,064,140 $3,324,071 $4,041,795 $4,081,939 $3,718,152 $3,306,216 $2,267,279 
Retraining Tuition $1,251,632 $1,931,210 $2,782,630 $2,564,318 $2,362,903 $2,724,030 $2,663,312 $2,442,222 $2,024,744 $2,330,134 
Testimony $0 $1,996 $72,917 $12,218 $16,504 $2,157 $1,308 $118 $110 $0 
VRC Travel/Mileage $940,036 $199,226 $78,803 $74,532 $100,375 $154,333 $46,614 $12,589 $0 $5 
Work Evaluation $1,555,101 $969,842 $525,460 $508,782 $685,531 $881,880 $828,505 $707,051 $810,927 $876,150 
Total $16,123,089 $25,590,305 $27,179,397 $27,201,171 $32,132,521 $36,099,548 $39,860,304 $40,342,043 $42,275,228 $44,246,773 
           
Voc Expenses 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Job Analysis $0 $74 $0 $0 $0 $0 $44,453 $171,871 $175,096 $273,814 
Job Modification $1,210,427 $1,073,743 $933,933 $1,007,950 $885,940 $801,985 $699,319 $720,355 $800,769 $1,015,448 
Other $605,800 $678,025 $696,262 $743,557 $333,463 $831 $32 $0 $585 $0 
Professional Services $36,982,372 $37,876,915 $37,582,419 $39,479,778 $36,151,688 $35,559,494 $35,594,714 $36,909,995 $39,493,946 $40,082,392 
Retraining Expenses $1,349,568 $1,251,740 $1,028,550 $1,653,759 $2,665,130 $2,095,088 $2,410,240 $2,705,427 $2,835,491 $2,732,717 
Retraining Tuition $1,846,918 $1,831,938 $1,732,137 $2,092,376 $2,432,576 $2,225,580 $2,782,487 $3,156,370 $3,385,942 $3,433,629 
Testimony $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 
VRC Travel/Mileage $0 $56 $0 $0 $759,036 $1,677,541 $1,620,555 $1,668,842 $1,717,719 $1,827,951 
Work Evaluation $748,490 $680,467 $710,248 $677,716 $410,692 $269,426 $426,287 $404,125 $345,368 $464,388 
Total $42,743,576 $43,392,958 $42,683,549 $45,655,137 $43,638,525 $42,629,944 $43,578,086 $45,736,984 $48,754,917 $49,830,340 
           
SOURCE:  Department of Labor and Industries         
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Appendix 2.2  Breakdown of VR Referrals 
 
CY 
referral 
start 
Injured 
workers 
referred 
(unique 
SSNs) 
Claims 
referred 
(unique 
claim Ids) 
*Voc 
intervention 
referrals 
Early 
intervention 
referrals 
Ability to 
work 
assessment 
referrals 
Voc plan 
development 
referrals 
Voc plan 
implementation 
referrals 
Total 
referrals 
1988 9,538 9,555 8,522 0 0 1,767 2,424 12,713 
1989 11,835 11,874 11,227 3 3 1,059 1,945 14,237 
1990 13,793 13,873 13,604 12 11 1,167 2,328 17,122 
1991 14,435 14,515 14,118 11 9 1,126 2,307 17,571 
1992 15,475 15,605 15,550 17 31 1,090 2,170 18,858 
1993 14,756 14,884 14,734 64 91 1,062 1,965 17,916 
1994 14,155 14,290 14,185 198 273 890 1,503 17,049 
1995 13,235 13,398 13,096 151 298 882 1,411 15,838 
1996 12,745 12,945 12,361 138 274 878 1,282 14,933 
1997 13,130 13,338 13,089 146 256 803 1,214 15,508 
1998 13,158 13,428 13,308 205 265 913 1,063 15,754 
1999 13,818 14,134 13,970 148 440 1,264 1,334 17,156 
2000 12,744 13,050 11,065 229 1,859 1,470 1,105 15,728 
2001 12,925 13,188 1,567 4,966 7,960 2,847 1,107 18,447 
2002 14,997 15,362 0 9,900 9,342 3,874 1,748 24,864 
2003 15,262 15,673 0 6,230 11,599 4,255 1,952 24,036 
2004 17,085 17,547 0 7,070 12,584 3,954 2,141 25,749 
2005 17,300 17,797 0 6,713 13,645 3,934 1,854 26,146 
2006 16,346 16,850 0 5,674 12,933 3,865 1,856 24,328 
2007 14,299 14,697 0 4,782 10,708 3,187 1,446 20,123 
Referral Start was used to determine Year rather than Referral Completion, as prior to 2001 many  
referrals did not have a completion date entered until the claim was closed, or a new referral started.  
Referrals with no completion date that were started prior to 2004 have been excluded as probable   
bad data.          
         
Injured workers with multiple referrals or claims with referrals during a year were counted only once in 
the ‘Injured Workers’ column. They would be counted again in other years if they had other referrals starting 
in those years.        
         
There were major changes in the data and how voc referrals were described made in 2001. There was no 
distinction made between Assessment and Intervention captured in the data prior to 2001, so these  
are considered generic Voc Intervention Referrals. Referral for Plan Development and Plan Intervention 
referrals were not separated prior to 2001, but the old data was migrated (split) into the two separate 
categories in 2001. This may cause apparent differences in the data pre- and post-2001.   
There are some Early Intervention and Ability to Work Assessment referrals showing as prior to 2001 
that were likely entered into the system post-2001 or migrated over from the old data.  
         
Referrals for Forensic Assessment (a fairly small number) and Stand-alone Job Analysis have not been included.  
Likewise, workers referred to the ERTW (Early Return to Work) process, but not to a private VRC, have not been 
included.        
         
Anticipation of major voc benefit changes in 2008, have caused changes in the numbers of referrals in 2007 as 
compared to previous years. Also, referrals without completion dates were not counted, causing 2007 statistics 
to look low.        
         
SOURCE:  Referral, Voc Referral, and Clm-Clmt tables from the L&I Data Warehouse.  
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Appendix 2.3  Timeline of Pension Relevant Events 
 
Date Events Source 
1981 L&I begins to purchase vocational rehabilitation services from private vendors.   Fiscal Note, HB 1084 and SB 
4193, 1985 legislative session 
1982 Mandatory Vocational Rehabilitation established. Change in time-loss provisions: prior to 1982 no more 
time loss when injured worker is medically stable; after 1982 time loss can continue when medically stable if 
injured worker is in voc rehab. 
Documents on HB1084, 1985 
legislative session 
1984 Joint Select Committee on Workers’ Compensation established by House Concurrent Resolution 35.  The 
Select Committee makes 17 recommendations for vocational rehabilitation and other recommendations on 
cost containment. 
Documents on HB1084, 1985 
legislative session 
1979-1984 Average time loss increases from 3.55 months to 7.11 months; Voc referrals increase from 2,767 to 17,020; 
payments to voc providers increase from $1 million to $22 million. State fund goes from substantial surplus 
to greater than $100 million deficit. 
Documents on HB1084, 1985 
legislative session 
1985 to 1993 Joe Dear, Deputy Director and then Director of L&I. Focused on industrial insurance, time-loss reduction, 
and cost containment. 
 
1985 Total Claims Management, Phase I. Claim Examiner and Treatment Authorizer positions were abolished. 
Their functions were combined in a new position of Claim Manager so that one person was now responsible 
for handling time loss and medical treatment issues. Also, a new position of Claim Analyst was created.  
Rehab Reviewers were moved into the claim units. Medical Adjusters and word processing specialists were 
moved out of claim units into separate support units. 
 
The transition to this new system moved through several phases, lasting through the 1990s and has been 
described as “chaotic.” According to several interviewees claim loads grew above 500, many claims were 
not thoroughly managed and as a result many claims “languished,” time-loss duration increased and it 
became too late for long-term claims to get back to work. The department “grew time-loss duration.” While 
some have argued that the reassignments of personnel, job duty changes, and shifting claim loads had 
negative consequences with reduced continuity and consistency in claims management, others believe these 
changes were necessary for long-term success.  
 
Example: Prior to TCM Disability Adjudicators made pension referrals. After TCM Claim Managers made 
them. Claim Managers were overloaded and had to make choices: working on authorizing a surgery and/or 
making a time-loss payment vs. working on a pension referral. As a result they often did not make pension 
referrals but simply continued claims on time loss.  
Review of Classification 
Questionnaires 
1985 HB 1084 repeals mandatory vocational rehabilitation. L&I supports the legislation. The purpose of voc rehab Documents on HB1084, 1985 
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Date Events Source 
changes from “qualify worker for employment” to “make the worker employable.” legislative session 
Summer 1985 L&I began a five-year project to automate the functions of the Industrial Insurance division by launching the 
Labor and Industries Industrial Insurance System (LINIIS), an integrated online information management 
system. LINIIS was implemented in phases. Each phase involved significant training in new business 
processes, some of which had important impact, at least temporarily, on the speed and manner in which 
claims were managed. 
Information Technology 
Executive Summary 2/6/92 
5/86 LINIIS Phase 1 completed: Database and claims inquiry system established. Older computer system 
(ARMS) was retired.   
Information Technology 
Executive Summary 2/6/92 
11/86 LINIIS Phases 2  and 2.5 completed: Online updating of records and entry of new claims; tracking of 
vocational rehabilitation disputes. 
Information Technology 
Executive Summary 2/6/92 
1986 to 1990 A major cost containment initiative was started, in response to the Joint Select Committee recommendations 
and rapid increases in medical costs (38 percent increase in 1986–87 alone). Changes included fee schedules 
for ancillary services, DRG system, surgical utilization review, and standards for chiropractic care.  
 
1987 Dennis v. Dept of L&I, Washington State Supreme Court (109 Wn.2d 472, 745 P.2d 1298). This decision 
significantly expanded the definition of occupational diseases by allowing work-related aggravation of a pre-
existing non work-related disease if the condition came about as a “natural consequence or incident of 
distinctive conditions” of the injured workers particular employment, even if the risk is no greater than in 
other employments or non-employment. The decision rejected the Court of Appeals test from L&I v. 
Kinville in 1983 that held that a condition arose “naturally” out of employment only if there was a greater 
risk in the injured worker’s employment than in other employments.  
L&I summary 
10/87 LINIIS Phase 3 completed: Medical Information and Payment System (MIPS) moved into the LINIIS 
database with new inquiry screens and reporting and statistical functions. 
Information Technology 
Executive Summary 2/6/92 
2/89 Within the previous one-year period there was complete turnover in staff for the three PAs assigned to the 
state fund. This resulted in a dramatic decrease in the experience level as a PA since these positions are 
typically static for years until retirement. 
PA Monthly Reports 
12/12/1988 to 
9/30/1989 
Yes We Can Initiative, a major effort to reduce time-loss duration and to return trust funds to healthy 
surpluses. CARE (Communication Action Resolution Effort) Teams were established to look at the worst 
cases. Claims units looked at everything else. CARE’s intent was to “achieve appropriate resolution of 
claims with ongoing time-loss benefits,” to “reduce the overall average time-loss duration of claims” and to 
reduce voc rehab costs. Order of priority for review:  voc cases “returned” after unsuccessful plan 
development; claims referred by attending physicians in need of coordinated resources; active time-loss 
claims with injury dates 1984–1987; active time-loss claims with 4,000 or more time-loss days; inactive 
claims.  A significant amount of overtime was authorized for claims staff during this period.  
 
• Ron Gray, CARE Team 
Project Overview, 12/1/1988 
• CARE Follow-up Report, 
8/17/1990 
• Review by Operations 
Managers 
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1,317 claims were closed in 9 ½ months, although 25 percent of these were still in various stages of litigation 
when a follow-up study was done in August 1990. Ninety-three of these claims were pensioned by 6/29/90. 
Pension awards were strongly associated with year of injury and time-loss duration. Only 18 claims with 
more than 4,000 days of time loss were included in this project, but 87.5 percent of these were pensioned. 
51.6 percent of the 152 “returned” voc cases were pensioned. The largest numbers of claims reviewed were 
active time-loss claims with less than 4,000 days and inactive claims. Fifty-nine percent and 40 percent, 
respectively, went on PPD while very few were pensioned.  
1990 Total Claim Management, Phase II. The Worker Compensation Adjudicator series was established. Claim 
Analysts became WCA 1, Claim Managers becameWCA2, Disability Adjudicators became WCA3, Claim 
Consultants became WCA4, and Pension Adjudicators became WCA5. Rehabilitation Reviewers became 
Rehabilitation Consultants. Various duties were redistributed as a result of these changes and there are 
varying views about the pros and cons of these changes. For example, there was a loss of expertise when 
Disability Adjudicators were no longer the only ones handling certain decisions, but there was a gain in 
efficiency when Claim Managers no longer had to wait for a limited number of Disability Adjudicators to 
make decisions.   
Review of Classification 
Questionnaires 
Review by Operation Managers 
1988 - 1990  LINIIS Phase 6 completed: Voc rehab subsystem simplified and claims subsystem improved with a variety 
of enhancements, including tickler system, activity log, intervention and investigation referrals, automatic 
and paperless adjudication, and overpayment tracking.  
Information Technology 
Executive Summary 2/6/92 
5/90 The VocLink Project was developed to allow preferred vocational providers to tie into the LINIIS system 
and to receive electronic referrals and input summaries of service outcome. 
Information Technology 
Executive Summary 2/6/92 
1991 A referral system was established to provide on-line referral of phone inquiries from the Office of 
Information & Assistance Hotline to claims staff.  
Information Technology 
Executive Summary 2/6/92 
1991 The State Personnel board established a new five-level vocational services series, proceeding from Trainee 
to Intern to Specialist to Consultant to Supervisor. Previous classes of Voc Rehab Counselors, Reviewers 
and Evaluators were eliminated. 
Review of Classification 
Questionnaires and related 
documents 
3/91 LINIIS Phase 7 completed: Online and batch processes to update MIPS authorization files through LINIIS. 
Improved medical management and communication between MIPS and claims unit staff on bill resolution. 
Information Technology 
Executive Summary 2/6/92 
9/91 L&I implemented a Conciliation Plan that reassigned claims consultants to claims units and empowered 
claim managers to settle disputes previously handled only by claims consultants. Impacts included 
significant changes in job duties and authorities as well as an increase in the number of claims consultants. 
Several experienced CMs became CCs. This Plan included a mandatory memo process for communication 
between CMs and CCs. CMs were required to get permission from CC to issue reaffirm orders. Also a 
process for CCs to direct CMs to refer claims to Pension Adjudicators rather than closing them. This system 
allowed CCs to staff a claim at any level and not just upon receipt of an appeal.   
• Memos from Mike Watson to 
Janet Morris, 8/20/91 and 
12/10/91 
• Related documents from the 
Office of Claim Consultants, 
1992-1996 
• Review by Operations 
Managers 
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This system lasted until 1998–99. Claim Consultants were later moved out of Claims Administration into 
Legal Services. 
1992 Vocational Dispute Resolution Office (VDRO) pushes to clear backlog, resulting in many claims going to 
pension. 
Interviews 
7/93 Benefit Payment System (BPS) Project: This replaced the Accident Fund Payment System with a new 
automated system to process a TL payment every 14 days for workers eligible for disability benefits as long 
as the tickler on the claim was current. Receipt of a Disability Certificate, contending disability benefits and 
providing medical certification was no longer the driver for issuance of TL benefits.  
Information Technology 
Executive Summary 2/6/92 
 
11/93 New Pension Adjudicator position added to state fund bringing staffing levels to four PAs. PA Monthly Report 
1993 to 1997 Mark Brown, Director of L&I. Major departmental reorganization. Less attention to industrial insurance 
issues, including time loss. 
 
3/21/94 HB 2843 adopted, requiring L&I to undertake two pilot projects on long-term disability (LTD). HB 2843 
4/94 Leeper v. L&I, Washington Supreme Court (123 Wn.2d 803). This decision held that “total permanent 
disability” means being unable to perform or obtain a gainful occupation. L&I argued unsuccessfully that 
disability was limited to being unable to perform a gainful occupation. Prior to this decision WAC 296-18A-
420 defined “employable” as “having the skills and training that are commonly and currently necessary in 
the labor market to be gainfully employed on a reasonably continuous basis…” When the vocational 
rehabilitation rules were rewritten in 2001 the employability definition in WAC 296-19A-010 became 
“having the skills and training that are commonly and currently necessary in the labor market to be capable 
of performing and obtaining gainful employment on a reasonably continuous basis…” 
 
Assistant Attorney General Thomas Chapman memo to L&I Director Mark Brown noted the Court’s 
conclusion that “the inability to obtain work because of a workplace injury is relevant evidence at all stages 
of a disability hearing” and states that “just what the Court means is not entirely clear. As I read it, the 
opinion seems to equate the inability to obtain with the inability to perform.”   
• Washington Supreme Court 
Decision 123 Wn.2d 803. 
• WAC 296-18A (1994 
version) 
• WAC 296-19A (2001 
version) 
• Memo from Thomas 
Chapman, Senior Counsel, to 
Mark Brown, Director, 
4/26/94 
1994 WISE (With Imaging Service Excellence) was established, using imaging technology to present paper-based 
documents on computer screens. Staff were encouraged to utilize imaging for quick retrieval of claim 
information instead of ordering and reviewing microfiche files.  
Online Reference System: 
Appendix J: Imaging Users Guide 
9/94 L&I Vocational Services Handbook continued to define employability per WAC 296.18 as “having the 
skills...necessary…to be gainfully employed…” 
Vocational Services Handbook 
9/1/94 The LTD pilot project was underway in Yakima and Everett PA Monthly report 
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mid 1990s L&I reminded voc providers that services are for those for whom they are necessary and who are likely to 
benefit. If unlikely to benefit services should be discontinued. This was intended to address a growing 
number of claims languishing in voc services. 
 
9/1/95 A Business Process Redesign (BPR) was underway for vocational services. PA Monthly report 
3/96 Responsibility for the administrative fraud program moved from the PAs to two full-time dedicated Fraud 
Adjudicators. Due to an expansion in the number of fraud cases the PAs had found that this aspect of their 
work, which had a statutory one-year date of discovery, had become their primary focus hampering efforts to 
review claims for pension eligibility.  
PA Monthly report 
3/25/96 HB 2724 was adopted, allowing an additional $5,000 of voc rehab expenditures for job modifications or 
accommodations necessary to perform essential functions or to participate in a retraining program. 
HB 2724 
1997 to 2004 Gary Moore, Director of L&I. Increased attention to industrial insurance and time-loss duration.  
 
1997- 1998 A State Audit Finding that L&I needed objective criteria for voc case referrals led to the development of the 
Complexity-Adjusted Cost Outcome (CACO) system. 
 
1997-1998 WCA3 in-training program started.  
1/97 
3/97 
One new PA hired, increasing PA unit from 4 to 5 FTE 
Pas acquire a new job duty- adjudicating applications for a $100,000 death benefit through the Department 
of Retirement Systems 
PA Monthly Reports 
PA Monthly Reports 
6/97 L&I reallocates 59 positions to claims management, including many field voc rehab staff. One impact was 
reduced supervision of private voc rehab providers. 
1998 L&I supplemental budget 
request 
12/97 Two additional positions added to PA unit as part of the reallocation of 59 positions noted above bringing 
staffing levels to seven PAs in the state fund.. 
PA Monthly Reports 
1998 Coaching system established. Several experienced CMs and CCs became coaches. Clarification and training 
was provided to CMs to help them understand when to seek help from claim consultants, Pension 
Adjudicators or coaching staff. Coaching and mentoring focused on in-training positions. “Everything seems 
to have changed in the past few months. You may not even be sure what is expected of you if you ask for 
help.”   
Robert Dziedzic memo, 8/1/98 
3/11/1998 1998 Supplemental Operating Budget proviso: $686,000 from the accident fund and $686,000 from the 
medical aid fund was provided to fund 24 Claim Managers (in addition to the 59 positions reallocated in 
1997.  L&I was expected to reduce time-loss duration by 5 percent by 6/30/2000 and 2.5 percent more by 
1998 Conference Committee 
Amendment to ESSB 6108 
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6/30/2001. L&I was also expected to reduce level-2 claim manager claim loads from 260 to 190. If 
substantial progress was not made by 6/30/2000 the positions and funding would be discontinued. 
 
5/1/98 The statutory Time Loss duration goal of 5 percent reduction was not being met; 8 percent reduction was 
now needed by 2000 to meet the goal. 
PA Monthly reports 
 
6/98 Responsibility for the initial adjudication of claims filed for cardiac diagnoses moved from the PAs to the 
Claims Units. 
PA Monthly report 
7/1/98 PAs asked themselves how to do more pension referrals for the TL duration initiative. PA Monthly reports 
9/1/98 The pension backlog was mentioned in the Director’s meeting as a detriment to the goal of reducing TL 
duration. Plan to hire an additional PA. 
PA Monthly reports 
10/98 DART (Duration Appropriate Reduction Team) was launched with 10 staff assigned. “Claim closure is 
primary goal.” DART focused on claims with injury before 10/97, 2 or more IMEs, 2 or more voc 
interventions, a current voc plan development request 9 months or older, a prior pension deferral, a claim 
needing a pension referral, a claim protest over 180 days old. 
• PA Monthly reports    
 
12/11/98 JLARC Performance Audit of Washington State Workers’ Compensation System. Thirty-two 
recommendations included: reorganizing claims units, modifying claims management duties, changing 
performance measures for claim managers, reduced reliance on formal claims closure process, make 
successful return to work the primary goal of vocational rehabilitation, make a percent of wages the standard 
for employability, increase retraining funds and time, increase vocational rehabilitation professionalism, 
improve CACO. 
JLARC Report 98-9 
 
7/9/99 In Re: Roger Neuman, BIIA D&O 97 7648. This Board decision held that a worker is permanently totally 
disabled when medically fixed and demonstrably permanently unable to be gainfully employed. It may be 
administratively practical for L&I to take additional time to complete its work and to establish a date of legal 
fixity that is some time after the date of disability. However, denying second-injury fund relief to a self-
insured employer during the period between disability and legal fixity is prejudicial to the employer who is 
entitled to the relief.  
BIIA D&O 97 7648 
7/99 Consultant Robert Shaffer & Associates conducted breakthrough strategy workshops. Teams were to be 
established over the summer that would develop measurable performance objectives that are achievable in 6 
to 8 weeks. The intent was to improve time loss and customer service performance. Eighteen teams 
developed breakthrough strategies in Phase One. Examples of goals:  reduce number of inactive time-loss 
claims by 20 percent; reduce number of provisional/not allowed claims over 30 days by 75 percent; complete 
80 percent of voc closure able-to-work reports within 10 days; reduce claims eligible for pension referrals; 
close 20 percent of pending medical-only and inactive time-loss claims. Additional teams and goals were 
Jody Moran memo 7/28/99 and 
related documents 
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established in Phase Two in May 2000. 
8/99 1485 DART claims reviewed, 443 claims closed. Since beginning of 1999 open time-loss claims 10+ years 
old decreased 2.7 percent while those 1 to 2 years old increased 1.2 percent.  
Robert Dziedzic memo 5/19/99 
and related documents 
11/1/99 181 DART pension referrals completed. PA Monthly reports 
12/1/99 DART winding down. PA Monthly reports 
12/20/99 Time-Loss 2000 announced with the goal to reduce time-loss duration 10 percent by 7/00 in order to meet 
the legislative requirement of 5 percent reduction from baseline. Activities were to include approving 
overtime, speed up IME processing, streamline voc rehab closures, establish five-person team (TART) to 
tackle difficult claims, and relieve claims staff of hearing loss claims. In addition to special teams and 
projects, the claims units undertook initiatives, e.g. Horse Race, Down Hill Slope, Tommy Timeloss. 
 
Options for reducing time loss included: 1) Terminate time loss by RTW, voc rehab determination of able to 
work, medical release, or a variety of “inappropriate” measures driven by pressured atmosphere (e.g. stop 
payment because there is no objective medical evidence or because paperwork is not complete) and 2) Claim 
closure with PPD, without PPD, or with pension. 
• Jody Moran memo, 12/20/99  
 
1/1/00 Overtime for CMs is increasing pension referrals. PA Monthly reports 
1/26/00 Responsibility for issuing ministerial orders required by the BIIA is given to the claim consultants.  
“Assumption of this task supports the Time-Loss Duration improvement efforts.” The responsibility was 
returned to claims administration in May, 2002.   
• Craig Lowe memo, 
1/26/2000 
• Jody Moran memo, 4/26/02 
2/1/00 Pension referrals continue to increase with CM overtime. PA Monthly reports 
2/8/00 TART (Targeted Area Resource Team) was established. TART was to concentrate on “vacated claim loads.” 
“Each claim will be reviewed. If it can be closed, we will close it. If it cannot be closed, we will take 
whatever action needs to be taken to get the claim moving.”   
Debbie Hadley memo of 2/8/2000 
3/1/00 Record number of pension referrals. CM overtime continues. PA overtime has reduced pension backlog to 2 
months. 
 
Prior to 1998 about 40 to 50 percent of claims were referred back to claims. During the time-loss duration 
initiative this percentage went way down. PAs were told, “don’t delay claim resolution.” If the worker was 
otherwise eligible for pension, PAs were to take actions to clean up the claim themselves and move to 
pension rather than defer and return the claim to the CM. PAs started negotiating with attorneys and 
awarding pensions with negotiated resolution instead of deferring back to the CM. Examples:  files with 
period of back time-loss contested but not paid or denied; claims with contention of new condition or 
• PA Monthly reports 
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aggravation that had neither been accepted or denied; old medical information that needed updating. Speed 
up meant PAs were not looking at every piece of paper in the file and were doing less detailed written file 
reviews.   
3/17/00 TART six-week progress report. 2,309 claims reviewed, 361 closed, 54 referred for pension. “Because we 
are working for production, reduction and claim closures, most claims are receiving a cursory review, some 
action taken to get it moving…Overall, we are not doing full file reviews, dotting all the I’s and crossing all 
the t’s…” 
Debbie Hadley memo, 3/17/2000 
5/00 Personnel approves change in minimum qualifications for Pension Adjudicators to include one year as a 
WCA4. 
PA Monthly report 
6/1/00 Seven QA staff became temporary WCA5s to make pension reviews and determinations (completed 38 
reviews by 11/00). QA staff were assigned a PA “buddy” for training and as mentors. 
PA Monthly reports 
11/1/00 
12/00 
1,783 pension referrals received for year to date, compared with 1,158 for previous year. 
PAs receive Governor’s award for reducing the turnaround time from receipt of a pension referral to the 
awarding of pension benefits from 11 months to 3.5 months. 
PA Monthly reports 
PA Monthly reports 
2001 Cockle v. Dept. of L&I, Washington State Supreme Court. This decision expanded the definition of wages to 
include a worker’s loss of employer-paid healthcare benefits. L&I devoted substantial resources to 
complying with this decision as well as the Court of Appeals decision in Fred Meyer v. Shearer (2000) that 
found that wages also included shift-differential pay, vacation, holiday and sick leave hours, and funeral pay.  
L&I summaries 
 
2001 The vocational rehabilitation rules were rewritten. Changes in the definition of employability included: 
1. “Necessary…to be gainfully employed” became “necessary…to be capable of performing and obtaining 
gainful employment.”  (see 1994 Leeper decision above)  
2. In the list of factors to be considered in assessing employability “physical and mental capabilities due to 
the industrial injury…” was changed to “physical and mental limitations caused, at least in part, by the 
worker’s industrial injury or occupational disease…” 
3. “Preexisting” physical and mental limitations was added to the factors to be considered 
The new rules also defined transferable skills as “any combination of learned or demonstrated behavior, 
education, training, work traits, and work-related skills that can be readily applied by the worker. They are 
skills that are interchangeable among different jobs and workplaces. Non work-related talents or skills that 
are both demonstrated and applicable may also be considered.” 
 
Changes were made in administration of the voc program. For example, contracts to major firms were 
• WAC 296-18A (1994 
version) 
• WAC 296-19A (2004 
version) 
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reduced and those to smaller providers increased. Some people feel that the voc rule changes made the 
system more open to pension recommendations 
Spring 2001 Creation of OLRS (OnLine Reference System). This online application provided claim staff with electronic 
versions of reference materials useful in managing claims. Searches were possible by subject matter. 
Reference materials included the RCWs, Policy Manual, WACs, WCA Manual, Management memos, 
Provider bulletins, and others. 
 
3/1/01 Need to close 1,000 claims in next 100 days in addition to business as usual in order to meet the time loss 
duration goal. 
PA Monthly reports 
6/30/01 The Time-loss Duration initiative was completed.  
8/14/01 In Re: Frederic Cuendet, BIIA D&O 99 21825. This Board decision held that a self-insured employer is 
entitled to reimbursement from the second-injury fund for time-loss benefits paid during a period following 
the effective date of a pension. Recovery or offset for any overpayment to the injured worker during that 
time period is the responsibility of L&I. 
BIIA D&O 99 21825 
2001-2002 The first proposal for Centers for Occupational Health and Education (COHE) was made. Relations between 
L&I and medical community were at an all-time low, having deteriorated through the 1990s. The COHE 
proposal was rejected by Washington State Medical Association. 
 
2001-2003 Boeing layoffs, reduction of 17,000. Boeing interview 
4/03 One time “special offer” extended to Claims Units to submit 10 claims each for pension review without 
completing a formal pension referral request.  
PA Monthly report 
4/1/04 The Early Return To Work program was launched.  
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4/14/04 Jody Moran gave a comprehensive presentation to an L&I Time-Loss Duration Symposium. She reported 
that the time-loss duration initiative began in 1997 when 59 FTEs were moved to claims management. 
Intensity increased in 1998 when the legislature funded 24 more positions, contingent on reaching time-loss 
duration reduction goals. Initially little work was done to reach the time-loss goals (e.g. DART did not last 
long) because other high priority events “diverted” attention. These diversions included: major change in 
personnel system for hiring and training claims staff, labor/management agreement for retraining, need to set 
up new units with major physical reconstruction to accommodate new staff, resources needed to respond to 
Cockle decision, “backlash” from BIIA, high vacancy rates.   
 
More focused planning began in 2000, including an actuarial target for reducing time-loss claims, pension 
identification, voc closures, addressing returned IMEs, moving hearing loss claims away from claim 
managers, special teams in each service area, and weekly meetings with executive management. The activity 
was described as a “frenzy.” Each service area met the actuarial goals but time-loss duration did not 
decrease.    
 
Jody Moran suggested reasons for failure:  the above diversions plus high unemployment rates, increased 
frequency and duration of occupational disease claims, increase complexity of claims (evidenced by 
increased percent of PPD awards), and “in our zeal to reach the goal” there were many appeals to the BIIA 
“which were not defendable.” “The department hired consultants and many breakthrough strategies were 
implemented…” Jody Moran described these breakthrough teams, intended to contribute to the time-loss 
reduction effort, as unhelpful diversions. Others involved with these activities assess them more positively.  
Jody Moran PowerPoint slides 
2005 Vocational Improvement Initiative, focusing on changes in 2001 legislation.  
2005 Pension Adjudicators stop accepting referrals directly from attorneys.  
2004-2005 Worker Compensation Adjudicator apprenticeship program started.  
1/05 PA for CRI (Chemically Related Illness) Unit is brought under the PA Section bringing total number of PA 
staff to eight for state fund. 
PA Monthly report 
4/05 Transition from WISE imaging system to LUCI (Look Up Claim Images) imaging system. LUCI is a web-
based system, adding functionality and expanding access to external customers.  
 
6/28/05 L&I Pension Adjudicators reviewed a random sample of 100 pensions awarded in 1995 and another 100 
from 2003. There was an increase in the percent of pensions to injured workers with language barriers (6% 
to 18%), opiate drug use (26% to 34%) and psychiatric issues (35% to 64%). The percent of pensions 
allowed after BIIA review decreased from 19 percent to 13 percent.  
L&I PowerPoint presentation for 
GMAP (Government 
Management, Accountability and 
Performance) review, 6/28/05 
9/05 Claim Lead Unit Expert (CLUE) position established at WCA4 level with responsibility to assist and mentor 
WCA3 and WCA2 staff and to be a technical a resource to the claim unit supervisor. Several experienced 
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WCA3s and WCA4s became CLUEs.   
2006 The courts stay CACO. L&I starts to revise performance indicators.  
8/06 Pension Adjudicators began having 2 “focus days” a month to work solely on pension referrals with 
“protected time” during which there was no expectation to respond to phone calls or emails and staffings 
were discouraged. The effect was to increase production and decrease backlog. 
 
8/05 CAC (Claimant Account Center) implemented. CAC allows authorized external customers access to claim 
information from remote location via a secure internet connection. Authorized users are able to view medical 
and vocational information, claim log notes, information on authorized and denied conditions and other 
claim file documents received and imaged into the imaging system after 1994. Users are able to send a 
secured message to their assigned claim manager providing or asking for information. 
Quick Reference Guide for L&I 
CAC, March 2007 
5/07 ORION (ORganized Information ONline) begins. ORION is a web based integrated document management 
system for the department and selected external users. It extends imaging to other L&I programs including 
employer services and self-insurance). The desktop has predefined queries that search for and filter 
information to reduce the number of tools CMs need to manage claims.  
WAC Manual, Chapter 1 
Note:  Interviews with the following individuals provided important information and insights for this timeline:  
Carrie Boyd 
Joe Dear 
Sandy Dziedzic 
Ron Gray 
Gary Moore 
Roy Plaeger-Brockway 
Sandra Torstenson 
R Wilson 
 
SOURCE: Department of Labor and Industries. 
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Appendix 2.4 Active and Open Claims 
 
Some analysts believe that Tables 2.12 and 2.13 should be shown in terms not of active 
claims but in terms of open claims. We believe that an argument can be made for each so we 
replicate below Tables 2.12 and 2.13 that appear in the text of the chapter in terms of active 
claims.  
 
An “Open” claim is one that has not been rejected or closed. A claim that has been 
rejected and is being protested is not open nor is a claim where a re-opening application is 
pending. An “Open-Active” time-loss claim is an open claim which has been paid time-loss for a 
period of disability within 60 days prior to the date of the report. About one-half of Open time-
loss claims are Open-Active claims though this fraction is not absolutely stable. Though this 
definition is used by the Data Warehouse, the actuaries rely on a somewhat different definition of 
“active.” They look at whether a claim was active during a specific accident quarter, that is, did 
the claim receive a time-loss payment during that quarter, regardless of the eligibility period that 
was being covered for the payment or the claim’s open/closed status at the end of the quarter, 
(e.g. a claim paid a year’s worth of back time loss after an appeal for a period of five years in the 
past would still be considered active during the quarter the payment was made) 
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3  Jurisdictional Comparisons 
 
This chapter complements chapter 2, “Program Assessment” which describes the 
problem (upsurge in TPD awards) and potential causes of that problem in some detail. We do not 
repeat the descriptions or statistics cited there. Instead, we take a comparative perspective which 
will enable us to assess the performance of the Washington workers’ compensation system 
relative to its peers. We will begin with a description of various methods of compensating 
permanent disability, as exemplified in the workers’ compensation systems of the U.S.  
This chapter will put the compensation of total permanent disability claims in the State of 
Washington into perspective in two different ways.86 First, we will use data published by the 
U.S. Department of Labor (USDOL) and the National Council of Compensation Insurance 
(NCCI) to provide the perspective of other U.S. jurisdictions. We will look at benefits and 
system performance in terms of incidence of permanent disability awards. Second, we will do a 
one-on-one performance comparison with the Canadian province of British Columbia; the 
jurisdiction which we think represents the closest match to Washington.  
TOTAL PERMANENT DISABILITY BENEFITS 
The workers’ compensation systems for work injury in the U.S. are based in the states 
and as a result there is considerable variety in the provisions of such programs. There is some 
variation in the rate at which lost earnings get replaced; most frequently two-thirds (or 60 
percent, 70 percent or 75 percent) of gross earnings before injury, but also eighty (or 75) percent 
of spendable (after tax) earnings. There is much more variation in the maximums and minimums 
that are applied to limit the range of these wage replacement formulas. There is also wide 
variation in the period for which such benefits will be paid, either because of a limited term or 
because of an age limitation or offset for other benefits that may be received by the injured 
worker.  
The highest weekly maximums are found in Iowa ($1,173), New Hampshire ($1,124), 
Illinois ($1,078), District of Columbia ($1,022), and Connecticut ($1,005). The lowest weekly 
maximums are in Mississippi ($351), Arizona ($374), New York ($400), Georgia ($450), and 
Louisiana ($454). Washington is generally in the upper part of the distribution of benefit 
                                                 
86  Terminology is also specific to jurisdiction. Most states (and the NCCI) refer to permanent total 
disability (PTD). But we will follow Washington’s practice of referring to such claims as total permanent disability 
(TPD). 
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generosity, particularly in relation to its neighbors. Washington’s maximum benefit in 2006 was 
$932 per week, followed by California at $840, Oregon at $713, Montana at $520, Utah at $501, 
and Idaho at $489. Maximum benefits reflect the wage structure of a state as well as the benefit 
formula, so the magnitude of these discrepancies would be reduced if they were expressed 
relative to the average wage. However, the absolute differences are large.  
Compensating for Permanent Partial Disability in U.S. Workers’ Compensation Systems87 
Those experienced in workers’ compensation issues speak of workers’ compensation 
“systems.” This seems entirely appropriate to us as the many aspects of workers’ compensation 
programs are directly or indirectly linked to each other. Recognizing that many linkages exist 
means that some limits must be placed on describing systems here. In this section of the report 
our focus is on how Washington compares to other jurisdictions in its treatment of total 
permanent disability claims. But to do that we think that it is necessary to understand how states 
compensate for permanent partial disabilities (PPDs) as well. We do this in part because we 
believe that the method used to compensate for PPDs in Washington is closely connected to the 
outcomes of TPD claims. 
Scheduled or Specific Benefits 
Although great variation exists in the precise method used, almost all jurisdictions in the 
U.S. and elsewhere provide explicitly that benefits are to be paid to workers who sustain 
occupational injuries or illnesses that result in permanent but partially disabling impairments. 
Most jurisdictions in the U.S. differentiate between injuries or illnesses that result in impairments 
to certain specified body parts and those that do not.88 At a minimum, these body parts involve 
the upper and the lower extremities and frequently include the eyes as well. Most commonly 
these are referred to as scheduled or specified losses. Forty-three jurisdictions including 
Washington use such schedules and most of these are drawn directly from the jurisdiction’s 
workers’ compensation statute.89 In 33 of them the benefit that the worker is eligible to receive 
depends in part on the employee’s average weekly (or monthly) wage.  
                                                 
87 Much of the following discussion is adapted from Barth and Niss (1999) by permission of the Workers 
Compensation Research Institute, Cambridge Massachusetts. While some of the data drawn from that report may 
have changed since they were gathered, in large part they remain accurate today. 
88 By jurisdictions in the U.S. we are referring to the 50 states and the District of Columbia. 
89 For Washington, see R.C.W. 51.08.150. 
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In 10 of the states, including Washington, the benefit paid is not a function of the injured 
worker’s pre-injury earnings, and a high-paid or low-paid worker would receive the same 
amount of compensation if they each sustain the same degree of impairment to the same body 
part. For the jurisdictions with scheduled conditions, differences exist in how benefits are 
determined when they involve certain types of body losses and for partial losses of specific body 
parts. Some jurisdictions differentiate in how they compensate between losses where there has 
been an amputation, while others do not distinguish between the loss of a body part and the “loss 
of use” of a body part.  
In 34 of the jurisdictions, the partial loss (or loss of use) of a specific body part is 
compensated solely on the basis of the degree of impairment—the physiological loss as 
evaluated by a health care provider. These jurisdictions simply measure the amount of the body 
part lost and apply that percentage to the compensation value of the entire body part. For 
example, such a state would set the benefit for the loss of one-quarter of a hand at precisely one-
quarter of the benefit specified for the loss of an entire hand (with distinction between dominant 
or lesser hand, possibly). 
Unscheduled Benefits 
Although a small number of states schedule almost all permanent partial disabilities, most 
states do not schedule injuries or illnesses that affect the spine or internal organs of the body. We 
can classify these states into one of four methods used to compensate for unscheduled or general 
injuries and illnesses. 
Impairment only 
Nineteen jurisdictions, including Washington, pay PPD benefits simply on the basis of 
the degree of impairment resulting from the injury or illness. Thus, once the medical rating has 
been determined, the size of the compensation is essentially also determined. Two of these states 
that use this approach for unscheduled impairments will allow additional benefits to be paid after 
the PPD benefits have been fully paid if the worker demonstrates some continuing disability.90 
And 2 of the 19 states provide for benefits to be paid strictly based on impairment but will adjust 
the benefit amount taking account of the worker’s age at the time of the injury. 
                                                 
90 Texas and Connecticut allow for such supplemental benefits to be paid if certain specified circumstances 
exist. 
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Loss of wage earning capacity 
Thirteen jurisdictions in the U.S. pay PPD benefits based on the loss of wage earning 
capacity (or some parallel phrase) that the worker is believed to have sustained as a result of the 
occupational injury or illness. Essentially, the determination of the amount of compensation is 
based on the projected or forecasted effect that the impairment will have on the worker’s ability 
to earn income. Factors that are or can be considered in determining this (often specified as such 
in the statute) include the degree of impairment, the worker’s age, the level of educational 
attainment, past training and the ability to benefit from vocational rehabilitation, and language 
skills. Unlike the strict impairment determination of the PPD rating in Washington, many of 
these factors are the very ones that are considered in the assessment of a TPD or pension claim in 
Washington. In PPD cases in other states, since such forecasts can be highly subjective, there is 
lots of room for the parties to contend with each other over the degree of disability, frequently 
resulting in compromise and release settlement outcomes.  
Wage loss 
Ten states use this approach where the worker has suffered an unscheduled injury or 
illness. Where the loss is unscheduled, temporary benefits can continue for a considerable period 
of time so long as the worker has not returned to employment. If the worker has returned to work 
but at some lower earnings level, the difference between the pre-injury and the post-injury wage 
levels can be the basis for continuing periodic compensation. And given the uncertainty about 
how long such time-loss benefits may have to be paid, the insurer in a wage-loss state has a 
strong incentive to close the claim quickly, frequently employing a compromise and release 
settlement to do so. In Washington, temporary disability benefits can continue for extended 
periods of time; but unlike most wage-loss jurisdictions, Washington’s statute does not place a 
time limit on such wage (earnings) losses before benefits are terminated, nor are compromise and 
release agreements allowed.  
Bifurcation 
Nine states use an approach that we label bifurcated. At the time the worker can be rated 
for disability, usually occurring when maximum medical improvement has been established, the 
worker is rated in one of two ways. If the worker has returned to employment with earnings at 
least close to the pre-injury earning level, then the employee will be rated simply on the basis of 
impairment. However, if the employee has not returned to work or is currently earning a wage 
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that is below (by some percentage) the pre-injury wage level, the worker can be rated based on 
the assessed loss of earning capacity. This estimate usually begins with the degree of impairment 
and then adds other factors to consider that will tend to increase the assessment of the degree of 
disability. For the employer or the insurer, in theory this should provide a financial incentive to 
reemploy the disabled worker, thereby incurring a lower cost of compensation.  
Direct Linkages between Permanent Partial Disability and Total Permanent Disability 
There are a number of ways that total permanent and permanent partial benefits are 
linked together. Perhaps most significantly for the State of Washington, where permanent partial 
benefits are paid exclusively for the degree of impairment that the worker has sustained, there 
can be obvious inequities. The classic case is one where the piano player loses only a tip of her 
finger and has suffered only a relatively minor impairment, but there is a resulting disability that 
is obviously far greater than the measured impairment. The disparity between determining the 
degree of disability solely based on impairment and the actual disability sustained can lead the 
pianist to seek total permanent disability benefits, if possible, as her remedy.  
The difference in the cost to an insurer between the size of the impairment benefit 
entitlement and a possible total permanent disability benefit will almost always lead to a 
settlement between the parties where the benefit is greater than what the impairment alone is 
supposed to provide, but less than the possible cost of a total permanent disability award. 
Typically, in most circumstances such as this one, a compromise and release agreement will 
close the claim. Only a small number of jurisdictions, including Washington, have legislated 
provisions barring or limiting the use of such agreements.  
Another significant form of linkage exists in states with compromise and release 
agreements, even where total permanent disability awards are not as commonly found as is 
customary in most jurisdictions. If there is some possibility that a claim could be awarded a total 
permanent disability benefit, the settlement value for a permanent partial disability benefit may 
be increased.  
An interesting example of this was found in Florida until the statute was recently 
amended. Although Florida paid permanent partial disability benefits strictly based on the degree 
of impairment, a worker could receive additional benefits based on disability after the 
impairment income benefits had expired. A necessary condition in order to obtain such 
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additional benefits was that the impairment was a serious one, specifically that it was rated at 
least 20 percent or higher.  
Some workers’ attorneys as well as certain judges of compensation treated the 20 percent 
threshold as the line above which a total permanent award was likely justified. For several 
reasons Florida was a state with a relatively high rate of awards for total permanent disability 
claims. Oddly then, what had been a measure to limit supplementary impairment benefits to 
those with more serious degrees of impairment became an important threshold for the possible 
awarding of total permanent disability benefits.  
Since impairment ratings were often subject to a “dueling docs syndrome” and disputes 
over these ratings could lead to extended litigation, the disputes became more important than one 
might otherwise expect as the possibility was assessed of a rating above or below the all-
important 20-percent level. The result of this was that impairment ratings that were thought to be 
near that threshold resulted in compromise and release settlements (known as “washouts” in 
Florida) that were considerably higher than the possible ultimate impairment rating alone might 
justify. 
Compensating for Total Permanent Disability in the U.S. 
Statutory total permanent disability 
All jurisdictions in the U.S. provide compensation for total permanent disabilities 
although a few do not use that terminology.91 Thirty-nine states, including Washington identify 
specific, catastrophic injuries in their statutes or rules that are presumed to constitute total 
permanent disability. Table 3.1 shows which states use such specific conditions as a basis for 
awarding total permanent disability benefits.  
                                                 
91 Texas, for example, provides “lifetime income benefits.” 
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Table 3.1  TPD Awards 
   Maximum Duration of TPD Awards 
 
 
 
Jurisdiction 
Medical impairments 
are specified as TPD 
in statute or rule 
TPD benefits can be 
awarded for injuries 
not specified in 
statute 
 
 
 
Lifetime 
 
 
Retirement 
age 
 
 
 
Other 
Alabama  X X   
Alaska X X X   
Arizona X X X   
Arkansas X  X   
California X X X   
Colorado X X X  Or the period of disability 
Connecticut X  X   
Delaware X  X   
District of 
Columbia 
X X X  Or the period of disability 
Florida X X X   
Georgia X  X   
Hawaii X X X  Subject to review every 2 years 
Idaho X X X   
Illinois X X X   
Indiana X X   500 weeks (including any TTD 
previously paid) 
Iowa X X X   
Kansas X X   To a maximum of $125,000 
Kentucky X X X  Until the worker is eligible for 
social security old-age benefits 
Louisiana  X   Period of disability 
Maine X    800 weeks from date of injury 
Maryland X  X   
Massachusetts  X   Period of disability 
Michigan X  X   
Minnesota X X  X  
Mississippi  X   450 weeks from date of injury 
Missouri  X X   
Montana  X  X  
Nebraska X X X  Or the period of disability 
Nevada X X X   
New Hampshire  X X   
New Jersey X X   Subject to periodic reconsideration 
and extension 
New Mexico X  X   
New York X X   Period of disability 
North Carolina X X X   
North Dakota  X X X Lifetime if age 65 was reached 
before August 1, 1995; retirement 
age if reached after August 1, 1995
Ohio X X X  Return to work 
Oklahoma X X X   
Oregon  X X  Offsets can reduce award 
Pennsylvania Not applicable     
Rhode Island X  X   
South Carolina X X   To a maximum of 500 weeks; 
lifetime for paraplegic, 
quadriplegic, and physical brain 
damage 
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   Maximum Duration of TPD Awards 
 
 
 
Jurisdiction 
Medical impairments 
are specified as TPD 
in statute or rule 
TPD benefits can be 
awarded for injuries 
not specified in 
statute 
 
 
 
Lifetime 
 
 
Retirement 
age 
 
 
 
Other 
South Dakota X  X   
Tennessee  X  X For those injured at age 60 or 
older, 260 weeks of benefits 
Texas X  X   
Utah X X X  Or the worker’s return to “gainful” 
employment 
Vermont X X X   
Virginia X  X   
Washington X X X   
West Virginia X X X   
Wisconsin X X X   
Wyoming  X   80 months, and then the worker 
may apply for extended benefits 
a  In South Carolina, the statute and rule mention only “disability.” In practice, impairment ratings are used as a 
starting point from which disability is determined.  
b  Texas does not have a separate explicit TPD benefit category, but pays lifetime income benefits (LIBs) for specified 
multiple losses, including limbs, eyes, a spinal injury that results in the loss of use of limbs or hands, or a skull 
injury that results in incurable insanity or imbecility. 
SOURCE:  Barth and Niss, 1999, p. 61. 
 
The medical conditions listed in Washington’s statute are very similar to those found in 
most of the other 38 states.92 In some instances these are irrebuttable presumptions. Even where 
the presumption is rebuttable these catastrophic injuries are still frequently found to be total 
permanent disability. As an example of a law with a list of impairments and a presumption that 
can be rebutted, Florida’s law specifies certain injuries that are presumed to be permanent and 
total disability unless the employer or insurer establishes that the employee is physically capable 
of engaging in at least sedentary employment within a 50-mile radius of the employee’s 
residence.93  
Of the 39 states that list specific medical conditions, 11 limit total permanent disabilities 
exclusively to those enumerated in the statute. (See Table 3.1) As a result, in some of these states 
injuries or illnesses that are very obviously disabling but are not listed in the statute will result in 
only permanent partial disability awards.94 Another measure separating some of the jurisdictions 
                                                 
92  Washington lists the “loss of both legs, or arms, or one leg and one arm, total loss of eyesight, paralysis 
…” (RCW 51.08.160). 
93  Fla. Stat. 440.15 (1) (b). 
94  Of course, some of these states may permit temporary total or wage-loss benefits to be paid for extended 
periods of time. 
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that list certain impairments as permanently and totally disabling is that some require that the 
loss of an extremity involve the actual loss and not simply the loss of use of the body part. 
Non-statutory total permanent disability 
An essential difference among those states that allow total permanent disability even for 
injuries that are not listed in their statute is the degree to which factors other than the extent of 
impairment can be considered in determining total permanent disability. The “odd-lot doctrine” 
is often cited in judicial opinions as the basis for awarding total permanent disability benefits, 
referring to the difficulty that an impairment will create for the reemployment of a worker with 
limited education, experience, language skills or possibly advanced age. Though most states 
appear willing to consider factors other than simply impairment, the presence of some severe 
impairment appears to substantially strengthen a worker’s case. Indeed, in some cases an explicit 
recognition of this is found in the law (see below).  
In terms of compensation for total permanent disability, we believe that Washington’s 
approach is almost unique and is likely to contribute to its significant rate of awarding 
pensions.95 Only one other state, Nevada, combines certain approaches to provide compensation 
in the same way for permanent partial and total permanent disability and claim closure that 
Washington does. Table 3.2 shows what we mean.96 First, Washington is different from most of 
the other states in that its workers’ compensation program does not allow for lump-sum 
settlements for indemnity benefits that decisively close claims. We believe that only eight states 
either do not allow such agreements or they place important limits on their use for indemnity 
benefits.  
                                                 
95  All states have certain features which make their workers’ compensation laws unique or almost so. The 
fact that workers directly pay a portion of the costs of the system through a payroll tax is unique. Workers pay one-
half of the medical costs and the inflation adjustment costs on indemnity benefits in Washington. This is not found 
in any other U.S. jurisdiction, although economists will maintain that workers always share in the costs of workers’ 
compensation through indirect wage tradeoffs. 
96  The data in the table are drawn from a study done in 1999. The references to Nevada are drawn from an 
analysis of that statute and interviews, both undertaken in August 2008. The original table has been modified to 
include Nevada in the last column along with Washington. 
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Table 3.2  Arrangements for Permanent Disability Compensation among State Workers’ Compensation 
Systems 
Limits on lump-sum 
settlements for indemnity 
benefits for permanent 
disability 
Permanent partial 
disability benefits based 
solely on impairment 
(unscheduled injuries) 
Total permanent 
disability benefits paid 
only for conditions 
listed in the statute 
Total permanent disability 
benefits paid based on 
impairments listed in the 
statute, or on incapacity 
from performing any 
work 
Delaware X X  
Indiana X   
Nevada X                      X 
New Mexico  X  
Tennessee    
Texas X X  
Washington X  X 
West Virginia X   
Notes: 
1. Columns 1 and 2 are based on a 1999 publication. Were these state practices evaluated today, some of the 
entries would need to be changed. States with major legislative changes since then include Nevada, 
Tennessee, and West Virginia. Some jurisdictions could be added as in the case of California which 
became an impairment based state (with modifications) in 2004. 
2. Texas does not explicitly pay total permanent disability benefits. It does pay Lifetime Income Benefits, but 
limits those to conditions listed in their statute. 
3. Texas pays a supplementary income benefit (SIB) in cases where the impairment benefit has been fully 
paid, where the impairment is evaluated by the AMA Guides to be 15 percent or greater, and where a lump- 
sum payment was not taken by the worker for the permanent partial disability. 
4. Indiana allows lump-sum settlements in cases where the claim is disputed. 
SOURCE: Barth and Niss (WCRI, 1999) 
 
While 19 states, including Washington, pay PPD benefits for unscheduled injuries or 
illnesses strictly on the basis of the extent of medically determined impairment resulting from the 
injury or illness, only six of these are states that limit lump-sum settlements as well. Of these six 
remaining jurisdictions only Washington and Nevada compensate total permanent disability on 
the basis of impairment (for conditions specified in the statute) or disability. In Washington the 
worker is totally disabled for the purposes of a pension when the injury or disease permanently 
incapacitates the worker from obtaining and performing any work at any gainful occupation. As 
a result, the opportunity to return to work is central to the pension award decision, aside from 
those conditions listed in the statute, which account for few cases annually.  
Thus, among the states where permanent partial disability compensation is based on the 
degree of impairment, and where the use of compromise and release agreements is limited by 
law or practice, only Washington and Nevada use other criteria besides the degree of impairment 
to evaluate and grant total permanent disability pensions.97 As a result, where a work-related 
                                                 
97 Interestingly, Washington and Nevada share another feature, that is, that an injured worker can simply re-
open a previously closed claim. 
 3-11 
injury causes a severe economic hardship, the law requires that only the impairment be 
considered in the awarding of permanent partial disability benefits. Yet the impairment benefit 
may bear very little relationship to the degree of disability. In Washington the absence of 
compromise and release settlements places the worker and the state fund or the self-insured 
employer in a position where the only possible source of additional compensation from workers’ 
compensation is a TPD pension.98  
Attempts to restrict TPD 
A number of jurisdictions have perceived that their total permanent disability programs 
require some explicit statutory description of when such benefits are to be awarded. In order to 
keep the number of such awards in check they may limit them to cases where impairment is 
severe. Effectively, this gives significant weight to the impairment component of a claim for total 
permanent disability. Without such a measure, the future employability of the injured worker 
could be virtually the sole consideration in determining a pension where the worker sustains any 
degree of impairment. This serves as a minimum threshold for workers to meet before they can 
be considered for the granting of these benefits. There seems to have been some increased use of 
this or other measures in recent years by a number of states. Nowhere is this better illustrated 
than in West Virginia, a state whose exclusive state fund built up huge unfunded liabilities that 
finally led to privatization of the workers’ compensation system by the Governor and legislature. 
Under its new approach total permanent disability is given special attention. In line with several 
other jurisdictions noted above, West Virginia raised the permanent partial disability rating 
                                                 
98 This raises the issue of Nevada’s experience with total permanent disability, the other state that combines 
these three characteristics. Using the most recently available NCCI data, Nevada had 10 total permanent disability 
cases per 100,000 workers at Third Report for policy year 2002–2003, resulting in only 5 states out of 45 reporting a 
higher rate. For policy year 2001–02, Nevada also had a rate of 10 total permanent disability cases out of 100,000 
workers at Third Report, with only 7 states of 45 reporting higher rates. It appears that Nevada can be fairly 
characterized as a state with a high incidence of total permanent disability as well. However, we are aware of at least 
two things that clearly differentiate Nevada’s workers’ compensation system from Washington. First, the Nevada 
economy and labor markets have been very strong in recent years although softening has occurred there in 2007–08. 
From 1998 to 2007 the average unemployment rate in the state was 4.7 percent compared with an average of 5.8 
percent for Washington from 1998 to 2006 (see Table 2.16 for Washington’s rates.) During these years, many 
employers in Nevada were eager to employ and retain labor in the fast growing economy. Secondly, total permanent 
disability claims are not as attractive to attorneys in Nevada as they are in many other jurisdictions, including 
Washington. Nevada’s workers receive their pension benefits periodically and Nevada law does not enable attorneys 
to receive their fees through the insurer’s withholding of a share of the worker’s benefit. As a result the attorney will 
receive payment when the worker pays, and there is no guarantee that the attorney will continue to receive payments 
regularly on a consistent basis. The attorney is unable to place a lien on the worker’s benefit. This is in contrast to 
Washington where the attorney receives the pension payment from L&I and in turn remits the workers share. 
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threshold from 40 percent to 50 percent as the minimum requirement for awarding total 
permanent disability benefits.99  
A novel approach to making certain that the finding of total permanent disability requires 
a high level of impairment is found Minnesota’s statute:100 
For purposes of subdivision 4, “total permanent disability” means only: 
(1) the total and permanent loss of the sight of both eyes, the loss of both arms at the 
shoulder, the loss of both legs so close to the hips that no effective artificial members can 
be used, complete and permanent paralysis, total and permanent loss of mental faculties; 
or 
(2) any other injury which totally and permanently incapacitates the employee from 
working at an occupation which brings the employee an income, provided that the 
employee must also meet the criteria of one of the following clauses: 
(a) the employee has at least a 17 percent permanent partial disability rating of the whole 
body; 
(b) the employee has a permanent partial disability rating of the whole body of at least 15 
percent and the employee is at least 50 years old at the time of injury; or 
(c) the employee has a permanent partial disability rating of the whole body of at least 13 
percent and the employee is at least 55 years old at the time of the injury, and has not 
completed grade 12 or obtained a GED certificate. 
For purposes of this clause, “totally and permanently incapacitated” means that the 
employee’s physical disability in combination with any one of clause (a), (b), or (c) 
causes the employee to be unable to secure anything more than sporadic employment 
resulting in an insubstantial income. Other factors not specified in clause (a), (b), or (c), 
including the employee’s age, education, training and experience, may only be 
considered in determining whether an employee is totally and permanently incapacitated 
after the employee meets the threshold criteria of clause (a), (b), or (c). The employee’s 
age, level of physical disability or education may not be considered to the extent the 
factor is inconsistent with the disability, age, and education factors specified in clause (a), 
(b), or (c). 
Minnesota’s approach builds into its scheme very explicit impairment thresholds, and combines 
this with the factor that most states implicitly include in their decisions, the age of the worker. 
Notice that the precision set out here for the degree of impairment still leaves considerable room 
for subjectivity, once the minimum standards of (a), (b), or (c) of subdivision 5 are met.  
                                                 
99  Senate Bill 2013 (2003). 
100  Minn. Stat.171.101, Subdivision. 5. 
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A variant of this can be found in New Jersey’s law. Aside from the list of conditions that 
are explicitly set out to be total permanent disability, the statute requires that:101 
Factors other than physical and neuropsychiatric impairments may be considered in the 
determination of permanent total disability, where such physical and neuropsychiatric 
impairments constitute at least 75% or higher of total disability. 
Only when the 75 percent threshold is met, a rating that suggests that a very severe impairment 
exists, will factors such as the worker’s age, education, and training be allowed to be considered 
in determining whether or not the claim for total permanent disability is allowed.102  
California has adopted a somewhat similar approach.103 The law provides that:104 
Permanent total disability means a permanent disability with a rating of 100 percent 
permanent disability only. 
However, the law also allows that for claims with a disability rating over 70 percent, once the 
maximum number of weeks of permanent partial disability benefits terminate, the worker 
becomes eligible for a lifetime pension.105 With the 2004 legislation effective January 1, 2005, 
the disability rating will be heavily determined by an impairment rating using the AMA Guides 
to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment.106  
Another variant of these approaches is found in North Dakota. Aside from a list of 
impairments that are presumed to be sufficient to establish total permanent disability, the law 
provides that a worker must have a whole-body impairment rating of at least 25 percent in order 
to be eligible to receive a total permanent disability award.107 As with the other jurisdictions 
listed above, this threshold level of impairment is set as a minimum condition for receiving total 
permanent disability benefits. Undoubtedly, it limits those workers with impairment levels below 
the threshold to permanent partial disability benefits. 
Pennsylvania’s statute sets a threshold value such that a 50 percent permanent 
impairment rating—according to the latest version of the AMA Guides to the Evaluation of 
                                                 
101  N.J. Stat 34:15-36. 
102  Darmetko v. Electron Technology, 243 N.J. Super.536. (Appeal dismissed) 
103  The California statute also lists four conditions that are conclusively presumed to be total permanent 
disability. 
104  Cal. Labor Code 4452.5. 
105  Cal. Labor Code 4659. 
106  Cal. SB 899 (2004). 
107  ND Cent. Code 65-01-02 (25) (h). 
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Permanent Disability—creates a presumption that the worker is permanently and totally 
disabled.108 However, the presumption is rebuttable and a recent court decision held that the 
employer was able to challenge the presumption on the grounds that the worker had “earning 
power” and that employment was generally available for him.109 
Further tightening standards in West Virginia law states that the comparability of pre-
injury to post-disability income is not to be a factor in determining total permanent disability. 
The availability of employment within a 75-mile radius of the worker’s residence can be 
considered, although if the distance traveled to work prior to the injury exceeded 75 miles then 
that distance was to be used. West Virginia also adopted tighter standards for monitoring post-
award activities and requiring more frequent medical evaluations. 
The Florida provision for non-statutory total permanent claims, parallels the provisions 
for statutory total permanent disability noted above, and it requires that the worker prove that 
he/she is unable to engage in even sedentary employment due to the physical limitation, within a 
50-mile radius of the employees’ residence. The specification of a geographic range of work is 
similar to the West Virginia approach. 
Another jurisdiction with a past record of a significant number of total permanent 
disability awards is Louisiana. That law has been modified to tighten eligibility standards 
although many in the employer community continue to express dissatisfaction with the current 
system. The existing statute provides that clear and convincing evidence, unaided by any 
presumption of disability is required for such an award, and that the employee is physically 
unable to engage in any employment or self-employment:110 
…including, but not limited to any and all odd-lot employment, sheltered employment or 
employment while working in any pain (sic) notwithstanding the location or availability 
of any such employment or self-employment. 
Montana defines total permanent disability as a condition resulting from an injury after 
maximum medical healing has occurred and: 
…in which a worker does not have a reasonable prospect of physically performing 
regular employment. Regular employment means work on a recurring basis performed 
for remuneration in a trade, business, profession, or other occupation in this state. Lack of 
                                                 
108  (77 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 511.2) 
109  Sign Innovation v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, 937 A.2d 623; 2007. 
110  LA R.S. 23:1221 (2) (c). 
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immediate job openings is not a factor to be considered in determining if a worker is 
permanently totally disabled.111 
Montana’s code provides that “The determination of total permanent disability must be 
supported by a preponderance of objective medical findings.”112 In one case the worker’s severe 
pain that resulted from the occupational injury was sufficient to prove a total permanent 
disability.113 The definition of total permanent disability contains both medical and non-medical 
components; the non-medical component of the definition requires that the claimant establish 
that there is no reasonable prospect for employment in the labor market.114 Even if the statutes of 
states do not require that certain levels of the “medical component” are met, the courts may 
expect that they are. In a Wyoming decision the court found: 
In order to come within “odd-lot” doctrine, it is the burden of the employee to establish 
not only that he is no longer capable of working at the job in which he was employed at 
the time of his injury, but that the degree of obvious physical impairment, coupled 
with other facts, such as mental capacity, education, training, or age, must prima facie 
place him in that category. The burden of proof then shifts to the employer to establish 
that light work of a special nature which the employee could perform but which is not 
generally available was in fact available to him.115  
Oregon’s definition of total permanent disability is not a particularly unusual one:116 
…the loss, including preexisting disability, of use or function of any portion of the body 
which permanently incapacitates the worker from regularly performing work at a gainful 
and suitable occupation. 
Suitable occupation is defined as well, meaning that the worker has the ability and the 
training or experience to perform, or can perform the work after rehabilitation. One of the 
challenges for applicants, however, is the need to meet another provision of the law that applies 
to all forms of compensation benefits. It requires that no injury or disease is compensable as a 
consequence of a compensable injury unless the compensable injury is the major contributing 
cause of the consequential condition.117 The worker has the burden of proving total disability—
                                                 
111  Mont. Code Anno. 39-71-116 (25). 
112  Mont. Code Anno. 39-71-702. 
113  Killroy v. Reliance Nat’l Indemnity, 923 P.2d 531 (1996). 
114  Larson v. Cigna Ins. Co., 915 P.2d 863 (1996). 
115  (Emphasis added) Anaya v. Holly Sugar Corp., 928 P.2d 473, 1996 Wyo.  
116  ORS 656.206 (1) (d). 
117  ORS 656.005 (7) (a) (A). 
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not unusual—and must also establish that he/she is willing to seek “gainful employment” and 
that they have made “reasonable efforts” to obtain such employment.118 
For some of the jurisdictions that will grant total permanent disability for conditions that 
are not listed in a statute or regulation, the standards can be very explicit. An extreme example of 
this can be found in Ohio where the statute is relatively simple and straight forward but where 
the regulations are extraordinarily detailed.119 The statute sets out that the test for this benefit 
requires either that:120 
(1) The claimant has lost, or lost use of both hands or both arms, or both feet or both legs, 
or both eyes, or of any two thereof … 
 
or 
 
(2) The impairment resulting from the employee’s injury or occupational disease prevents 
the employee from engaging in sustained remunerative employment utilizing the 
employment skills that the employee has or may reasonably be expected to develop. 
Rather than leave a great deal for the courts to decide, the regulations associated with this 
section of the statute are filled with details. The following are examples of the explicit guidance 
that is set out in the regulations to be used in determining whether a claim is to be designated a 
total permanent disability.121 
(a) “Sedentary work” means exerting up to ten pounds of force occasionally: (activity or 
condition exists up to one-third of the time) and/or a negligible amount of force 
frequently (frequently: activity or condition exists from one-third to two-thirds of the 
time) to lift, carry, push, pull, or otherwise move objects. Sedentary work involves sitting 
most of the time, but may involve walking or standing for brief periods of time. Jobs are 
sedentary if walking and standing are required only occasionally and all other sedentary 
criteria are met. 
(iii) “Limited education” means seventh grade level through eleventh grade level. 
Limited education means ability in reasoning, arithmetic and language skills but not 
enough to allow an injured worker with these educational qualifications to do most of the 
more complex job duties needed in semi-skilled or skilled jobs. Generally, seventh grade 
through eleventh grade formal education is limited education. 
Several methods are used to limit the costs incurred in these claims. A number of 
jurisdictions place limits on the period of time for which TPD benefits are to be paid or on the 
                                                 
118  ORS 656.206 (3). 
119 Ohio, like Washington, is an exclusive fund state. 
120  Ohio Rev. Code 4123.58. 
121  Ohio Administrative Code 4123-3-34. 
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age of the recipient. As examples, Indiana limits total disability (temporary and permanent 
disability combined) to 500 weeks, while South Carolina has a 500-week cap on total permanent 
disability benefits except for claims where the worker is paraplegic, quadriplegic, or the claim is 
for brain damage. Kansas has a dollar cap on the benefits that are to be paid in total permanent 
disability cases.  
Some jurisdictions are able to hold down the frequency of the total permanent disability 
awards by making serious impairments disproportionately more valuable as permanent partial 
claims. As the benefits for serious impairments are increased more substantially, the 
attractiveness of a total permanent disability award, relatively, declines. One method of doing 
this is for the statute to provide “tiered” benefits to those with PPD claims. Fourteen states 
increase the rate at which benefits will be paid as the degree of measured impairment or 
disability increases.122 As an example, in Florida the worker is entitled to 2 weeks of benefits for 
each rated point where the impairment rating is between 1 and 10 percent, but if the rating is 
between 11 and 15 percent, the worker is entitled to 3 weeks per point above the 10-percent 
level. Thus, for example, an impairment rating of 14 percent would entitle the worker to receive 
32 weeks of benefits (10 × 2 + 4 × 3). 
Several measures have also been used by states that would lead to lower levels of benefits 
for those found to be permanently and totally disabled. An example of this is where jurisdictions 
terminate benefits whenever the worker achieves a certain age. Another method that some states 
use to limit the costs of these claims is to offset benefits for other income that the worker 
receives. Nineteen states, including Washington, offset compensation payments for old-age 
benefits paid under the Social Security program. (See Table 3.3) Five states offset total 
permanent disability benefits for any employer-paid pension benefits that the worker receives.123 
And 14 states, including Washington, use the reverse offset by reducing workers’ compensation 
indemnity benefits to place a cap on the combined benefits from the state program and the Social 
Security Disability Insurance program.  
                                                 
122  Typically, this is done by paying more weeks of benefits per point of impairment or disability as the 
impairment or disability rating increases. Thirteen states are listed in Barth and Niss (Table 3.10) and Florida 
recently added this approach in its statute. 
123  These are AL, AK, CO, KY and MI. 
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Compromise and release agreements 
The use of compromise and release agreements (C&Rs) in workers’ compensation is 
common across the U.S., though it is not allowed in Washington.124 In most cases a C&R means 
that the insurer and the worker agree that for a sum of money paid to the worker, usually 
provided in a lump sum, no further liability exists for the employer or the insurer as a result of 
the injury or illness. The use of the C&R is attractive to many insurers as a way to “close the 
books” on a claim, and establish with certainty the ultimate cost and resolution of the claim. 
Fully resolving the claim cannot be possible unless the C&R also ends any potential insurer 
liability for future health care costs. Still, agreements between the insurer and the worker are 
sometimes used that seal off future liability for the indemnity portion of the claim and leave 
open, if necessary, future health care costs. 
                                                 
124  In fact, a lump-sum payment can be made “in case of death or permanent disability” (RCW 51.32.130). 
However, the maximum amount is limited to $8,500 and such payments do not constitute a compromise and release 
in the legal sense. Where such a payment is made, the death or total permanent disability claim has already been 
resolved. 
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Table 3.3  Jurisdictions that Offset TPD Benefits 
Jurisdiction 
Social Security 
old-age benefits Employer-paid pensions 
Reverse offset for SSDI 
benefits 
Alabama  X  
Alaska X X  
Californiaa   X 
Colorado X X X 
District of Columbia X   
Florida   X 
Kansas X   
Kentucky X X  
Louisianab X  X 
Massachusetts X   
Michigan X X  
Minnesotac X  X 
Montana X  X 
Nevadad   X 
New Jerseyb   X 
New York X  X 
North Carolinae X   
North Dakotaf X  X 
Ohiog X  X 
Oklahoma    
Oregonb X  X 
Rhode Island  X  
South Dakota X   
Tennessee X   
Utah X   
Washingtonh X  X 
Wisconsin   X 
a  In California, the reverse offset applies only to payments from the Subsequent Injuries Fund. Also, the state allows 
offsets for certain employer-provided benefits, including short-term disability insurance. 
b  In Louisiana, New Jersey, and Oregon, the reverse offset applies only to TPD-benefit cases. 
c  In Minnesota, the reverse offset applies only to TPD-benefits cases and to “certain supplementary workers’ 
compensation payments.” 
d  In Nevada, the reverse offset applies only to cases with onset before March 1, 1981, or to cases in which the 
month of onset is before September 1981. 
e  North Carolina also allows an offset for severance pay. 
f  In North Dakota, the reverse offset applies for TTD or TPD benefits if the injury occurred after January 1, 1980. 
g  In Ohio, the reverse offset applies to combinations of payments that include workers’ compensation and the 
Disabled Workers Relief Fund. 
h  In Washington, the reverse offset applies to both TPD and TTD benefits. 
SOURCE:  Information on SSDI benefits is from the U.S. Social Security Administration. 
SOURCE: Barth and Niss, 1999, p. 67. 
Some states seek to protect workers in their rights to compensation by limiting the types 
of settlements that they will approve. (See Table 3.4) Several jurisdictions do not allow C&R 
agreements to include a provision that ends an insurer’s liability for future medical benefits, or 
for future vocational rehabilitation benefits. Since future medical treatment is impossible to 
predict, it is felt that such rights should not be signed away. Of course, these states also may be 
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protecting themselves from having to deal with covering future health care costs for any injured 
workers who become indigent after having settled their claims with a lump sum.   
Table 3.4  Limitations on Lump-Sum Settlements 
 Lump-sum settlements cannot terminate future liability for 
Jurisdiction 
Permanent disability 
indemnity benefits Medical benefits Rehabilitation benefits 
Arizona   X 
Connecticut   X 
Delaware X X  
Florida   X 
Indiana X X  
Massachusetts  X  
Montana   X 
Nevada X X  
New Hampshire  X  
New Mexico X X  
Oregon  X  
South Dakota  X  
Tennessee X X  
Texas X X  
Vermont   X 
Washington X X X 
West Virginia X X  
SOURCE:  Barth and Niss, 1999, p. 68.  
Since injured workers are generally not experienced in using such agreements, unlike the 
typical insurer, most states require that the agreement be approved by the state workers’ 
compensation agency, or by a court. Where the employee is represented by an attorney, who is 
also presumed to be experienced with these agreements, such a review need not occur or where it 
does it may be only pro forma. However, the C&R may fail to end disputes over a claim where 
the worker sustains a subsequent condition that the worker alleges is a new condition and the 
insurer argues that it is the same condition that the employee had agreed to settle. Of course, 
such disputes do not occur in a state like Washington that prohibits compromise and release in 
the first instance. 
Nevertheless, the use of C&R agreements in other states poses a problem for our analysis 
of TPD claims in Washington. In most states we have no way of knowing whether a C&R 
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agreement was used in a claim where the worker would have ultimately been found to be 
permanently and totally disabled. Insurance rate-making organizations generally classify C&Rs 
as permanent partial disability cases. However, some unknown number of these are undoubtedly 
claims that would have developed into total permanent disability had they not been settled before 
a final determination was made. Thus, comparing the incidence of total permanent disability 
claims in Washington with that in other jurisdictions involves some measurement difficulties. 
We will turn to that task next.  
A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF WASHINGTON AND NCCI STATES 
The existence of compromise and release settlements in most states is not the only 
complicating factor. There are a host of statutory differences among state workers’ compensation 
statutes, not to mention administrative rules, court precedents, and local practice. In fact, it 
would be safe to say that no two workers’ compensation jurisdictions are exactly alike, which 
makes any generalization hazardous.  
Some of the differences that should be noted include coverage differences. The 
proportion of all employment covered by workers’ compensation statutes differs, and this 
definitely affects the performance numbers. For instance, if farm sector employers are excluded 
from coverage, the number of injuries and their distribution will be affected since agriculture 
tends to be an industry of high-injury incidence. The opposite is true of industries with low-
accident incidence, like banking or insurance. So the precise nature of workers’ compensation 
coverage will affect the measured performance of the system. According to the National 
Academy of Social Insurance (NASI), Washington is among the highest states in workers’ 
compensation coverage when compared to unemployment insurance covered employment.125 
Insurance arrangements also differ across jurisdictions. While Washington is unusual in 
having an exclusive state fund with allowance for self-insurance, there are many other models. 
Approximately 20 states have competitive state funds, which means that they compete for 
employer clients in the workers’ compensation insurance market with private insurers. If they 
also allow self-insurance for the largest employers, such jurisdictions are referred to as “three-
way” systems. There are only four states (OH, ND, WA, WY) that currently follow the exclusive 
state fund model. 
                                                 
125  See Sengupta, Reno, and Burton, (2007), Table A1. 
 3-22 
There is also great variation in the allowance of the self-insurance privilege among 
systems. In some jurisdictions like Washington, only the most fiscally stable, large employers are 
allowed to self-insure. In Canadian jurisdiction, self-insurance is frequently restricted to the 
largest public utilities or government entities, and even they are generally not allowed to self-
administer their workers’ compensation claims. In other jurisdictions, the rules are less strict. In 
Michigan, even the smallest employers are eligible for “group self-insurance” if they belong to 
an industry association that secures access for their members through various financial 
guarantees and collective responsibilities.  
There is a fundamental data problem in workers’ compensation as well. The data that are 
gathered in the states are generally intended for use in rate-making for workers’ compensation 
insurance. Because these are our oldest social programs, they do not have a strong policy-
oriented research tradition as many other programs do. Thus, there is no universal and consistent 
source of data on the state workers’ compensation systems. The annual report published by the 
National Academy of Social Insurance (NASI) captures some basic measures like coverage, 
benefits, and employer costs across time.126 The National Council on Compensation Insurance 
(NCCI) gathers the rate-making data from the states that use private insurance for their workers’ 
compensation programs. They publish an annual Statistical Bulletin which reports data on 
workers’ compensation claims in some detail for 45 states, not including Washington or the other 
exclusive fund states.127 And the U.S. Chamber of Commerce publishes an annual volume that 
summarizes the benefits and law provisions of the states.128 However, these sources are only of 
marginal value in comparing workers’ compensation system performance. Because they offer the 
most specific detail, we will use NCCI published data to compare the 45 states with private 
insurance to the Washington workers’ compensation system. 
NCCI Data 
The NCCI maintains an extensive workers’ compensation claim reporting system that 
calls for specific reports at definite times after the completion of an “accident year.” For 
instance, the First Report is required 6 months after the end of the exposure period. So, adding 6 
months to the 12-month insurance term means that First Report covers accidents that occurred 
from 6 months to 18 months ago. Similarly the Second Report, which comes a year later, covers 
                                                 
126  Sengupta, Reno, and Burton, 2007, Table A1. 
127  NCCI, 2007. 
128  U.S. Chamber of Commerce, 2007. 
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accidents that occurred from 18 to 30 months previously; and Third Report gives the results from 
30 to 42 months after the injury, and so on. While these reports cover the same original 
population of claims from a given accident year, their experience may have changed significantly 
with each intervening 12 months. Changes from report to report are referred to as claim 
“development,” and the aggregate change in anticipated costs from year to year is termed “loss 
development.” These loss development factors reflect many system features, including the 
litigiousness of the workers’ compensation system.  
The truth is that there is no guarantee that measures from any two workers’ compensation 
systems that have the same name will actually be completely comparable, even though the NCCI 
and the independent state rating organizations put considerable effort into ensuring they are as 
comparable as possible. This “tower of Babel” is one of the motivations behind the series of 
administrative inventories produced by the Workers Compensation Research Institute over the 
past 25 years. These volumes provide a detailed introduction and overview to the workers’ 
compensation systems of 22 larger states, including the state of Washington (Pease, 1989 and 
Telles and Fox, 1996). 
In addition, there is the problem of non-comparable policy periods. States use different 
dates to define an accident year for workers’ compensation insurance purposes. This means that 
when comparing two states in some performance dimension, we can be up to nine months out of 
sync with the measurement. For example, California, Oregon, and Montana all use the calendar 
year (January through December) as the accident year, but Louisiana and Mississippi use 
September through August. Presumably this reflects some historical influence that is no longer 
obvious. The NCCI reports data for the “policy period” specified by the individual state. 
Washington uses the state fiscal year (July through June) for data reporting. There are nine other 
states that use this period. But the point is that there are still differences among the states, even 
when we are trying to measure the same thing.  
Last is the critical issue of claim development. It is vital to allow workers’ compensation 
claims sufficient time to develop if we are to compare apples to something close to apples. The 
full implications of a work injury are not apparent at one month, or even one year following the 
accident. For our comparisons between Washington and NCCI states, we have elected to use data 
from the NCCI Third Report (meaning claims that occurred 30 to 42 months previously) as a 
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compromise between claim development and reporting currency. If we maximize the time for 
claim development, we are analyzing older claims that may not be relevant to current practice.  
The “countrywide” average incidence of permanent and total disability claims according 
to the NCCI stabilizes at 7 claims per 100,000 workers by the Third Report, and does not rise 
beyond that level (at least by Fifth Report, which is the latest available to us).129 For the state of 
Florida, another state with high incidence of TPD, analysis of the last four years of data indicates 
that TPD incidence reaches a level of 19–20 TPD claims per 100,000 workers by Second Report, 
and then slowly edges up from there. California appears to peak between Second and Third 
report and then decline.  
Montana lacks the statistical credibility of larger states, but as a high TPD incidence, 
close neighbor state it is of considerable interest to Washington. Montana total permanent 
disability incidence rates reported by NCCI appear to peak at second report, and then decline 
significantly thereafter. This is not to say that the actual number of permanent and total 
disabilities is declining. Presumably this reflects both compromise and release settlements and 
the normal caution of claims personnel who do not want unpleasant surprises after all premium is 
collected and the year has ended. Therefore, they would tend to be overly cautious in reserving 
for potentially expensive serious injuries.  
Therefore, we believe that a comparison at Third Report allows sufficient time for the 
overwhelming majority of claims to develop enough that their ultimate outcome as a permanent 
and total disability claim is fairly clear. When the data gathering and publication lags are added 
to the reporting lag this means that we will be comparing claims from the period 2001–2002 
(dates differing slightly in individual states) to Washington claims from the fiscal year July 1, 
2001, through June 30, 2002.130 In addition, it is clear that Washington claims are slower to 
develop than in most other states. Thus, comparisons at Third Report with NCCI states will 
substantially understate the ultimate Washington level. So we will also look at the actuarially 
projected ultimate level of Washington claims based on past development patterns.  
Table 3.5 displays the NCCI data on the incidence of workers’ compensation claims per 
100,000 workers for each of the 45 states and the District of Columbia that report their data to 
insurance industry rate-making organizations. This is the most comprehensive data source for 
                                                 
129  Based upon NCCI Annual Statistical Reports for 2005-2008.  
130  Thanks to the L&I Actuarial Department for developing these special runs for our purpose.  
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U.S. workers’ compensation, but does not include all states and does not include the experience 
of self-insured employers in any of the jurisdictions.  
Table 3.5  Frequency by Injury Type 
                  NCCI Third Report 
State Policy period 
Total claims per 
100,000 workers 
Medical only claims per 
100,000 workers 
Time-loss claims per 
100,000 workers 
     
AK 04/01 – 03/02 8,542 5,792 2,750 
CA2 01/01 – 12/01 7,026 4,363 2,663 
HI 06/01 – 05/02 5,647 2,994 2,653 
RI 01/01 – 12/01 6,783 4,517 2,266 
OR 01/01 – 12/01 6,763 4,810 1,953 
WI 01/01 – 12/01 8,101 6,267 1,834 
MT 01/01 – 12/01 8,576 6,771 1,805 
OK 06/01 – 05/02 5,861 4,096 1,765 
VT 07/01 – 06/02 6,600 4,855 1,745 
MO 07/01 – 06/02 5,619 3,926 1,693 
NH 04/01 – 03/02 6,441 4,868 1,573 
ID 07/01 – 06/02 7,920 6,350 1,570 
CT 08/01 – 07/02 5,115 3,598 1,517 
IA 03/01 – 02/02 6,177 4,689 1,488 
NV 01/01 – 12/01 7,628 6,157 1,471 
MA2 07/01 – 06/02 5,138 3,676 1,462 
ME 06/01 – 05/02 8,214 6,776 1,438 
DE2 01/01 – 12/01 5,243 3,862 1,381 
FL 01/01 – 12/01 5,945 4,574 1,371 
IL 04/01 – 03/02 4,575 3,230 1,345 
MS 09/01 – 08/02 5,844 4,504 1,340 
MN2 01/01 – 12/01 6,408 5,073 1,335 
NJ2 01/01 – 12/01 4,275 2,945 1,330 
SD 01/01 – 12/01 7,817 6,532 1,285 
PA2 01/01 – 12/01 6,757 5,497 1,260 
CW6 average 5,543 4,303 1,240 
KY 05/01 – 04/02 6,682 5,466 1,216 
KS 07/01 – 06/02 6,358 5,145 1,213 
NY2 01/01 – 12/01 3,479 2,267 1,212 
SC 05/00 – 04/01 5,008 3,801 1,207 
CO 03/01 – 02/02 6,540 5,346 1,194 
MI 04/01 – 03/02 6,195 5,013 1,182 
NM 07/01 – 06/02 5,601 4,431 1,170 
TN 06/01 – 05/02 5,973 4,826 1,147 
MD 04/01 – 03/02 3,847 2,704 1,143 
TX 01/01 – 12/01 3,994 2,864 1,130 
AL 05/01 – 04/02 5,787 4,666 1,121 
UT 07/01 – 06/02 6,360 5,277 1,083 
NE 08/01 – 07/02 6,013 4,934 1,079 
AR 02/01 – 01/02 6,058 4,982 1,076 
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State Policy period 
Total claims per 
100,000 workers 
Medical only claims per 
100,000 workers 
Time-loss claims per 
100,000 workers 
LA 09/01 – 08/02 4,199 3,166 1,033 
IN 07/01 – 06/02 6,920 5,898 1,022 
AZ 03/01 – 02/02 5,994 5,059 935 
NC 01/01 – 12/01 4,387 3,509 878 
GA 07/01 – 06/02 4,499 3,672 827 
VA 02/01 – 01/02 4,036 3,316 720 
DC 02/01 – 01/02 1,316 855 461 
1  Based on fewer than 25 cases. 
2  Data provided by the appropriate local organization noted in the Appendix. 
3  Represents total incapacity. 
4  Represents partial disability. 
5  Based on fewer than three cases; value not displayed. 
6  Excluding California, Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, 
   New York, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin. 
SOURCE: Annual Statistical Bulletin, 2007 Edition. 
 
Of course, the variation in self-insurance incidence also affects the experience of the 
workers’ compensation insurance pool. In a state with a relatively permissive self-insurance 
provision, more employers will be absent from the insurance pool data. Since self-insured 
employers are generally regarded as more safety-oriented and more inclined to engage in 
disability management practices (in part because of their direct interest in their workers’ 
compensation costs), it could be expected that their absence would raise the average incidence of 
workers’ compensation claims relative to a state that was more restrictive in granting access to 
self-insured status.  
Nevertheless, it is worth noting that the range in workers’ compensation experience by 
state is very large indeed. At the top of the scale are states like Montana, Arkansas, and Maine all 
of which have more than 8,000 workers’ compensation claims per 100,000 workers. This means 
that approximately 8 workers out of 100 in these states have some contact with the workers’ 
compensation system resulting from work-related injuries or diseases in a given year. At the 
bottom of the scale, jurisdictions like the District of Columbia, New York, and Maryland that 
have a lot of white-collar employment experience less than 4,000 workers’ compensation claims 
per 100,000 workers; or less than half the incidence of work-related injury and illness.  
Table 3.5 also reports the incidence for “medical only” and “time-loss” claims. Since the 
medical only claims are so numerous, they tend to dominate the total number of claims and the 
ranking of states is much the same; but when we look at the incidence of time-loss claims the 
picture changes somewhat. The table indicates that the highest incidence is in the states of 
 3-27 
Arkansas, California, and Hawaii; all exceeding 2,500 time-loss claims per 100,000 workers 
annually. Since these are not states known for their dominant logging, mining, or manufacturing 
industries (with attendant high injury rates), we can presume that the relatively high incidence of 
time-loss claims reflects some combination of characteristics of their workers’ compensation 
systems. Similarly for the states with relatively low incidence of time-loss claims; District of 
Columbia, Virginia, and North Carolina all have less than 1,000 time-loss claims per 100,000 
workers annually.  
Where does Washington stand? In terms of total claims, the Washington state fund 
reports an actuarially adjusted claim rate of 8,590 per 100,000 workers for 2001–2002.131 This 
would place Washington in the first rank of states in terms of workers’ compensation claims 
incidence, comparable to Montana, Arkansas, and Maine. Similarly for the incidence of time-loss 
claims; Washington reports 2,154 time-loss claims per 100,000 workers in fiscal year 2002, 
which would put Washington about 20 percent below the highest incidence states but still in the 
top five.  
However, there is another very significant difference between Washington figures and 
those of other states. Washington measures employment in hours worked rather than payroll. In 
NCCI states, reported payroll figures are converted to estimated employment using average 
earnings reported to the unemployment insurance system in the state. Since coverage of workers’ 
compensation is very similar to that for unemployment insurance for all states except Texas 
(which has a voluntary workers’ compensation statute), this provides a fairly accurate 
employment estimate. But it becomes necessary to convert hours worked to number of 
employees to make Washington data comparable to other states. The Department of Labor and 
Industries in the State of Washington uses a rate of 1,920 hours (or the equivalent of working 40 
hours per week for 48 weeks per year) to convert hours worked to employment.  
We believe this figure for average hours per employee is too high, given the incidence of 
unemployment, seasonal employment, and part-time employment in Washington. Therefore, we 
would be underestimating the actual number of employees potentially exposed to work injury or 
                                                 
131 We have selected fiscal year 2001–2002 because it is closest to the span of years covered by the most 
recent NCCI Third Report data (generally the year ending in the first half of 2002. See Table 3.5 for the exact dates 
for each state). We have not included self-insured employers in Washington since they are not included in NCCI 
figures. We are very thankful to the Actuarial Department of L&I for providing us with figures from the fiscal year 
ending 6/30/2002 and developed to the 42-month level using quarterly data. These figures should be as comparable 
to NCCI as we can make them.  
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disease. This in turn overestimates the incidence of workers’ compensation claims, since the 
number of claims (the numerator) remains the same while the number of workers (the 
denominator) is decreased.  
The Washington State Employment Security Department, Labor Market and Economic 
Analysis Branch reports that there were 3.4 million individuals employed in the State of 
Washington at some point in 2006. However, only 30 percent of them worked more than 2,000 
hours and only one-half of them worked more than 1,560 hours in the year. More than one-fifth 
of the total worked fewer than 520 hours during the year.132 Given the prevalence of migrant 
labor in Washington, and the growing incidence of part-time and contract employment in all 
labor markets, we have elected to use 1,600 hours per year as the lower bound and 2,000 hours 
per year as the upper bound for the average work year. 
Using a more realistic average of 1,600 hours per employee would reduce the estimated 
incidence of workers’ compensation claims in Washington by 20 percent. Thus the total 
incidence of claims in 2002 would be 6,872 per 100,000 workers and the incidence of time-loss 
claims would fall to 1,723 per 100,000 workers, and a rank of tenth among the states. It is worth 
noting that the overall claims incidence rate for self-insured employers in Washington is 
approximately the same as for state fund insured employers, varying by 10 to 20 percent 
(sometimes higher, sometimes lower) over the years.  
Incidence of Total Permanent Disability  
Table 3.6 reports the NCCI data on the incidence of total permanent disability claims 
(what the NCCI terms permanent total disability or PTD, but we will follow Washington practice 
and refer to these as TPD claims). California has the highest incidence rate at third report with 37 
TPD claims per 100,000 workers. Montana, Florida, Arkansas, South Carolina, Kentucky, and 
Texas all had more than 10 claims per 100,000 workers. At the other end of the distribution; 
South Dakota, Rhode Island, and Indiana had TPD rates of 1 claim per 100,000 workers or less. 
Other low incidence jurisdictions included: Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Kansas, 
Arizona, and the District of Columbia, all with 2 TPD claims or less per 100,000 workers.  
The Washington state fund had made 482 TPD awards to claims in fiscal year 2001–2002 
by third report (or 42 months following the start of the period) against an estimated employment 
                                                 
132  Cited in “2007 Washington State Labor Market and Economic Report,” (LMEA, Olympia, WA) 
December 2007.  
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base (using 2,000 hours per employee) of 1.43 million for an incidence rate of 34 per 100,000 
employees. Using our estimate of 1,600 average hours per employee, would reduce that to 27 
TPD claims per 100,000 employees. This is in the same range as California and Montana, the 
highest incidence states shown in Table 3.6. However, this is not the end of the story, especially 
in Washington.  
Table 3.6  Incidence of TPD Relative to Employment 
    NCCI Third Report 
  
State 
  
Policy period 
TPD rate   
per 100,000 
workers 
CA2 01/01 – 12/01 37  
MT 01/01 – 12/01 24  
FL 01/01 – 12/01 19  
AK 04/01 – 03/02 14 1 
SC 05/00 – 04/01 13  
KY 05/01 – 04/02 11  
TX 01/01 – 12/01 11  
MN2 01/01 – 12/01 10  
NV 01/01 – 12/01 10  
MS 09/01 – 08/02 9  
VT 07/01 – 06/02 9 1 
LA 09/01 – 08/02 8  
NC 01/01 – 12/01 8  
NY2 01/01 – 12/01 8  
CO 03/01 – 02/02 7  
CW6 average 7  
AL 05/01 – 04/02 6  
CT 08/01 – 07/02 6  
NH 04/01 – 03/02 6 1 
NJ2 01/01 – 12/01 6  
OK 06/01 – 05/02 6  
TN 06/01 – 05/02 6  
MI 04/01 – 03/02 5 3 
NM 07/01 – 06/02 5 1 
AR 02/01 – 01/02 4 1 
GA 07/01 – 06/02 4  
IL 04/01 – 03/02 4  
MD 04/01 – 03/02 4  
MO 07/01 – 06/02 4  
NE 08/01 – 07/02 4 1 
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State 
  
Policy period 
TPD rate   
per 100,000 
workers 
VA 02/01 – 01/02 4  
DE2 01/01 – 12/01 3 1 
HI 06/01 – 05/02 3 1 
IA 03/01 – 02/02 3 1 
ID 07/01 – 06/02 3 1 
ME 06/01 – 05/02 3 1 
OR 01/01 – 12/01 3  
UT 07/01 – 06/02 3 1 
AZ 03/01 – 02/02 2 1 
DC 02/01 – 01/02 2 1 
KS 07/01 – 06/02 2 1 
MA2 07/01 – 06/02 2 1 
PA2 01/01 – 12/01 2  
WI 01/01 – 12/01 2  
IN 07/01 – 06/02 1  
RI 01/01 – 12/01 1 1 
SD 01/01 – 12/01 — 5 
1  Based on fewer than 25 cases. 
2  Data provided by the appropriate local organization noted in the Appendix. 
3  Represents total incapacity. 
4  Represents partial disability. 
5  Based on fewer than three cases; value not displayed. 
6  Excluding California, Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, 
   New York, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin. 
SOURCE: Annual Statistical Bulletin, 2007 Edition. 
The average age of a state fund claim at TPD pension award in Washington has varied 
between six and eight years over the past decade, so these incidence rates at an average of three 
years after the date of injury or disease reflect just the “early decision” claims. Thus, this 
estimate would be a significant understatement of the ultimate incidence of TPD in Washington. 
Using the ultimate projected total of TPD claims from the Actuarial Department of L&I would 
yield an estimate of 65 TPD claims per 100,000 for fiscal year 2001–02, nearly twice the pre-
reform rate in California. 
As discussed earlier, this extended decision period for permanent and total disability 
claims is not the norm in other states, possibly because of the compromise and release option. 
Private insurers are anxious to resolve claims as early as possible, and will use compromise 
settlements to achieve that objective. This would have the effect of reducing the count of TPD 
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awards as these claims get tabulated according to their monetary cost. For the NCCI countrywide 
average (36 states), the incidence of TPD does not increase between third and fourth report, or 
between fourth and fifth report. So, we conclude that 3rd report data represents the maximum 
estimate of TPD claims in most NCCI states, but it is only the beginning of the story in 
Washington. Our conclusion is that Washington has a very high incidence of total permanent 
disability claims relative to its employment base, perhaps twice as high as the nearest other state 
and approximately nine times the NCCI “countrywide” average.  
Perhaps this is due to Washington being a relatively high-injury state, owing in part to its 
industrial mix as we discussed in chapter 2. Table 3.7 shows the incidence of TPD relative to all 
time-loss (or indemnity) claims from the NCCI third report. It indicates that the same group of 
states shows a high incidence of TPD relative to all time-loss claims. California, Florida, 
Montana, and South Carolina have TPD incidence rates of over 13 per 1,000 time-loss claims. 
The Washington state fund had an incidence rate of 15.6 TPD claims per 1,000 time-loss claims, 
slightly higher than the rate of California, Montana and Florida in fiscal year 2002. Scaling this 
to match the ultimate expected TPD numbers would yield an incidence rate of 38.0 per 1,000 
time-loss claims, or nearly three times the rate in California and Florida at third report. And 
while Florida’s rate is still increasing from third report to fourth and fifth report, California’s is 
not. So the rate of TPD is high relative to the number of time-loss claims as well.  
What about the relationship between TPD and permanent partial disability (PPD) claims? 
Perhaps the threshold between PPD awards and TPD awards is set at a lower point in  
Table 3.7  Incidence of TPD Relative to All Indemnity Claims 
    NCCI Third Report 
          
     
     
State Policy period 
  
TPD per 
100,000 
workers   
  
Medical only 
per 100,000 
workers   
Indemnity 
claim per 
100,000 
workers   
  
TPD per 1,000  
indemnity claims 
         
CA2 01/01 - 12/01 37  4,363  2663  13.9 
FL 01/01 - 12/01 19  4,574  1371  13.9 
MT 01/01 - 12/01 24  6,771  1805  13.3 
SC 05/00 - 04/01 13  3,801  1207  10.8 
TX 01/01 - 12/01 11  2,864  1130  9.7 
NC 01/01 - 12/01 8  3,509  878  9.1 
KY 05/01 - 04/02 11  5,466  1216  9.0 
LA 09/01 - 08/02 8  3,166  1033  7.7 
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State Policy period 
  
TPD per 
100,000 
workers   
  
Medical only 
per 100,000 
workers   
Indemnity 
claim per 
100,000 
workers   
  
TPD per 1,000  
indemnity claims 
MN2 01/01 - 12/01 10  5,073  1335  7.5 
NV 01/01 - 12/01 10  6,157  1471  6.8 
MS 09/01 - 08/02 9  4,504  1340  6.7 
NY2 01/01 - 12/01 8  2,267  1212  6.6 
CO 03/01 - 02/02 7  5,346  1194  5.9 
CW6 Average 7  4,303  1240  5.6 
VA 02/01 - 01/02 4  3,316  720  5.6 
AL 05/01 - 04/02 6  4,666  1121  5.4 
TN 06/01 - 05/02 6  4,826  1147  5.2 
VT 07/01 - 06/02 9 1 4,855  1745  5.2 
AK 04/01 - 03/02 14 1 5,792  2750  5.1 
GA 07/01 - 06/02 4  3,672  827  4.8 
NJ2 01/01 - 12/01 6  2,945  1330  4.5 
DC 02/01 - 01/02 2 1 855  461  4.3 
NM 07/01 - 06/02 5 1 4,431  1170  4.3 
MI 04/01 - 03/02 5 3 5,013  1182  4.2 
CT 08/01 - 07/02 6  3,598  1517  4.0 
NH 04/01 - 03/02 6 1 4,868  1573  3.8 
AR 02/01 - 01/02 4 1 4,982  1076  3.7 
NE 08/01 - 07/02 4 1 4,934  1079  3.7 
MD 04/01 - 03/02 4  2,704  1143  3.5 
OK 06/01 - 05/02 6  4,096  1765  3.4 
IL 04/01 - 03/02 4  3,230  1345  3.0 
UT 07/01 - 06/02 3 1 5,277  1083  2.8 
MO 07/01 - 06/02 4  3,926  1693  2.4 
DE2 01/01 - 12/01 3 1 3,862  1381  2.2 
AZ 03/01 - 02/02 2 1 5,059  935  2.1 
ME 06/01 - 05/02 3 1 6,776  1438  2.1 
IA 03/01 - 02/02 3 1 4,689  1488  2.0 
ID 07/01 - 06/02 3 1 6,350  1570  1.9 
KS 07/01 - 06/02 2 1 5,145  1213  1.6 
PA2 01/01 - 12/01 2  5,497  1260  1.6 
OR 01/01 - 12/01 3  4,810  1953  1.5 
MA2 07/01 - 06/02 2 1 3,676  1462  1.4 
HI 06/01 - 05/02 3 1 2,994  2653  1.1 
WI 01/01 - 12/01 2  6,267  1834  1.1 
IN 07/01 - 06/02 1  5,898  1022  1.0 
 3-33 
          
     
     
State Policy period 
  
TPD per 
100,000 
workers   
  
Medical only 
per 100,000 
workers   
Indemnity 
claim per 
100,000 
workers   
  
TPD per 1,000  
indemnity claims 
RI 01/01 - 12/01 1 1 4,517  2266  0.4 
SD 01/01 - 12/01 — 5 6,532   1285   — 
1  Based on fewer than 25 cases. 
2  Data provided by the appropriate local organization noted in the Appendix. 
3  Represents total incapacity. 
4  Represents partial disability. 
5  Based on fewer than three cases; value not displayed. 
6  Excluding California, Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, 
    Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin.  
SOURCE: Annual Statistical Bulletin, 2007 edition. 
 
Washington than in other states, as discussed earlier in this chapter. If the “threshold” for TPD 
award is lower in Washington, we should find that the ratio of TPD awards to PPD awards would 
be higher. Table 3.8 reports the number of TPD claims per 100 PPD claims for NCCI states. 
Florida, Montana, Michigan, Kentucky, and Louisiana show at least 3 TPD claims per 100 PPD 
claims at Third Report.133 California and South Carolina are close behind at about 2.8 TPD 
claims per 100 PPD claims. Washington’s level stood at approximately 4.7 TPD claims per 100 
non-hearing loss PPD claims in fiscal year 2002 at third report equivalent. But this could rise to 
11.4 TPD claims per PPD claim ultimately, when the cohort has fully matured. Thus, it is clear 
that Washington makes considerably more TPD awards relative to PPD awards than these other 
states, and the threshold between PPD and TPD may well be an issue.134  
 
Table 3.8  Incidence of TPD Relative to PPD Claims 
    NCCI Third Report 
        
    
State Policy period 
TPD rate 
per 100,000  
workers   
PPD rate 
per 100,000 
workers   
  
TPD per 100 
 PPD claims 
FL 01/01 –- 12/01 19  372  5.1 
MT 01/01 – 12/01 24  631  3.8 
MI 04/01 – 03/02 5 3 138 4 3.6 
KY 05/01 – 04/02 11  355  3.1 
LA 09/01 – 08/02 8  261  3.1 
                                                 
133  Though Michigan should be discounted since it is a wage-loss state and does not use the PPD as a 
category for compensation. Thus PPD awards in Michigan are estimated based upon the expected dollar payout, or 
amount of the C&R settlement.  
134 Of course if compromise and release settlements are used to reduce the number of TPDs measured, they 
would also increase the number of PPDs measured. This would have the effect of lowering the ratio of TPD to PPD 
and making the Washington ratio look artificially high.  
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State Policy period 
TPD rate 
per 100,000  
workers   
PPD rate 
per 100,000 
workers   
  
TPD per 100 
 PPD claims 
CA2 01/01 – 12/01 37  1,320  2.8 
SC 05/00 – 04/01 13  466  2.8 
MN2 01/01 – 12/01 10  376  2.7 
MS 09/01 – 08/02 9  355  2.5 
NC 01/01 – 12/01 8  337  2.4 
AK 04/01 – 03/02 14 1 633  2.2 
TX 01/01 – 12/01 11  513  2.1 
VA 02/01 – 01/02 4  192  2.1 
AL 05/01 – 04/02 6  292  2.1 
NV 01/01 – 12/01 10  498  2.0 
NH 04/01 – 03/02 6 1 299  2.0 
VT 07/01 – 06/02 9 1 449  2.0 
UT 07/01 – 06/02 3 1 173  1.7 
CW6 average 7  423  1.7 
NY2 01/01 – 12/01 8  490  1.6 
DC 02/01 – 01/02 2 1 125  1.6 
CO 03/01 – 02/02 7  460  1.5 
ME 06/01 – 05/02 3 1 217  1.4 
GA 07/01 – 06/02 4  297  1.3 
TN 06/01 – 05/02 6  466  1.3 
NM 07/01 – 06/02 5 1 400  1.3 
CT 08/01 – 07/02 6  502  1.2 
ID 07/01 – 06/02 3 1 268  1.1 
AR 02/01 – 01/02 4 1 358  1.1 
MD 04/01 – 03/02 4  358  1.1 
DE2 01/01 – 12/01 3 1 308  1.0 
NJ2 01/01 – 12/01 6  635  0.9 
PA2 01/01 – 12/01 2  213  0.9 
NE 08/01 – 07/02 4 1 478  0.8 
AZ 03/01 – 02/02 2 1 264  0.8 
OK 06/01 – 05/02 6  817  0.7 
IL 04/01 – 03/02 4  636  0.6 
IA 03/01 – 02/02 3 1 543  0.6 
MA2 07/01 – 06/02 2 1 400  0.5 
OR 01/01 – 12/01 3  600  0.5 
HI 06/01 – 05/02 3 1 603  0.5 
MO 07/01 – 06/02 4  846  0.5 
WI 01/01 – 12/01 2  537  0.4 
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State Policy period 
TPD rate 
per 100,000  
workers   
PPD rate 
per 100,000 
workers   
  
TPD per 100 
 PPD claims 
IN 07/01 – 06/02 1  286  0.3 
KS 07/01 – 06/02 2 1 604  0.3 
RI 01/01 – 12/01 1 1 356  0.3 
SD 01/01 – 12/01 — 5 314  — 
1  Based on fewer than 25 cases. 
2  Data provided by the appropriate local organization noted in the Appendix. 
3  Represents total incapacity. 
4  Represents partial disability. 
5  Based on fewer than three cases; value not displayed. 
6  Excluding California, Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, 
   Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin. 
SOURCE: Annual Statistical Bulletin, 2007 Edition. 
 
Table 3.9 shows the average cost of TPD claims and PPD claims for NCCI states at third 
report, ranked by total cost per TPD claim. Idaho, Arizona, Delaware, Oregon, and Pennsylvania 
all showed average costs per claim in excess of $2.0 million for the policy periods shown. On the 
other end, Rhode Island, Hawaii, New Hampshire, and Michigan reported total costs per TPD 
claim of less than $300,000. It is interesting that California has a very high incidence of TPD 
relative to all claims and to employment, but its cost per TPD claim is quite low at about 
$400,000 in policy year 2001.  
The indemnity benefit for TPD in Washington is set by statute, with the monthly payment 
varying according to the worker’s wage and dependency status.  For injury year 2001–2002, the 
average cost per TPD award was $315,259.135 Medical aid costs averaged $62,277 and indemnity 
was $252,982. This would put Washington well below the “countrywide” average in medical 
costs and slightly above average in indemnity.136  
                                                 
135  As a “reverse offset” state, Washington benefits are reduced for those workers who receive Social 
Security Disability insurance payments. In addition, Washington uses a relatively high discount rate to value future 
payments which also has the effect of reducing the present value of such commitments. 
136  The average cost per award must be actuarially determined, as the payments for a current award can 
continue for decades. While this is true for all states, since other jurisdictions rely more heavily on lump-sum 
settlements their basis for estimating average cost per TPD claim are based more on payments that have already 
been completed. Further, for long-term liabilities such as this, the total cost for a claim is the present value of future 
(estimated) payments. As such, the choice of the discount rate to be used will vary across jurisdictions, and can 
contribute very substantially to interstate differences in average cost calculations. 
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Table 3.9  Average Cost of Permanent Disability Claims 
    NCCI Third Report  
       
  
Total cost per case 
total permanent  
Total cost per case 
permanent partial  
State Policy period Indemnity   Medical   Total   Indemnity   Medical   Total  
ID 07/01 –- 06/02 740,883 1 2,210,581 1 2,951,464 1 36,748  37,988  74,736  
AZ 03/01 – 02/02 171,993 1 2,634,585 1 2,806,578 1 32,275  66,641  98,916  
DE2 01/01 – 12/01 735,288 1 2,023,016 1 2,758,304 1 66,263  127,003  193,266  
OR 01/01 – 12/01 305,600  2,300,485  2,606,085  23,318  35,876  59,194  
PA2 01/01 – 12/01 933,276  1,125,701  2,058,977  104,565  68,258  172,824  
AL 05/01 – 04/02 220,841  1,445,437  1,666,278  34,440  83,358  117,798  
GA 07/01 – 06/02 315,465  1,023,665  1,339,130  53,280  47,697  100,977  
AR 02/01 – 01/02 119,377 1 1,120,076 1 1,239,453 1 21,458  31,601  53,059  
ME 06/01 – 05/02 478,496 1 733,788 1 1,212,284 1 99,982  84,957  184,939  
KY 05/01 – 04/02 225,515  802,956  1,028,471  44,334  120,991  165,325  
IN 07/01 – 06/02 142,728  833,797  976,525  18,114  25,050  43,164  
UT 07/01 – 06/02 211,182 1 762,921 1 974,103 1 28,220  52,921  81,141  
KS 07/01 – 06/02 107,964 1 832,964 1 940,928 1 21,103  22,796  43,899  
MO 07/01 – 06/02 368,357  498,747  867,104  20,231  18,467  38,698  
NV 01/01 – 12/01 370,385  490,000  860,385  37,750  28,584  66,334  
CO 03/01 – 02/02 285,751  530,367  816,118  32,917  29,019  61,936  
MT 01/01 – 12/01 195,898  589,486  785,384  35,835  65,893  101,728  
CW6 average  234,840  535,857  770,697  35,735  39,188  74,923  
VA 02/01 – 01/02 256,871  499,411  756,282  54,409  71,499  125,908  
NC 01/01 – 12/01 281,508  470,005  751,513  58,620  39,552  98,172  
NE 08/01 – 07/02 245,469 1 493,147 1 738,616 1 28,029  35,714  63,743  
CT 08/01 – 07/02 333,528  365,110  698,638  49,920  36,731  86,651  
FL 01/01 – 12/01 212,069  469,254  681,323  34,369  54,483  88,852  
IL 04/01 – 03/02 263,725  393,706  657,431  33,361  22,630  55,991  
MA2 07/01 – 06/02 473,239 1 178,751 1 651,990 1 49,752  21,896  71,648  
TN 06/01 – 05/02 185,482  437,510  622,992  37,096  40,366  77,462  
OK 06/01 – 05/02 252,071  361,394  613,465  26,953  24,738  51,691  
MD 04/01 – 03/02 347,282  264,760  612,042  44,960  48,141  93,101  
TX 01/01 – 12/01 95,430  515,110  610,540  17,814  41,411  59,225  
DC 02/01 – 01/02 339,514 1 213,456 1 552,970 1 64,906  37,167  102,073  
NJ2 01/01 – 12/01 177,421  373,803  551,224  24,871  16,304  41,175  
WI 01/01 – 12/01 217,657  286,212  503,869  23,746  32,539  56,285  
MN2 01/01 – 12/01 212,860  275,162  488,022  43,831  46,720  90,551  
VT 07/01 – 06/02 230,327 1 245,742 1 476,069 1 45,202  45,798  91,000  
SC 05/00 – 04/01 160,965  271,063  432,028  36,033  26,906  62,939  
NM 07/01 – 06/02 149,758 1 269,612 1 419,370 1 29,988  32,463  62,451  
MS 09/01 – 08/02 109,312  289,772  399,084  38,784  49,052  87,836  
CA2 01/01 – 12/01 175,116  223,214  398,330  35,620  38,634  74,254  
LA 09/01 – 08/02 227,040  155,936  382,976  67,005  67,413  134,418  
AK 04/01 – 03/02 136,037 1 215,209 1 351,246 1 51,242  90,067  141,309  
IA 03/01 – 02/02 245,163 1 99,932 1 345,095 1 29,772  26,225  55,997  
NY2 01/01 – 12/01 176,095  158,589  334,684  56,715  22,618  79,333  
MI 04/01 – 03/02 170,842 3 123,501 3 294,343 3 98,405 4 62,486 4 160,891 4 
NH 04/01 – 03/02 117,574 1 142,772 1 260,346 1 54,907  106,097  161,004  
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Total cost per case 
total permanent  
Total cost per case 
permanent partial  
State Policy period Indemnity   Medical   Total   Indemnity   Medical   Total  
HI 06/01 – 05/02 147,570 1 85,498 1 233,068 1 35,534  27,469  63,003  
RI 01/01 – 12/01 171,970 1 19,652 1 191,622 1 48,878  18,967  67,845  
SD 01/01 – 12/01 —   5 —   5 —   5 21,765   46,107   67,872   
1  Based on fewer than 25 cases. 
2  Data provided by the appropriate local organization noted in the Appendix. 
3  Based on fewer than three cases; value not displayed. 
4  Represents total incapacity. 
5  Represents partial disability. 
6  Excluding California, Delaware, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania,    
Texas, and Wisconsin. 
SOURCE: Annual Statistical Bulletin, 2007 Edition. 
Sorting out the manifold influences on the level of statutory benefits and average costs 
per claim are beyond the scope of the current study. In Washington, the average PPD award for 
injury year 2001–2002 was $10,535 plus an average of $20,458 in time-loss benefits and 
$20,451 in medical costs, for a total cost of $51,444 per case. Based on the data in Table 3.9, 
Washington is clearly a relatively low-cost state for PPD benefits since they are below the 
“countrywide” average for both medical and indemnity costs.  
We believe the boundary between PPD and TPD may be one cause of the high measured 
incidence of TPD in Washington. This stems from the unique relationship between the statutory 
standards of disability determination in the two categories. Thus the high incidence of TPD may 
be partly a by-product of the limited flexibility inherent in the strict impairment standard for PPD 
and the more inclusive disability standard for TPD. 
COMPARING WASHINGTON TO BRITISH COLUMBIA 
 Because of the significant structural differences between workers’ compensation systems 
in Washington and NCCI states, we sought a more direct comparison that would help to 
characterize the level of TPD awards. We have selected British Columbia, Canada (B.C.) for our 
comparison with Washington for at least three reasons. First, both jurisdictions are in the same 
geographic region, with approximately the same population and with broadly similar economic 
bases. They are both strongly oriented to exporting to the Pacific Rim, and are engaged in a long-
term transition from a largely extractive industry orientation to a new information-based 
economy. Second, several of the authors for this study have considerable familiarity with British 
Columbia, while the others are very familiar with Washington, hopefully facilitating 
comparisons between them.  
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But third, and most importantly, they are jurisdictions with similar workers’ 
compensation systems, even though located on opposite sides of an international boundary. They 
are both exclusive public fund jurisdictions with limited self-insurance, although B.C. does not 
allow self-administration and only permits self-insurance for employers specified by statute. 
They both have relatively generous wage replacement benefits for injured workers and a 
reputation for fair and timely administration of those benefits. Neither jurisdiction allows 
compromise and release settlements. While there are always significant differences, the broad 
structure of workers’ compensation in B.C. is comparable and certainly more similar to 
Washington than her nearby U.S. neighbors.  
However, there are a number of difficulties with making direct comparisons between the 
published performance numbers from these similar systems. First, while Washington has a 3-day 
waiting period (with a 14-day retroactive trigger) before income replacement benefits begin for 
injured workers, British Columbia has no waiting period. Thus, it is necessary to adjust B.C. data 
by removing those claims with durations of less than four days. Of course, this is not an ideal 
solution because there still may be behavioral differences induced by the waiting period.  
More technically, there are significant differences in the way that claims are counted. 
While it might seem straight forward to count the number of claims that are receiving benefits, 
there are many details that must be specified. For example, in B.C. the claims that are waiting for 
or undergoing vocational rehabilitation services are not included in the count of active time-loss 
claims. This reflects the financial accounting base of many workers’ compensation statistics; 
they are paid from a different pot of money, so they are counted in a different way. So it was 
necessary to add back the vocational rehabilitation claims in B.C. to make the claims data more 
comparable to that of Washington. 137 
Another critical difference for which there is no easy adjustment is the process for 
assessing and reporting permanent disability. Washington uses a conventional (to U.S. audience) 
division between total permanent disability (TPD) claims and permanent partial disability (PPD) 
claims. Washington also distinguishes between “statutory” total permanent disability and 
“administrative” total permanent disability, according to whether the specific loss is listed in the 
statutory language of the workers’ compensation law, or has been determined to be equivalent by 
                                                 
137  We are very thankful to the staff of WorkSafeBC (and especially Maureen Charron) for performing 
these adjustments. 
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administrative or judicial process. B.C. does not maintain such distinctions, but refers to long-
term disability (over six months) or short-term disability (LTD or STD). They also seek to rate 
the level of disability from 0 to 100 percent, without explicitly making a determination of 
whether the disability is total or partial. This allows for more flexible specification and 
compensation of disability, but makes comparisons across systems more difficult.  
Another difficulty in making comparisons across systems is the different development 
patterns over time. Claims are not permanently “closed” in either jurisdiction, as they are in 
many other places in the U.S.  A change in circumstances for the injured worker can restore, 
change, or terminate benefits in both jurisdictions. We have had access to the actuarial staff at 
L&I for purposes of this study, but have not had the same access in British Columbia. Thus, our 
comparisons are subject to some lack of precision as we try to compare oranges and tangerines. 
However, the point is that we are not comparing oranges to apples in this case.  
Still, a tactical analytical choice must be made between waiting until claims are old 
enough that we can be reasonably sure of their ultimate outcome and reviewing claims that are 
“new” and therefore will rely on actuarial projections, rather than hard facts. The problem is that 
old claims developed and were compensated under old policies that may not reflect current 
practice, since the legal entitlement to workers’ compensation benefits is usually set by the date 
of injury. We have chosen to focus on claims from 2001–2002, in an attempt to find a happy 
medium between these two extremes and to maintain consistency with the earlier material from 
NCCI states. But there is no guarantee that the different development patterns in British 
Columbia and Washington will not contribute to some obfuscation of the true differences 
between these jurisdictions.  
Permanent Disability Compensation in British Columbia with Comparisons to Washington 
In British Columbia a permanent disability—partial or total—is paid as a pension. The 
level of the monthly benefit in B.C. is a function of the assessed degree of disability and the 
injured worker’s pre-injury earnings. By contrast, in Washington the worker’s pre-injury wage 
does not affect the total amount of the benefit for a permanent partial disability, but the size of 
the monthly payment is set at the worker’s TTD benefit rate. As a result, for the same degree of 
impairment lower wage earners receive smaller periodic payments than would higher paid 
workers, but they receive them for longer periods of time; and there is an interest rate adjustment 
made (at 8 percent per annum) to take account of the extended payout period. In both 
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jurisdictions small PPD awards are generally cashed out using present value tables. Plus, in 
certain unusual circumstances the worker in Washington may apply to be paid the PPD benefit in 
a lump sum, as is true in B.C.  
 In B.C. there is essentially no difference between the treatment of a permanent partial and 
a total permanent disability case except the amount of the benefit that is paid. A total permanent 
disability is simply a 100 percent permanent disability rating. The statute does not define total 
permanent disability and gives it little attention: 
(1) Subject to sections 34 and 35, if a permanent total disability results from a worker’s 
injury, the Board must pay the worker compensation that is a periodic payment that 
equals 90% of the worker’s average net earnings. 
(2) The compensation awarded under this section must not be less than $1,464.75 per 
month.138 
 
The Board’s claims manual provides only this guidance as to total permanent disability: 
“Some examples of permanent total disability are paraplegia, quadriplegia, hemiplegia 
and total or near total blindness. Combinations of permanent partial disabilities can also 
become permanent total disabilities such as bilateral amputations or arms and legs.”139  
 
 Subsequent to a change in the law in British Columbia in 2002, a permanent (partial or 
total) disability pension ends when the worker reaches age 65.  There are a few exceptions to 
this. If the Board is satisfied that retirement would have occurred beyond the age of 65, the 
pension need not be terminated at that age. If the worker is age 63 or above at the time of the 
injury, the worker is entitled to the pension benefit for up to 2 years from the date that the degree 
of disability is determined. 
Washington may be unique in North America in allowing the pensioner to choose 
between receiving a full pension or taking a reduced periodic amount that assures that the 
pension will be paid to a designated beneficiary (eligible surviving spouse, child, or dependent) 
upon the worker’s death. The pension is paid for the worker’s lifetime in Washington.  
 Using the terminology developed above, Washington is a pure impairment approach state 
in cases of permanent partial disability. It uses a schedule which is very similar to the ones found 
in most states in the U.S. The schedule lists the dollar amount to be paid for the total loss, or total 
loss of use of the body part involved. Payments for partial losses (or the loss of use of) of a 
scheduled body part are based on an impairment rating using the most recent version of the 
                                                 
138  Workers’ Compensation Act (RSBC 1996) Chapter 492, Sec. 22. 
139  Sec. 37.00. 
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AMA Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment. The rating is related to the value of 
total loss (an amputation or comparable) in order to determine the benefit, with the payout 
schedule being the same as that described earlier. 
Unscheduled (“unspecified”) loss benefits (PPD) are also based entirely on the degree of 
impairment. The state has a category rating system somewhat similar to California’s approach 
prior to the 2004 law change (SB 899). As an example, a permanent cervical impairment must be 
assigned to one of five categories. These five categories e.g., mild, moderate, etc., are based on a 
medical assessment and each category defines a specific quantitative rating ranging from 0 to 35 
percent. That percentage is then multiplied by the legislatively determined dollar value of total 
body impairment. If an unscheduled body impairment does not appear in the category rating 
system, the AMA Guides are to be used to set the percentage of impairment. 
In describing the existing British Columbia system for assessing the extent of permanent 
disability, it is instructive to begin with the approach used prior to the legislative changes in 2002 
in B.C. Dissatisfaction with the workers’ compensation program led the British Columbia 
government to commission a “core review” in 2002 that directly resulted in changes to the 
statute.140 Strikingly for our purposes, the review notes that a major concern that prompted the 
call for a review was the growth in total permanent disability awards, which appeared to some to 
threaten the long-term financial viability of the system. 
Both before the law change and since, the approach used by B.C. can be described as a 
bifurcated system, or a “dual” system as it is known there. Prior to the 2002 reforms a worker 
would be assessed for the degree of disability in two ways. Once the worker reached maximum 
medical improvement (“medically plateaued” in B.C. terminology) a rating was made of the 
permanent functional impairment (PFI) by a medical professional. This is the same as the model 
used by Washington and other impairment approach states. Further, in both jurisdictions the state 
or the province uses its own medical rating guide to quantify the degree of permanent disability, 
although this is supplemented with other guides as needed.  
Prior to 2002 every worker who received a PFI evaluation was also rated for loss of 
earning capacity (LOE). This assessment sought to determine the loss of earning capacity that 
the permanent impairment would likely cause the injured worker. At a minimum the degree of 
                                                 
140 Core Services Review of the Workers’ Compensation Board, retrieved from 
http://www.labour.gov.bc.ca/pubs/pdf/WinterReport-Complete.pdf 
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disability would be the rating given based on the PFI assessment. If the LOE evaluation found a 
higher level of disability than the PFI rating, the LOE rating would be used to set the pension.  
If the LOE served as the basis for the pension, the rating was automatically reassessed 
two years after the original assessment, or the date of the decision resulting from the appeal 
process. Thereafter, the LOE pension was not automatically reviewed but could be reassessed at 
the discretion of the Board. Many of these claims, at least by the standards of B.C., did result in 
disputes. Just as is the case in many of the states in the U.S. that employ a loss of wage earning 
capacity approach to the assessment of the degree of disability, there is considerable room for 
discretion or judgment in forecasting any future earnings capacity impact and this helped 
contribute to controversy. 
The core review found that the LOE was the de facto approach to pension in B.C. and the 
functional impairment approach was simply the guaranteed minimum benefit. As these awards 
were larger than those using the PFI rating they required large increases for reserves for these 
LOE pensions. The  review found that much of that was due to LOE pensions that awarded a 100 
percent permanent disability rating (total permanent disability) to cases where there was a much 
lower rating given for the worker’s permanent functional impairment. The core review found that 
the large disparity between the impairment and the LOE ratings occurred “…where the worker 
was determined to be unemployable.” In 1990, 17 percent of LOE awards were rated as 100 
percent while in 2000 over 36 percent of the LOE awards were rated at 100 percent. 
The key legislative change recommended by the core review and adopted in the 2002 
amendments to the statute did not eliminate the bifurcated (dual) approach. However, it 
eliminated the practice of always assessing both a PFI and an LOE rating. Instead, it made clear 
that the LOE rating was only to be used in very exceptional cases, so that the PFI evaluation was 
to be the sole basis for the pension award in almost all permanent disability evaluations. No 
longer would a five percent impairment result in a total permanent disability pension, except in 
the most unusual of cases. Despite the fact that claims from 2002 are not yet fully mature, it is 
clear that there has been a huge reduction in the number of LOE pension awards. It remains to be 
seen how this will play out in the future. 
Several factors cause the current application of the law to be somewhat less than a full 
scale shift from a bifurcated approach to a strict impairment approach. First, the Board’s Claims 
Manual states that the Permanent Disability Evaluation Schedule (PDES) is a set of “guide-
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rules” and not “fixed” standards. The Board officer in the Disability Awards section is free to 
apply “other variables” in arriving at the final award. However, these other variables relate to the 
physical or psychological impairment, and they expressly do not relate to social or economic 
factors. The actual or projected loss of earnings because of the work-caused disability is not a 
variable which can be considered by the Board officer.141  
Yet another reason that the 2002 amendments deviate from a strict impairment approach 
is that the PDES values are now supposed to reflect the earnings capacity losses that can be 
expected as a result of specific impairments, and not be based strictly on medical values. How 
well this will work remains to be seen. Doctors would still rate the disability using the PDES or 
another guide, but the guide itself would be a reflection of the linkage between specific 
impairments and economic losses. Strikingly, this is very close to the 2004 law change in 
California (SB 899) which requires that the permanent partial disability benefit be modified to 
reflect empirically determined earnings losses associated with specific types of impairments. 
One last factor renders the B.C. approach to be other than a strict impairment method. 
The law provides that an age adaptability factor be used, such that the permanent disability 
benefit is to be increased for each year that the worker is older than 45 years at the time of the 
disability award. Specifically, for each year older than 45 the worker would receive a 1 percent 
adjustment as shown in the following example. For a worker aged 55 at the time the award is 
made, with a 50 percent disability rating, the benefit would be increased to 55 percent (50% + 
(10% × 50) = 55 percent. 
As is true in Washington, B.C. has both scheduled and non-scheduled awards. The PDES 
includes the spine and psychological impairments (not commonly included as scheduled in most 
states). For all non-scheduled conditions, some consideration is to be given to scheduled injuries 
or illnesses that may be analogous, as well as to the medical evaluation, the circumstances of the 
worker, the medical opinion of the Board or non-board doctors, and to schedules used in other 
jurisdictions.142 
As we observe above there are many features of the two systems that are shared and 
others that are different. In our view no difference is more important than the flexibility of 
options that exist in B.C. that are not present in Washington. Two of those stand out. First, 
                                                 
141 See Appendix 3.1 for a full description of this process from the vocational rehabilitation perspective.  
142  Sec. 39.50. 
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despite the limits imposed by the 2002 amendments, the B.C. Board can make adjustments in the 
permanent partial disability rating so as not to be locked in by the PDES rating. These 
adjustments can recognize very special circumstances, and adjust the disability rating and the 
benefit as it perceives necessary. Secondly, total permanent disability awards are not an all or 
nothing outcome in B.C. since a highly rated permanent partial disability pension can serve as a 
substitute for a total permanent award (a 100 percent disability rating) albeit with a lower level of 
benefits. It should be noted however, that the discretion available to the Board in B.C.’s system 
would be more difficult to administer if it operated in a litigious environment, as exists in many 
of the states of the U.S. 
Direct Comparison of B.C. and Washington 
We begin our comparison with the number of long-term (or permanent) disability claims 
in the workers’ compensation system in British Columbia. Table 3.10 shows the number and 
level of permanent functional impairment (PFI) claims by year of injury since 1990 for British 
Columbia. These figures do not correspond with published figures for B.C. because of the 
adjustments discussed above to make them more comparable to Washington. They also have not 
been actuarially adjusted for prospective development; thus the figures for the last four or five 
years would not be reliable indicators of the ultimate claim counts, even in the absence of the 
huge policy change in 2002.  
However, the point is that there are a lot of relatively minor permanent impairments and 
not very many major impairments. Since 1990, the average permanent functional impairment 
rating was only 5.8 percent. Out of a total of 3,000 to 3,500 permanent functional impairment 
awards per injury year, approximately 75 percent of them are for awards of less than 10 percent 
PFI impairment. Only about 1 to 1.5 percent of PFI awards are for 100 percent disability. Even if 
we lower the major (total permanent) impairment standard to 50 percent, the number is still less 
than 5 percent of all PFI awards, or fewer than 150 claims per year.  
About 12 to 15 percent of PFI claims also received loss of earnings awards (LOE) to 
supplement the PFI award in those cases where it was determined that the impairment rating did 
not adequately reflect the economic impact of the disability. Table 3.11 reports the number and 
level of LOE pensions that were awarded for injury years 1990 through 2002. Over the entire 
period, the average LOE rating was 10.9 percent. Again, it is obvious that the last few years are 
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not yet mature. However, the conclusion is that there have typically been another 200 to 250 total 
(100 percent) permanent disability claims in B.C. each year arising from this administrative 
determination of the impact of the disability on lifetime earnings expectations. Once again, 
lowering the threshold of major impairment to 50 percent LOE disability rating would raise that 
number to a range of 350 to 400 claims per year.  
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Table 3.10  Number of Claims by PFI Rating and Accident Year for British Columbia* 
PFI 
Rating 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
.02–2.5% 1,142 1,206 1,228 1,278 1,163 1,023 908 970 930 961 973 790 700 812 801 834 620 119 
2.5–5% 758 811 818 827 780 655 665 717 756 745 739 666 515 574 540 475 323 38 
5–10% 711 774 760 752 702 733 707 861 831 825 819 744 723 787 828 746 433 52 
10–15% 278 317 284 305 304 294 312 378 369 362 363 344 326 366 392 325 161 12 
15–20% 156 155 131 158 169 139 151 177 177 182 185 155 165 155 165 149 77 3 
20–25% 77 73 75 68 57 77 73 87 78 62 90 49 78 79 79 65 19 1 
25–30% 31 31 42 44 36 45 32 36 55 32 33 35 43 43 38 35 15  
30–40% 49 37 43 48 58 65 42 55 61 40 42 39 39 51 37 31 8  
40–50% 19 21 30 18 33 29 26 37 32 27 38 31 22 37 23 10 3  
50–60% 20 9 22 12 20 24 21 19 25 18 22 24 18 30 23 10 5  
60–75% 14 9 12 15 15 23 16 21 12 19 16 14 13 13 17 8 1  
75–99% 10 9 5 9 4 11 8 11 13 11 9 6 12 12 4 4   
100% 15 21 24 28 30 38 29 39 21 11 21 22 16 16 13 3 3 1 
Total 3,280 3,473 3,474 3,562 3,371 3,156 2,990 3,408 3,360 3,295 3,350 2,919 2,670 2,975 2,960 2,695 1,668 226 
*Adjusted for comparability with Washington State. 
SOURCE:  Compiled by WorkSafeBC 
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Table 3.11 Number of Claims by LOE Rating and Accident Year for British Columbia* 
%LOE 
Ratings 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
0.01–10% 18 14 9 16 14 8 6 10 13 15 11 6 1 
10–20% 33 43 38 48 42 35 25 43 44 49 44 38 14 
20–30% 42 41 43 40 49 45 41 59 60 49 49 45 8 
30–40% 49 47 45 46 49 54 61 49 63 36 58 40 23 
40–50% 64 52 61 59 47 48 52 62 59 68 55 38 22 
50–60% 47 61 57 56 51 57 51 63 48 51 63 33 22 
60–70% 51 42 57 50 42 46 38 51 50 46 43 43 13 
70–80% 39 44 35 31 31 27 32 33 41 30 26 12 9 
80–90% 8 10 19 19 25 15 25 17 18 8 14 8 3 
90–99.99% 2 1 2 1 2 2 3 1 3 2 3 1 2 
100% 211 215 235 223 204 231 211 238 246 185 180 107 44 
Total 575 576 602 591 556 568 545 628 645 539 546 371 161 
*Adjusted for comparability with Washington State. 
SOURCE:  Compiled by WorkSafeBC 
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No one receives an LOE pension unless they qualify for a PFI award, so this does not 
increase the total number of permanent disability awards in British Columbia. However, 
considering these figures together on a case-by-case basis is appropriate to estimate the number 
of “total and permanent” disability awards, since the LOE pensions are added to the PFI 
pensions.  So, our best estimate is that in the British Columbia workers’ compensation system, 
there were approximately 3,000 to 3,500 permanent functional impairments compensated each 
year, of which 500 to 550 were major disability awards (over 50 percent disability) and 250 to 
300 were total (100 percent) and permanent disability claims. As we will see shortly, this is 
substantially fewer than in Washington.  
Table 3.12 provides a direct comparison of the incidence of permanent disability claims 
in British Columbia and Washington. Employment is reported at the maximum estimate for 
Washington (based on average of 1,600 hours per year) and at the minimum estimate (based on 
1,920 hours per year). Using the maximum employment estimate, which we regard as the most 
realistic, the state fund in Washington covers just about the same level of employment as the 
fund in British Columbia.143 We have chosen to use calendar accident year 2001 statistics for 
B.C. because of the major policy changes in 2002. (See Appendix 3.1 for a discussion of the way 
these changes have been implemented.) 
Table 3.12  Permanent Disability Claim Incidence, Washington and British Columbia Compared 
    Washington, 2001–2002 
 British Columbia, 2001   State fund Self-insured 
      
Employment 1,753,413  Maximum 1,792,430 743,686 
   Minimum 1,493,692 619,738 
      
Time-loss claims 
(>3 days lost) 
44,914   30,886 16,058 
      
Rate per 100,000 
Employees 
2,562   1,723 2,159 
      
Total permanent disability 
claims (>50% in B.C.) 
450   1,173 351 
      
Total permanent disability 
rate per 100,000 employees 
26   65 47 
SOURCE: Compiled by the authors. 
                                                 
143  It is worth noting that B.C. also estimates employment level, but they collect data on the payroll and 
then estimate number of employees using average wages for the industry. This would result in over or under 
estimates of specific establishment employment according to whether their wages were more or less than the 
industry average.  
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Even deducting the time-loss claims of less than four days’ duration (to compensate for 
no waiting period in B.C.) there were significantly more time-loss claims in B.C. than for the  
Washington state fund. When expressed as a rate of time-loss claims per 100,000 employees, 
British Columbia is 49 percent higher than the Washington state fund and 19 percent higher than 
Washington self-insured employers. We do not know to what extent this may reflect the 
inadequacy of our adjustment mechanism (simply dropping the claims with less than four days 
lost time in B.C.). It seems likely that a waiting period would serve to inhibit claims, generally 
speaking. If a worker is slightly injured and stays home for a couple of days following medical 
treatment for a work-related injury, there is little incentive to pursue a workers’ compensation 
claim, especially if the medical costs will be covered by employer-paid health insurance. 
It is also necessary to be aware of the differences between the disability measures 
reported by the two systems. We will report measures for each system that are broadly 
comparable, but use different nomenclature and different administrative processes. For British 
Columbia, we will report the number of permanent functional impairment (PFI) awards and the 
number of loss of earnings (LOE) awards; and also the estimated number of those that involve 
more than 50 percent disability. This amounts to assuming that a total permanent disability 
(TPD) award in Washington could be triggered by a worker with the equivalent of a 50 percent 
impairment rating in B.C.  
For calendar accident year 2001, B.C. recorded 2,919 permanent functional impairment 
claims through the end of 2007 for a rate of 166 per 100,000 employees. Approximately 75 of 
the B.C. claims were for PFI ratings at 50 percent impairment or above. In addition, they 
experienced 371 LOE pensions from accident year 2001 to date, of which approximately 204 
were rated at greater than 50 percent loss of earnings capacity. Since these loss of earnings 
figures are not yet fully mature, we project that there will ultimately be another 170 LOE awards 
based upon experience from prior years. Deducting the small overlap between categories, our 
estimate of “total” permanent disability claims (over 50 percent disability) in British Columbia 
would be a maximum of 450 claims for calendar accident year 2001. This would yield an 
incidence rate of 26 “total” permanent disability claims per 100,000 employees. 
For total permanent disability claims, it is estimated that the Washington state fund will 
ultimately realize about 1,173 TPD claims for fiscal accident year 2001–2002, while the self-
insured employers are expected to record 351 TPD claims at ultimate development. This would 
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give rates of 65 TPD claims per 100,000 employees for the state fund and 47 TPD claims per 
100,000 employees for self-insured employers. In both cases we are using the maximum 
estimated state employment for the base. If we used the minimum estimated state employment 
level these rates would be increased by about 25 percent. Therefore, using the 50 percent rated 
impairment level to estimate the equivalent of total permanent disability claims in British 
Columbia would yield a rate of 26 claims per 100,000 employees. So, the incidence is 2.5 times 
as high for the Washington state fund and two times as high for Washington self-insurers.  
This estimate is more directly comparable than the NCCI statistics, as it is not subject to 
measurement distortion due to compromise and release, or other system characteristics not 
present in Washington. Thus, both comparison with other U.S. jurisdictions through NCCI 
statistics and a more carefully controlled comparison with a similar workers’ compensation 
jurisdiction have led to the conclusion that there is a very high incidence of total permanent 
disability awards in the state of Washington.  
Time-Loss Duration of Claims 
Given the high incidence of total permanent disability awards in Washington and the long 
durations (described in chapter 2) before a pension determination is made in Washington, it 
would be very meaningful to compare durations of disability claims in Washington and British 
Columbia as well. Figure 3.1 directly compares the number of 2002 calendar accident year 
workers’ compensation claims still active (meaning some indemnity payment was made in the 
last quarter of the calendar year) at the end of each year through 2006 for Washington and 
British Columbia.  
British Columbia has slightly fewer active claims at the end of the initial or injury year, 
despite the higher incidence of time-loss claims discussed earlier. But the number of active time-
loss claims falls off dramatically over the second through fifth years. From a little over 5,000 
active claims with injury dates in 2002 at the end of 2002, the inventory of active 2002 claims 
falls to under 1,000 by the end of the second year and under 500 by the end of the third year.  
In contrast, Washington with 6,000 active claims from 2002 at the end of the accident 
year, still has over 3,000 active at the end of the second year, and 2,000 active at the end of the 
third year. Thus, claims in Washington are much more likely to have extended time-loss 
durations. These data are roughly consistent with what was presented earlier in Tables 2.8 and 
2.9. Long time-loss claims are very likely to end up as total permanent disability pensions, so 
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these extended durations are definitely an issue. As reported earlier, about 10 percent of 
Washington claims remain active at the end of the second year, and 6 to 6.5 percent at the end of 
the third year; and the likelihood of pension rises each year. So, compared to British Columbia, 
Washington has many more claims remaining in active status and much longer average durations 
of time-loss payments. This, in turn, leads to a much higher incidence of TPD pensions.  
 
Figure 3.1 
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 Figure 3.2 shows that the number of long-duration claims has actually increased in the 
last decade in Washington. Both the number of claims still active after five years, and the percent 
of all compensable claims that are active after five years have risen since the mid 90s in 
Washington. In fact, since the mid 90s, the percent of all compensable claims that were still 
active after five years had nearly doubled, from just under 3.0 percent to about 5.5 percent.  
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Figure 3.2  Five-Year-Old Active Claims 
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Based on our earlier analysis, we know that the longer the duration of a temporary disability 
claim, the higher the probability that a pension award will follow. So an increase in the number 
of claims still active after five years will lead to more pensions in the future.  
Conclusion 
 Washington has a very high incidence of total permanent disability claims in the workers’ 
compensation system; two to three times as high as any other jurisdiction we have examined 
here.  The Washington rate is high relative to the employment base, relative to the total number 
of workers’ compensation claims, and relative to the number of permanent partial disability 
awards. This high incidence of TPD awards is built upon a foundation of very long-duration 
TTD claims, which has been growing very significantly over the past decade. The “upsurge” in 
pension awards was the result of an administrative effort to reduce durations and close more 
claims beginning in the late 1990s. But the raw material for this growth  was the very large 
inventory of long-term active time-loss claims in the Washington system. This remains a 
problem today.  
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Appendix 3.1  Pension Determination and Vocational Rehabilitation in British Columbia 
Vocational rehabilitation (VR) has always had at its heart the rehabilitation and return to 
work of injured workers. At the Workers’ Compensation Board (WCB) of British Columbia 
(B.C.), now WorkSafeBC, this has historically meant providing vocational rehabilitation as near 
the beginning of a claim as feasible in order to facilitate return to work (RTW). If RTW is not 
immediately possible, services are provided in order to prevent an eventual loss of earnings 
(LOE) for the injured worker. The latter was driven from a belief that work is an important factor 
in everyone’s life and that no one benefits emotionally from being dependent on an insurance 
company, no matter how well meaning that insurance company may be.  
Nevertheless, while there were vocational rehabilitation activities for people who were 
not going to sustain an LOE, the majority of the effort went into developing vocational 
rehabilitation plans that had the effect of eliminating or reducing the LOE pension. This focus is 
what primarily distinguished VR at WorkSafeBC from general vocational rehabilitation 
conducted elsewhere, and gave VR a “bad reputation” among some interest groups in B.C.  
Based on a Core Review144 of the workers’ compensation system conducted in 2002, the 
government of British Columbia amended the Workers’ Compensation Act. Of particular interest 
to this discussion are the changes to Section 23. This amendment changed a system of assessing 
and awarding pensions to workers with permanent disabilities that had been in place since the 
1970s. This was known as the “dual system” and involved consideration of the impact of both 
the permanent functional impairment (PFI) and the potential loss of earnings (LOE) when 
considering a permanent disability pension for the individual injured worker. The PFI involved 
determining the residual physical abilities post injury and the LOE involved assessing the 
economic loss the individual would sustain as a result of the PFI. It is important to note that a 
LOE could not be considered without a PFI being assessed first.  
The LOE evaluation was determined through an Employability Assessment conducted by 
a Vocational Rehabilitation Consultant (VRC). This assessment contained recommendations to a 
Claims Adjudicator Disability Awards (CADA) who then made the final pension decision, 
subject to appeal. These reports were often contentious and fraught with difficulty due primarily 
to the subjective nature of many of the components of the overall assessment. The Core Review 
                                                 
144  Core Services Review of the Workers’ Compensation Board, retrieved from 
http://www.labour.gov.bc.ca/pubs/pdf/WinterReport-Complete.pdf 
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identified these problems and made recommendations that reduced the dependency on the dual 
pension evaluation system. In the new Section 23, primary emphasis is placed on the PFI 
component of the disability assessment and it indicates that the amount of a person’s pension 
should be based primarily on that factor.145 
Section 23(1) states:  
 
Subject to subsections (3) to (3.2) and sections 34 and 35, if a permanent partial disability 
results from a worker’s injury, the Board must  
(a) estimate the impairment of earning capacity from the nature and degree of the injury, 
and 
(b) pay the worker compensation that is a periodic payment that equals 90% of the 
Board’s estimate of the loss of average net earnings resulting from the impairment.146 
 
This is very similar to the previous system. In order to do (a) and (b) the level of impairment 
must first be assessed, the impact on earnings considered, and a financial award made. Whether 
this award is called a PFI or LOE seems immaterial as the result should be compensation for “the 
loss of average net earnings resulting from the impairment.”  
The Rehabilitation Services and Claims Manual (RSCM), which is the guide to 
compensation practice at WorkSafeBC, at Volume II, item 40 states with respect to the WCB 
Act Section 23(3):  
Section 23(3) is a discretionary provision that establishes rules for compensating a 
worker for a permanent partial disability in exceptional circumstances. Section 
23(3) is only applied where the test set out under section 23(3) and (3.1) is met. 
This test requires that the Board determine whether the combined effect of a 
worker’s occupation at the time of injury and a worker’s disability resulting from 
the injury is so exceptional that an amount determined under section 23(1) does 
not appropriately compensate the worker for the injury. Occupation is broadly 
defined as a collection of jobs or employments that are characterized by a 
similarity of skills.147 
 
This policy statement outlines the criteria for meeting the test outlined in 23(3), specifically the 
“so exceptional” criterion and the definition of an occupation. The application of these criteria 
                                                 
145 This is somewhat analogous to the move among U.S. jurisdictions toward what is called “objective” 
disability determination through the increasing reliance on the AMA Guides, which increases the role of impairment 
assessment in permanent disability awards.  
146 Workers Compensation Act, retrieved from 
http://www.qp.gov.bc.ca/statreg/stat/W/96492_01.htm#section23  
147  Rehabilitation Services and Claims Manual II, retrieved from http://www.worksafebc.com/publications 
/policy_manuals/Rehabilitation_Services_and_Claims_Manual/volume_II/assets/pdf/rscm_ii_06.pdf 
  3-55
seems to have had a drastic impact on the number of loss of earnings awards since 
implementation in the middle of 2002.  
As dramatic as these changes have been, VRCs at WorkSafeBC still function largely 
within the same paradigm as before. The new legislation does not alter the phases of VR, so by 
itself does not signal a change in VR direction. Where the change occurs is when one uses a 
broader definition of occupation as suggested in the new policy.  
The RSCM item No. 40.00 defines ‘skills’ as the “learned application of knowledge and 
abilities.”148 This is a relatively simple understanding of the term, but the National Occupational 
Classification System149 (NOC) is not so simplistic in its use. In fact, the NOC divides skills into 
Skill Level and Skill Type. Skill Type is based on the type of work performed, but it also reflects 
the field of training or experience that is normally required for entry into the occupation. This 
includes the educational area of study required, as well as the industry of employment in cases 
where experience within an internal job ladder is required for entry. These categories are 
intended to indicate easily understood segments of the world of work.  
Skill Level is primarily based on the nature of education and training required to work in 
an occupation. This criterion also reflects the experience required for entry, and the complexity 
of the responsibilities involved in the work, compared with other occupations.150 How then is an 
economic loss determined? WorkSafeBC uses the term ‘significant loss of earnings’ and then 
states: 
The sole fact that the worker may experience a loss of earnings as a result of a work 
injury is not sufficient to meet the test set out in section 23(3.1) of the Act and does not 
mean that the worker is entitled to an award under section 23(3).151 
Section 23(3.1) simply states that the economic loss must be “so exceptional” that an award 
under 23(1) is insufficient. Therefore, if an award under 23(1) accurately reflects the workers 
actual economic loss, not just an award for the loss of function or impairment itself, then all 
would be fine.  
                                                 
148  RSCM retrieved from http://www.worksafebc.com/publications/policy_manuals/rehabilitation_ 
services_and_claims_manual/default.asp 
149  The NOC is Canada’s job classification system similar to the Dictionary of Occupation Titles (DOT) 
used in the USA. 
150 Retrieved from http://www23.hrdc-drhc.gc.ca/2001/e/tutorial/sklevel.shtml  
151  Best Practices Information Sheet retrieved from http://www.worksafebc.com/regulation_and_policy/ 
practice_directives/compensation_practices/best_practice_information_sheets/assets/pdf/permanent_disability_ 
benefits.pdf 
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The problem is that with a broad enough definition of occupation, it is possible to deny 
almost everyone access to consideration under 23(3.1). Previously the awarding of a PFI would 
result in a referral to a VRC for a consideration of the possibility of a LOE. The VRC, in the 
Employability Assessment would consider many factors, but primarily if the person could work 
with this level of impairment. It was possible to have a 100 percent LOE recommendation based 
on a 5 percent PFI award if the person could not go back to their pre-accident employment and 
no other solutions could be found. Further, this assessment had to be based on suitable and 
reasonably available jobs in the worker’s general location.  
Under the current system it is possible to have an assessment of viable transferable skills, 
and deny a worker any consideration for an LOE. In reality this means they will be compensated 
at 5 percent rather than 100 percent. The change in assessing potential LOE pensions has greatly 
reduced the workload of VRCs in the system and allowed them to focus their efforts on earlier 
interventions and RTW efforts, which is showing great returns. However, the corresponding 
decrease in LOE pensions has caused consternation amongst organized Labor and other groups 
representing injured workers, especially since the new policy was put out for public discussion 
and consultation in July, 2007.  
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4  Claim Review Findings 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study is to determine the reasons for the significant growth in the 
number of total permanent disability awards, and to project what growth the Department of 
Labor and Industries can anticipate in the future. In this chapter we consider the workers’ 
compensation system in two time periods, at the very early stages of the rise in pensions, and 
five years later, when pension incidence was much higher.  
We accomplish this goal by reviewing in detail a stratified sample of 903 state fund and 
self-insured claims. A total of 497 of these claims were pensioned in the two observation years, 
and another 406 time-loss claims from those same years were used as comparison claims. The 
comparison claims had a high probability of pension award because of their similarity to pension 
claims but they had not been granted pensions within five years of the observation year (either 
1997 or 2002). This chapter explains the methods used and the results of the claim review, as 
well as descriptive statistics for the study and comparison groups. A multivariate model using 
data collected from the Claim Review is also reported. 
Necessity and Requirements of the Claim Review 
The objective of the claim review is three-fold. First, we aim to identify the influence of 
key claim characteristics that are not available through analysis of existing administrative data. 
For example, information on education of the injured worker is not collected by the department 
in any systematic way, but is available for most of the claims we reviewed. Information recorded 
from the claims review was matched to other available electronic data on the claim to provide a 
very rich quantitative analysis.  
Second, we seek to provide some insight into the characteristics of claims with a view to 
how claims or claim processing may have changed over a relatively short period of time, perhaps 
in a way to cause the increase in pensions. By combining our statistical analysis with knowledge 
of claim trends and claim management experience, we can add to the overall understanding of 
the factors causing the increase in pensions.  
Third, the claims review enabled the program assessment team to evaluate the perceived 
impact of various factors on pension outcomes. Our statistical testing helps establish which of 
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these might be causally related to the pension increase, and should therefore be included in a 
predictive model of the probability of pension award. 
After developing our research plan, we had to locate experienced and knowledgeable 
claim reviewers. It was our aim to find retired and experienced claims adjudicators; these were 
located largely by word of mouth. Fortunately, we located five (5) retired L&I claims 
adjudicators who were able to assist us. Each claim reviewer had over 15 years’ experience in 
claims adjudication and had reached at least Workers’ Compensation Adjudicator 3 status during 
his/her career at L&I. Some of our claim reviewers had experience in both state fund and self-
insurance, and some had been Pension Adjudicators. Their insights and perspectives were 
invaluable. 
Second, because claim reviews require access to and use of personally identifiable 
information, including health information for research purposes, we were required under Federal 
and State laws to obtain a review from the Washington State Institutional Review Board 
(WSIRB), as well as the researchers’ respective institutional review boards. The claim review 
could not begin until we developed our research protocol and obtained approval from the 
WSIRB. This process normally takes researchers a few months to complete, but the short time 
frame available to us placed a great deal of pressure on the process. We were very fortunate to 
secure rapid reviews from all involved boards, and we are grateful to various staff who helped to 
expedite the process. 
Because adjudicators are accustomed to reviewing all salient aspects of the claim, we had 
to make some adjustments in stressing that we were abstracting claims. Even with abstracting for 
several key characteristics of claims, each claim took over two (2) hours to complete initially. 
Because these are very complex claims, with long and involved histories, the time for review 
was much longer than originally anticipated. Many claim files had more than 300 pages of 
supporting documents that were often difficult to sort through to find the information requested. 
This would not have been feasible without the experienced claim abstracters with extensive L&I 
experience. Some adjustments to the process reduced the average review time to 1.5 hours per 
claim. 
In addition, the claim review necessitated a great deal of administrative and data support. 
The review was conducted on site at the Department of Labor and Industries, requiring that most 
computer or data difficulties encountered had to be resolved through L&I. L&I staff were always 
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very responsive to our needs and concerns, but some processes (such as requests for access to 
sensitive information) took several days to accomplish. Without the excellent support of 
experienced L&I personnel this part of the project would not have been possible.  
METHODS 
Choice of Study and Comparison Groups 
Our method for analysis of the increase in pensions was to choose observations at two 
different time periods, with one early and the other late in the rise; compare the total permanent 
disability claims awarded in those two time periods; then select a comparison population from 
time-loss claims in each of those time periods. This way it would be possible to compare the 
characteristics of claims that were awarded pensions in the two time periods, and also compare 
pension claims to non-pension claims in the two periods. With this strategy it should be possible 
to maximize the likelihood of identifying significant changes between the periods. If there was a 
difference between pension claims in the two periods, we could check the non-pension claims to 
determine whether the observed change was specific to pension determination, or something that 
pertained to the larger workers’ compensation environment, or even the broader economy.  
Our choice of the two time frames, calendar years 1997 and 2002, was influenced not 
only by the trends in pensioned claims but also by the availability of data that would support this 
type of analysis. The study of total permanent disability in Washington State is somewhat 
constrained by the availability of adequate data. Because data on time loss paid by quarter had 
been archived for the years prior to 1997, we were unable to use any year before 1997 as our 
baseline for pension recipients. By choosing 1997, we were able to find a group of claims that 
had similar time-loss experience but had not yet received a total permanent disability award. We 
realize that by choosing 1997 we are close to the beginning of potential changes in claims and 
pension adjudication that may have led to the rise in pensions, but we are confident that the 
choice of 1997 still allows for some significant “before and after” comparisons between the two 
time periods. The 1997 pension awards were adjudicated as injury or illness claims well before 
1997, so they represent the types of claims management and claims trends of the period before 
the increase in the state fund pension incidence rate. 
The sample of 1997 pensions was selected as claims having a total permanent disability 
(TPD) award made between January 1 and December 31, 1997. We limited the selection of TPD 
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claims to those having original claim received dates on or after January 1, 1987. This was done 
in order to accommodate the fact that many crucial elements of the electronic storage of claims 
data were unavailable or of very poor quality prior to 1987. While this method limits the analysis 
to claims with 11 years or less of time loss, this threshold still represents roughly 70 percent of 
all claims that receive TPD awards.  
Our sample consisted of approximately 30 percent of the TPD claims that met the 
criteria. This provides a statistical estimate reliability of around 5 to 7 percent at the 95 percent 
confidence level in representing all TPD claims. In other words, we should be able to detect a 
difference between sample cohorts of around 5 to 7 percent with a high degree of statistical 
confidence. A similar sample selection of TPD claims was performed for the 2002 claims, 
limiting the group to those with claim received dates on or after January 1, 1992, to keep the 
sample as identical as possible to the 1997 sample. Pension cases were selected at random within 
each time frame and TPD category, including self-insured claims. 
Obtaining a suitable comparison group was difficult. Ideally we sought a group of claims 
that had a high probability of TPD by virtue of their characteristics, but had not received a TPD 
award at the time of our observation year. Thus, comparing the characteristics of pension claims 
and these comparison non-pension claims would offer insight into the changes in pension 
probability between our two observation dates.  
It had been suggested to us that we should use permanent partial disability (PPD) claims 
as a comparison group, but PPD claims are notoriously difficult to work with, because of the 
many influences that are introduced by the routine disputation over such claims in most workers’ 
compensation jurisdictions. In addition, we were concerned about possible interaction between 
PPD awards and TPD awards in Washington (see chapter 2 discussion).  
We performed a propensity score analysis of the factors potentially associated with 
pension claims that were readily available from the L&I data warehouse. Propensity score 
analysis is a technique used to identify those factors that are correlated with a given outcome. In 
this case, we were looking for claim characteristics that lead to a pension, e.g., similar 
demographic features. Ultimately the selection of claims for the comparison group was made 
using only two predictive factors: time loss paid to date, and age of the worker at injury. We 
estimate that these two factors were associated with approximately 33 percent of the variance in 
pension probability.  
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We selected comparison claims for review based on a randomized nearest-neighbor 
matching algorithm. Thus, claims having paid time loss in 1997 that were not pensioned by 
December 31, 2002, were eligible if they had a time-loss/age-at-injury profile that matched one 
of the 1997 pension claims. And claims having paid time loss in 2002 that were not pensioned by 
December 31, 2007, were included in the comparison group if they had a time loss/age profile 
that matched one of the 2002 pension claims. Again, claims were selected at random if they met 
the above criteria.  
It should be noted that the process for selection of self-insured claims was conducted the 
same way, but the data on time loss among the 1997 self-insured claims were very incomplete. 
We believe that we have a representative selection of self-insured claims for review, but we are 
not fully confident in the quality of the time-loss data among the self-insured. Our analysis of 
self-insured claims is also limited by the relatively small sample numbers.  
After the selection of claims for review, five reviewers worked full time for several 
months to review 903 claims (See Table 4.0). Of these, 228 were 1997 pension claims and 269 
were 2002 pension claims, while 238 were 1997 comparison time-loss claims and 168 were 2002 
comparison time-loss claims. Because of the time required to abstract information from claim 
files, we had to cut our 2002 comparison sample for state fund claims short of the goal. 
Approximately 26 percent (231 claims) of the claims reviewed were self-insured claims and 74 
percent (672 claims) were state fund claims. 
Table 4.0  Claim Review Sample Distribution 
 1997 pension 
claims 
2002 pension 
claims 
1997 comparison 
time-loss claims 
2002 comparison 
time-loss claims 
 
Total 
State fund 162 210 188 112 672 
Self-insured   66   59   50   56 231 
Total 228 269 238 168 903 
Claim review sample of pension claims was drawn at random from L&I files. Comparison time-loss claims were 
matched to pension claims using propensity score. 
Since we used a matching method to select time-loss claims with a high probability of 
pension, we encountered further methodological challenges in that several of the 1997 time-loss 
comparison claims received pension awards after our cut-off date of December 31, 2002. In other 
words, our matching algorithm worked too well. We were faced with an analytical dilemma. If 
we chose only those claims that had never been pensioned, we would be introducing a bias 
between the earlier and the later sample of time-loss claims because the latter might not have had 
enough time to reach full maturity and possible pension status. If we kept the ultimately 
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pensioned claims in the sample, we ran the risk of corrupting the comparison group with claims 
that look more like the pension study group.  
We decided that it was better to keep the two samples as similar as possible, as two 
snapshots in time. We could not know which, or how many, of the 2002 time-loss claims also 
would have received pensions after 2007. Therefore, we chose to retain in the sample the 40 
claims (17 percent) from the 1997 comparison group that received pensions after 2002. This 
keeps the two samples most comparable. We are assuming that a similar percentage of the 2002 
comparison time-loss claims will be pensioned between 2008 and 2012. 
Choice of Abstract Elements 
The L&I data warehouse was the source for about half of the needed information on 
claims without conducting a file review. The choice of information abstracted from the claims 
files was based on data unavailable in the data warehouse, as well as other factors coming to 
light in the interviews we conducted and our preliminary analysis of the Washington TPD 
(pension) system. By conducting a file review we were able to collect detailed information on 
characteristics of the worker that were not available through the usual reports of injury. For 
example, because most workers in these serious disability claims had some vocational 
assessment, we were able to collect information on worker education, which is a key variable in 
labor market outcomes.  
We were also able to collect additional information on injury and treatment 
characteristics. Of greatest interest in this selection is the number of back and other 
musculoskeletal injuries and illnesses. Also important to the analysis is the percent of cases with 
psychiatric or psychological treatment, as well as opioid use. Our reviewers were able to go 
beyond the information contained in the data warehouse (which was reported in Chapter 2). The 
claim review also documented the number and outcomes of various independent medical 
examinations which were not available in the data warehouse for earlier years.  
Our preliminary research suggested that the nature of independent medical evaluations 
may have had some effect on eventual pensioning of claims. By collecting more information on 
the medical review, we could determine whether or not significant changes in evaluations were 
evident. Most of the analysis we performed was at a high level (focusing on the total number of 
IMEs), but a more detailed analysis could be conducted if warranted.  
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The claim review also tracked vocational rehabilitation and return-to-work efforts. Earlier 
claim file information on vocational rehabilitation was somewhat inconsistent, leading us to use 
the claim reviews to collect more information on the process. Return-to-work efforts were 
tracked, as well as whether or not return to employment with the employer at injury had 
occurred, and whether or not job accomodations or light-duty restrictions were used to assist 
return to work. 
Appeals were also believed to have a significant effect on the pensioning of claims. Our 
claim review collected information about up to six appeals, including outcomes as ordered by 
BIIA. Claim reviewers were also instructed to identify other reasons for pensioning that could 
result from administrative delays, barriers in the labor market, and so on. We recognize that these 
determinations are subjective, and may be dependent on whether or not the original claim 
adjudicators recorded the appropriate information in the file. Nevertheless, we are confident that 
with our very experienced reviewers, we were able to identify key administrative issues with the 
claims. 
A full list of the data elements collected from the claim review, and their definitions is 
available in Appendix Table 4.1. A full list of the supplemental data made available from the 
Data Warehouse is presented in Appendix Table 4.2. These data were matched to the review data 
by claim ID, checked for a match on last name, and then these and other personal identifying 
elements were removed from the dataset as required by the Washington State Institutional 
Review Board. 
Sample Weighting  
We believe that we have a time-loss comparison group that represents cases likely to be 
pensioned, based on time-loss experience and age of the injured worker, but the uneven sample 
size of groups presented another issue for analysis. To resolve the potential for bias among 
sample groups, we constructed sample weights using a stratification of year, liability (state fund 
or self-insured), pension status, and time-loss category. Sample weights were constructed from 
the ratio of the population to our sample size for each group and finite population controls were 
applied in STATA software for survey analysis.  
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DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS OF CLAIMS 
As a part of the process of collecting our comparison time-loss claims, we conducted a 
“propensity scoring analysis” using factors such as time loss, age of worker, whether or not 
opioids or psychological issues were involved in the claim, and others that had been suggested. 
Through L&I, we secured a sample of nearly 9,000 state fund time-loss claims that had been 
received from 1987 through 1997 and where some time loss was paid in calendar year 1997. 
Aproximately 16 percent of these claims had received pension awards by the end of 1997. The 
results from our propensity scoring model are shown on Table 4.1, which indicates that duration 
of time loss and the age of the worker at injury are very significant predictors of the likelihood of 
a claim becoming a pension. In addition, the use of opioids, psychological issues, prior receipt of 
PPD benefits, previous surgery, reopened claim, male gender, and agricultural industry were all 
significantly associated with the probability of receiving a pension. Only the factor of a prior 
claim for workers’ compensation benefits was not a significant predictor of pensions.  
It is worth noting that this is the only place in this chapter where we compare the 
characteristics of pension claims to the population of all time-loss claims. We will examine some 
of these factors in more detail as we present the results for the claim review samples, but the 
comparison is between pensioned claims and other serious injury claims that have been selected 
for their similarity to the pension claims. As indicated earlier, the main focus of our analysis is 
on the differentiation of 1997 and 2002 pension claims. We will consider some of these factors 
again when we present our predictive model of pension claims (chapter 5).  
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Table 4.1  Propensity Score Analysis 
Variable 
Coefficient 
(odds ratio) 
Standard 
error Z Prob > Z 
1 year time loss .240 .073 3.29 .001 
2 years time loss .652 .076 8.59 .000 
3 years time loss .940 .082 11.47 .000 
4 years time loss 1.179 .091 13.00 .000 
5 years time loss 1.514 .099 15.27 .000 
6 years time loss 1.669 .121 13.82 .000 
7 years time loss 1.626 .143 11.36 .000 
8 years time loss 1.530 .190 8.05 .000 
9 years time loss 1.774 .189 9.41 .000 
Age at injury .055 .002 25.50 .000 
Opioids .306 .045 6.81 .000 
Psych .380 .045 8.41 .000 
Ag sector .232 .076 3.07 .002 
PPD -.969 .042 -23.06 .000 
Male .221 .045 4.96 .000 
Surgery .135 .025 5.42 .000 
Reopened .392 .051 7.65 .000 
Prior claim .009 .005 1.72 .086 
Constant -3.841 .124 -31.06 .000 
Log likelihood = -2574.07 
Pseudo R2 = .330 
n = 8,834 
 
 We present our results in a series of tables which present the values for the four sub-
samples of the claim review; 1997 pensions, 2002 pensions, 1997 comparison time-loss claims, 
and 2002 comparison time-loss claims. By testing 2002 pension values against 1997 pension 
values, we are asking which factors changed significantly from before the increase (or early on) 
to the time of the increase, and might have predictive value. A significant difference between 
1997 and 2002 pension characteristics indicates that this factor may have predictive value and 
should be considered in a model to predict future pension probability. 
In addition, we tested 1997 comparison time-loss claims against 2002 comparison time-
loss claims to determine whether the changes observed among the pension claims were unique to 
the pension population, or represented more general changes among the serious disability claims 
in the Washington L&I system. For that reason we will generally present two sets of statistical 
hypothesis tests for each table. The first will test the hypothesis that the values for 1997 and 2002 
pensions are the same. The second will test the hypothesis that the values for 1997 and 2002 
comparison time-loss claims are the same. Suppose we reject the first hypothesis, and conclude 
that variables associated with pensions in 2002 were different from those in 1997 on some 
dimension. We still need to establish that this was not true for all serious disability claims to 
indicate that this factor might be causally related to the increase in pensions.  
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Since we are reporting on a sample of claims, we use statistical inference to establish that 
the differences in sample values are likely to represent true differences among the populations.  
Samples are subject to a range of uncertainty, depending upon the actual variance and the size of 
the sample. The reason for reporting the statistical tests is to enable the reader to determine how 
much credence to put in a particular finding. Is a reported difference likely a true population 
difference, or is it just due to the vagaries of sampling? Researchers use probability statements to 
express the confidence that can be put in a particular sample statistic. Thus, you will see that a 
specific difference is “significant at the 95 percent confidence level” as indicated by a single 
asterisk (*). This means that we can be 95 percent certain that this is a true difference between 
the groups in the population. On the other hand, it also means that there is a 5 percent chance that 
this result could be due to the “luck of the draw” as the sample was selected and does not 
represent a true difference in the population. Similarly, two asterisks (**) indicate statistical 
significance at the 99 percent confidence level, and three asterisks (***) indicate statistical 
significance at the 99.9 percent confidence level. We also report the probability of observing the 
given difference directly as prob > F, which indicates the likelihood of such a difference 
occurring if the two population means are in fact the same.  
In policy-relevant research work, it is important to distinguish between an effect that is 
statistically significant and one that is “important.” An important effect is one that is deserving of 
attention by a program administrator or policymaker because it has relevance for the 
performance of the system. That is a different dimension than a test of statistical significance.  
It may also be important to know whether the experience of state fund pension claims is 
similar to that of self-insured employers. They are handled differently from the start (as time-loss 
claims), since self-insured claims are not administered by the Department of Labor & Industries. 
This continues to some degree in the pension determination process, as the Self Insurance 
Department of L&I has its own Pension Adjudicators to evaluate pension claims from self-
insured employers. However, all employers and all workers are operating under the same statute, 
and should experience similar results.  
Because our self-insured sample is rather small (a total of only 231 claims), and the sub-
samples are even smaller, this will limit the analysis of self-insured claims. With such small 
samples, it is difficult to establish statistically significant findings. But there will be a few 
instances where we will present results for self-insured pension and comparison claims because 
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the results are of particular interest. These will usually be presented in separate tables with the 
same general structure as described above.  
Injury Characteristics 
Statistics from pension awards in 1997 and 2002 indicate very few differences between 
the pensioned claims with regard to nature of injury and body part affected from the injury. The 
time-loss comparison category showed a higher percentage of claims in 1997 that were back 
claims compared to 2002, but among the state fund claims with TPD pensions, there was no 
difference (Table 4.2). Among the self-insured claims, 38 percent of the 1997 pension claims 
were back cases, compared to 17 percent in 2002, and this difference was statistically significant 
(Table 4.3). We can say that there were significantly more back claims among pension and time-
loss self-insured claims that we reviewed from 1997 than for the 2002 claims. So a greater 
number of back claims cannot be the cause of the increase in pensions, since there were fewer 
back injuries among the self-insured sector and no significant increase among state fund claims.  
Table 4.2  Back Claims in 1997 and 2002 
    State Fund Claims 
Back Injury 1997 pensions 2002 pensions 1997 time loss 2002 time loss 
Yes 32.1% 32.9% 35.1% 29.5% 
No 66.9% 66.1% 64.9% 70.5% 
n          162           210          188           112 
H0:  Back injuries are as likely in 1997 as in 2002 among pension claims. 
F (1,370) = .06, prob > F = .801 
 
H0:  Back injuries are as likely in 1997 as in 2002 among comparison time-loss claims. 
F (1,298) = 7.16**, prob > F = .008 
 
Table 4.3  Back Claims in 1997 and 2002 
    Self-Insured Claims 
Back Injury 1997 pensions 2002 pensions 1997 time loss 2002 time loss 
Yes 37.9% 16.9% 18.0% 10.7% 
No 62.1% 83.1% 82.0% 89.3% 
n           66             59           50             56 
H0:  Back injuries are as likely in 1997 as in 2002 among pension claims. 
F (1,123) = 25.80***, prob > F = .000 
 
H0:  Back injuries are as likely in 1997 as in 2002 among comparison time-loss claims. 
F (1,104) = 6.06*, prob > F = .016 
Table 4.4 shows the number of allowed conditions among our samples of serious 
disability claims in Washington. It indicates that the average number of conditions has not 
changed significantly, although showing a 17 percent increase among pension claims and a 19 
percent decrease among comparison time-loss claims from 1997 to 2002. So, if the number of 
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allowed conditions represents the degree of impairment, or disability severity of the injury, it is 
possible that 2002 pension claims were more serious, but this could not be proven with our 
sample.   
Table 4.4  Number of Allowed Conditions, 1997 and 2002 
 1997 pensions 2002 pensions 1997 time loss 2002 time loss 
Average number of 
allowed conditions 
1.90 2.23 2.08 1.69 
n     228       269         238        168 
H0:  Number of allowed conditions was the same in 1997 and 2002 among pension claims. 
F (1,495) = 2.96, prob > F = .086 
 
H0:  Number of allowed conditions was the same in 1997 and 2002 among comparison time-loss claims. 
F (1,404) = 3.68, prob > F = .056 
Table 4.5 indicates that the average number of hospital admissions per claim was much 
lower in 2002 than in 1997, for both pension claims and comparison time-loss claims. This 
would seem to point toward less serious injuries in 2002, under the assumption that medical  
Table 4.5   Total Hospital Admissions, 1997 and 2002* 
 State Fund Claims 
Number of hospital 
admissions 
1997 pensions 2002 pensions 1997 time loss 2002 time loss 
Mean .642 .252 .542 .107 
Standard error .064 .020 .034 .012 
H0:   Number of hospital admissions was the same in 1997 and 2002 for pension claims. 
F (1,370) = 33.71***, prob > F = .000 
 
H0:   Number of hospital admissions was the same in 1997 and 2002 for comparison time-loss claims. 
F (1,298) = 144.36***, prob > F = .000 
*Through end of sample year. 
 
treatment patterns were the same. However, that is probably not a viable assumption. Table 4.6 
shows that there was a higher rate of cases with five or more surgical procedures performed 
among the 1997 pension claims compared to 2002, and this difference was statistically 
significant at the 95 percent confidence level. This was also true among our comparison time-
loss claims, so 
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Table 4.6  Number of Surgical Procedures, 1997 and 2002 
  State Fund Claims 
Mean number of 
procedures 1997 pensions 2002 pensions 1997 time loss 2002 time loss 
Mean      .294    .178    .323    .071 
Percent with 5 or 
more surgical 
procedures 
10.5% 4.2% 8.5% 1.6% 
n           228          269          238         168 
H0:  Number of surgical procedures for pension claims is the same in 1997 and 2002. 
F (1,329) = 5.16*, prob > F = .024 
 
H0:  Number of surgical procedures for comparison time-loss claims is the same in 1997 and 2002.  
F (1,404) = 14.27***, prob > F = .000 
presumably it represents a change in medical practices rather than a general change in the nature 
or severity of compensable injuries. It is interesting to note that there was also a lower 
percentage of claims with five or more surgical procedures among the 2002 pensioned claims 
than among the 1997.  
Table 4.7 shows medical aid payments to our sample claims. In each case the measure 
was taken at the end of the sample year, so the payments should be comparable except for price 
changes. We have also added the inflation adjusted number to make the 1997 and 2002 levels 
more comparable. We used the “Medical Care” index from the general cost of living index (CPI-
U) to adjust these prices to 2007 levels.  
Table 4.7  Total Medical Aid Paid* 
 State Fund Claims 
Medical aid paid 1997 pensions 2002 pensions 1997 time loss 2002 time loss 
Mean $41,540 $55,021 $49,981 $37,399 
Standard error        1,872.7       1,767.8        1,534.7        1,138.6 
In constant (2007) dollars $62,185 $67,621 $74,822 $45,963 
H0:   Total medical aid was the same in 1997 and 2002 for pension claims. 
F (1,370) = 27.40***, prob > F = .000 
 
H0:   Total medical aid was the same in 1997 and 2002 for comparison time-loss claims. 
F (1,298) = 43.36***, prob > F = .000 
*Through end of sample year. 
 
 It is very interesting to observe that the average cost of medical aid increased very 
significantly between 1997 and 2002 for pension claims (up 32.5 percent), while the average 
medical aid cost actually declined for comparison time-loss claims (down 25.2 percent). This is 
not due to increased development of the 1997 claims, since the measurement is taken at the same 
point relative to the pension decision. After adjustment for medical cost inflation, the increase for 
medical aid in pension claims is 8.7 percent in real terms.  
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 Table 4.8 reports the level of time-loss benefits paid to pension and comparison group 
claims in 1997 and 2002. Once again, time-loss benefits are measured as paid through the end of 
the sample year, so there is no problem of comparability between cohorts. Nominal time-loss 
benefits paid to pension claims increased by an average of 23 percent between 1997 and 2002. 
After adjustment for inflation (using CPI-U), the increase was 9.8 percent. Among comparison 
time-loss claims there was a 23 percent decrease in average total time-loss benefits paid between 
the 1997 and 2002 samples. This result was also highly statistically significant. We are puzzled 
by the fact that time-loss benefits were so much higher in 1997 for our comparison group. One 
would expect that if pension decisions are being made earlier, the average amount of time-loss 
benefits would have declined accordingly. But the difference seems much larger than expected. 
We do not have an explanation for this outcome.  
Table 4.8  Time-Loss Benefits Paid, 1997 and 2002* 
 State Fund Claims 
 1997 pensions 2002 pensions 1997 time loss 2002 time loss 
Aggregate time-loss benefits 
paid 
$66,775 $82,199 $106,435 $81,597 
Standard error        1,930.0        2,155.6         2,120.2         2,009.6 
In constant (2007) dollars $86,273 $94,693 $137,514 $95,152 
H0:   Time-loss benefits paid were the same for pension claims awarded in 1997 and 2002. 
F (1,370) = 28.42***, prob > F = .000 
 
H0:   Time-loss benefits paid were the same for comparison time-loss claims in 1997 and 2002. 
F (1,298) = 72.29***, prob > F = .000 
*Through to end of sample year. 
 
How are these differences manifested in the length of time-loss benefits paid? Table 4.9 
shows the estimated time-loss days paid through the end of the sample year for each claim. 
Using the aggregate time-loss benefits paid and the weekly compensation rate, it is possible to 
estimate the length of time-loss payments. These measures should be comparable across the 
injury cohorts, except for any possible distortions caused by sampling variability. The table 
shows that there was a small increase (4.2 percent) in average days of paid time loss between 
1997 pension and 2002 pension claims. This is not a statistically significant difference given  
the sampling variability of these measures. The same is true for the average days of paid time 
loss for 1997 and 2002 comparison time-loss claims. The table shows a small increase (7.2 
percent) but this is not statistically significant. 
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Table 4.9  Estimated Time-Loss Days Paid* 
                 State Fund Claims 
Estimated time-loss days paid 1997 pensions 2002 pensions 1997 time loss 2002 time loss 
Mean 1,625.1 1,693.8 1,063.9 1,140.7 
Standard error       44.43       26.87        38.06        20.62 
H0:   Estimated time-loss days paid were the same in 1997 and 2002 for pension claims. 
F (1,370) = 1.75, prob > F = .187 
 
H0:   Estimated time-loss days paid were the same in 1997 and 2002 for comparison time-loss claims. 
F (1,298) = 3.15, prob > F = .077 
*Through to end of sample year. 
 
So it does not appear that the injuries pensioned in 2002 were more serious, at least from the 
perspective of the number of allowed conditions, the number of surgical procedures, medical aid 
costs, or paid time-loss days. Thus we doubt that the rise in pension awards could be due to more 
serious or more disabling injuries in 2002 than in 1997.  
Worker Characteristics 
Generally speaking, older workers are less likely to be injured, but those who have been 
injured on the job are less likely to return to work. We considered age both at injury and at 
pension award. Among the 1997 pension group, the mean age at injury was 47.4. Among the 
2002 pension group, the mean age at injury was 49. This relatively small difference between the 
two years was significant at the 99 percent confidence level (Table 4.10). This difference was 
confirmed by the median age statistics. The mid-point of the age distribution among those 
receiving pensions in 2002 was 3.5 years older than in 1997. Among comparison time-loss 
claims it was 4.0 years older. Age at the time of pensioning was also significantly different 
between the two years, but in the opposite direction. Workers receiving state fund pensions in 
2002 were more than one year younger than in 1997 (Table 4.11). This reflects the more rapid 
pension decisions that were characteristic of the system by 2002 as discussed in chapter 2.  
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Table 4.10  Age at Injury, 1997 and 2002 
 State Fund Claims 
Age in years 1997 pensions 2002 pensions 1997 time loss 2002 time loss 
Mean 47.4 49.0 44.4 46.8 
Median 48.5 52.0 44.0 48.0 
n            162            210             188            112 
H0:  Mean age at injury, 1997 pensions equals  2002 pensions. 
F (1,370) equals 7.67***, prob > F = .006 
 
H0:  Mean age at injury, 1997 time-loss comparison claims equals 2002 time-loss comparison claims. 
F (1,298) = 35.63***, prob > F = .000 
Table 4.11 Mean Age at Pension Award, 1997 and 2002 
 State Fund Self-Insured 
 1997 pensions 2002 pensions 1997 pensions 2002 pensions 
Age in years 57.9 56.7 56.0 54.3 
n            162            210              66              59 
H0:  Mean age at pension award is the same in 1997 and 2002 for state fund claims. 
F (1,370) = 4.21*, prob > F = 0.41 
 
H0:  Mean age at pension award is the same in 1997 and 2002 for self-insured claims. 
F (1,123) = 4.08*, prob > F = .046 
The mean age for the time-loss comparison group also increased, from 44.4 in 1997 to 
46.8 in 2002. These claims were selected for their high probability of pensioning based on time 
loss and worker age, so it is not surprising that they would show similar trends in these variables, 
and our sampling method may explain differences between data presented in this chapter and the 
administrative data presented in chapter 2. However, because of the age composition of the 
Washington State work force (with younger workers more likely to be moving into the state) as 
well as the data presented here, we do not believe that age is a large factor in explaining the rise 
in pensions, but it may be one of many factors to consider when estimating the probability of 
pensioning.  
Table 4.11 also shows that age at pension award was lower in 2002 than in 1997 for 
workers from the self-insured sector. This difference is statistically significant, but Table 4.12 
indicates that these workers were not actually younger at the time of injury (48.9 years in 2002 
versus 49.1 years in 1997). So once again the shorter elapsed time from injury to pension award 
could be responsible. 
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Table 4.12 Age at Injury, 1997 and 2002 
   Self-Insured Claims 
 1997 pensions 2002 pensions 1997 time loss 2002 time loss 
Age in years 49.1 48.9 43.9 46.5 
n              66              59              50              56 
H0: Age at injury of 1997 pensions equals that of 2002 pensions. 
F (1,123) = .40, prob > F = .842 
 
H0: Age at injury of 1997 time-loss comparison claims equals 2002 time-loss comparison claims. 
F (1,103) = 8.39**, prob > F = .005 
In general, men were more likely than women to receive a pension, which may have 
more to do with the sort of work in which men are employed and injured. There were some 
insignificant differences in gender composition, with slightly more women having a state funded 
TPD in 2002 as compared to 1997 (Table 4.13). Among the self-insured, the trend was reversed; 
women comprised a larger percentage of the TPD claims in 1997 than in 2002 (Table 4.14).  
This difference was significant at the 95 percent confidence level.  
Table 4.13 Gender of Workers, 1997 and 2002 
    State Fund Claims 
Gender 1997 pensions 2002 pensions 1997 time loss 2002 time loss 
Female 22.8% 25.7% 33.0% 32.1% 
Male 77.2% 74.3% 67.0% 67.9% 
n           162           210           188           112 
H0: Gender for 1997 state fund pension claims equals gender for 2002 state fund pension claims. 
F (1,370) = 1.11, prob > F = .292 
H0: Gender for 1997 state fund time-loss comparison claims equals that for 2002 comparison claims. 
F (1,298) = 0.16, prob > F = .694 
Table 4.14  Gender of Workers, 1997 and 2002 
      Self-Insured Claims 
Gender 1997 pensions 2002 pensions 1997 time loss 2002 time loss 
Female 42.4% 32.2% 60.0% 50.0% 
Male 57.6% 67.8% 40.0% 50.0% 
n             66             59             50             56 
H0: Gender of 1997 pension recipients equals gender of 2002 pension recipients. 
F (1,123) = 5.10*, prob > F = .026 
H0: Gender of 1997 comparison claims equals gender of 2002 comparison claims. 
F (1,104) = 5.90*, prob > F = .017 
Among the other worker characteristics that did not test out, there was no statistically 
significant difference in the proportion of workers who were obese (not shown), although this 
had been suggested as a possible causative factor in the pension increase. The proportion with a 
body mass index (BMI) greater than 30 was slightly greater among 2002 pensions than among 
1997 pensions, while the reverse was true for comparison time-loss claims. Similarly, the need 
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for an interpreter or other indications of significant language problems was not associated with 
an increase in the number of pensions between 1997 and 2002 (not shown). The number of 
dependents also showed no trends, but there was a significant drop in the percentage of married 
workers who received pensions between the years of 1997 and 2002, for both the state fund and 
the self-insured claims (Table 4.15). This was much less true for the comparison time-loss 
claims. We do not have a ready explanation for why this should be true in either instance.  
Table  4.15  Proportion Married, 1997 and 2002 
 1997 pensions 2002 pensions 1997 time loss 2002 time loss 
State fund 70.4% 64.3% 62.2% 65.2% 
n 162 210 188 112 
     
Self-insured 72.7% 57.6% 64.0% 50.0% 
n             66             59             50             56 
H0: Proportion married is the same in 2002 as 1997 for state fund pension claims. 
F (1,370) = 4.19*, prob > F = .041 
 
H0: Proportion married is the same in 2002 as 1997 for state fund comparison claims. 
F (1,298) = 1.84, prob > F = .176 
 
H0: Proportion married is the same in 2002 as 1997 for self-insured pension claims. 
F (1,123) = 11.81***, prob > F = .001 
 
H0: Proportion married is the same in 2002 as 1997 for self-insured comparison claims. 
F (1,104) = 11.85***, prob > F = .001 
Table 4.16 reports the estimated pre-injury monthly earnings for the workers in our 
sample. These are estimated by L&I actuaries from the earnings implied by time-loss benefit 
rates.152 Estimated monthly earnings are reported both in “current” dollars and “constant 2007” 
dollars. Current dollars represents the estimated earnings at the time of injury, while constant 
2007 dollars adjusts that figure to 2007, using the CPI-U cost of living index. Estimated pre-
injury monthly earnings for pension recipients increased by 17.1 percent over the 5 years, or 3.2 
percent annually. Injured comparison workers saw estimated earnings increases of 16.2 percent, 
or 3.0 percent annually. After adjustment for the cost of living, only a very small increase in 
“real” pre-injury monthly earnings over the five years is apparent; 4.4 percent for pension 
recipients and 3.6 percent for comparison cases. In both 1997 and 2002 the estimated monthly 
earnings of pension recipients are slightly higher than the comparison time-loss claimants, 
although not significantly.  
                                                 
152  Estimates are subject to error in individual cases based upon number of dependents, benefit inflation 
adjustment, and other considerations. 
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Table 4.16  Estimated Pre-Injury Monthly Earnings, 1997 and 2002 
 State Fund Claims 
Estimated monthly earnings 1997 pensions 2002 pensions 1997 time loss 2002 time loss 
Mean $2,160 $2,529 $2,123 $2,467 
Standard error             50.10             43.95             32.15             46.55 
In constant (2007) dollars $2,791 $2,913 $2,743 $2,842 
H0:   Monthly earnings before injury were the same in 1997 and 2002 for pension claims. 
F (1,370) = 30.53***, prob > F = .000 
 
H0:   Monthly earnings before injury were the same in 1997 and 2002 for comparison time-loss claims. 
F (1,298) = 37.05***, prob > F = .000 
 The initial monthly compensation rate for state fund claims is reported in Table 4.17. 
Naturally, the story is very similar to that for pre-injury earnings, since the monthly 
compensation rate is based upon the earnings level. However, it is interesting to note that the 
unadjusted compensation rate showed higher growth from 1997 to 2002 among the comparison 
time-loss claims (22 percent) than among the pension claims (13 percent). However, in both 
years, the earnings of comparison workers were slightly lower than those of pension recipients. 
Table 4.17  Initial Monthly Compensation Rate  
 State Fund Claims 
Estimated initial monthly 
compensation rate 
1997 pensions 2002 pensions 1997 time loss 2002 time loss 
Mean $1,086 $1,230 $944 $1,153 
Standard error            26.67            20.83           13.19            20.92 
In constant (2007) dollars $1,403 $1,417 $1,220 $1,328 
H0:   Initial monthly compensation rate for pensions was the same in 1997 and 2002. 
F (1,370) = 18.04***, prob > F = .000 
 
H0:   Initial monthly compensation rate for comparison time-loss claims was the same in 1997 and 2002. 
F (1,298) = 71.45***, prob > F = .000 
 
 Education is a very important factor in securing employment and return to work after 
injury, but the Department of Labor and Industries does not collect this information directly. The 
information was available through our claim review because nearly all workers receiving TPD 
pensions and many of the comparison workers went through a vocational assessment process. 
We collected information on whether or not workers had less than a high school education, high 
school graduate or GED, some college, or had graduated from college.  
A large percentage of workers (47 percent) with total permanent disability awards have 
less than a high school education. (Table 4.18). We found that there was a slight, but not 
statistically significant, increase in the percentage of state fund pension cases having less than a 
high school education, from 44 percent in 1997 to 50 percent in 2002. However, among the 
comparison group there was a significant drop in the percentage of cases having less than a high 
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school education, from 43 percent in 1997 to 35 percent in 2002. So while the proportion of high 
school dropouts among pension recipients has not significantly declined, the average pension 
recipient went from roughly the same level as similar time-loss workers to considerably more 
disadvantaged. Thus we feel that education level is a significant factor in the pension increase as 
disadvantaged workers have fewer employment options and are therefore more likely to qualify 
for a total permanent disability pension.  
Table 4.18  Education Level of Workers, 1997 and 2002 
      State Fund Claims  
Less than high 
school graduate 
1997 pensions 2002 pensions 1997 time loss 2002 time loss 
Yes 44.4% 50.0% 43.1% 35.5% 
No 55.6% 50.0% 56.9% 64.5% 
n           153           196           181           124 
H0: Percent with less than high school education is equal in 1997 and 2002 for state fund pension claims. 
F (1,370) = 3.15, prob > F = .77 
 
H0: Percent with less than high school education is equal in 1997 and 2002 for comparison time-loss claims. 
F (1,298) = 18.57***, prob > F = .000 
The industry of the injured worker can also have significant impacts on return to work. 
The profile of our randomly selected group of state fund TPD cases shows a fairly stable industry 
mix: that is, not much seems to have changed between 1997 and 2002 (Table 4.19). There were 
slightly more agricultural workers receiving pensions in 2002 than in 1997, but this was not a 
statistically significant change and certainly not enough to suggest it is a cause of the increase in 
pension incidence.  
What is particularly noteworthy is that the manufacturing sector accounts for 
substantially fewer pension claims than comparison time-loss claims in 2002. Perhaps this is due 
to the impact of the recession that began in 2001. The proportion of pension claims from the 
services sector increased substantially from 1997 to 2002, but basically in line with the increase 
among comparison time-loss claims. Because of the general impression that agriculture and 
construction account for more than their share of workers’ compensation claims, we provide 
statistical tests for those industries, and will test them again in the multivariate work offered 
later. However, it does not appear that changes in sector of employment account for the rise in 
pensions.  
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Table 4.19  Selected Industry of Employment at Injury, 1997 and 2002 
      State Fund Claims 
Sector 1997 pensions 2002 pensions 1997 time loss 2002 time loss 
Agriculture 9.9% 11.0% 11.7% 4.5% 
Construction 21.6% 21.4% 24.5% 22.3% 
Manufacturing 8.6% 10.0% 6.4% 17.0% 
Services 21.0% 28.1% 21.8% 25.0% 
n           162           210           188           112 
H0:  Proportion of state fund pension claims from agricultural sector was the same in 1997 and 2002. 
F (1,370) = .310, prob > F = .580 
 
H0:  Proportion of state fund comparison claims from agricultural sector was the same in 1997 and 2002. 
F (1,298) = 35.54***, prob > F = .000 
 
H0:  Proportion of state fund pension claims from construction sector was the same in 1997 and 2002. 
F (1,370) = .00, prob > F = .947 
 
H0:  Proportion of state fund pension claims from construction sector was the same in 1997 and 2002. 
F (1,298) = 1.26, prob > F = .263 
 
Table 4.20 shows the distribution of serious disability claims from the Puget Sound area 
and the rest of the state of Washington. The proportion of pension claims from Puget Sound has 
declined slightly (by about 11 percent) while the proportion of comparison time-loss claims has 
not changed significantly (about 1 percent). Of course, this proportion is among a larger number 
of pension claims overall, but it does not appear that claims from Puget Sound account for the 
rise in pensions.  
Table 4.20  Region of Claim Origin, 1997 and 2002 
       State Fund Claims 
Percent of claims 
from: 1997 pensions 2002 pensions 1997 time loss 2002 time loss 
Puget Sound 58.6% 52.3% 49.5% 48.4% 
Rest of WA 41.4% 47.7% 50.5% 51.6% 
N           219           263           215          184 
H0:  The proportion of pension claims from Puget Sound region is the same in 1997 and 2002.  
F (1,370) = 4.51*, prob > F = .034 
 
H0:  The proportion of comparison claims from Puget Sound region is the same in 1997 and 2002.  
F (1,298) = 1.05, prob > F = .306 
However, Table 4.21 displays the location of claims in a different way. This table uses 
the definition of economically distressed counties from the Washington Employment Security 
Department. Counties determined as economically distressed are Adams, Benton, Chelan, 
Clallam, Columbia, Cowlitz, Douglas, Ferry, Franklin, Grant, Grays Harbor, Jefferson, Kittitas, 
Klickitat, Lewis, Mason, Okanogan, Pacific, Pend Oreille, Skagit, Skamania, Stevens, 
Wahkiakum, Walla Walla, and Yakima. These 25 counties produced nearly 26 percent of 
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pension claims in 1997 and 41 percent in 2002, while the proportion of comparison time-loss 
claims fell from 41.5 percent to 37.5 percent. This highly significant result tells us that 
economically distressed areas became substantially more likely to produce pension claims; and 
that economic conditions or changes in them are likely to be related to claim activity. We believe 
it is very likely that changes in economic conditions contributed to the increase in pensions.  
Table 4.21  Claims from Economically Distressed Areas, 1997 and 2002 
       State Fund Claims 
Economically 
distressed? 1997 pensions 2002 pensions 1997 time loss 2002 time loss 
Yes 25.9% 41.0% 41.5% 37.5% 
No 74.1% 59.0% 58.5% 62.5% 
n           162           210           188           112 
H0:  The proportion of pension claims from economically distressed counties is the same in 1997 and 2002. 
F (1,370) = 26.63***, prob > F = .000 
 
H0:  The proportion of comparison time-loss claims from economically distressed counties is the same in 1997 and 
2002.  
F (1,298) = 3.26, prob > F = .072 
Medical Treatment and Psychological Impairment 
One possible explanation for the rise in pension incidence is the changing medical 
treatment injured workers receive. This section details medical treatment, medical examinations, 
and psychological or psychiatric treatment. We showed earlier that there were actually fewer 
back injuries among our time-loss claims, and among self-insured pension claims, but not among 
state fund pension claims. We also found no statistically significant reduction in the number of 
surgical procedures performed among the pension and comparison groups in our sample. So it is 
not the extent, but the specific type of treatment that will be examined here.  
As discussed in chapter 2, opioid use appears to have increased considerably over time. 
Our review of claims indicates that opioid use is very prevalent among the long-term disabled 
cases. Almost 40 percent of the state fund claims we reviewed had opioid use of two or more 
prescriptions of seven or more days each. Such opioid use increased from 30 percent of 
pensioned claims in 1997 to 45 percent of pensioned claims in 2002, while opioid use in the 
time-loss category actually decreased slightly over those same years (Table 4.22). However, it is 
the 1997 pension claims that stand out for having the lowest incidence of opioid use; the other 
three groups seem to be in the same general range. Our claim reviewers also noted that opioids 
were sometimes provided to patients who had a history of narcotic abuse. Given the mixed 
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evidence, we feel that opioid use may well have contributed to the increase in pensions, but it is 
nearly impossible to separate cause from effect in this instance.  
Table 4.22  Opioid Involvement, 1997 and 2002 
       State Fund Claims 
Opioids involved 1997 pensions 2002 pensions 1997 time loss 2002 time loss 
Yes 29.9% 45.5% 53.1% 46.4% 
No 70.1% 54.5% 46.9% 53.6% 
n           134           198           143           112 
H0:  Opioid involvement in pension claims was the same in 1997 as in 2002. 
F (1,370) = 14.65***, prob > F = .000 
 
H0:  Opioid involvement in comparison time-loss claims was the same in 1997 as in 2002. 
F (1,298) = 6.74**, prob > F = .001 
Yet another possible contributor to the incidence of pensions is the ability of pain clinics 
to help patients deal with chronic pain. Presumably, pain clinics would reduce the incidence of 
pensions by enabling injured workers to return to work after they are able to manage their pain 
effectively. The use of pain clinics to help workers manage pain increased but not significantly 
among pension claims from 1997 to 2002. About 27 percent of pensioned workers from 2002 
had received pain clinic treatment (Table 4.23). More recent 2002 time-loss claims indicate a 
much lower rate of pain clinic use, standing at about 10 percent. We conclude that pain clinics 
were probably not a significant factor in the pension increase.  
Table 4.23  Pain Clinic Used, 1997 and 2002 
      State Fund Claims 
Was pain clinic 
used? 1997 pensions 2002 pensions 1997 time loss 2002 time loss 
Yes 22.8% 27.6% 27.7% 9.8% 
No 77.2% 72.4% 72.3% 90.2% 
n           162           210           188           112 
H0:  Proportion of pension claims using pain clinics was the same in 1997 and 2002. 
F (1,370) = 3.03, prob > F = .082 
 
H0:  Proportion of comparison time-loss claims using pain clinics was the same in 1997 and 2002.  
F (1,298) = 109.06***, prob > F = .000 
Perhaps psychological or psychiatric conditions are more prevalent, or more likely to be 
accepted as disabling conditions, giving rise to an increased pension incidence. There appears to 
be a prevalent belief among those familiar with the Washington workers’ compensation system 
that this is true. Because of the measurement difficulties, we examined this in several ways to 
supplement the analysis of data warehouse data that was provided in chapter 2 (See Table 2.11). 
First, we had our claim reviewers record whether any psychological conditions were indicated in 
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the claim file. Of all the state fund pension claims reviewed, they found that 36 percent of the 
claims involved some psychological or psychiatric issues. But we did not not find statistically 
significant differences across pension cohorts as we did for the time-loss comparison groups 
(Table 4.24). So while pension claims showed a non-significant increase in the incidence of 
psychological issues, comparison time-loss claims showed a significant decrease in 
psychological involvement.  
Table 4.24  Psychological Issues in Claim, 1997 and 2002 
      State Fund Claims 
Psychological issues 
in claim 
1997 pensions 2002 pensions 1997 time loss 2002 time loss 
Yes 33.9% 38.1% 39.4% 17.9% 
No 66.1% 61.9% 60.6% 88.1% 
n           151           213           177           116 
H0:  Psychological issues among pension claims were as likely in 1997 as in 2002. 
F (1,370) = 1.83, prob > F = .177 
 
H0:  Psychological issues among comparison claims were as likely in 1997 as in 2002. 
F (1,298) = 118.20***, prob > F = .000 
 
While we are surprised at the percentage of claims with psych involvement, we accept 
that injured workers may have difficulty adjusting to a new lifestyle that a significant disabling 
injury can bring. We also were able to pull from the state fund data warehouse information on 
whether or not any psychological treatment or assessment was paid on the claim. Of the claims 
we reviewed, 36.6 percent had some psych payments which could have included evaluations. 
The percentage of state fund pension claims with psych payments increased from 35 percent in 
1997 to 41 percent in 2002, but the increase in pension claims with psych payments was not 
statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level (Table 4.25). Comparison time-loss 
claims again showed a significant decline. 
Table 4.25  Proportion with Psych Payments, 1997 and 2002 
      State Fund Claims 
State fund payment 
for psych treatment? 1997 pensions 2002 pensions 1997 time loss 2002 time loss 
Yes 35.2% 41.4% 42.6% 19.6% 
No 64.8% 58.6% 57.4% 80.4% 
n           162           210          188           112 
H0:  Proportion of pension claims that showed payment for psychological or psychiatric treatment was the same in 
1997 and 2002.  
F (1,370) = 1.83, prob > F = .177 
 
H0:  Proportion of comparison time-loss claims that showed payment for psychological or psychiatric treatment was 
the same in 1997 and 2002.  
F (1,298) = 118.20***, prob > F = .000 
 4-25 
We also examined whether or not independent medical examinations involved a 
psychiatric evaluation. Approximately 47 percent of all claims with IMEs had been referred for a 
psych evaluation, occurring more frequently in 1997 than in 2002, but once again this was not a 
statistically significant difference (Table 4.26). This last finding resonates with our claim 
reviewers’ observations that psych issues seemed to present problems in resolving claims, 
especially in the earlier time period, with repeated referrals to vocational counselling or 
independent medical examinations. It was evident that adjudicators were having difficulty 
resolving claims with psychological or psychiatric indications. The rates do suggest that this is 
somewhat less of a problem for the 2002 claims. 
Table 4.26  IME Included Psych Evaluation, 1997 and 2002 
      State Fund Claims 
Did IME include 
psych evaluation? 1997 pensions 2002 pensions 1997 time loss 2002 time loss 
Yes 55.6% 50.5% 51.1% 27.8% 
No 44.4% 49.5% 48.9% 72.2% 
n           162          214           188           126 
H0:  Proportion of pension claims with IMEs for psychological or psychiatric issues was the same in 1997 and 2002.  
F (1,370) = 1.67, prob > F = .197 
 
H0:  Proportion of comparison time-loss claims with IMEs for psychological or psychiatric issues was the same in 
1997 and 2002.  
F (1,298) = 140.81***, prob > F = .000 
Claims Management 
 We reviewed the management of claims during our claim review to seek evidence of 
changes in procedure that might help to explain the rise in pensions. Our experienced claim 
reviewers were asked to offer their summary judgment as to whether there had been any 
“adjudicative delays” in the processing of individual claims. These adjudicative delays were 
those judged to have been unnecessary if the administrative machinery had functioned smoothly. 
Table 4.27 reports that they found evidence of such delays among a sizable minority of these 
serious disability claims. Pension claims from 1997 showed nearly 40 percent with adjudicative 
delays; declining to just under 30 percent for 2002 pension claims. Among comparison time-loss 
claims the decline was from about 30 percent to about 20 percent. This seems to be indicative of 
an improvement in the efficiency of processing claims, at least as judged by our experienced 
observers.  
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Table 4.27  Adjudicative Delays, 1997 and 2002 
 State Fund Claims 
Adjudicative delays 1997 pensions 2002 pensions 1997 time loss 2002 time loss 
Yes 39.6% 28.5% 31.7% 21.6% 
No 60.4% 71.5% 68.3% 78.4% 
H0:   Same proportion of pension claims show adjudicative delays in 1997 and 2002 for pension claims. 
F (1,359) = 12.52*, prob > F = .001 
 
H0:   Same proportion of pension claims show adjudicative delays in 1997 and 2002 for comparison time-loss 
claims. 
F (1,289) = 24.95***, prob > F = .000 
 This is reflected also in Table 4.28, which reports the number of days spent in assessment 
of various types. Pension claims from 1997 had an average of over 500 days in assessment, with 
a decline to 435 for 2002 pension claims. Comparison time-loss claims showed an even bigger 
change; declining from over 650 days in 1997 to about 330 in 2002. Both differences are 
statistically significant. Since these differences could be due to the additional aging of 1997 
claims within the system, we sought additional information on the claims management 
procedures that had been employed.  
Table 4.28  Time Spent in Assessment 
 State Fund Claims 
Days spent in assessment 1997 pensions 2002 pensions 1997 time loss 2002 time loss 
Mean days 508.5 435.0 653.4 331.6 
Standard error    31.92    11.93    15.46    10.26 
H0:   Time spent in assessment was the same in 1997 and 2002 for pension claims. 
F (1,343) = 4.64*, prob > F = .032 
 
H0:   Time spent in assessment was the same in 1997 and 2002 for comparison time-loss claims. 
F (1,258) = 300.53***, prob > F = .000 
 
The use of independent medical examinations (IMEs) may also provide clues on case 
management. The number of IMEs was significantly lower in 2002 than in 1997. Table 4.29 
indicates that the decline was particularly significant among comparison time-loss claims; 
declining by about one-third compared to about one-seventh for pension claims, but both results 
are highly statistically significant. Again, we take this as an indication of increasing efficiency in 
claims management at L&I.  
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Table 4.29  Number of Independent Medical Exams 
 State Fund Claims 
Number of IMEs 1997 pensions 2002 pensions 1997 time loss 2002 time loss 
Mean 3.51 2.92 4.68 3.06 
Standard error    .102    .055    .076    .072 
H0:   Number of IMEs was the same in 1997 and 2002 for pension claims. 
F (1,361) = 25.49***, prob > F = .000 
 
H0:   Number of IMEs was the same in 1997 and 2002 for comparison time-loss claims. 
F (1,290) = 239.36***, prob > F = .000 
 
 However, the outcomes of the claims in terms of PPD ratings do not suggest that IME 
outcomes changed significantly over the time period. Rather, it seems that earlier IME referrals 
were possibly used in an attempt to resolve the claim when a claim adjudicator was unsure what 
to do. Our claim reviewers noted this among the 1997 time-loss claims and felt it supported the 
changing adjudication patterns they noticed among the pension claims. The 2002 time-loss 
claims do not seem to suffer from the same problems of multiple and contentious IMEs, which 
may bode well for the future. 
The same general pattern is evident in Table 4.30, which reports the proportion of sample 
claims with multiple referrals for vocational rehabilitation services. Over 60 percent of 1997 
pension claims had multiple VR referrals, declining to 54 percent among 2002 pension claims. 
For comparison time-loss claims the decline was more pronounced; from over 80 percent to 65 
percent. Again, both differences are statistically significant.  
Table 4.30  Multiple Vocational Rehabilitation Referrals 
      State Fund Claims 
Proportion of claims with 
multiple VR referrals 
1997 pensions 2002 pensions 1997 time loss 2002 time loss 
Yes 61.7% 53.8% 80.8% 65.2% 
No 38.3% 46.2% 19.2% 34.8% 
H0:   Proportion with multiple VR referrals was the same in 1997 and 2002 for pension claims. 
F (1,370) = 6.35*, prob > F = .012 
 
H0:   Proportion with multiple VR referrals was the same in 1997 and 2002 for comparison time-loss claims. 
F (1,298) = 62.56***, prob >F = .000 
 
 However, there was not an increase in what might be regarded as claims management 
futility, those claims where a referral is made for “early VR” action, but the evaluation shows 
that the individual is “not likely to benefit” from VR. Our claim reviewers took this as an 
indication that the CM was “parking” the case to await further developments. Table 4.31 shows 
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that there is a good deal of such activity in both 1997 and 2002, but not any significant change 
for either pension or comparison time-loss claims.  
Table 4.31  Number of Early VR Actions with “Not Likely to Benefit” Outcomes 
 State Fund Claims 
 1997 pensions 2002 pensions 1997 time loss 2002 time loss 
Mean 1.38 1.41 1.62 1.52 
Standard error   .06  .04   .04   .04 
H0:   Number of early VR actions with “Not Likely to Benefit” Outcomes was the same in 1997 and 2002 for 
pension cases. 
F (1,139) = 0.18, prob > F = .675 
 
H0:   Number of early VR actions with “Not Likely to Benefit” Outcomes was the same in 1997 and 2002 for 
comparison time-loss cases. 
F (1,136) = 3.52, prob > F = .063 
Preexisting conditions, however, seem to be an increasing problem. We note that 92 
percent of 2002 state fund pensions that we reviewed had preexisting conditions (Table 4.32), 
and the increase from 88 percent in 1997 is statistically significant. Meanwhile the proportion of 
comparison time-loss claims saw a significant decline in the proportion with preexisting 
conditions. The very high levels for all four groups may argue against this variable as a good 
discriminator among them, however. 
Table 4.32  Preexisting Conditions, 1997 and 2002 
      State Fund Claims 
Preexisting 
condition 1997 pensions 2002 pensions 1997 time loss 2002 time loss 
Yes 87.8% 92.5% 83.4% 76.9% 
No 12.2% 7.5% 16.6% 23.1% 
n           196          252           169           117 
H0:  Same proportion of pensions with preexisting conditions, 1997 and 2002. 
F (1,370) = 27.58***, prob > F = .000 
 
H0:  Same proportion of time-loss comparison claims with preexisting conditions in 1997 and 2002.  
F (1,298) = 5.56*, prob > F = .019 
Prior workers’ compensation claims were also higher among the 2002 pension category, 
with 89 percent of pension claims having a prior claim, compared to 83 percent among the 1997 
pension claims, but this difference was not statistically significant (Table 4.33). While the 
proportion of pension awards with prior claims was increasing, the proportion among 
comparison time-loss claims was declining slightly (85 percent to 83 percent). It should be noted 
that there are substantially fewer claims included here than in the previous table, presumably 
reflecting greater difficulty in determining whether the claimant had a prior workers’ 
compensation claim.  
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Table 4.33  Prior Claims among Pension Awards, 1997 and 2002 
     State Fund Claims 
Prior Claim 1997 pensions 2002 pensions 1997 time loss 2002 time loss 
Yes 83.3% 89.3% 85.2% 82.7% 
No 16.7% 10.7% 14.8% 17.3% 
n           132           197           122             81 
H0:  Same proportion of pensions with prior claims in 1997 and 2002. 
F (1,370) = 1.07, prob > F = .301 
 
H0:  Same proportion of time-loss comparison claims with prior claims in 1997 and 2002. 
F (1,298) = 34.60***, prob > F = .000 
Prior claims with the same condition accounted for 47 percent of 2002 state fund pension 
claims, compared to 44 percent in 1997 (Table 4.34). This was also not statistically different, but 
the pattern among the time-loss claims was interesting. In 1997, 35.6 percent of the time-loss 
claims we reviewed had prior claims with the same condition, compared with 53.7 percent of 
time-loss claims in 2002. This was significant at the 95 percent confidence level, but we do not 
know what to make of this. It is puzzling that there should have been such a large increase 
among time-loss claims, but not pension claims. 
Table 4.34  Prior Claims with Same Condition, 1997 and 2002 
        State Fund Claims 
Prior claim with 
same condition 1997 pensions 2002 pensions 1997 time loss 2002 time loss 
Yes 43.6% 47.2% 35.6% 53.7% 
No 56.4% 52.8% 64.4% 46.3% 
n             91           157             92             63 
H0: Proportion of pensions with prior awards for the same condition was the same in 1997 and 2002.  
F (1,302) = 0.0, prob > F = .958 
 
H0: Proportion of comparison time-loss claims with prior awards for the same condition is the same in 1997 and 
2002. 
F (1,298) = 15.75***, prob > F = .000 
Most notable was the percentage of state fund cases with a prior PPD. The proportion of 
pension awards with a prior PPD award increased from 33 percent in 1997 to 41 percent in 2002 
(Table 4.35). Similarly, the proportion of comparison time-loss claims with prior PPD awards 
increased from 20 percent to 34 percent over the same time period. Both of these differences are 
statistically significant. These results may indicate changing standards of claim adjudication. 
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Table 4.35  Prior Claims with PPD Award, 1997 and 2002  
      State Fund Claims 
Prior PPD 1997 pensions 2002 pensions 1997 time loss 2002 time loss 
Yes 33.3% 40.6% 19.5% 33.9% 
No 66.7% 59.4% 80.5% 66.1% 
n             75             85             82             62 
H0:  Same proportion of pension claims had prior PPD award in 1997 and 2002. 
F (1,302) = 8.69**, prob > F = .004 
 
H0:  Same proportion of time-loss comparison claims had prior PPD award in 1997 and 2002.  
F (1,248) = 19.27***, prob > F = .000  
As expected, the self-insured sector reports a higher proportion of cases with preexisting 
conditions, presumably reflecting the desire to qualify as a second-injury fund reimbursable 
claim. Table 4.36 shows the prevalence of prior claims from the self-insured sector in 1997 and 
2002. While the sample size is small and the numbers subject to more sampling variability, it is 
clear that a great majority of self-insured serious disability cases have prior claims. However, the 
proportion with prior workers’ compensation claims actually declined between 1997 and 2002 
for pension claims, while it increased among comparison time-loss claims, although this was not 
statistically significant.  
Table 4.36  Prior Claims from Self-Insured Sector, 1997 and 2002  
Prior claim filed? 1997 pensions 2002 pensions 1997 time loss 2002 time loss 
Yes 93.9% 84.7% 78.0% 83.9% 
No 6.1% 15.3% 22.0% 16.1% 
n            66             59             50             56 
H0:  Percent of self-insured pension claims with prior claims was the same in 1997 and 2002. 
F (1,123) = 10.70**, prob > F = .001 
 
H0:  Percent of self-insured comparison claims with prior claims was the same in 1997 and 2002.  
F (1,104) = 3.24, prob > F = .075 
The adjudication decisions that are being made may also be lasting longer. Table 4.37 
shows that the proportion of reopenings is down significantly among both pension claims and 
comparison time-loss claims from 1997 to 2002. However, we should be careful about over-
interpreting this result since it is clearly affected by the age of the claim. As 2002 claims 
continue to mature in the system, it is likely that the number of reopenings will rise in the future.  
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Table 4.37  Reopenings among State Fund Claims 
Was the claim a 
reopening? 1997 pensions 2002 pensions 1997 time loss 2002 time loss 
Yes 10.5% 7.1% 22.3% 4.5% 
No 89.5% 92.9% 77.7% 95.5% 
n           162           210           188           112 
H0:  Proportion of reopenings among state fund pension claims was the same in 1997 and 2002.  
F (1,370) = 3.16, prob > F = .076 
 
H0:  Proportion of reopenings among state fund comparison time-loss claims was the same in 1997 and 2002.  
F (1,298) = 147.25***, prob > F = .000 
Vocational Rehabilitation  
This section examines the total number of vocational rehabilitation actions, number of 
early intervention actions and ability to work assessments, and percentage of claims having ever 
had a vocational plan. First, we note that there are few differences between analysis groups with 
respect to total number of vocational rehabilitation actions. In 1997 there were 3.28 vocational 
actions on each pension claim that showed VR activity, compared with 3.13 in the later group 
(Table 4.38). The time-loss groups had more intensive VR activity, at least as indicated by the 
number of activities, in both 1997 (at 4.86 average) and in 2002 (at 4.49 average).  
Table 4.38  Number of VR Activities Where VR Was Used, 1997 and 2002 
      State Fund Claims 
Estimated mean 
number of VR 
actions 1997 pensions 2002 pensions 1997 time loss 2002 time loss 
Mean 3.28 3.13 4.86 4.49 
Standard error     .053                 .098     .064      .088 
n          156          199           188           111 
H0:  Number of VR actions for state fund pensions is the same in 1997 and 2002. 
F (1,353) = 1.82, prob > F = .178 
 
H0:  Number of VR actions for state fund comparison time-loss claims is the same in 1997 and 2002.  
F (1,297) = 11.99***, prob > F = .001 
Presumably this reflects attempts to get these seriously injured workers back to work, but the 
differences between 1997 and 2002 are statistically significant only for comparison claims.  
Table 4.39 indicates that this pattern was slightly different among self-insured claims. 
While the difference between 1997 and 2002 pension claims was not significant, it is interesting 
that the level of VR activity was lower. In 2002 the typical self-insured pension claim had less 
than two VR actions while the typical state fund pension claim had more than three VR actions. 
The difference was even more striking among the comparison time-loss claims. The self-insured 
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showed a similar decline in the number of VR actions from 1997 to 2002, but demonstrated less 
than half as many actions in both years. 
Table 4.39  Number of VR Activities, 1997 and 2002 
           Self-Insured Claims 
Estimated mean 
number of VR 
actions 1997 pensions 2002 pensions 1997 time loss 2002 time loss 
Mean 2.06 1.87 2.28 1.96 
Standard error     .088                .064     .086     .058 
n             66            59             50             56 
H0:  Number of VR actions for self-insured pensions is the same in 1997 and 2002. 
F (1,116) = 3.10, prob > F = .081 
 
H0:  Number of VR actions for self-insured comparisons is the same in 1997 and 2002.  
F (1,101) = 9.37**, prob > F = .003 
The average number of “early” vocational referrals (referring to Early Intervention or 
Ability to Work Assessments) was also not significantly different by analysis group. Among the 
1997 TPD cohort, 2.07 early vocational interventions were made on average compared with 2.03 
in the 2002 group (Table 4.53). Comparison time-loss claims were again higher with 2.83 early 
VR referrals in 1997 and 2.72 in 2002. None of these differences are statistically significant and 
we presume are not related to the rise in pensions.  
Table 4.40  Early VR Referrals*, 1997 and 2002 
      State Fund Claims 
 1997 pensions 2002 pensions 1997 time loss 2002 time loss 
Early VR actions 317 402 526 302 
Claims 153 198 186 111 
Early actions/claim           2.07           2.03           2.83           2.72 
% of all VR actions          61.9%         64.5%         57.6%          60.6% 
*Early VR referral means either the Early Intervention Program or Ability to Work Assessment.  
 
H0:  Same number of early VR referrals in 1997 and 2002 for pension claims. 
F (1,349) = 0.34, prob > F = .558 
 
H0:  Same number of early VR referrals in 1997 and 2002 for comparison time-loss claims. 
F (1,295) = 2.22, prob > F = .137 
However, the time to first vocational rehabilitation referral fell significantly from 1997 to 
2002, albeit still at an average of over one year from injury date. Among the state fund pension 
claims, the average time to first vocational referral dropped from 599 days in 1997 to 423 in 
2002 and this difference was significant at the 99 percent confidence level (Table 4.41). So it is 
clear that claims that will eventually end up as pensions are getting to VR considerably earlier 
than they used to. This is also true for comparison time-loss claims as shown in Table 4.31.  
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Table 4.41  Time to First VR Referral, 1997 and 2002 
       Among State Fund Pension Claims 
Mean number of 
days to first VR 
referral 1997 pensions 2002 pensions 1997 time loss 2002 time loss 
Mean (in days) 598.7 423.0 513.8 376.0 
Standard error     40.34    17.25    19.38     11.34 
n             162             210             188             112 
H0:  Time to first VR referral was the same in 1997 and 2002 for state fund pension claims. 
F (1,352) = 16.03***, prob > F = .000 
 
H0:  Time to first VR referral was the same in 1997 and 2002 for state fund comparison time-loss claims. 
F (1,297) = 37.35***, prob > F = .000 
Furthermore, the amount of time spent in vocational rehabilitation has changed, at least 
among time-loss claims. Table 4.42 indicates that among pension claims that received some 
vocational rehabilitation services, the average days from the start of vocational services to the 
end was 1,305 days for 1997 pension claims and 1,227 days for 2002 pension claims. This is not 
a significant difference, but represents over three years of elapsed time in VR for both groups. 
Among the comparison time-loss claims, the 1997 cohort shows nearly double that (or nearly 6.5 
years) even though their experience was supposed to be cut off (or truncated) at the end of 2002 
to preserve comparability with the 2002 cohort. This certainly seems to corroborate the story 
about repeated, though largely unproductive, referrals to VR in the 1997 time frame.  
Table 4.42  Truncated Time in VR Treatments, 1997 and 2002 
       State Fund Claims 
Days from VR start 
to end (truncated at 
five years) 1997 pensions 2002 pensions 1997 time loss 2002 time loss 
Mean in days 1304.8 1227.2 2361.5 1419.2 
Standard error       59.01      27.61      37.54      31.58 
n              154               19              187              111 
H0:  Length of VR treatment is the same for pension claims in 1997 and 2002.  
F (1,349) = 1.42, prob > F = .234 
 
H0:  Length of VR treatment is the same for comparison time-loss claims in 1997 and 2002.  
F (1,196) = 368.91***, prob > F = .000 
We also analyzed the furthest VR stage reached by each of the workers with some 
vocational rehabilitation action. The outcomes were divided into eight possible choices with the 
following rank:  1) medically unstable, 2) further services not appropriate for reasons other than 
medical instability, 3) further VR services appropriate, 4) able to work, 5) plan in development, 
6) plan developed or approved, 7) plan completed, and 8) returned to work. Vocational 
rehabilitation outcomes in Table 4.43 indicate a higher percentage of workers in the 2002 TPD 
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group received a “further services not appropriate” outcome, with nearly 80 percent being 
declared either “medically unstable” or “otherwise unable to benefit” from VR.  
Table 4.43  Vocational Rehabilitation Outcomes, 1997 and 2002 
       State Fund Claims 
VR outcome 1997 pensions 2002 pensions 1997 time loss 2002 time loss 
Medically unstable 36.5% 26.6% 22.9% 23.8% 
Not likely to benefit 35.1% 53.3% 10.1% 15.6% 
Further services 
appropriate 
4.7% 1.0% 7.3% 3.3% 
Able to work 15.5% 16.6% 49.7% 25.4% 
VR plan developed 
or approved 
3.4% 1.5% 3.9% 18.0% 
Return to work 4.7% 1.0% 6.1% 12.3% 
n          148          199          179           122 
 
Pension claims from 1997 were more likely to have been found “medically unstable” and 
less often “not likely to benefit” when compared to 2002 pensions. A similar proportion was 
found “able to work” in both years, but there was a huge difference in those claims which were 
deemed “further services appropriate” with nearly five times as many in 1997 as in 2002. This is 
reflected in the “VR plan developed or approved” statistic with more than twice as many 
reaching this level in 1997.  
There were fewer differences among the 1997 and 2002 comparison time-loss claims. 
However, there were less than half as many where the outcome was “further services 
appropriate” or “able to work” in 2002. In addition, the 2002 time-loss claims were more than 
four times as likely to have a “VR plan developed or approved.” This is a clear indication that 
vocational rehabilitation services were more effectively focused on return to work in the later 
period. It is also noteworthy that while the proportion receiving a VR plan was similar for 
pension claims and comparison claims in 1997, the figure for 2002 comparison time-loss claims 
is more than ten times as high as the 2002 pension claims. We believe this indicates a more 
efficient targeting of vocational rehabilitation services on those who may be able to benefit.  
In summary, we do not think that VR activity contributed to the increase in pensions. VR 
in the 1997 time frame may have served as a way to avoid referral for pension evaluation, and 
therefore discharge from VR may have put a larger number of claims into the pension 
adjudication queue. It is interesting to note that roughly one in six pension cases from both 1997 
and 2002 had an earlier “able to work” determination. Unfortunately, we are not able to sort out 
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how many were not able to find work versus those who suffered reversals in their recovery. But 
vocational rehabilitation services, per se, did not cause the rise in pensions.  
Return-to-Work Experience 
This empirical investigation is focused on pension and comparison time-loss claims 
awarded by L&I in two specific years, 1997 and 2002. Of course, the workers are living, 
breathing human beings and their situations change through time. However, we are interested in 
evaluating the question of whether there was any return to work before the time of pension 
award. We know that these injured workers are several years past the date of injury at the time of 
pension award. One of the indicators we are interested in is the percentage of pension claims and 
comparison time-loss claims in which the worker attempted a return to work at some point; and 
our claim reviewers attempted to discern this fact from the claim record. Of course, it is clear (at 
least for the pension claims) that they did not ultimately succeed in returning to work; and we do 
not know for how long the worker may have been successfully back at work. We only know the 
outcome was a pension award for total permanent disability.  
Table 4.44 shows the return-to-work attempts for pension and comparison cases for 1997 
and 2002 state fund claims. Note that the proportion that ever returned to work declined 
significantly between these two years, for both pension claims and the comparison time-loss 
claims. In both cases the difference is statistically significant. It is also interesting that in 1997 
time-loss comparison claims had a higher return-to-work rate than pensions, but in 2002 pension 
claims had the slightly higher rate.  
Table 4.44  Return to Work Experience, 1997 and 2002 
      State Fund Claims 
Any return to work? 1997 pensions 2002 pensions 1997 time loss 2002 time loss 
Yes 58.1% 49.8% 65.9% 45.2% 
No 41.9% 50.2% 34.1% 54.8% 
n           155           207           176           104 
H0:  Proportion with some return to work is the same for 1997 and 2002, state fund pension claims. 
F (1,360) = 6.59*, prob > F = .011 
 
H0:  Proportion with some return to work is the same for 1997 and 2002 state fund comparison time-loss claims. 
F (1,278) = 82.65***, prob > F = .000 
Table 4.45 repeats this analysis for self-insured claims. In this instance, there is not an 
appreciable change in the proportion of pensioned workers that made an attempt at return to 
work. There appears to be a slight drop in the rate for time-loss claims, but it is not statistically 
significant. We know that these workers were not employed at the time of observation (1997 or 
 4-36 
2002), since they were either on pension or drawing time-loss benefits, so their efforts to return 
to work in the past did not result in permanent reemployment. However, the fact that an attempt 
was made is an important indicator of claims management performance, injured worker 
motivation, and employer willingness to accommodate injured workers.  
Table 4.45  Return to Work, 1997 and 2002 
      Self-Insured Claims 
Any return to work? 1997 pensions 2002 pensions 1997 time loss 2002 time loss 
Yes 58.1% 60.3% 77.6% 70.4% 
No 41.9% 39.7% 22.4% 29.6% 
n             62             58             49             54 
H0:  Proportion with some return to work is the same for 1997 and 2002 self-insured pension claims. 
F (1,118) = .23, prob > F = .630 
 
H0:  Proportion with some return to work is the same for 1997 and 2002 self-insured comparison time-loss claims. 
F (l,101) = 3.84, prob > F = .053 
The rate of return to work with the employer at injury among those who made an attempt 
to return to work further indicates the willingness and capability of employers to retain their 
injured workers, even though ultimately these workers may have failed to sustain the return to 
work. Table 4.46 shows the rate of return to work at the employer at injury among those who 
made an attempt. In this case, the return-to-work rate was significantly higher in 2002 than in 
1997, for both pension claims and time-loss claims. Again, this seems to reflect more effective 
targeting of L&I resources and a more accepting attitude among employers. However, this is not 
apparent in our reviewers’ judgments of accommodation efforts for disabled workers by their 
employers. 
Table 4.46  RTW at Employer at Injury for Those with RTW, 1997 and 2002 
      State Fund Claims 
Return to work at 
employer at injury? 1997 pensions 2002 pensions 1997 time loss 2002 time loss 
Yes 84.3% 91.3% 66.4% 77.8% 
No 15.7% 8.7% 33.6% 22.2% 
n             89          103           113             45 
H0:  RTW at employer at injury was the same in 1997 and 2002 for state fund pension claims. 
F (1,201) = 4.61*, prob > F = .033 
 
H0:  RTW at employer at injury was the same in 1997 and 2002 for state fund comparison time-loss claims. 
F (1,230) = 18.64***, prob >  F = .000 
Table 4.47 shows a slight decline in the proportion of pension cases that demonstrated 
efforts at accommodation, in the judgment of our claim reviewers. This is not a significant 
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difference for pension claims, but the larger decline in the proportion accommodated among 
comparison time-loss claims is significant.  
Table 4.47  Accommodation, 1997 and 2002 
 State Fund Claims 
Accommodated 1997 pensions 2002 pensions 1997 time loss 2002 time loss 
Yes 19.3% 14.2% 29.7% 13.1% 
No 80.7% 85.8% 70.3% 86.9% 
H0:   Accommodation was as prevalent in 2002 as in 1997 for pension claims. 
F (1,194) = 2.24, prob > F = .136 
 
H0:   Accommodation was as prevalent in 2002 as in 1997 for time-loss comparison claims. 
F (1,150) = 42.03***, prob > F = .000 
 The same pattern is evident in Table 4.48, which reports the incidence of light-duty jobs 
provided to our sample of workers’ compensation claimants. There was no significant difference 
in the proportion of pension claims with light duty provided between 1997 and 2002; but 
comparison time-loss claims showed a significant decline.  
Table 4.48   Light Duty Provided  
    State Fund Claims 
 1997 pensions 2002 pensions 1997 time loss 2002 time loss 
Proportion of claims with light 
duty provided 
34.8% 35.1% 42.7% 33.9% 
Standard error    .035    .020    .021    .021 
H0:   The proportion with light duty provided was the same in 1997 and 2002 for pension claims. 
F (1,224) = 0.01, prob > F = .942 
 
H0:   The proportion with light duty provided was the same in 1997 and 2002 for comparison time-loss claims 
F (1,163) = 8.95**, prob > F = .003 
We are somewhat at a loss to explain these results for return to work. However, several 
potential explanatory factors can be offered. First, economic forces may have played a role in re-
employment success for injured workers in Washington. Also, the administrative efforts to 
reduce time-loss durations may have affected the return-to-work focus. It is also possible that the 
additional years of experience for the 1997 claims have led to these results. We are not prepared 
to conclude that there has been any diminution in return-to-work efforts, nor that this has played 
a significant role in the rise in pensions.   
Disputation in the L&I System 
Table 4.49 reports the proportion of pension and comparison group time-loss claims that 
were contested by employers in 1997 and 2002 in state fund claims. This refers to protests or 
appeals of claim allowance, and not to a protest of the actual pension award. While the increase 
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is modest and not significant for pension claims (from 11.7 to 15.2 percent), it is significant for 
comparison group claims (from 13.3 to 23.2 percent).  
Table 4.49  Contested by Employer Claims, 1997 and 2002 
       State Fund Claims 
Claim contested by 
employer? 
1997 pensions 2002 pensions 1997 time loss 2002 time loss 
Yes 11.7% 15.2% 13.3% 23.2% 
No 88.3% 84.8% 86.7% 76.8% 
n           156           211           182           125 
H0:  Employers are contesting the same proportion of state fund pension claims in 2002 as they did in 1997. 
F (1,370) = 2.70, prob > F = .101 
 
H0:  Employers are contesting the same proportion of comparison group claims in 1997 and 2002. 
F (1,298) = 32.55***, prob > F = .000 
Table 4.50 shows that the increase in contested claims is even more striking among self-
insured pension claims. This is an increase for pension claims from about 10 percent to 34 
percent in just five years. It is also revealing that there was only a very modest increase in the 
proportion of comparison time-loss claims contested by employers (from 6.0 to 7.1 percent). 
Looking at the overall comparison of 1997 and 2002, this is a large increase, and this result 
indicates a more contentious workers’ compensation system.  
Table 4.50  Contested Claims, 1997 and 2002 
       Self-Insured Claims 
Claim contested by 
employer? 
1997 pensions 2002 pensions 1997 time loss 2002 time loss 
Yes 10.6% 34.1% 6.4% 7.1% 
No 89.4% 65.9% 93.6% 92.9% 
N             66             59             50             56 
H0:  Proportion of pension claims contested by employer was the same in 1997 and 2002.  
F (1,123) = 18.09***, prob > F = .000 
 
H0:  Proportion of comparison claims contested by employer was the same in 1997 and 2002. 
F (1,104) = 0.31, prob > F = .578 
Table 4.51 shows the distribution of BIIA appeals among the sample claims. The rate of 
appeals was determined by our claim reviewers based upon the separate dates of filing as 
recorded in the administrative file. As shown in the table, between 60 percent and 75 percent of 
these claims do not show any BIIA filings. It appears from the table that the frequency of BIIA 
appeals has increased for pension claims and declined for comparison time-loss claims between 
1997 and 2002.  
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Table 4.51  Number of BIIA Appeals* 
 1997 pensions 2002 pensions 1997 time loss 2002 time loss 
None 70.6% 60.2% 67.2% 75.6% 
1 24.1% 32.7% 20.6% 19.6% 
2   3.5%   6.0%   8.4%   4.2% 
3 or more 1.8% 1.1% 3.8% 0.6% 
N          228          269          238          168 
*Number of BIIA appeals is derived from the separate dates of filing as determined by our claim reviewers. 
 This result is confirmed in Table 4.52 which reports the total number of appeals divided 
by the sample size. This table therefore represents the average number of appeals per claim 
among the pension claims and comparison time-loss claims. The average number of appeals 
increased slightly from 1997 to 2002 pension claims, but this difference was not statistically 
significant. The average number of appeals among comparison group claims declined very 
significantly between 1997 and 2002.  
Table 4.52  Appeals to BIIA* 
 State Fund Claims 
Number of appeals 1997 pensions 2002 pensions 1997 time loss 2002 time loss 
Mean .376 .448 .601 .330 
Standard error .037 .022 .031 .020 
N         228         269         238         168 
H0:  Average number of appeals per claim was the same in 1997 and 2002 for pension claims. 
F (1,370) = 2.75, prob > F = .098 
 
H0:  Average number of appeals per claim was the same in 1997 and 2002 for comparison time-loss claims. 
F (1,298) = 53.56***, prob > F = .000 
*Number of BIIA appeals is derived from the separate dates of filing as determined by our claim reviewers. 
REVIEWER OBSERVATIONS OF CLAIMS 
 Our five experienced, retired claim adjudicators reviewed over 900 state fund and self- 
insured claims. In the process of the review, several important observations were noted by claim 
reviewers that may otherwise be missed by a purely quantitiative analysis. This section captures 
some of their important observations from the review. Claim reviewers were frequently asked 
about the quality of the claims and met periodically with researchers to share their views of 
different or similar characteristics of claims across years, and pension and liability status. Claim 
reviewers were asked specifically to note any oddities in the claims, comment on any systemic or 
efficiency issues L&I faces in processing claims, differences between pension and time-loss 
claims, and differences in pension claims across years (1997 and 2002 pension award dates). We 
regard these observations as a powerful complement to the quantitative analysis presented 
heretofore.  
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Observations across Pension Years 
Claim reviewers frequently noted the very large number of multiple vocational 
rehabilitation referrals and the seeming overuse of independent medical examinations. In their 
view, the claim adjudicator often did not know what to do about the claim and simply referred it 
out for another assessment. More often than not, such claims returned with a “not likely to 
benefit” or “medically unstable” outcome when it was fairly clear that would be the outcome 
from the beginning. This was generally perceived to be a bigger problem among the 1997 claims.  
Vocational rehabilitation among the 1997 set of time-loss claims often seemed to begin 
too quickly, sometimes immediately after surgery and at inappropriate times. For example, 
several times injured workers over the age of 70 were referred for further vocational services, 
eventually resulting in a not likely to benefit outcome. These problems may be due to slow or 
lack of proper information provided to the claim adjudicator, or they may be due to poor 
adjudicator decisions. Claim reviewers expressed concern that claim adjudicators often requested 
several Ability to Work Assessments when there had already been a decision made. Claim 
reviewers did not perceive any difference between the two years with regard to vocational 
rehabilitation referral patterns. It was felt that discretionary vocational rehabilitation seemed to 
work better but it was only used sparingly. It could have been used more often especially with 
the 1997 cohort of claims. 
Claim reviewers also noted that there were not many differences across the years with 
respect to the use of independent medical examinations, but that the 2002 pension claims seemed 
to have better documentation. Also a very prevalent problem was psychological issues, often as a 
preexisting condition or personality disorder (as opposed to psychiatric conditions of which there 
were also many). Depression, with preexisting conditions and low levels of education, seemed to 
be an emerging pattern among semi-retired injured workers. Claim reviewers felt that many of 
these claims would have resulted in TPD no matter what the Department of Labor & Industries 
did. Both years demonstrated a cycle of preexisting conditions such as MS or diabetes with post-
injury worsening of systems (combined effects), particularly with back and knee injuries, 
osteoarthritis and heart conditions. The ability of the injured worker to recover was diminished, 
increasing strain and drawing the time-loss claim out. Often what held up the state fund claims in 
the later group was the presence of psychological or psychiatric conditions. When the claim 
adjudicator did not know what to do, especially with psych, it was referred for yet another 
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outside independent medical examination or vocational rehabilitation assessment rather than an 
internal occupational nurse or medical consultant. Reviewers noted that self-insured employers 
use occupational nurse case managers much more (but sometimes in a heavy-handed way.) 
Claim reviewers noted that the 2002 pension claims were generally pensioned more 
quickly than the 1997 claims. While generally faster in pensioning claims, it was observed that 
the 2002 claims had fewer vocational rehabilitation plans. There was often slow recovery, and 
many cases where L&I “bought” the pension due to significant time loss and inactivity on the 
claim.  
Other Observations of Factors Affecting Pensioning 
Claim reviewers believed that BIIA orders on self-insurance second– 
injury fund pensions provided a big incentive over what the award would have been had the 
second-injury fund payment not been board ordered. In the later set of pension cases, the 
Department failed to contest what it would have with an earlier set of claims exhibiting similar 
issues, indicating accommodation to the BIIA decisions.  
Another observation was that more injured workers were being granted SSDI in 2002 
than in 1997. When this occurs, it is difficult to argue that an injured worker is not eligible for 
pension, and generally the ability and/or motivation to return to work is greatly diminished.  
From the claim review perspective it was difficult to tell whether this was due to a change in 
eligibility requirements or worsening severity. 
Claim reviewers expressed some surprise at the larger than expected number of older age 
pension and noncooperative claims, especially among the 2002 pension and 1997 time-loss 
groups. The older the worker, the more health problems (diabetes, etc.). Noncooperation on the 
claim “dragged out the time loss.” Others noted that the combination of pychological issues and 
attorney involvement would be interesting to pursue, as well as the interaction between 
vocational rehabilitation and post-injury exacerbation of symptoms, especially in the 
management of pain. Claim reviewers felt there was a “fear factor” associated with vocational 
rehabilitation and pain management that the department should address pro-actively rather than 
passively allowing litigation and dispute. Self-insured claim managers often appeared to have a 
more aggressive or assertive approach to addressing fears of return to work, but claim reviewers 
were not sure whether this always resulted in a positive outcome.  
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Another surprise to the claim reviewers was the large number of injured workers who had 
less than a high school education. This seemed to be a growing problem over the time between 
the 1997 and 2002 claims. Those with a high school or college education are much more likely to 
be found able to work. Self-insured injured workers were also more likely to have a high school 
or college education, and thus more likely to be able to return to work after injury. 
While archived self-insured claim information is limited, the differences between state 
fund and self-insured claims were notable in vocational services. Self-insured claim managers 
are much less likely to use outside vocational rehabilitation specialists to achieve outcomes on 
the claim. On the other hand, self-insured companies are much larger and located in more urban 
areas and perhaps better able to provide return-to-work opportunities themselves than are 
smaller, state fund insured employers. It was also difficult to draw conclusions between state 
fund and self-insured use of independent medical examinations due to limitations in file 
information. However, self-insured claims managers appeared to use multiple independent 
examinations in order to obtain a preponderance of medical opinions more often than did state 
fund claim managers.  
Time-loss claims in 2002 seemed to have fewer surgeries and this was also verified by 
the data analysis. It was the claim reviewers’ opinion that attitudes about abilities may have 
changed. In some cases claim reviewers expressed surprise that later claims did not have 
surgeries, while in 1997 providers seemed to “jump at surgery.” Surgery claims were also more 
likely to prescribe addictive opioid drugs. In some cases it was felt opioids were provided to 
individuals who appeared to have a history of narcotic drug abuse or alcohol abuse  
Claims pensioned in 2002 seemed to have more “out of state, out of mind” problems, 
with large voids in time between different claim adjudicators managing the claim and different 
standards for out-of-state medical providers. The total percentage of pension claims with out-of-
state residences is unknown, due to the practice of paying pensions to legal representatives, who 
forward payments to pension recipients.  
Observations Regarding Information Available to Conduct Claim Reviews 
Of particular interest to researchers and policymakers is the quality and availability of 
data. The Department of Labor & Industries data systems provide a wealth of information often 
not available from other state workers’ compensation agencies. In general, the Department 
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probably has too much information on somewhat less important fields and not enough on other 
very important fields.   
First, gaining timely information on each claim is challenging in itself. Our experienced 
claim reviewers were fairly insistent about having access to microfiche for each claim. Without 
it, there was no way to efficiently gain a comprehensive view of the claim. Imaged data was also 
useful, but the system’s operation is slow in the latter half of the day, such that it is very difficult 
to get a clear and complete view of what is going on with the claim in a timely fashion. Use of 
the imaged documents also involves a time-consuming process of scrolling through electronic 
documents.  
The imaging system for self-insurance does not provide an ability to index or separate 
types of documents received. Self-insurers submit copies of up-to-date claim information to the 
department in bulk. If the department claim reviewer is specifically looking for an independent 
medical examination report or vocational report, all images must be scanned to find the needed 
documents. This imaging issue in itself is worth noting because we often asked ourselves “If we 
as researchers could not get a complete electronic view of the claim, how could claim 
adjudicators expect to make well-informed and timely decisions on a claim?” It should not take 
more than a day for a claim adjudicator to receive a complete file and more than three to four 
hours for an experienced claim adjudicator to gain knowledge of the case. The lack of 
consistency in reporting and retrieiving good quality information on key variables was very 
frustrating.  
Second, while the data contains a wealth of information necessary for managing claims, 
there are some extremely important fields that are lacking and would not be hard to capture. For 
example, education of the worker is an extraordinarily important field for predicting labor market 
outcomes (and by extension time loss and pension outcomes) but it is not captured by the 
Department of Labor & Industries in any systematic way. Similarly, county of residence may 
carry more weight on labor market outcomes than county of injury.  
Third, data—especially on older claims—is clearly lacking about self-insured claims. 
Information on vocational rehabilitation services or retraining information is usually not 
available. Information on time loss paid to date is often inaccurate or incomplete. These 
problems stem from inconsistent or unclear enforcement or communication with self-insured 
carriers as to what should be required, and poor attention to loading self-insured data in the 
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department’s data systems. More recent claims seem to be improving in data quality, but are still 
lacking in reliability.  
We are aware that self-insured employers or their TPAs have their own data systems, but 
we did not attempt to obtain information on those systems due to concerns about 
representativeness and about the time it would take to achieve approval from institutional review 
boards to gather such data. We are also aware of a request by the Washington State Legislature 
for the Department to review self-insurance issues, and so will leave this comment as a 
reinforcement of any request for data that would support that effort. 
Conclusion 
Claim reviewers noted that there was either inexperience or inability of claim 
adjudicators to see a pension coming and get action on the claim. We recognize that this is much 
easier in retrospect and without the confusing volume of diverse claims that must be handled 
every day. Reviewer observations suggest many factors potentially involved in any changes in 
system performance:  changing medical management; inappropriate use of vocational 
rehabilitation and independent medical examinations; changing educational levels, possibly 
related to immigrants’ education; passivity toward previously contestable issues; and general 
attitudes toward disability. The combination of factors affecting pension decisions and inability 
to obtain data in a fast and reliable way on complex claims may explain some of the difficulty of 
claim adjudicators to anticipate pension outcomes. In the opinion of our claim reviewers, claim 
adjudicators frequently missed the early signs of an eventual TPD: an injured worker’s outlook 
that he or she cannot return to any work, as well as lawyers or providers who encourage this 
view; no specific expectation for return to work; inconsistent work patterns in the past; 
conflicting medical evidence and opinions; unsuccessful vocational outcomes early in the claim; 
and poor labor market conditions to name a few.  
MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS OF CLAIM REVIEW DATA 
 Now we want to look at all these variables (or as many as practical) simultaneously. The 
value of this multivariate approach is that it allows for interactions and intercorrelations among 
the variables. For example, older workers would be expected to have more preexisting conditions 
than younger workers when they file a workers’ compensation claim. So it is important to try and 
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separate the effects of age and preexisting conditions on the likelihood of pension. Within some 
statistical limits, that is possible with multivariate analysis.  
For the sake of easy interpretation, we will present these multivariate results in two linear 
probability models, where the dependent or outcome variable is the probability of receiving a 
total and permanent disability pension award from L&I. This will be estimated similarly for both 
sampled years (1997 and 2002) as a function of various claim, treatment, and injured worker 
characteristics. The estimates that we report measure the difference between our samples of 
pension claims and the comparison time-loss claims that did not receive a pension award; so they 
really represent the differential between injuries and illnesses that obtained pensions versus those 
that did not. It is also important to understand that this is not the same as comparing pension 
claims to all time-loss claims, as we did earlier in the propensity score exercise). The degree of 
variation among these claims has been artificially restricted by the process of matching pension 
claims to similar time-loss claims.  
We present the analysis of the 1997 and 2002 pension cohorts separately to highlight the 
differences between them and to establish what has changed in the interim. These models relate 
primarily to characteristics of the injured worker or his/her claim. Thus the variance that is 
explained by these models does not represent changes in the workers’ compensation system per 
se, but their manifestation through the outcomes for individual workers.   
In addition to the coefficients of the regression equations, which measure the contribution 
of the particular variable to the probability of a pension award, we also test the statistical 
significance of each coefficient. In each case the test of statistical significance is a test of the null 
hypothesis that the particular coefficient is actually zero; that is, there is no association between 
that characteristic and the likelihood of pension. While we will report the statistical significance 
of each coefficient, we will discuss some notable point estimates even where they are not 
significant. Because of the relatively small samples (particularly after cases with missing data are 
excluded) we will be generous in utilizing these unique multivariate results.  
Thus, we will describe the impact of a preexisting condition as an increase in the 
probability of pension award, given that there is a subsequent injury and workers’ compensation 
claim. But this increase in probability of pension will be estimated holding other factors included 
in the model constant. So there will be a separate estimates for each year of the rise in pension 
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probability with increasing age, holding constant other factors, including the possibility of a 
preexisting condition.  
Analysis of 1997 Claim Review Sample 
Tables 4.53 (for 1997) and 4.54 (for 2002) report the variables used in the linear 
probability regression model, their estimated linear regression coefficients, uncorrected t 
statistics, and the probability of that t statistic if the null hypothesis of no effect is correct. It is 
worth noting that these t statistics may cause us to overstate the significance of our findings 
slightly because of heteroskedasticity (correlation of predicted values and error terms), but this is 
only a problem where statistical significance is dubious. Where the t statistic is large, a small 
bias is not a problem, particularly for descriptive regressions like ours. (See Wooldridge, 2006, 
Chapter 8.) We will employ a theoretically more correct model when predicting pension 
probabilities in chapter 5.  
 4-47 
Table 4.53  Linear Probability Estimate of the Probability of Pension Award, 1997 
Independent Variable Pension Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| 
Accommodation              .06025 .0677771   0.89 0.375 
Est mo wage -.0000797 .0000316 -2.52 0.012 
Age at inj  .0068526 .0026951   2.54 0.012 
Male  .1341468 .0665075  2.02 0.045 
Contested -.0053731 .0822396 -0.07 0.948 
Legal rep .2220763 .0579602 3.83 0.000 
Number proc .0176003 .0135281  1.30 0.194 
Number voc -.0647672 .0142497 -4.55 0.000 
Opioid invol -.0500005              .0652769  -0.77 0.444 
Pain clinic .1162993 .0740168   1.57 0.117 
ppd payments            -.34124 .0577429 -5.91 0.000 
Preexisting             .119488 .0598357  2.00 0.047 
Prior claims  .0059639 .0068936  0.87 0.388 
Reopened -.0575322 .0693516 -0.83 0.408 
Psych invol .0070401 .0565335  0.12 0.901 
Married .1344316 .0549005  2.45 0.015 
Number IMES            -.012429 .0124248 -1.00 0.318 
Less than high school .1299457 .0553741   2.35 0.020 
Construction .0003757 .0743074   0.01 0.996 
Agriculture -.0749571 .0899662 -0.83 0.406 
Econ distress            -.0367112 .0593755 -0.62 0.537 
Self-insured            -.1891048 .0741716       -2.55 0.011 
       constant .4295314 .1835038 2.34 0.020 
Summary Statistics 
      Source SS df              MS 
Model           25.6228703          22         1.16467592     
Residual           42.3126135        256           .165283647   
Total           67.9354839      278           .244372244   
Number of obs =     279 
F( 22,   256) =   7.05 
Prob > F      =  0.0000 
R-squared     =  0.3772 
Adj R-squared =  0.3236 
Root MSE      =  .40655 
* Pension claims measured against comparison time-loss claims that were selected to match the characteristics of the 
pension claims using a propensity scoring model.  
The advantage of estimating this model on the claim review sample is that we are able to 
incorporate some summary judgments made by our claim reviewers that pertain to the claim, the 
claim processing, or the worker’s behavior. Rather than being limited to “official” variables that 
are available from the L&I data warehouse, we were able to go further and form judgments about 
the particular situation faced by the injured worker. This can be illustrated in the accommodation 
variable that we included in our linear probability estimates.  
The first variable in our model is “accommodation,” or the determination by our claim 
reviewers that there was some type of job accommodation provided to assist the injured worker 
in a return to work. The dependent variable for the linear probability regression presented in 
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Table 4.53 is the dichotomous variable “pension granted” yes or no. So the interpretation of the 
regression coefficient where the independent variable is a dichotomous (yes or no) variable as in 
the case of accommodation is very simple. The coefficient is an estimate of the average impact 
of an accommodation offer by the employer on the probability of pension award. In this case, the 
estimated coefficient of 0.06 indicates that a worker is six percent more likely to receive a 
pension if his/her employer showed some effort at accommodating the disability. However, this 
coefficient is not statistically different from zero, as shown in the P>t column, so we conclude 
that employer accommodation as evaluated by our reviewers, does not have a material effect on 
pension probability in Washington, holding other factors constant.  
It is important to state that this finding does not mean that accommodation is 
unimportant, or that it creates more pensions. It may be that we measured accommodation 
poorly; it may be that there were too few claims that got accommodation to estimate the effect 
successfully; or it may be that the effect of accommodation was similar for pension and 
comparison claims; or it may be that some other independent variable (or variables) is closely 
correlated with accommodation, rendering it more difficult to identify the independent effect of 
either variable or its statistical significance. All the finding tells us is that there was not a 
statistically significant difference between pension claims and comparison time-loss claims in 
the impact of accommodation as perceived by our claim reviewers. 
The next variable (“est mo wage”) is the actuarial estimate of the monthly wage of the 
injured worker before injury. This is a continuous variable, which means that it has a different 
impact depending upon the level. The regression coefficient represents the average effect of 
wage at the mean value for the population. This variable is not a direct measure of monthly 
earnings, but an imputation of the monthly wage based upon time-loss payments and the 
apparent duration of time-loss disability. Since these injuries occurred several years earlier, they 
may not represent contemporary wage levels. The mean for this variable is $2,422 per month. 
The regression coefficient indicates that for every $100 gain in estimated monthly earnings, the 
probability of pension declines by about 0.8 percent. Further, this coefficient is highly significant 
so we can be quite confident that the relationship is negative. However, it is obviously not a large 
effect as even a difference of $1,000 in estimated monthly earnings would mean only an 8 
percent difference in probability of pension. So this finding means that lower wage workers are 
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more likely to receive a pension, holding other factors constant, but that the effect was fairly 
small.  
“Age at injury” is another interesting variable. It is well established in the literature that 
older workers are less likely to be injured, but that they have longer periods of recovery and 
disability when they are injured. Our estimate is that for each additional year of age, the 
probability of pension rises by 0.7 percent. This is also a small increase, but it isappears to be 
statistically significant at the 5-percent level. Thus a worker who was 60 years old at injury is 7 
percent more likely (10 times 0.7 percent) to receive a pension than one who was 50 years of age 
at injury. Being “male” rather than female increases the probability of pension by 13.4 percent, 
which is another highly significant result. Presumably this reflects the occupational distribution 
by gender, and the resultant exposure to serious injury, rather than some specific behavioral or 
claim processing difference among genders.  
The fact that the claim was “contested” by the employer does not appear to significantly 
affect the likelihood of pension. The presence of “early voc” (VR services, Early Intervention or 
Ability to Work Assessment) is also not statistically significant in our regression estimate. We 
suspect that this may be due to the sorting of claims to find those where an early intervention 
may be useful. 
“Language difficulty” represents the situation where the worker requested an interpreter 
at some point, or where the claim reviewer finds other evidence of language difficulty in the 
claim file. A little more than seven percent of the sample was judged to have language difficulty 
by our claim reviewers. Language difficulty showed a positive impact on pension probability of 
about 10 percent, but due to the small number of such workers and a high standard error, it was 
not statistically significant.  
A variable with very high statistical significance is “legal representation.” If a worker had 
legal representation, she or he was 22.2 percent more likely to secure a pension in 1997; and over 
70 percent of our seriously injured worker sample had legal representation. This is one of the 
largest impacts of any variable in our multivariate model for 1997 claims.  
The “number of medical procedures” is another variable that we were able to gather 
because of our direct review of claim files, but it was not statistically significant. We took this 
variable to represent the degree of medical complication and nearly 45 percent of the sample had 
 4-50 
more than one medical procedure performed, but the number of procedures did not distinguish 
pension claims from the rest.  
The number of vocational rehabilitation actions (“number voc”) was highly negatively 
related to the probability of pension. Our coefficient indicates that each VR action reduced the 
probability of pension by 6.5 percent. This may not be surprising since the purpose of VR is to 
return injured workers to work, thereby forestalling a TPD pension. However, the coefficient 
indicates that VR is having a significant impact in reducing the number of TPD pensions in 
Washington. The mean number of VR actions in the sample was 3.4 with a range of from 1 to 
15. Fully 40 percent of the sample had more than three VR actions. Presumably this matches our 
earlier finding that VR referrals were frequently used as a way to “park” a claim to see what 
developed. It is also true that these multiple referrals may have reflected the CM’s aim to be 
certain that VR would not benefit the worker before he/she recommended going to a permanent 
pension solution.  
At least 38 percent of our sample of serious injuries showed two or more prescriptions of 
opioids for more than seven days each. It has been shown that opioid use is associated with a 
longer duration of disability (see chapter 2), but opioid use (“opioid invol”) was not significantly 
related to the probability of pension in our 1997 sample. Neither was receiving the services of a 
“pain clinic.” although the estimated effect was larger. For those injured workers showing use of 
a pain clinic, there was an 11 percent higher likelihood of pension. Again it is necessary to 
reiterate that this does not mean that these are not important factors in determining the outcome 
of individual claims; but simply that the difference between claims that receive pensions and 
those that do not is not statistically different from zero based upon our sample evidence. Opioid 
use may well be correlated both with pension award and with extended time-loss claims as 
shown earlier. 
Almost half (49.5 percent) of the workers in our samples had received a PPD award 
somewhere in the life of their claim. The variable “ppd payments” which indicates a payment for 
PPD was associated with a 34.1 percent reduction in the probability of receiving a pension in the 
1997 sample. This was one of the most significant variables in our linear probability estimate and 
it is also very large in magnitude. We showed earlier in the chapter that there had been a 
significant increase in the number of prior PPD awards among both pension claims and 
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comparison time-loss claims between 1997 and 2002. But we find here that receipt of PPD 
payments is also important in predicting there will not be a subsequent pension award.  
Another highly significant result is for “preexisting” condition, which was determined to 
be the case for over 80 percent of the injured workers in our sample. A preexisting condition 
raised the likelihood of a pension outcome by 114.9 percent on the average among 1997 
recipients. This is also a very large effect, which was found earlier to have increased among 
pension claims, but decreased among comparison time-loss claims between 1997 and 2002.  
There was a large majority (84 percent) of claims where there was a “prior claim” but this 
variable was not associated with a pension outcomes. This variable may have been dominated by 
the “ppd payments” variable reporting actual payments for permanent partial disability. In a 
linear regression analysis, the variable with the “better fit” will be identified as the significant 
one. Among these seriously injured workers, it appears that a previous PPD serves as a better 
(negative) predictor of future pension than any prior workers’ compensation claim.  
The same is true with the “reopened” claim variable. We thought this variable would 
represent the drawn out and difficult type of claim that frequently results in a total permanent or 
permanent partial award. However, only about 11 percent of the claims in our sample had closed 
and then reopened before receiving a pension, and this was not correlated with final pension 
outcome.  
Our claim reviewers also were able to make an overall judgment as to whether there was 
any evidence of psychological issues in a claim (“psych invol”). In almost 35 percent of these 
serious injury claims, they did find evidence of some psychological or psychiatric issues. 
However, Table 4.53 does not indicate strong association between psychological issues and a 
pension outcome. The coefficient indicates that “psychological invol” produced a negligible (0.7 
percent) impact on the chance of pension, and this was not significantly different from zero. The 
results for psychological variables earlier in the chapter were also equivocal, with no significant 
difference between 1997 and 2002 in pension claims, but there was a significant decline in psych 
treatment for comparison claims.  
The relationship of marital status to pension is much clearer, however. The coefficient for 
“married” shows that married individuals were 13.4 percent more likely to receive a pension 
award, and this is highly significant. It is conventional to assume this effect has to do with 
greater family responsibilities and therefore more pressure on receiving continuous wage and 
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salary earnings, or the workers’ compensation replacement for such earnings, when one is 
injured.  
The number of Independent Medical Examinations (“Number IMEs”) was not 
significantly related to pension probability. Only 30 percent of our samples did not have at least 
one IME, and the average was 2.0 per claim. So we believe that this variable may be more 
difficult to assess in terms of impact on pension outcomes. If nearly everyone has an IME, it is 
not likely that it will prove to be a discriminating characteristic. A more detailed and careful 
analysis is needed to determine the impact of multiple IMEs on the likelihood of pension. 
We saw earlier that lack of education is very detrimental to labor market success and 
hence leads to an increased likelihood of pension. Those injured workers with less than a high 
school education were 13.0 percent more likely to receive a pension than others in 1997. We 
presume that this is a measure of labor market disadvantage which represents the inability to 
secure a job.  
Table 4.53 reports that employment in the construction industry is apparently not 
associated with pension probability in 1997, holding all other factors constant. Workers in 
agriculture were less likely than others to receive pensions (by 7.5 percent) in 1997, but this was 
not a statistically significant finding. Other industry variables also did not perform well in earlier 
test regressions, so they were dropped from the final specification.  
Location in an economically distressed area (“econ distress”) also did not pass our test of 
statistical significance in the probability of pension regression for 1997. This variable performed 
well in distinguishing between 1997 and 2002 pensions earlier, so we believe it likely is a 
causative factor despite the finding here. It was associated on average with a 3.7 percent lower 
probability of pension in 1997, which will contrast with our findings for 2002.  
Our samples, with about 26 percent self-insured claims, demonstrated a large negative 
effect of self-insurance on the probability of pension. On the average, workers from self-insured 
employers were 18.9 percent less likely to receive a pension in 1997 than workers with state fund 
insured employers controlling for all other variables in the regression. This difference is highly 
statistically significant. The interesting question is what causes this difference. Is there a 
systematic difference in the way claims are managed before they reach the pension referral stage, 
or perhaps differences in the labor force employed by the self-insured? Or is it due to better 
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performance of disability management tasks to prevent injuries from turning into permanent 
disabilities? Unfortunately, our data cannot answer these questions.   
This exercise is revealing for several reasons. First, it has sorted the variables that were 
examined earlier in the chapter in a new and more revealing way. We were able to test variables 
in a multivariate model that removes incidental correlation between causative variables and 
assigns the causation to the variable that fits best. This estimate explains approximately 33 
percent of the variation in the probability of pension among 544 of the 1997 claims in our 
sample. This is about average for a cross-sectional sample, particularly of workers’ 
compensation claims. But we must remember that comparison time-loss claims were selected on 
the basis of the closeness of their match to pension claims; so we had an artificially reduced 
amount of variance in our sample to begin with. As mentioned earlier, a significant number of 
1997 comparison time-loss claims had, in fact, gone on to receive pensions between 2002 and 
2007. So these pension claims and comparison claims were very similar indeed. 
Analysis of 2002 Claim Review Sample 
We will analyze the 2002 claim review sample separately in order to focus on the 
differences between our two observations and to maximize the comparability with the earlier 
bivariate results. We will present the linear probability estimates of the characteristics associated 
with receipt of pension for the 2002 cohort, and we will discuss differences between 1997 and 
2002 as we proceed. Table 4.54 reports the linear probability regression coefficients, standard 
errors, and t-statistics for the 2002 sample.  
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Table 4.54  Linear Probability Estimate of the Probability of Pension Award, 2002 
Independent Variable Pension Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| 
Accommodation  .065792 .0553335   1.19 0.236 
Est mo wage -.0000257 .0000158 -1.62 0.106 
Age at inj -.0002595 .0021829 - 0.12 0.905 
Male  .0903474 .0467964  1.93 0.055 
Contested -.0353535 .0537424 -0.66 0.511 
Legal rep .1491798 .0451162 3.31 0.001 
Number proc .0063927 .0125648 -0.51 0.611 
Number voc -.0333775 .0139669 -2.39 0.018 
Opioid invol .0254983              .0470174   0.54 0.588 
Pain clinic .0015747 .0550173   0.03 0.977 
ppd payments -.2221868 .043753 -5.08 0.000 
Preexisting .4140948 .0491911  8.42 0.000 
Prior claims -.0077937 .0041586 -0.187 0.062 
Reopened .1192789 .0747088 1.60 0.112 
Psych invol .0974608 .0452916  2.15 0.032 
Married .0660302 .0409349  1.61 0.108 
Number IMES -.0074927 .0120391 -0.62 0.534 
Less than high school .0380145 .0411828 0.92 0.357 
Construction .0669434 .0548192 1.22 0.223 
Agriculture .1641622 .072567 2.26 0.025 
Econ distress .0628234 .0427625 1.47 0.143 
Self-insured -.1824614 .0617725      -2.95 0.003 
       constant .4787156 .1463294 3.27 0.001 
Summary Statistics 
      Source SS df              MS 
Model           24.235958            22         1.10163445     
Residual           22.8797137        245           .093386586   
Total         47.1156716         267           .17646319     
Number of obs =     268 
F( 22,   245) =   11.80 
Prob > F      =  0.0000 
R-squared     =  0.5144 
Adj R-squared =  0.4708 
Root MSE      =  .30559 
* Pension claims measured against comparison time-loss claims that were selected to match the characteristics of the 
pension claims using a propensity scoring model.  
 
The accommodation variable indicates that employer accommodation is associated with 
about 6.6 percent greater chance of pension, but this estimated coefficient is not statistically 
different from zero due to elevated variance. This is essentially the same result as was found for 
1997. As before, we do not interpret this coefficient as indicating that accommodation is counter-
productive, but rather that accommodation may be associated with other characteristics of the 
worker or the employer that make a pension more likely.  
The estimated monthly wage is also not significant by conventional statistical standards 
(5 percent chance of error) for 2002, but is indicated as slightly negative. This is a change from 
the 1997 results as the coefficient is only about one-third the size that was reported earlier. This 
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seems to indicate that higher wage earners are slightly less likely to qualify for pensions, given 
other characteristics, but that this effect may be less important in 2002 than it was in 1997.  
Age of the worker at injury is not related to the probability of pension in our 2002 
sample. This is also different from the 1997 findings and presumably represents a real change in 
the Washington system. Whereas each additional year of age in 1997 increased the probability of 
pension by 0.7 percent, this relationship is not demonstrated in 2002.  
Injured workers who are male were 9.0 percent more likely to receive a pension in our 
2002 sample, a result which just missed statistical significance at the 5 percent level. This is a 
decline from 13.4 percent in 1997. Again, we believe this reflects the nature of the injury or labor 
market prospects rather than a specific gender impact.  
Claims contested by the employer were slightly (3.5 percent) less likely to wind up 
receiving a TPD pension, but this is a change from 1997 when the estimated effect was less than 
0.5 percent. Those workers with legal representation were 14.9 percent more likely (and 
statistically significant) to receive a pension award in 2002. This is one of the larger effects 
found in this analysis but represents a reduction from 22.2 percent in 1997.  
The number of medical procedures (“number proc”) was not related to the likelihood of 
pension in 2002 or in 1997, but the number of VR activities was. Each instance of VR treatment 
activity in 2002 reduced the probability of pension by 3.3 percent, which was statistically 
significant, and indicates a meaningful impact of VR in reducing pension incidence.  
Opioid use is not significantly related to pension probability, with the estimated 
coefficient indicating that such use was associated with a 2.5 percent increase in likelihood. This 
is a reduction from the 1997 estimated level of 5.0 percent, but neither result was statistically 
significant.  
Use of pain clinics did not show any effect in 2002, which is a big change from 1997 
when the utilization of a pain clinic was associated with an increase of 11.6 percent in the 
probability of pension. We presume that this represents a change in practice, perhaps reflecting 
experience with pain clinics as a treatment in the earlier period.  
Prior receipt of payment for PPD had a powerful impact on the probability of pension in 
2002. On average PPD receipt was associated with a lower likelihood of pension by 22.2 percent, 
a result which was highly statistically significant. However, this was a reduction from the even 
stronger impact of 34.1 percent in 1997.  
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On the other side, the presence of a preexisting condition increased the probability of 
pension by 41.4 percent in 2002, the largest estimated effect in this analysis. This is also a major 
change from 1997, when a preexisting condition only increased the probability of pension by 
11.9 percent. We do not know what kind of behavioral change or system change may have led to 
this major shift in the impact of preexisting conditions.  
Prior claims had a small, non-significant effect of 0.7 percent on pension probability in 
2002. This result was not significant in either year. Reopened claims were 11.9 percent more 
likely to receive a pension in 2002, which is about double the estimate for 1997, but of the 
opposite sign. However, this result was not significant in either year due to high variance of the 
measure. 
Confirming what many observers told us, the contribution of psychological disorders to 
pension award was significant. On average, the psychological component added a significant 9.7 
percent to the probability of pension in 2002. No such effect was found in 1997, which likely 
indicates a change in the system.  
Injured workers who were married were not significantly more likely to receive pensions 
in 2002, as they had been in 1997. The estimated coefficient for “married” showed a decline 
from 13.4 percent in 1997 to 6.6 percent in 2002. We do not have an explanation for why this 
should be so. The number of independent medical evaluations (“number IMES”) did not show a 
significant impact on pension probability in either 1997 or 2002.  
In 2002, the impact of educational disadvantage (“less than high school”) was 
substantially smaller than in 1997. Having less than a high school education was associated with 
an increase of 3.8 percent in the likelihood of pension in 2002 (not significant) in contrast with 
13.0 percent in 1997. This result seems counter-intuitive, but perhaps may be connected with the 
very substantial change in the impact of agriculture on pension probability between 1997 and 
2002.  
While construction was not significantly associated with pension probability in either 
year, the estimated effect was substantially higher at 6.7 percent in 2002. However, agriculture 
showed a big change. In 1997 employment in the agricultural sector was (not significantly) 
associated with a reduction of 7.5 percent in the probability of pension. But in 2002, agriculture 
showed a positive impact of 16.4 percent, and was statistically significant. This is one of the 
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largest swings between 1997 and 2002 and presumably represents a major change in 
Washington’s workers’ compensation population.  
Counties that were in economic distress also increased in importance and changed signs. 
In 2002 residence in one of these counties had a positive point estimate of 6.3 percent impact on 
the probability of pension, compared to a negative impact of 3.6 percent in 1997. But neither 
coefficient was statistically significant. 
The final variable in our analysis is self insurance (“self-insured”). In 2002, the fact that 
the employer was self-insured reduced the likelihood of pension by 18.3 percent. This is 
essentially no change from 1997, when the effect was 18.9 percent. Both results are highly 
significant.  
Comparisons between 1997 and 2002 
 There are major differences between the two linear probability equations presented here 
that presumably indicate changes in Washington’s workers’ compensation system between 1997 
and 2002. The largest changes in estimated coefficients were found in psychological conditions, 
agricultural employment, and preexisting conditions. We heard that the incidence of serious 
disability claims from the agricultural sector has escalated with the changes in labor supply in 
that sector. The contribution of these factors cannot be estimated directly from our results, but it 
could be sizable.  
 Other variables that showed rising influence on the likelihood of pensions in 2002 
include opioid drug use, reopened claims, claims from economically distressed areas, and claims 
from the construction industry. These all seem to be consistent with what we heard from 
knowledgeable observers in Washington. In addition, the effect of the number of VR activities 
and prior PPD award both became less negative from 1997 to 2002.  
 Among those variables that declined in influence between 1997 and 2002 were gender, 
marital status, age at injury, and less than high school education. Thus the demographic 
characteristics of the injured worker seemed to be less important in 2002. In addition, the 
influence of pre-injury earnings, use of pain clinics, and legal representation were all less 
positive than they had been in 1997. Small declines were recorded for employer contested 
claims, prior claims, and the number of medical procedures. No change was seen in the effect of 
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employer accommodation, the number of independent medical examinations, or self-insured 
status of the employer.  
 Overall, our estimated equations explained 32 percent of the variance in 1997 and 47 
percent in 2002. Furthermore, the Chow statistic indicates that the two equations are 
fundamentally different in structure. This has been demonstrated in our discussion of the 
independent variable coefficients in these two linear probability equations. It seems that both the 
characteristics of injured workers who claim pensions and the characteristics of the workers’ 
compensation system within which they claim them changed between 1997 and 2002. We have 
sketched out some of the dimensions of those changes in this chapter with statistical analyses of 
matched samples of claims from 1997 and 2002.  
 We believe these analyses supplement the presentation and interpretation of 
administrative data in chapter 2, and improve our understanding of the increase in pension 
frequency that occurred in Washington over this time period. However, this claim review 
exercise has been disappointing overall. We have not generated the new insights that we 
expected, and the results are more equivocal than we anticipated. In the final analysis, changes in 
the functioning of a workers’ compensation system may be too subtle to detect with the simple 
statistical measures available here. 
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Appendix Table 4.1  Data Elements from the Pension System Claim Review 
Variable name Description 
reviewer The reviewer of the claim  
reviewdate Date reviewed 
claimid Claim ID (Removed from de-identified file) 
lastname Last name of worker (Removed from de-identified file) 
birthdate Birth date of worker  
otherimpinfo Other comments to assist with review 
injdate Date of injury 
date_rec Date claim was received (was not filled out and removed) 
injcause Brief description of cause of injury from accident report 
dep_inj Number of dependents at the time of injury 
dep_pens Number of dependents at the time of pension 
marital_pens Marital status at the time of pension (at time of injury available through data warehouse) 
county_res County field number from L&I 
interpret If interpreter was used or language barrier noted, “Y” else “N” 
contested If employer contested the claim, “Y” else “N” 
contest_reason Text of why the employer contested the claim 
diag Text of Diagnoses (A=accepted D=denied T=temporary) 
numproc Total number of procedures 
procdesc Description of procedures performed 
opioids If opioids were prescribed for a chronic condition, then “Y” else “N” (discussion of chronic included definition of more than 2 prescriptions of more than 7 days each) 
psych If psych evaluation/ conditions were indicated, then “Y” else “N” 
psychdate Date psych was first noted 
preexisting If preexisting conditions were indicated, then “Y” else “N” 
psychremarks Text of psych remarks 
peremarks Text of preexisting condition remarks 
priorclaims If there were prior claims, then “Y” else “N” 
priorsame If there were prior claims in the same area, “Y” else “N”  
postinj If there were other medical/psych conditions that developed after the accepted conditions for the injury, then “Y” else “N” 
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Variable name Description 
prior_ppd If prior claims had a PPD, then “Y” else “N” 
evals Text of IME evaluations  
forensiccase If the assessment was forensic, “Y” else “N” 
forensicdate Date of forensic evaluation 
rtw If there was any return to work, then “Y” else “N” 
rtweoi If there was any return to work, was it with the employer of inj then “Y” else “N” 
monthsrtweoi If any return to work, total months in return to work status 
lightduty If any light duty was provided, then “Y” else “N” 
accom If any job accommodation was provided, then “Y” else “N” 
workhistory Text of injured workers’ work history 
education Highest educational level obtained:   
vocdates Text of vocational rehabilitation actions 
vocrtw If voc was completed, did the injured worker return to work?  
vocatw Was there an able to work determination? 
vocdispute Was there a dispute over vocational rehabilitation? 
vocdisputedate Date of dispute over vocational rehabilitation 
vocdisputeoutcome Text outcome of dispute 
legal Did the injured worker have a legal representative? 
appeals Number of appeals 
biiadate1 First appeal 
whofiled1 Who filed first appeal (IW, ATTY, Employer, etc.)? 
issue1 What was the issue (Med, PPD, TL, TPD)? 
decision1 Decision reasoning 
decdate1 Date of decision 
outcome1 Outcome of decision 
biiadate2 Second appeal 
whofiled2 Who filed second appeal (IW, ATTY, Employer, etc.)? 
issue2 What was the issue (Med, PPD, TL, TPD)? 
decision2 Decision reasoning 
decdate2 Date of decision 
outcome2 Outcome of decision 
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Variable name Description 
biiadate3 Third appeal 
whofiled3 Who filed third appeal (IW, ATTY, Employer, etc.)? 
issue3 What was the issue (Med, PPD, TL, TPD)? 
decision3 Decision reasoning 
decdate3 Date of decision 
outcome3 Outcome of decision 
biiadate4 Fourth appeal 
whofiled4 Who filed fourth appeal (IW, ATTY, Employer, etc.)? 
issue4 What was the issue (Med, PPD, TL, TPD)? 
decision4 Decision reasoning 
decdate4 Date of decision 
outcome4 Outcome of decision 
biiadate5 Fifth appeal 
whofiled5 Who filed fifth appeal (IW, ATTY, Employer, etc.)? 
issue5 What was the issue (Med, PPD, TL, TPD)? 
decision5 Decision reasoning 
decdate5 Date of decision 
outcome5 Outcome of decision 
biiadate6   (*** Note: or 
could be last appeal) Sixth (or last appeal) 
whofiled6 Who filed sixth/last appeal (IW, ATTY, Employer, etc.)? 
issue6 What was the issue (Med, PPD, TL, TPD)? 
decision6 Decision reasoning 
decdate6 Date of decision 
outcome6 Outcome of decision 
biianum1 Higher court case number 
hcdecdate1 Higher court decision date 
hcoutcome1 Higher court outcome 
biianum2 Second case at higher court case number 
hcdecdate2 Second case at higher court date 
hcoutcome2 Second case at higher court outcome (e.g. remand) 
adjudicativedelays Did the reviewers feel there were adjudicative delays? 
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Variable name Description 
noncoop Did the reviewers find there was noncooperation on the claim from the injured worker?
suspension Did the reviewers note suspension on the claim? 
labormarket Did the reviewers feel there were significant labor market barriers? 
spousedis Did the reviewers find indication that a spouse or significant other was disabled also? 
relief Was there second injury fund relief on the claim? 
reliefamount What was the amount of the second injury fund relief? 
otherimpinfo Other misc entries 
otherobs Other misc entries 
ssdi From the misc entries, SSDI? 
disability_conviction From the misc entries, strong disability conviction? 
drugalchuse From the misc entries, drug and alcohol abuse? 
obesity From the misc entries, obesity a factor? 
grade_school From the misc entries, did IW have only grade school education? 
iw_died Did the injured worker die (could be unrelated cause)? 
lengthdays If a self-insured claim, what was the length of days on time loss? 
timelossamount If a self-insured claim, what was the time loss amount? 
datelastpaid If a self-insured claim, what was the last date time loss was paid? 
cleaned Data management field (ignore) 
firstvoc Date of first vocational rehabilitation 
numvoc Number of vocational rehabilitation actions (EI,AWA,PD,PI) 
earlyvoc Number of early voc actions (EI,AWA) 
earlynlb Number of early voc actions (EI,AWA) with not likely to benefit outcome 
plandev Did the injured worker reach the plan development stage?  Y.N 
dateplan When was the date of the plan? 
plancomp Did the injured worker ever complete a plan? 
lastvoc What was the last date of voc activity? 
outcome Highest outcome achieved from voc:  1=further services not approp: medically 
unstable, 2= further services not approp: not likely to benefit, 3= eligible, 4= able to 
work, 5= plan development, 6= plan developed or approved, 7= plan completed, 
8=return to work 
firstimedate Date of first independent medical evaluation 
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Variable name Description 
numberimes Total number of IMEs 
lastimedate Last date of IME 
psycheval Did IME include psych evaluation 
ime_outcome1 Outcome of IME (in terms of PPD rating) 
ime_outcome2 Second PPD rating 
ime_outcome3 Third PPD rating 
mmi Maximum medical improvement noted from IME 
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Appendix Table 4.2  Data Elements from the L&I Data Warehouse 
Variable Name Description 
unique unique identifier corresponding to claim ID 
sample_year whether year was 1997 or 2002 
group group A=1997 pension, B= 2002 pension, C= 1997 time loss, D= 2002 time loss 
claim_id Claim ID (Removed from de-identified file) 
clmt_last_name Worker’s last name (Removed from de-identified file) 
clmt_1st_name Worker’s first name (Removed from de-identified file) 
clmt_birth_date Worker’s date of birth (Removed from de-identified file) 
clmt_ssn Social security number (Removed from de-identified file) 
injry_date Date of injury 
injry_oiics_accdt_type_code OIICS accident type code 
oiics_accdt_type_code_desc OIICS accident type description 
injry_oiics_body_part_code OIICS body part code 
oiics_body_part_code_desc OIICS body part description 
injry_oiics_nat_code OIICS nature code 
oiics_nat_code_desc OIICS nature description 
injry_oiics_srce_code OIICS source code 
oiics_srce_code_desc OIICS source description 
clmt_hgt_qty Height of worker in inches as self-reported by worker on most recent Report of 
Accident filed with L&I. 
clmt_wgt_qty Workers weight in pounds as self-reported by worker on most recent Report of 
Accident filed with L&I. 
clm_recv_date Date the claim was received 
naics_code NAICS (Industry) code 
naics_code_description NAICS (Industry) code description 
number_of_imes Number of IMEs  
tl___lep_pd_thru_sample_ 
year_end 
Time loss and loss of earning power paid through sample year end 
clm_1st_med_visit_date First medical visit date as recorded in data warehouse 
clmt_sex_code Gender  M=male, F=female 
marital_status Martial status  S=single  M=married D=divorced 
current_county_code County of injury code 
county_desc County of injury description 
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Variable Name Description 
multiple_voc_rfrls Where there multiple voc referrals or not 
vr_disputes How many vocational rehabilitation disputes were there 
age_at_pension_allowance Age at pension allowance  
time_in_assessment Time in assessment 
pens_alwn_date Pension allowance date 
pension_amount Amount of pension award 
actuary_mo_wage_amt Actuary monthly wage amount (calculated) 
psych_tx Flag for psych treatment based on codes (see worksheet) 
amt_pd_for_psych_tx Amount paid for psych treatment 
appeals Number of appeals 
employer_contested_claim Did the employer contest the claim? 
accident_year_employer_ 
size 
Size of the employer during the accident year 
opioid_claim Flag indicating that worker has received more than one opioid prescription with a 
total of more than a 120 days supply of H3A, H3U, or H3N therapeutic class 
drugs.  Y equals yes, N equals No.  (Prescriptions filled after Sample Year 
excluded) 
pain_clinic_flag Flag indicating that L&I paid for at least one Pain Clinic program or evaluation on 
the claim. (Pain Clinic admissions or evaluations after Sample Year excluded) 
total_hospital_admissions Number of unique Admit Dates from Hospital billings on a claim. Admission 
Dates after Sample Year excluded. 
prauth_los_day_qty Total number of days authorized, not actual days, for hospital inpatient stays on a 
claim--back to 1988. Days authorized after Sample Year excluded. 
prior_claims Number of claims filed by worker with same Social Security Number prior to 
current injury date. 
prior_tx  
reopened_claim Code indicating if claim was closed and reopened prior to being placed on 
pension.  Y = reopened once, M = reopened more than once, N = not closed or 
reopened. 
retro_flag Flag indicating that employer was enrolled in Retrospective Rating Group 
program during the quarter the injury occurred. 
surgical_procedures Number of unique Surgery Dates from Hospital billings on a claim. Surgery Dates 
after Sample Year excluded 
time_loss_pd_by_six_mths  
clm_sso_af_amt Amount of Accident Fund money by which the worker’s monthly compensation 
rate has been reduced due to offset of Social Security Benefits. 
clm_base_mo_rate_amt Derived field showing the initial monthly compensation rate (Accident Fund only) 
for a claim. Calculated by taking current compensation rate and dividing by all 
Cost of Living Increase percentages applied since the claim was filed.  
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Variable Name Description 
clmt_forgn_lang_code Code indicating worker is not English speaking, or is more fluent in some other 
language. 
allowed_conditions Number of Unique ICD9 codes loaded into database and associated with a claim 
record with a Diag-Alwn-Code equal to “A” for accepted. 
denied_conditions Number of Unique ICD9 codes loaded into database and associated with a claim 
record with a Diag-Alwn-Code equal to “D” for denied 
temporary_conditions Number of Unique ICD9 codes loaded into database and associated with a claim 
record with a Diag-Alwn-Code equal to “T” for temporarily allowed. 
ppd_flag Flag indicating that the Clm-PPD-Award-Amt-Ptd field in the LINIIS database is 
greater that $5. 
age_at_injury Worker’s age in years at injury date, capped at 89 years for Human Subjects 
Research protection 
liability field indicating claim liability charged to state fund or self-insured employer. 
medical_aid_pd_thru_ 
sample_year_ 
Medical aid paid through to end of sample year 
estimated_tl_days_pd_thru_s
ample 
Estimated time-loss days paid through to end of sample year 
clm_dep_qty Number of legally dependent children (current) 
pension_awarded_after_ 
2002 
 
actuary_tl_ptd_total Derived field showing the combined total of all time-loss benefits and loss of 
earning power benefits paid to date on a claim. 
clm_medical_aid_ptd_amt Total amount of money expended from the Medical Aid Fund on a claim through 
the most recent update of the Report  
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5  Pension Predictive Model 
INTRODUCTION 
This section describes our model designed to predict total permanent disability pension 
(TPD) cases for the Washington State Department of Labor & Industries. As explained in 
chapter 1, this was a requirement of the contract with the Upjohn Institute. Rather than try to 
improve on current actuarial science, we chose to emphasize prediction of the probability that a 
given time-loss case would become a pension claim. To develop this model, we selected factors 
found to be correlated with pension awards from our previous analyses (reported in earlier 
chapters) and from other empirical studies. However, we limited ourselves to the data available 
from the L&I data warehouse to make the model potentially usable by L&I staff. After 
presentation of our model, we offer suggestions for further testing and improvement of the 
model. 
The data used for model development included state fund claims (no self-insured claims) 
with long time-loss durations. We selected all claims with three or more years of time-loss 
payment by the end of each calendar year from 1997 until 2007. We did this with the expectation 
that approximately half of these cases would receive pensions, and we wanted to test our ability 
to identify pension claims based on factors that may signal TPD. Claims with fewer than three 
years’ time loss are not included in this analysis. Claims for analysis were also limited to cases 
with less than 10 years of time loss due to data limitations in the data warehouse on claims prior 
to 1997. 
The data included such factors as time-loss duration, gender, age at injury, county of 
injury, industry, PPD and Social Security offset status, number of appeals, timing of vocational 
rehabilitation and plan development, hospital admissions, surgical procedures, opioid 
prescriptions, neck and back conditions, psych treatment, and prior claim status. From these 
factors we constructed a model that could be used in predicting the likelihood of pension. The 
data provided by the department included information on whether or not each claim received a 
TPD award by six years after the end of the calendar year (for years 1997–2001).  
We used this information to develop a model that could be applied to claims that are still 
open, including those in later years, up until December 31, 2007. Our model correctly predicts 
pension outcomes approximately 70 percent of the time based upon the available factors. Strictly 
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speaking, the predictive results that we present apply only to open claims that had between 3 and 
10 years of time loss, but we believe the model could be extended to predict pension outcomes 
for other claims as well. Additional data and further model refinements may lead to higher levels 
of precision.  
MODEL SPECIFICATION AND ESTIMATION 
The model we choose to use in this section is a binomial logit model which is described 
in more detail in Appendix 5.1. For some variables, this model has results that are not fully 
consistent with those reported earlier, whether from L&I statistics used in chapter 2, or from our 
Claim Survey sample presented in chapter 4. This could be due to the structure of the model, the 
estimation method, differences in sample size, years selected, and sampling methods.  
We do not regard this predictive model as a substitute for our earlier findings, nor for the 
actuarial predictions of future pensions that L&I generates. Rather, it is an exercise to test 
whether one can predict the probability that a serious workers’ compensation case (with at least 
three years’ time loss) will develop into a total permanent disability claim in a finite period.  
Table 5.1 summarizes the findings from the logit model. The coefficients are presented in 
terms of the log of the odds ratios. Odds ratios are interpreted as the likelihood of an event 
occurring versus not occurring. A coefficient that is significantly greater than 1.0 statistically 
indicates that the factor contributes positively to TPD probability, while a ratio that is 
significantly under 1.0 indicates that it has a negative effect. So, the odds of a pension are 
greater, for instance, for workers from an economically distressed county than for those whose 
employment had been in counties with low unemployment rates. Further, the coefficient of 1.160 
indicates that the point estimate of that effect would be 16 percent. An odds ratio that is not 
statistically significantly (indicated by the asterisks) different from 1 would indicate no effect. 
Since most of us are not used to dealing with odds ratios, we also offer a direct probability 
interpretation for the effect of some individual variables. 
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Table 5.1  Model of Total Permanent Disability (TPD) Cases, among Cases with Three or More Years  
   of Time Loss, Washington State Industrial Insurance Fund, 1997–2001 
 
Odds 
Ratios Std Error Signif 
 
  Z   Pr>|z|    95% low    95% high 
Years since injury    1.30073 0.013802 *** 24.78 0.000 1.273958 1.328064 
Age at injury 1.092177 0.002224 *** 43.3 0.000 1.087827 1.096545 
Male 1.182759 0.053163 *** 3.73 0.000 1.083019 1.291683 
Daily time-loss rate 1.009053 0.000831 *** 10.95 0.000 1.007426 1.010683 
Economically distressed area 1.159841 0.045672 *** 3.77 0.000 1.073693 1.252902 
Psych treatment 1.398046 0.055015 *** 8.52 0.000 1.294273 1.510141 
Accepted neck or back 
condition 
1.301336 0.051455 *** 6.66 0.000 1.204295 1.406196 
Total hospitalizations 1.039014 0.017243 ** 2.31 0.021 1.005762 1.073366 
Opioids 1.208449 0.044559 *** 5.13 0.000 1.124196 1.299015 
Approved vocational plan  0.440064 0.017088 ***  -21.14 0.000 0.407815 0.474862 
Social Security offset 2.350718 0.088226 *** 22.77 0.000 2.184005 2.530158 
PPD within 3 years 0.831102 0.041939 *** -3.67 0.000 0.752837 0.917504 
Agriculture 1.250807 0.081751 *** 3.42 0.001 1.100416    1.42175 
Construction  0.980947 0.044559  -0.42 0.672 0.897387 1.072286 
Appealed 1.101185 0.04202 ** 2.53 0.012 1.021831 1.186702 
Prior claims 1.017587 0.045139  0.39 0.694 0.932854 1.110016 
1998 dummy 0.984271 0.053429  -0.29 0.77 0.884929 1.094764 
1999 dummy  1.040118 0.056995  0.72 0.473 0.934199 1.158046 
2000 dummy 1.166894 0.066818 ** 2.7 0.007 1.043015 1.305487 
2001 dummy 1.342768 0.077835 *** 5.08 0.0000 1.19856 1.504325 
    *indicates statistical significance at the 95% level. 
  **indicates statistical significance at the 99.% level. 
***indicates statistical significance at the 99.9% level. 
In this model, the most important determining factor in the prediction of the likelihood of 
pension is the length of time from the date of the injury. We measured the years since the injury 
among all claims as of the end of each calendar year to construct the variable “years since 
injury.” The results in Table 5.1 indicate that each year since the injury increases the odds of a 
pension by 30 percent, which was significant at the 99 percent confidence level. Table 5.2 lays 
out the probability of pension by number of years since the injury, holding all other variables in 
the regression constant at their means. 
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Table 5.2  Predicted Probabilities of TPD by Time-Loss Year  
                 among Claims with 3 to 10 Years of Time Loss 
Years since injury Predicted probability of TPD 
3-4 32% 
4-5 38% 
5-6 42% 
6-7 45% 
7-8 47% 
8-9 51% 
9-10 55% 
 
Age at injury was also a very significant factor. Each additional year beyond the mean is 
associated with a nine percent increase in the odds of pensioning, holding other factors constant. 
Translating this to predicted probabilities, a worker who is less than 30 years old and has 
between 3 and 10 years of time loss has a 15 percent predicted probability of pensioning, while a 
worker with the same characteristics, but between 60 and 65 years of age has a 78 percent 
predicted probability of TPD. Table 5.3 shows predicted probabilities of TPD for different age 
categories, holding other factors constant. 
Table 5.3  Predicted Probabilities of TPD by Age  
                 among Claims with 3 to 10 Years of Time Loss 
Age Predicted probability of 
TPD  
<30 15% 
=30-40 29% 
=40-49 47% 
=50-59 67% 
=60-65 78% 
>65 89% 
 
In this model gender is also associated with differences in pension rates. The logit regression 
coefficient indicates the odds of receiving a pension are 18 percent higher for males.  
The estimated amount of time loss paid per day also influences the likelihood of pension 
slightly. For each dollar paid over the mean, there is an increase of .90 percent in the odds of 
TPD. For example, $50 over the estimated average daily amount paid in time-loss benefits is 
associated with an increase in pension odds of five percent. Refinements such as actual benefit 
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payments as well as controls for wage inflation would need to be incorporated into this model to 
make it more operational. 
Claims from economically distressed areas had a 16 percent increased likelihood of TPD 
over those that are not from distressed areas. This reflects the impact of being in an economically 
distressed area controlling for other characteristics that might lead to pension. Claims with 
psychological treatment within the first three years of injury had a 40 percent increased chance 
of pension outcome over claims without psychological treatment. Accepted back and neck 
conditions (as defined by ICD-9 codes) were associated with a 30 percent increase in odds of 
pension over claims with conditions other than neck and back. These variables were all highly 
statistically significant (99.9 percent level).  
We also included total hospital admissions as one limited control for severity of injury, 
and each hospitalization increased the odds of pension by about four percent. Because surgical 
procedures and opioid prescriptions were highly collinear (meaning they tended to occur 
together), we determined that opioids appeared to be a better predictor of pension than the 
number of surgical procedures and therefore chose to include opioids in the model.  
Opioid claims are defined as those for which the worker has received more than one 
opioid prescription with a total of more than 120 days supply of H3A, H3U or H3N therapeutic 
class drugs. In this sample of workers with 3 to 10 years of time loss, the percentage found to be 
“opioid claims” increased from 38 percent in 1997 to 57 percent in 2007. Claims with opioid 
prescriptions showed a 21 percent greater likelihood of pensioning than claims without opioid 
prescriptions. Of course, it is difficult to determine whether the opioids are a causative or 
resultant factor, and we refer to chapter 2’s discussion.  
One indicator of whether or not a case will be closed or pensioned is whether or not the 
worker receives a vocational rehabilitation plan. A case with a vocational plan approved is 56 
percent less likely to receive a pension than a case without such a plan, other things equal. Again, 
this factor serves as a signal of what is likely to affect the outcome of a claim, and does not say 
that VR treatment will reduce the likelihood of pension by 56 percent. But it does indicate that 
claims selected for VR referral that proceed to VR plan approval are much less likely to end up 
as pension claims.  
Social Security offset provisions effectively apply benefit limits for injured workers who 
are entitled to time loss or pension benefits and whose benefits are combined with Social 
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Security payments. If a worker’s benefits are offset due to Social Security payments, the worker 
is more than twice as likely to be pensioned. Presumably this is due to the disability status they 
have demonstrated already, which makes them very unlikely to return to work.  
Receiving a permanent partial disability (PPD) award has a negative effect on the 
likelihood of pension, although almost all TPD cases also have a PPD rating as a result of 
assessments that have been made of the injured worker. Our model indicates that the receipt of 
PPD within the first three years of a claim lowers the probability of pension by 17 percent, 
holding other factors constant.  
Industry is also an important factor. In this model we included agriculture and 
construction as two major industries tending to have seasonal effects and relatively high 
workers’ compensation claim profiles. Individuals injured in agriculture and construction may 
have more serious injuries, lower levels of formal education, and more difficulty returning to 
work. Our model estimates that an agricultural worker was 25 percent more likely to receive a 
TPD than other workers, but that construction workers were not statistically different from other 
workers with regard to TPD benefit receipt.  
Appeals can also signal TPD likelihood, as a case with appeals increases the TPD 
likelihood by 10 percent. While this is not a large effect, it was significant at the 95 percent 
confidence level. The existence of prior workers’ compensation claims did not prove to be a 
significant factor explaining TPD rates. Table 5.1 indicates that there was no change in the odds 
of pension given a prior claim.  
We included controls for different years in the analysis in an attempt to pick up some of 
the unexplained variance in those years and to test whether there was a specific effect on pension 
likelihood. With 1997 as the default year, years 1998–1999 were not significantly different from 
1997, but 2000 and 2001 showed higher rates of TPD for claims having three or more years of 
time loss and controlling for other factors discussed above. This finding indicates that the 
likelihood of pension was 17 percent higher in 2000 and 34 percent higher in 2001 than in 1997, 
over and above any changes in the characteristics of claims from those cohorts. This is 
interpreted as a direct measure of the surge in pension awards among this population of claims. 
MODEL’S PREDICTIVE ABILITY 
The predictive ability of the model is examined as follows. First, we estimate the ability 
of the model to predict outcomes among cases already receiving a TPD. That is, what was the 
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predicted outcome from the estimators, and what actually happened? We have the six years 
following the initial three years of time loss to observe what happens with our sample of claims. 
Because the model provides a range of predicted probability between 0 and 1, we have to apply a 
decision rule to arrive at a pension/no pension indication. An examination of our model’s 
pension probabilities shows an overlapping distribution between those that were actually 
pensioned and those that were not, but one that begins to separate around the 45 percent 
predicted pension probability level.  
By choosing cases with more than a 45 percent chance of pensioning according to our 
pension prediction model, we were able to correctly identify more than 72 percent of the cases 
that would be pensioned in the next six years. We also looked at the cases that were incorrectly 
identified as having less than 45 percent pension probability, and found that we had misjudged 
28 percent of them for the 1997 to 2001 period.  
We examined the ability of the model to discern those cases not likely to be pensioned as 
well. Among cases that were not pensioned in the following six years, we were able to correctly 
identify over 74 percent of those cases using the 45 percent predicted probability cutoff point. 
This means that we incorrectly tagged 26 percent of those long duration time-loss cases as being 
potential TPDs. 
Our model’s predicted pension probability is somewhat lower than the ultimate 
probability of pension predicted by L&I Actuarial Services for claims three or more years old. 
But it is important to note that our pension probability model misses many of those likely to be 
identified by the actuarial models, especially claims older than 10 years. The actuarial models are 
using a different method, employing projections of ultimate counts based on the number of 
active claims and past claim closure rates rather than individual claim characteristics, and their 
numbers are not directly comparable to ours. In essence, actuarial methods use a macro or 
system approach, while our model uses a micro or individual approach. In addition, our model 
only explains a portion of the overall variation in pension rates. While we think our model could 
offer a valuable contribution toward understanding the individual factors affecting pension 
likelihood, our model is definitely not a substitute for what actuaries at L&I currently employ.  
The value to the Department of Labor and Industries of this model is that it could be used 
to identify cases with a high probability of pension so that a claims management intervention 
could be applied earlier in the claim if necessary. This model—or a more developed variation of 
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it—could help the department to evaluate what future pension outcomes are likely to be, given 
the nature of claims currently in the system. We caution that the variance is larger than we would 
like it to be, but estimators and error rates appear to be fairly consistent in the 1997–2001 time 
period. The model does less well in predicting cases from 2003–2004, but then appears to 
improve after that point among the cases in our sample.  
Data summarizing the model’s predictive capabilities are presented in Table 5.4. This 
table shows the actual and model predicted outcomes of pensions by six years following each 
calendar year. For example, 40 percent of the claims with at least three years of time loss in our 
1997 sample resulted in a TPD pension. Our model correctly predicted 68 percent of those and 
incorrectly predicted 32 percent for time-loss claims administered in 1997. The predictive power 
of the model seems to increase by the most recent administrative year available for the model 
(2001), and that may be due to data limitations on claim details for earlier years, or it may be due 
to some factors not identified for those years. By applying the model to later years of data we are  
Table 5.4  All Cases—Model Prediction versus Actual, 1997 through 2007 
Cases with 3–10 years  
time loss Model predicted TPD  Model predicted no TPD 
 Actual Outcome Actual Actual % TPD % not 
Pension 
evaluation year No TPD TPD % TPD No TPD TPD No TPD TPD 
correctly 
predicted 
correctly 
predicted 
1997 2,197 1,494 0.405 483 1,020 1,714 474 0.683 0.317 
1998 2,243 1,647 0.423 524 1,172 1,719 475 0.712 0.288 
1999 2,128 1,658 0.438 549 1,220 1,579 438 0.736 0.264 
2000 1,729 1,472 0.460 509 1,066 1,220 406 0.724 0.276 
2001 1,644 1,494 0.476 482 1,115 1,162 379 0.746 0.254 
2002 1,964 1,350 0.407 486 870 1,478 480 0.644 0.356 
2003 2,290 1,129 0.330 613 679 1,677 450 0.601 0.399 
2004 2,749 1,145 0.294 791 699 1,958 446 0.610 0.390 
2005 3,279 1,067 0.246 1,136 702 2,143 365 0.658 0.342 
2006 3,771 801 0.175 1,586 566 2,185 235 0.707 0.293 
2007 4,253 108 0.025 2,002 79 2,251 29 0.731 0.269 
             
Total 28,247 13,365 0.321 9,161 9,188 19,086 4,177 0.687 0.313 
1997-2001 9,941 7,765 0.439 2,547 5,593 7,394 2,172 0.720 0.280 
2002-2007  18,306 5,600 0.234 6,614 3,595 11,692 2,005 0.642 0.358 
 
also able to identify a large proportion of the claims that are eventually pensioned based on 
characteristics of those claims. For example, our model correctly predicted TPD award for 79 of 
the 108 cases in 2007 (73 percent) that had more than three years of time loss and received a 
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TPD. Certainly there will be many more TPD cases to expect from the claims administered in 
2007, but the model does a fairly good job of predicting those that actually were early pension 
decisions.  
Going back to 2002 claims, our model predicts fewer of the cases that received TPD by 
December 31, 2007:  we predicted 870 of the 1,494, (or 64 percent) of the sample cases from 
2002 that actually received TPD by the end of 2007. Among those claims for which there was 
full information (1997–2001) our model correctly identified 72 percent of these outcomes based 
on characteristics of the claims and failed to predict 28 percent of them. The model applied to a 
later group of claims (2002–2007) correctly identified 64 percent of the actual outcomes and 
incorrectly identified 36 percent of them. This could be due to development of the claim or other 
factors that could not be identified or quantified, including a change in claims administration 
(See chapter 2). 
Based on the model we presented, which used 1997–2001 estimators, we also applied the 
model to the set of open time-loss cases at the end of 2007. These results are presented in Table 
5.5. The table shows the estimated number of claims with 3–10 years of time loss that were open 
as of December 31, 2007. Applying our model and the 45 percent probability decision rule, we 
identify 5,702 of the 13,164 open cases (43 percent) currently without TPD awards that we 
predict will receive TPD at some point based on characteristics such as time loss, age at injury, 
region, disability status, and the other variables shown in Table 5.4.  
It is interesting to note that the marginal predicted probability of pension, in the 
aggregate, rises substantially from 1998 through 2001. Then it drops back down with 2002, 
before rising even more considerably through 2007. This generally parallels the surge in pension 
awards. So our model is predicting a rising incidence of pension claims based on the claim 
characteristics of open time-loss claims already in the pipeline. Of course, these estimates are 
only for the probability of pension awards among open time-loss claims, and they must be 
combined with pensions already awarded, reopened cases, etc., to estimate the completed 
pension cohort.  
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Table 5.5  Open Cases without TPD—Model Prediction  
     1997–2007 
  
Expected 
to be 
TPD 
Expected 
to have 
no TPD 
Open 
Claims 
Model’s 
expected rate 
among open 
claims 
1997 51 141 192 0.2656 
1998 63 182 245 0.2571 
1999 97 222 319 0.3041 
2000 140 225 365 0.3836 
2001 200 262 462 0.4329 
2002 243 437 680 0.3574 
2003 355 613 968 0.3667 
2004 555 847 1,402 0.3959 
2005 844 1,149 1,993 0.4235 
2006 1,288 1,432 2,720 0.4735 
2007 1,866 1,952 3,818 0.4887 
       
Total 5,702 7,462 13,164 0.4332 
     
2002-
2007 5151 6430 11581 0.4448 
 
Based on the evaluation of predicted probabilities and examination of cases we were able 
to predict using the 45 percent cutoff rate, we expect to see a TPD rate comparable to 2001 for 
years 2002 through 2007. The rate rises toward the end of the period, possibly due to claim 
development, but also due to the characteristics of claims L&I is administering. This indicates 
that based on the characteristics of claims in the system, we expect pension rates to continue to 
remain relatively high compared to earlier years.  
However, caution is advised in interpreting the results presented in Table 5.5. This is just 
a preliminary exploration of an untested model of the probability of pension. The rates our model 
suggests are below those predicted by L&I Actuarial Services for a number of reasons. First, our 
model is intended to predict likely outcomes for individual claims for a fixed period of time and 
does not attempt to predict ultimate counts. The model is only looking at TPD awards within six 
years after the calendar year for time-loss claims with more than three years of time loss. This is 
a more restricted set of claims than those included in the Actuarial Services forecasts.  
Again, this model almost certainly underestimates the total number of claims that will 
eventually become TPD pensions. It should therefore not be construed to relate directly to the 
total aggregate number of future TPD cases, pension costs, or future premium rates. While we 
caution against comparing our model, or its predictions, with established actuarial models, our 
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intent is to complement the work done by the actuaries. We seek to provide a model that could 
potentially improve claim management operations by early identification of individual cases 
likely to result in a TPD. Further development of this model may help with actuarial prediction 
of total pension counts, but the model requires additional refinement and incorporation of 
ultimate counts for each of the micro variables identified. That would be a very time consuming 
endeavor that goes beyond the scope of this project. 
SUMMARY, CAVEATS, AND EXTENSIONS 
While we have developed a model that can predict pensions with some degree of 
accuracy, there are some significant limitations. Our model is only applied after the claims have 
matured to three years of time loss. Some predictive factors—such as number of surgeries or 
vocational rehabilitation—may take months if not years to develop in a way that signals eventual 
pensioning. In the application of this model, some data lags are to be expected and so the ability 
to identify likely pension cases early may depend on how quickly and accurately information 
about the claims can be loaded into L&I’s system and analyzed.  
The predictive results that we present apply only to open claims that had between 3 and 
10 years of time loss, but we believe the model could be extended to other claim populations to 
predict their pension outcomes as well. Another caution is that this model was applied to a 
smaller group of claims than would be necessary if the model were to be employed by the 
Department of Labor & Industries. Some claims will certainly become pensions after the 10-year 
time period considered here. The model should also be tested against claims with shorter time- 
loss durations, maybe 6 to 36 months of time loss. We included reopened cases in the analysis, 
but for simplicity and time constraint reasons, we did not include cases that are likely to be 
reopened and become TPD awards later, although that is a sub-group that could possibly be 
incorporated into the model. Of course such extensions would necessitate re-estimation of the 
parameters of the model.  
While the older claims we viewed appeared to have markers that would indicate a 
continuation of relatively higher rates, the more recent claims have not fully matured yet. Thus it 
is risky to predict a continuation of the same patterns based on claim characteristics. But, of 
course, it is also risky to predict the continuation of the recent trend, especially if the drivers of 
that trend are not well understood.  
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Although we know our model can be strengthened and improved, we believe that it can 
be employed toward the goal of identifying potentially difficult cases and getting a general idea 
of what the department can expect from open time-loss cases in the future. The value to the 
Department of Labor and Industries of this model is that it can be used to identify cases that may 
become pensions so that an operational decision could be applied earlier in the life of the claim, 
if indicated. The Department would have to consider what kind of interventions should be made, 
and at what level of probability cases should be evaluated.  
The findings of this model are not entirely consistent with those reported earlier based 
upon our claims review data. Our predictive model used claims with 3 to10 years of time loss, 
whereas the claim review included a sample of all pensioned claims in two calendar years and 
without limits on the amount of total time loss. In addition, because certain measured factors are 
not fully consistent, we would urge caution in reaching firm conclusions about those factors. We 
do, however, believe that a model such as this (and perhaps including some subjective data such 
as was possible with the claims review) could help to predict pension claims and pension rates.  
In creating and applying this model, we recognize that the ability to predict could be 
improved in the future were more data available. For example, and as mentioned in chapter four, 
education is a very significant labor market factor that could signal chances for successful return 
to work. Pre-injury wage is also a factor which we could not adequately include, but used instead 
a time-loss rate (daily rate paid based on total time-loss costs divided by days paid) as a proxy. 
Also other studies have indicated that motivation and depression are very important in return-to-
work outcomes, though measuring these is understood to be difficult. Certain administrative 
information associated with the claim (such as the adjudicators’ caseloads, turnover, speed or 
accuracy) may also be useful in predicting the eventual resolution of a particular claim.  
Finally, we stress again that this model is very different than those typically used by 
actuaries to predict the future population of workers’ compensation claims. Actuarial models 
incorporate the development of claims by estimating the “ultimate” number of open and active 
claims having certain amounts of time loss and applying time series estimation techniques to 
those claims to predict pension awards. Our approach does not estimate ultimate claims but 
instead estimates the expected pension rate at some future point based on the characteristics of 
claims currently in the system. Like the actuarial model, time loss paid to date is an important 
predictor in our model. We are able to provide predictions of the likelihood of pensioning given 
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more detailed information available about these actual claims. The advantage of this approach is 
that it allows some mid-stream estimation of pension probabilities which may serve to verify 
actuarial trends. Future work may lead to a combined cross-sectional time-series model that 
could be used by the Department to further improve predictive capability.  
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APPENDIX 5.1  Motivation for Logit Model 
A binomial logit applies an S-shape pattern to the probability of total permanent 
disability and provides an easier method of interpreting 0,1 factors (dummy independent 
variables). Instead of a linear ordinary least squares approach, this method applies an iterative 
estimation technique called “maximum likelihood estimation.” It maximizes the log of the 
probability (or likelihood) of observing a particular set of values of the variable we are trying to 
predict (dependent variable). In this case, the dependent variable is the natural log of the 
probability of total permanent disability (pension award). 
 
L: Pr(Di = 1)  =  ln (Di /[1-Di])  where i= 1 to the total number of time-loss claims in the 
sample, where Di = 1 if the i-th time-loss claim resulted in a TPD, 
  and Di = 0 if the i-th time-loss claim did not result in a TPD 
While the linear regression model presented earlier in this report is adequate for evaluating 
approximate effects on probability, a more theoretically appropriate model for estimation is one 
that applies an S-curve because real-world data are often described well by this pattern. Other 
methods (such as those employing Weibull or similar distributions) may yield more efficient 
results, but we were not able to test this. For example, an application of this model to all claims 
regardless of time-loss days would likely require a Poisson distribution because of the relatively 
small number of total time-loss cases that receive pensions. 
Although predictive capability is generally improved with a non-linear binomial model, 
one disadvantage of this approach is that interpretation of continuous variables such as age 
becomes more cumbersome. For that reason, we have provided tables and additional discussion 
to make the effects more understandable. 
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6  Summary and Findings 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study has been to analyze the incidence of Total Permanent Disability 
(TPD) pensions in Washington’s workers’ compensation program. Concerns have grown at both 
the Department of Labor and Industries and in the state legislature as there appears to have been 
a sharp upturn in the number of pensions awarded since late in the 1990s. This report examines 
the factors that may be causally related to the upsurge in such awards. Our task is to evaluate 
pension incidence for both the state fund and the self-insured populations, with the charge of 
identifying causes of the trend in both sectors. Because of data limitations, we concentrate more 
on the state fund claims, but present some findings for self-insured employers also. We use our 
results to develop a model that can be used to predict the future number of TPD pensions based 
on some of these causative factors. 
Interest in pensions arises both because of their costs and because of the widely held view 
that wherever possible injured workers should be enabled to return to productive employment. 
The average cost of a total permanent disability award is high in all workers’ compensation 
jurisdictions, generally varying with the worker’s age and the wage at the time of injury. In 
Washington, the cost depends also on the marital status of the worker and on the amount of 
future inflation adjustments that will be made to the benefits. In Washington, TPD pensions 
currently make up more than 30 percent of the annual benefit costs for the state fund, and more 
than 80 percent of the supplemental pension fund costs. In total, TPD pensions account for more 
than one-fourth of workers’ compensation costs for state fund insured employers in Washington. 
Yet total permanent disability awards do not represent a very large share of overall benefit costs 
in most states because the incidence of such claims is low. Several factors make the incidence of 
these awards particularly noteworthy in Washington.  
First, it appears that Washington has a higher incidence of total permanent disability 
cases than do other states. Second, these benefits will be adjusted annually in the future to reflect 
increases in the state’s average annual wage. Inflation adjustments of this or similar kinds are 
rare in the other state systems, and represent a sizeable portion of the cost of these claims. 
However, these costs are reduced for employers in Washington since workers pay half the cost of 
inflation adjustment. Finally, pensions are payable for life (or possibly longer if a spousal 
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annuity option is selected by the worker or if the worker’s death is related to the accepted injury 
or disease). The costs of a pension are potentially lowered by the worker’s receipt of Social 
Security old age or disability insurance benefits, and an offset will also apply for any previously 
paid permanent partial disability benefit associated with the permanently and totally disabling 
injury or illness.  
This chapter summarizes the findings of our study. It is organized into five major sections 
which we treat as questions: 
• Are pensions or rates of pensions high in Washington State? 
• What factors are associated with claims that result in the granting of pensions? 
• Has there been substantial growth in pensions awarded? 
• What factors are associated with the growth of pensions? 
• How can the number of pensions in the future be predicted?  
ARE PENSIONS OR PENSION RATES HIGH IN WASHINGTON STATE? 
How does Washington compare to other states in the awarding of total permanent 
disability pensions? Making interstate comparisons in workers’ compensation is always 
challenging. State laws, practices, terminology, data availability and reporting all vary. Further, 
workers’ compensation data users always must cope with the problem of the “long tail” of 
claims, and with widely different times to claim resolution across the various states. An extra 
challenge is that most states allow insurers to use lump-sum settlements to close claims and to 
terminate liability. In such cases it can be difficult to determine even how much indemnity 
compensation—as opposed to medical benefits—was paid on a claim. The result of such 
compromise and release agreements for purposes of a comparative analysis is that there are 
claims that could result in TPD compensation, but are not recorded as such in other jurisdictions. 
The payment of the lump-sum benefit terminates the case and there is no need to categorize it as 
a TPD claim, or even to make that determination since it will not affect the benefits. 
NCCI State Comparisons  
Using comparative data from the National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI), 
Washington ranks amongst the highest states for time-loss injuries per covered employee. 
However, we believe that an adjustment to this ranking is needed for Washington based on the 
different way of measuring the employment base, somewhat lowering the state’s rank but leaving 
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it still about 40 percent above the average for time-loss case incidence among all states in the 
NCCI ranking. OSHA data are somewhat consistent in finding that the incidence of occupational 
injuries and illness with time lost from work falls above the national average (See Table 2.23). It 
should also be noted that the overall claims incidence rate for self-insured employers in 
Washington is approximately the same as for state fund insured employers. 
NCCI reports on the incidence of total permanent disability cases for 44 states and the 
District of Columbia. California has the highest incidence rate at third report (30 to 42 months 
following date of injury) with 37 TPD claims per 100,000 workers. Montana, Florida, Arkansas, 
South Carolina, Kentucky, and Texas all had more than 10 claims per 100,000 workers. At the 
other end of the distribution; South Dakota, Rhode Island, and Indiana had TPD rates of 1 claim 
per 100,000 workers or less. The “countrywide” average reported by the NCCI was 7 TPD 
claims per 100,000 workers, but this 36-state average excludes many of the larger states. 
We estimate that Washington’s State Fund made 27 TPD awards per 100,000 covered 
employees in 2001–2002. This is in the same general range as California and Montana, the 
highest incidence states according to the NCCI. However, taking account of the long time lag 
between the injury date and the date that a pension is awarded in Washington requires an 
adjustment, or else this estimate would be a sizeable understatement of the final incidence of 
TPD. Using the ultimate projected total of TPD claims from the Actuarial Department of L&I for 
2001–2002 would yield an estimate of 65 TPD claims per 100,000 employees. We do not think 
that the ultimate projected totals for other states result in such substantial upward adjustments 
based on the data available to us. This reflects the fact that claims are closed much sooner than in 
Washington in other jurisdictions, partly through the use of compromise and release settlements. 
So, we consider an alternative metric. The Washington State Fund has an incidence rate 
of 15.6 TPD claims per 1,000 accepted time-loss claims, slightly more than the rate of California 
or Florida in fiscal year 2002. Scaling this to match the ultimate expected TPD numbers would 
yield a final estimated incidence rate of 38.0 TPD awards per 1,000 time-loss claims for 
Washington, or nearly three times the rate in California and Florida. (Again, we do not know 
what the ultimate number of TPD awards will be in these states when sufficient time has passed 
for all their claims to have matured, but do not see strong upward trends from third report 
through fifth report.) Washington also ranks very high among the states in the ratio of TPD 
awards to permanent partial disability awards, which raises the possibility that the high incidence 
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of TPD may be due in part to the threshold between PPD and TPD in Washington. Overall, we 
believe that Washington has two to four times the TPD incidence of the highest other states. 
Comparing Washington and British Columbia  
Although interstate comparisons of the incidence of TPD claims are difficult to nail down 
because of the widespread use of compromise and release settlements elsewhere, an opportunity 
exists to compare Washington to another jurisdiction with critically important similar features. 
We have selected British Columbia, Canada (B.C.) for comparison with Washington for a 
number of reasons. Both jurisdictions are in the same geographic region, with approximately the 
same population size and similar economic bases. More importantly, they have broadly similar 
workers’ compensation systems with more in common than with most of the states in the U.S.  
They are both exclusive public fund jurisdictions, with only three other such states in the 
U.S. Both have limited self-insurance, although B.C. does not allow self-administration and only 
permits self-insurance for employers specified by statute. They both have relatively generous 
benefits for injured workers and a reputation for fair and timely administration of those benefits. 
Neither jurisdiction allows compromise and release settlements, and lump-sum payments are 
used sparingly. Relative to many other jurisdictions, the level of disputation over workers’ 
compensation claims is fairly low, although Washington has many more attorneys involved in 
the system than does British Columbia. While there are always significant differences, the broad 
structure of workers’ compensation in B.C. is similar to Washington’s approach.  
In British Columbia permanent partial disability compensation is paid as a monthly 
pension. The level of the periodic benefit is a function of the assessed degree of disability and the 
injured worker’s pre-injury earnings. By contrast, in Washington the worker’s pre-injury wage 
does not affect the aggregate amount of the benefit, which is specified by statute, but the size of 
the monthly payment is determined by the worker’s TTD benefit rate.  
In B.C. there is essentially no difference between the treatment of a permanent partial and 
a total permanent disability case except the amount of the benefit that is paid. A total permanent 
disability is simply a 100 percent permanent disability rating. The statute does not define total 
permanent disability and gives it little attention explicitly. In Washington, permanent partial 
disability is rated strictly on the basis of medical impairment (medical disability). The extent of 
impairment determines the size of the benefit for either a scheduled or unscheduled injury or 
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illness. However, total permanent disability is determined by the legislatively specified 
impairments, or the inability to perform or obtain work at a gainful occupation (work disability).  
In 2002 a “core review” was undertaken in British Columbia that led to very significant 
changes in the evaluation of permanent disability. Dissatisfaction with the rating of disability, 
including 100 percent disability (total permanent disability), before the “reform” was enacted 
was one of the key issues that led to the core review. In brief, prior to the reform every worker 
with a permanent impairment was rated in a “dual” or “bifurcated” system once the condition 
had “medically plateaued” (or maximum medical improvement). In every case the worker was 
rated by a medical professional on the basis of impairment just as in Washington. However, in 
every case the worker was also separately rated by a vocational rehabilitation professional on the 
basis of any loss of earning capacity. The workers’ compensation benefit was based on the 
higher of the two ratings. 
Dissatisfaction from the employer community among others resulted, as more and more 
disability ratings came to be based on the loss of earning capacity evaluation. In some cases, 
substantial pensions were paid to workers with fairly low levels of medical impairment. The 
legislative changes resulting from the core review no longer mandate both methods of assessing 
the degree of permanent disability. Instead, the province now uses impairment as the basis for 
evaluating disability and uses the loss of earning capacity assessment method only in 
“exceptional” instances. The B.C. Parliament also saw fit to end pension payments at age 65. 
The law changes and the associated operating rules for the B.C. Board appear to have had a 
dramatic impact by lowering the number of loss of earning capacity awards drastically beginning 
in the second half of 2002. 
We have observed there are many features of the two systems that are shared and others 
that are different. In our view no difference is more important than the range of options, or 
flexibility of compensation, that exists in B.C. that are not available in Washington. Two of those 
features stand out. First, despite the limits imposed by the 2002 amendments, the B.C. Board can 
make adjustments in the permanent disability rating so as not to be locked in by the impairment 
rating. These adjustments can recognize very special circumstances and adjust the disability 
rating correspondingly. This flexibility makes it possible to award the benefit it perceives 
necessary to compensate the injured worker fairly. Secondly, total permanent disability awards 
are not an all or nothing outcome in B.C. since a permanent partial disability pension can serve 
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as an adequate alternative for a total permanent award (a 100 percent disability rating), albeit 
with a lower level of benefits. 
A striking difference between B.C. and Washington is the tendency in Washington for 
sizable numbers of time-loss claims to remain open for very extended periods. WorkSafe BC has 
avoided this with several measures. The most significant method of keeping time-loss benefits 
from growing to lengthy levels is through the vocational rehabilitation program. Early and 
aggressive intervention by skilled VR professionals has great potential to reduce time loss and 
improve return to work for injured workers. Additionally, B.C. uses a claims inventory 
management system, with regular tracking and reporting on all their time-loss claims. This 
information is widely shared throughout the agency and red flags are given to those claims that 
appear to be extending longer than expected for the claim in question, based on data from other 
similar claims. This prevents claims from languishing in the system. 
Another measure, though not used extensively, is to move the worker’s benefit from a 
temporary total disability to a temporary partial disability benefit. As the Board perceives that 
the worker is capable of making some earnings, albeit at a level that is below the pre-injury level 
of earnings, it can reduce the worker’s indemnity benefit to reflect the earnings the worker is 
assumed to be capable of earning at that time. This serves as an added inducement to the worker 
to return to employment at pre-injury earnings level as soon as possible. 
So how do the outcomes in BC compare to those in Washington? Covering roughly the 
same workforce as the state fund in Washington, WorkSafe BC pays nearly 50 percent more 
time-loss claims of more than three days; that is after adjusting for the fact that they have no 
waiting period. However, they have an incidence rate of total permanent disability (defined by us 
as greater than 50 percent impairment) that is only about 40 percent that of Washington state 
fund insured employers and 50 percent that of Washington self-insured employers. This 
comparison is not subject to distortion due to compromise and release settlements, or other 
distortions due to system characteristics; thus it confirms our findings from comparison with 
NCCI states.  
Conclusion 
A comparison with other U.S. jurisdictions through NCCI statistics leads us to the 
conclusion that there is a very high incidence of total permanent disability awards in 
Washington. Also, a more carefully controlled comparison with British Columbia, a jurisdiction 
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with many program similarities to Washington serves to reinforce that conclusion. Definitive 
quantitative comparisons between jurisdictions cannot be made, but the general conclusion is 
very clear. 
WHAT FACTORS ARE ASSOCIATED WITH CLAIMS THAT RESULT IN 
PENSIONS? 
 In order to summarize our findings and conclusions regarding the factors relating to 
pension claims in Washington, our response to this question is in two parts. First, we suggest 
some structural reasons why the incidence of total permanent disability claims is high in 
Washington. Then we report on the findings drawn from a claim file review that demonstrate 
some of the important correlates of claims that resulted in pension awards. 
A Structural Source of the High Incidence of Pensions in Washington 
In chapter 3 we considered how Washington State’s workers’ compensation system 
compares with those of other jurisdictions in the U.S. and with British Columbia. In terms of 
pensions we believe that Washington’s approach is almost unique in a very significant way. Only 
one other state, Nevada, provides compensation in basically the same way as Washington does 
for total permanent disability  
First, Washington is different from most of the other states in that its workers’ 
compensation program does not allow for lump-sum settlements for indemnity benefits to 
decisively close claims. We believe that only eight states either do not allow such agreements or 
place important limits on their use (See Table 6.1). While 19 states, including Washington, pay 
PPD benefits for unscheduled injuries or illnesses strictly on the basis of the extent of medically 
determined impairment resulting from the injury or illness, only six of them also limit lump-sum 
settlements.  
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Table 6.1 Arrangements for Permanent Disability Compensation among State Workers’  
   Compensation Systems 
Limits on lump-sum 
settlements for indemnity 
benefits for permanent 
disability 
Permanent partial 
disability benefits based 
solely on impairment 
(unscheduled injuries) 
Total permanent 
disability benefits paid 
only for conditions 
listed in the statute 
Total permanent disability 
benefits paid based on 
impairments listed in 
statute or on incapacity 
from performing work 
Delaware X X  
Indiana X   
Nevada X  X 
New Mexico  X  
Tennessee    
Texas X X  
Washington X  X 
West Virginia X   
Notes: 
5. Columns 1 and 2 are based on a 1999 publication. Were these state practices evaluated today, some of the 
entries would need to be changed. States with major legislative changes since then include Nevada, 
Tennessee, and West Virginia. Some jurisdictions could be added as in the case of California which 
became an impairment based state (with modifications) in 2004. 
6. Texas does not explicitly pay total permanent disability benefits. It does pay Lifetime Income Benefits, but 
limits those to conditions listed in their statute. 
7. Texas pays a supplementary income benefit (SIB) in cases where the impairment benefit has been fully 
paid, where the impairment is evaluated by the AMA Guides to be 15 percent or greater, and where a lump- 
sum payment was not taken by the worker for the permanent partial disability. 
8. Indiana allows lump-sum settlements in cases where the claim is disputed. 
SOURCE: Barth and Niss (WCRI, 1999) 
Of these six jurisdictions only Washington and Nevada compensate total permanent 
disability based on (medical) impairment (for conditions specified in the statute) or for work 
disability. In Washington the worker is totally disabled for the purposes of a pension when the 
injury or disease permanently incapacitates the worker from obtaining and performing any work 
at any gainful occupation. As a consequence, the opportunity to return to work is central to the 
pension award decision, except for those specific conditions listed in the statute which account 
for relatively few cases annually.  
Thus, among the states where permanent partial disability compensation is based on the 
degree of impairment, and where the use of lump-sum settlements for indemnity benefits is 
limited by law or practice, only Washington and Nevada use other criteria besides the degree of 
impairment to evaluate and grant total permanent disability pensions.  
However, the impairment benefit may bear very little relationship to the actual degree of 
work disability or economic loss. Even where it appears evident that the permanent partial 
disability inadequately compensates for the work disability that the worker has experienced, the 
system has no flexibility to remedy this. The result of this combination of factors places the 
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worker and the state fund or the self-insured employer in a position where the only possible 
source of additional compensation is the TPD pension.  
Characteristics of Pension Claims: Claim File Review 
A claim review study was necessary in order to gain a detailed understanding of the 
claims management and pensioning processes, and to observe any differences in claims or 
pension adjudication from before the upsurge in claims to the period when substantial numbers 
of awards were being made. It was also necessary to conduct a claim review in order to obtain 
data elements that have either never been available in the Department’s data warehouse or were 
archived and no longer available. Last but not least, a claim review allowed us to form a more 
comprehensive picture of the claims and pensioning process: it allowed a qualitative 
understanding of trends and patterns as well as consistent quantitative measurement of factors 
affecting pensioning. 
Our method of analysis of the increase in pensions was to take two different time periods, 
comparing the total permanent disability claims awarded in those time periods, then also 
selecting a comparison population from time-loss claims in each of those time periods. This way 
it would be possible to compare characteristics of pensions awarded in the two time periods, and 
also to compare pension claims to non-pension claims in the two periods. With this strategy it 
was possible to maximize the likelihood of identifying significant changes between the periods. 
If there was a difference between pension claims in the two periods, we could check the non-
pension claims to determine whether the observed change was specific to pension determination, 
something that pertained to the larger workers’ compensation environment, or even the broader 
economy.  
Our choice of the two time frames, calendar years 1997 and 2002, was influenced not 
only by the trends we were seeing in pensioned claims but also by the availability of data that 
would support this type of analysis. We understand that in choosing 1997 we are close to the 
beginning of potential changes in claims and pension adjudication, but we are confident that the 
choice of 1997 still allows for some significant “before and after” comparisons between the two 
time periods. The samples of 1997 and 2002 pension recipients were selected as any claim 
having a total permanent disability (TPD) award between January 1 and December 31, 1997 and 
2002, respectively. We limited the selection of TPD claims to those having original workers’ 
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compensation claim received dates, on or after January 1, 1987 or January 1, 1992. This means 
that our sample of pension claims all showed less than 11 years since the claim originated. 
Obtaining a suitable comparison group was difficult. Ideally we sought a group of claims 
that had a high probability of TPD by virtue of their characteristics, but had not received a TPD 
award by the time of our analysis year. We used a propensity score analysis, which matches each 
“treatment” observation with the most similar “comparison” observation. Ultimately the 
selection of the comparison group was made using just two predictive factors: time loss paid to 
date, and age of the worker at injury. We estimate that these two factors were associated with 
approximately 33 percent of the variance in pension probability.  
The selection of self-insured claims was conducted in a similar fashion, but the data on 
time loss among the self-insured claims were very incomplete. We believe that we have a 
representative selection of self-insured claims for review, but we are not satisfied with the 
quality of the time-loss data among the self insured. Our analysis of self-insured claims is also 
limited by the small sample numbers. Approximately 26 percent (231 claims) of the claims 
reviewed were self-insured claims and 74 percent (672 claims) were state fund claims. (Table 
6.2) Because our sample of self-insured claims is small, and the sub-samples even smaller, this 
limits our analysis of self-insured claims. Unfortunately, we also underestimated the time 
required to gather the data from the claim files and, as a result the 2002 time-loss comparison 
sample is smaller than intended. 
Table 6.2  L&I Claim Review Sample Distribution 
 1997 pension 2002 pension 1997 time loss 2002 time loss Total 
Self-insured 66 59 50 56 231 
State fund 162 210 188 112 672 
Total 228 269 238 168 903 
 
We had two purposes in analyzing the results from our claim review. First, we were 
screening potential causative factors associated with pensions. This would be useful as inputs 
into a predictive model that we were building. Also, we were eager to link these results with 
those reported using administrative data (chapter 2).  
We generally present two sets of statistical hypothesis tests for each variable that we 
analyze. The first tests the hypothesis that the values for 1997 and 2002 pension samples are the 
same. The second tests the hypothesis that the values for 1997 and 2002 comparison time-loss 
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claims are the same. Suppose we reject the first hypothesis, and conclude that variables 
associated with pensions in 2002 were different from those in 1997 on some dimension. We still 
need to establish that this was not true for all serious disability claims to indicate that this factor 
might be causally related to the surge in pensions. 
Table 6.3 summarizes the findings from the claims review. Column 1 specifies whether 
the measure is for state fund or self-insured claims. Columns 2 and 3 identify the reported 
variable by name and type. Columns 4 and 5 are the values for the varible for those individuals 
who received pensions in 1997 or 2002 respectively. Column 6 indicates whether the values in 
Columns 3 and 4 are essentially the same or if there is a statistically significant difference 
between them. If they are statistically different we indicate that by a single asterisk representing 
a 95 percent degree of confidence that the values are different, two asterisks representing a 99 
percent level of confidence, and three asterisks indicating a 99.9 percent level of confidence. 
Columns 7, 8, and 9 replicate columns 4, 5, and 6, respectively, with the values applying to those 
in our comparison groups for 1997 and 2002.  
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Table 6.3  Summary of Key Findings from Claim Review 
Sector Variable name Description 
1997
Pension
Awardees
2002
Pension
Awardees
Statistical 
Significance
1997 
Comparison
Group
2002
Comparison
Group
Statistical 
Significance
 
Injury Characteristics 
SF Back injury % Yes 32.1 32.9  35.1 29.5 ** 
SI Back injury % Yes 37.9 16.9 *** 18.0 10.7 * 
SF Number of allowed 
conditions 
 1.90 2.23  2.08 1.69  
SF Average hospital 
admissions 
Mean # .642 .252 *** .542 .107 *** 
SF Surgical  
procedures 
Mean # .294 .178 * .323 .071 *** 
SF Medical aid paid Mean # $41,540 $55,021 *** $49,981 $37,399 *** 
SF Time-loss benefits 
paid 
 $66,775 $82,199 *** $106,435 $81,597 *** 
SF Time-loss days paid Mean # 1,625.1 1,693.8  1,063.9 1.140.7  
 
Worker Characteristics 
SF Age at injury Mean # 47.4 49.0 *** 44.4 46.8 *** 
SF Age at injury Median # 48.5 52.0  44.0 48.0  
SI Age at injury Mean # 49.1 48.9  43.9 46.5 ** 
SF Age at pension Mean # 57.9 56.7 * 56.0 54.3  
SI Age at pension Mean # 56.0 54.3 *  
SF Gender % Female 22.8 25.7  33.0 32.1  
SI Gender % Female 42.4 32.2 * 60.0 50.0 * 
SF Marital status % Married 70.4 64.3 * 62.2 65.2  
SI Marital status % Married 72.7 57.6 *** 64.0 50.0 *** 
SF Monthly earnings Mean # $2,160 $2,529 *** $2,123 $2,467 *** 
SF Monthly compensa- 
tion rate 
Mean # $1,086 $1,230 *** $944 $1,153 *** 
SF Education less than 
high school 
% 44.4 50.0  43.1 35.5 *** 
SF Agriculture  % 9.9 11.0  11.7 4.5 *** 
SF Construction % 21.6 21.4  24.5 22.3  
SF Manufacturing % 8.6 10.0 X 6.4 17.0 X 
SF Services % 21.0 28.1 X 21.8 25.0 X 
SF Puget Sound  
region % 
Compared to 
rest of state 
58.6 52.3 * 49.5 48.4  
SF Economically 
distressed region % 
Yes, distressed 25.9 41.0 *** 41.5 37.5  
 
Medical Treatment and Psychological Impairment 
SF Opioid use % Yes 29.9 45.5 *** 53.1 46.4 ** 
SF Pain clinic used % Yes 22.8 27.6  27.7 9.8 *** 
SF % Psych issues Yes 33.9 38.1  39.4 17.9 *** 
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Sector Variable name Description 
1997
Pension
Awardees
2002
Pension
Awardees
Statistical 
Significance
1997 
Comparison
Group
2002
Comparison
Group
Statistical 
Significance
SF % with Psych 
Payment 
 
Yes 35.2 41.4  42.6 19.6 *** 
SF % IME with psych 
evaluation 
Yes 55.6 50.5  51.1 27.8 *** 
 
Claims Management 
SF Adjudicative delays  % Yes 39.6 28.5  31.7 21.6 *** 
SF Days in assessment Mean # 508.5 435.0 * 653.4 331.6 *** 
SF Number medical 
exams 
Mean # 3.51 2.92 *** 4.68 3.06 *** 
SF Multiple VR 
referrals 
% Yes 61.7 53.8 * 80.8 65.2 *** 
SF Early VR actions Mean # 1.38 1.41  1.62 1.52  
SF % Preexisting 
conditions 
Yes 87.8 92.5 *** 83.4 76.9 * 
SF % Prior claims 
among pensions 
Yes 83.3 89.3  85.2 82.7 *** 
SF % Prior claim same 
condition 
Yes 43.6 47.2  35.6 53.7 *** 
SF % Prior claims PPD 
award 
Yes 33.3 40.6 ** 19.5 33.9 *** 
SF % Reopenings Yes 10.5 7.1  22.3 4.5 *** 
SI % Prior claim same 
condition  
Yes 93.9 84.7 ** 78.0 83.9  
 
Vocational Rehabilitation 
SF Mean number VR 
actions 
Mean # 3.28 3.13  4.86 4.49 *** 
SI Mean number VR 
actions 
Mean # 2.06 1.87 2.28 1.96 ** 
SF Early VR referrals 
% 
Actions per 
claim 
2.07 2.03  2.83 2.72  
SF Days to 1st VR 
referral 
Mean # 598.7 423.0 *** 513.8 376.0 *** 
SF Days in VR  Maximum 
value is 5 
years 
1,304.8 1,227.2  2,361.5 1,419.2 *** 
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Sector Variable name Description 
1997
Pension
Awardees
2002
Pension
Awardees
Statistical 
Significance
1997 
Comparison
Group
2002
Comparison
Group
Statistical 
Significance
 
Return-to-Work Experience 
SF Any return to work % Yes 58.1 49.8 * 65.9 45.2 *** 
SI Any return to work % Yes 58.1 60.3  77.6 70.4  
SF RTW at employer at 
injury 
% Yes of those 
with a RTW 
84.3 91.3 * 66.4 77.8 *** 
SF Accommodation % Yes 19.3 14.2  29.7 13.1 *** 
SF Light duty provided % 34.8 35.1  42.7 33.9 ** 
 
Disputation in the L&I System 
SF Employer 
contested claim 
% Yes 11.7 15.2  13.3 23.2 *** 
SI Employer 
contested claim 
% Yes 10.6 34.1 *** 6.4 7.1  
SF Appeal to BIIA Mean #         .376         .448        .601        .330 *** 
Note:  X means did not test 
    *indicates statistical significance at the 95% level. 
  **indicates statistical significance at the 99% level. 
***indicates statistical significance at the 99.9% level. 
For the state fund sector, 2002 pension claims show a slightly higher age at injury, and a 
lower proportion married; they also show a lower number of hospital admissions and surgical 
procedures than 1997 pensions. They are more likely to demonstrate opioid use, to have 
preexisting conditions, and to be from economically distressed counties. They are less likely to 
show any attempt at return to work than 1997 pension claims. 
 State fund comparison time-loss claims from 2002 are less likely than 1997 claims to 
involve back injury, have much lower hospital admission rates, and fewer surgical procedures. 
They are older at injury and are more likely to have at least a high school education. They show 
less opioid use, are much less likely to have used a pain clinic, and have significantly less 
psychological involvement. They are also less likely to have preexisting conditions, far less 
likely to be a reopened case, and are less likely to show a return-to-work attempt. They are more 
likely to have had their claim contested by their employer but are far less likely to have been 
involved in an appeal to the BIIA.  
 Self-insured pension claims from 2002 are less likely than those from 1997 to involve 
back injuries and less likely to be female. Fewer of them had prior claims, but they are much 
more likely to have had a contested claim. Fewer of these 2002 pension claims show appeals. 
Comparison time-loss claims from 2002 are quite similar. They involve fewer back injuries, are 
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slightly older, and less likely to show opioid use. There were no significant differences in the 
number with prior claims or return-to-work attempts. There was also no difference in the number 
whose claims were contested by the employer.  
Multivariate comparisons between 1997 and 2002 
 We concluded our analysis of the claim review sample with a multivariate analysis that 
compared the influence of selected variables on the probability of pension award in 1997 and 
2002. This differed from the preceding bivariate analysis in that all variables were considered 
simultaneously, thereby reducing misleading interactions and intercorrelations among causative 
factors. The differences between the two probability equations presumably indicate changes in 
Washington’s workers’ compensation system between 1997 and 2002.  
The largest changes in estimated coefficients were found in psychological conditions, 
agricultural employment, and preexisting conditions. Other variables that showed rising 
influence on the likelihood of pensions in 2002 included opioid drug use, reopened claims, 
claims from economically distressed areas, and claims from the construction industry. In 
addition, the effect of the number of VR activities and prior PPD award both became less 
negative from 1997 to 2002.  
 Among those variables that declined in influence between 1997 and 2002 were gender, 
marital status, age at injury, and possessing less than a high school education. Thus the 
demographic characteristics of the injured worker seemed to be less important in 2002. In 
addition, the influence of pre-injury earnings, use of pain clinics, and legal representation were 
all less positive than they had been in 1997. Small declines were recorded for employer contested 
claims, prior claims, and the number of medical procedures. No change was seen in the effect of 
employer accommodation, the number of independent medical examinations, or self-insured 
status of the employer.  
 Our ability to predict whether a given claim would receive a pension award improved 
somewhat between 1997 and 2002. Overall, our estimated equations explained 32 percent of the 
variance in 1997 and 47 percent in 2002. It seems clear that both the characteristics of injured 
workers who claim pensions and the characteristics of the workers’ compensation system within 
which they claim them changed between 1997 and 2002. While there are differences, we believe 
these analyses supplement the presentation and interpretation of administrative data in chapter 2 
  6-16
and improve our understanding of the increase in pension incidence that occurred in Washington 
over that time period.  
HAS THERE BEEN SUBSTANTIAL GROWTH IN PENSIONS AWARDED? 
Figure 6.1 shows the numbers of pensions awarded in Washington for the past two 
decades. It is evident that a sizeable upturn began in the mid to late 1990s and continued at least 
through 2003, along with a considerable jump in awards in 2007. Also, although pensions 
awarded in 2004 and 2005 fell from the previous peak in 2003, the number of pensions awarded 
in those years were higher than levels reached before 2000. The figure makes it clear that this 
upturn was more characteristic of state fund claims than of self-insured claims, although self-
insured pensions rose substantially also. We noted earlier that the comparative growth of state 
fund and self-insured claims depends heavily on the base year selected for comparison. 
Figure 6.1  Number of TPD Pensions Awarded by Fiscal Year 
0
500
1,000
1,500
2,000
2,500
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
Self-Insured State Fund
 
SOURCE:  L&I Research and Data Services 
Perhaps the most remarkable thing about the growth in pension awards, at least among state fund 
employers, is that it occurred in the face of a steady decline in the number of workers’ 
compensation claims for time-loss benefits, since reaching a peak in 1990–91.  
Our analysis begins with the question, was there actually sizable growth in pensions 
beginning in the mid 1990s and if so, was it very significant? Although we believe that such a 
phenomenon did occur, it may have been somewhat less dramatic than a first look at the data 
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suggests. Consider that in the five years 1988–1992, there were an average of 682 pensions 
awarded per year; or that in 1989 to 1991 under the previous push to close claims at L&I, there 
were 735 pensions awarded per year. Then consider that in the years 1993–1998 there were only 
499 pensions awarded per year. If the 1989–91 period was a spike that was accounted for by the 
“Yes-We-Can” push, it was followed by a dearth of pensions from 1993 to 1998, with an 
inventory buildup that was pared down over the next few years. This view would suggest that a 
portion of the jump in pensions actually was an inventory adjustment from the decline in the 
average number of pensions awarded in the 1993–98 years.  
If we consider the years 1999 to 2006, the average number of awards is indeed higher 
than the 1989–91 baseline. That is hardly surprising in the light of time-loss claims that began to 
increase after 1982 and peaked in 1990. Claims from this peak period were the raw material for 
the pensions in the late 1990s and going forward. From 1998 to 2001 the median length of time 
for pension awards made in those years was eight years from date of injury. That the number of 
pensions is correlated with the number of time-loss cases with a lag of six to 10 years is both 
intuitive and indisputable.  
Based on the peaking of time-loss claims in 1990, give or take a few years around this 
point, pensions should have been growing for that reason alone in the late 1990s and early 2000s; 
even aside from the working down of the excess inventory that built up from 1993–1998. There 
was indeed an upsurge in pensions around 1999, at least for the state fund. But the judgment of 
the size of the upsurge must necessarily be shaped by the baseline used to measure it. There is 
little doubt that there has been a continuing increase in the ratio of active or open claims to all 
compensable claims from the mid 1990s to the present. As duration continues to increase, the 
raw material for future pensions does as well.  
Aside from the issue of a claims inventory adjustment and of the lag from the peak years 
for time-loss claims to the awarding of pensions, one other factor adds to the puzzle. Beginning 
early in the 2000s the median time from claim origination to allowance fell from approximately 
eight years to about six years. That is equivalent to saying that claims that once would have 
remained in open payment status for some additional years were now being pensioned, boosting 
the number of pensions that L&I awarded beginning early in the 2000s. Had this change in 
practice or policy not occurred, it is likely that the pension counts would have been lower in the 
mid 2000s, though very likely most of these would have become pensions a few years later. 
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Where do these various complications leave us? We conclude that pensions have been 
growing and not simply due to an inventory adjustment resulting from claims management 
processes in the agency. The rate of pensions relative to time-loss claims, lagged appropriately, 
has also grown. And there has been continuing growth in the proportion of time-loss claims that 
remain open or active, both for relatively short durations and for long ones suggesting that the 
agency is encountering difficulty in closing claims as quickly as they have in the past. That said 
it is likely that the amount of the growth in pensions is not as great as one might sense, if the 
basis for that is simply Fig. 6.1. 
WHAT CAUSED THE GROWTH IN PENSIONS? 
This section consists of two parts. First, we examine the claims flow process. Then we try 
to establish the factors that were responsible for the growth in pensions. 
The Claims Flow Process  
Claims by injured workers are dealt with in a manner that is not notably different than in 
many other states. In addition to other duties, L&I plays the role that private insurance carriers 
do in 47 states and the District of Columbia and similar to those of the more than 20 competitive 
state insurance funds. One notable difference is that in most states claims are initially filed by 
injured workers or their employers, while in Washington it is left to the health care provider to 
submit the first report of injury. This can be a source of some delay in the initial delivery of time-
loss benefits. A pilot project is currently underway in Washington to evaluate a procedure where 
the initial report is submitted instead by the employer.  
Self-insured employers in Washington manage their own workers’ compensation claims, 
either directly or through a third-party administrator. L&I exercises broad regulatory and 
oversight functions, becoming involved in specific claim management issues only in limited 
circumstances. For example, L&I reviews and approves all claim rejections and most closures. 
But L&I adjudicates all pension claims, whether from self-insured or state fund insured 
employers. 
Some attention was given in chapter 2 to the processes that are used to close claims. 
There is a record of periodic dissatisfaction by some critics of L&I regarding the lengthy time for 
which claims remain open and for which time-loss benefits are paid. This has led to periods of 
intense attention that the agency has given to try to reduce the number of long-term claims, both 
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those open and those in active status. Claims are eventually closed in a limited number of ways, 
either when no timely protest or appeal is filed and the closing order becomes final, or when all 
protests and appeals have been exhausted. The paths to closure, which essentially parallel those 
found in most jurisdictions, include the following:  
• determination of maximum medical improvement by the attending physician, a medical 
consultant or an IME; 
• return to work (with or without vocational rehabilitation; with or without permanent 
restrictions; with or without modified work);  
• determination of employability following maximum medical improvement based upon 
the opinion of the attending physician, medical consultant, IME, vocational provider or 
forensic vocational assessment; 
• finding that the continued inability to work was not related to the injury or illness for 
which the claim was allowed (e.g. preexisting conditions that naturally progressed post 
injury or an unrelated post-injury condition); 
• a PPD award, after a determination of maximum medical improvement; 
• settlements resolving issues such as back time loss, medical bills, travel expenses or 
accepted conditions. Settlements may include PPD, but only insofar as this is adequately 
supported by documented medical opinion; and 
• determination of total and permanent disability leading to pension. 
One path to closure that is found in most states but not in Washington is the use of 
compromise and release settlements. All but eight states allow, with few or no meaningful limits, 
the use of such settlements to terminate the payment of indemnity benefits. Lump-sum 
settlements are allowed under RCW 51.32.130 in death or total permanent disability cases. But 
because the maximum amount is limited to $8,500 this provision is rarely used.  
There are numerous barriers to claim closure in Washington, at times delaying definitive 
action, and these can substantially extend the payment of time-loss benefits. Actions taken by 
injured workers, employers, attorneys, and medical or vocational providers all can play some 
role in extending the period for which time-loss benefits are paid and claims remain open. The 
Department can also be responsible for delays that extend time-loss payments, and there have 
been periodic bursts of managerial response which have not always proven to be effective. In 
some cases efforts to close claims of long duration may have been successful, but served to 
increase the number of cases where pensions were granted.  
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As is the case in most states, disputes in Washington can be resolved by protests or 
appeals; made first to the workers’ compensation agency (L&I), and if not resolved there to an 
appellate body independent of the agency. The decisions of that appellate body (the Board of 
Industrial Insurance Appeals in Washington) can be appealed to the courts. The appeals process 
involving the BIIA and the courts can also contribute to the extended duration of some claims. 
The BIIA currently receives about 9,000 state fund case appeals per year and issues 
decisions on about 6,000 to 7,000. These numbers rose slowly from 1988 to 1999, then jumped 
significantly in 2000 and have remained relatively flat since then. Unfortunately, it is not 
possible to determine from existing BIIA or L&I records how frequently pension issues were 
either the main or secondary reason for appeals. According to L&I’s data warehouse, the number 
of pensions ordered by the BIIA rose sharply from FY 1988 to a peak of 149 in 1992, then 
dropped back to 75 to 90 from 1996 through 1999, before rising sharply again to 207 in 2002. 
Since that high point the numbers have fallen back to the 70 to 90 range per year. 
The number of self-insured pensions awarded by BIIA decisions rose gradually from 
1988 to a peak of 63 in 2006, without the steep increases experienced by the state fund in 1992 
and 2002. The frequency of self-insured pensions, as a percent of all BIIA self-insured decisions, 
has consistently ranged between one and two percent since calendar year 1989, except for a one-
year peak of 2.5 percent in 2006. 
When the available data are considered as a whole, we cannot conclude that changes in 
BIIA behavior explain the changes in the rate of state fund pensions from the late 1990s to the 
present. But we are unable to rule out the importance of BIIA decisions in the years prior to the 
substantial growth in pensions granted by L&I. Increased BIIA pension decisions have 
contributed to the overall increase in pension numbers because of the increase in appeals 
reviewed by the BIIA, not because the BIIA has become more likely to award pensions at a 
higher rate. 
Major Causes of the Increases in Pensions: Claims Management Practices  
We examined claims management practices at L&I to determine how significant this has 
been in the sharp growth in pensions. In our view one of the factors that led to a surge in 
pensions was the result of three conditions that occurred in combination. These conditions are: 
• a build-up of open (or active) long-duration time-loss claims; 
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• a high probability that a long-duration time-loss claim will evolve into a pension case; 
and 
• a concerted push to clear out the long-duration time-loss claims. 
In 1998 about one in seven open claims at L&I had been open for at least six years; many 
of these were a good deal older. This proportion began to decline slowly thereafter, yet one in 
every eight open time-loss claims had been open for six or more years in 2001. Each year from 
1996 to 1999 there were close to 6,000 open time-loss claims that had been open for six or more 
years. This is compared to a range of 600 to 1,000 pension awards per year. 
A large share of the pensions awarded in any year goes to claims where the work accident 
occurred 10 or more years previously. In 2000 a high water mark was reached as over 38 percent 
of the pensions awarded that year went to claims that had been open for 10 or more years. The 
number of these 10-year-old or older cases that were pensioned peaked in 2002 and 2003.  
The data suggest that there is a continuing problem with long-duration claims in 
Washington. The percent of compensable claims from each calendar accident year that are active 
five years after the injury year began to rise in 1996, increasing nearly 60 percent by 2002. This 
growth of long-duration time-loss claims provides the base for pension growth in the future. 
Additionally, as is noted in chapter 2, the linkage between long-duration cases and the increasing 
probability that this results in pensions seems incontrovertible. 
Steps to shorten average duration have been taken at various points for more than two 
decades at L&I. One such major push was made in 1998 when money was made available to 
fund 24 additional Claim Managers, with the proviso that time-loss duration be reduced by 5 
percent by June 30, 2000 and an additional 2.5 percent by June 30, 2001. This added 
considerably to the workloads of the Pension Adjudicators, both because of the increased number 
of pension determinations that were needed to be made by them, and because the average 
experience level of the Claim Managers was less due to the presence of newly acquired staff. 
 We believe the concerted push to reduce time loss and close claims during the period 
from 1998 to 2001 contributed to a lumpiness in the year-to-year number of pensions that were 
awarded, thereby precipitating a portion of the upsurge in the number of pensions awarded.153 
This administrative phenomenon accounts for a significant share of the pension growth. 
                                                 
153  Not only do such special efforts contribute to year-to-year volatility, there is considerable variation in 
the number of pensions awarded on a quarter-to-quarter basis. This seems particularly pronounced since 2000. 
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However, the administrative push and its resulting awarding of pensions was built upon a 
foundation of increasing time-loss durations. This push to resolve claims also led to some 
decisions by the agency that disappointed some claimants and fostered an increased number of 
appeals. 
Major Causes of the Increases in Pensions: Poor Labor Market Conditions 
Difficulty in the labor market is likely to increase the probability that an injured worker 
cannot return to employment and the earnings level that existed before the injury or illness. That 
difficulty may be the result of economic weakness in the injured worker’s community or region, 
and/or it may result from personal characteristics that contribute to difficulty in finding and 
retaining employment, except perhaps when the labor market is very strong. We believe the 
evidence shows that labor market conditions have played a significant role in the pension 
increase in Washington.  
Labor markets that provide substantial job opportunities reduce some of the barriers that 
injured workers face in seeking and retaining employment. Strong labor markets also cause 
employers to have a greater need to reemploy their injured workers. These high-demand labor 
markets also tend to generate wages that encourage workers to return to, and to remain in, 
employment.  
Since the early 1990s the labor market in Washington has been weak, though some 
geographic areas have been strong for most years. Not surprisingly, those workers with the least 
education have been disproportionately at risk for having their work injuries evolve into 
pensions. Work injuries and illnesses compound the problems that such workers face in the labor 
market. 
Other Possible Causes of the Increases in Pensions: Changing Demographics  
There is no doubt that a worker’s age is positively associated with receiving a pension. It 
is also true that Washington’s population, and likely its labor force, have grown older in recent 
years. Did this contribute to the growth in pensions? Our analysis finds that the aging of the 
workforce is not a significant contributor to the year-to-year growth in pensions. Age 
undoubtedly has an impact on pension likelihood but not on short-term swings. The impact of 
age does manifest itself over longer periods of time, and it has likely had some effect when 
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viewed over the period of a decade or more. As the state’s labor force continues to age, it will 
tend to raise the rate of pensioning.  
Other Possible Causes of the Increase in Pensions: Changing Types of Injuries and 
Illnesses and Their Treatment  
We examined back injuries and psychological conditions as well as certain treatments to 
determine their role, if any, in the growth of pensions. Back injuries are often the focus of 
concern in workers’ compensation studies because of their frequency, their cost, and the difficult 
diagnostic, etiological, and treatment issues they present. From 1993 to 2004, accepted back or 
spinal injury claims fell by 29 percent in Washington, and the number of denied claims over the 
same period fell by 48 percent. When we examined the proportion of back or spinal injury claims 
that were accepted as a proportion of all time-loss claims in each accident year, the rate fell over 
the 12 years, albeit slightly.  
Could changing treatment for back injuries be responsible for the increase in pensions? It 
was suggested to us that more frequent use of lumbar fusion surgery in Washington State, 
especially with intervertebral cage devices, may have made a significant contribution to the 
increase in pension awards. The data on such procedures lead us to conclude that this type of 
surgery could not have been responsible for more than a small percent of the increased number 
and rate of pensions during calendar years 1996 to 2003. 
By contrast, claims with psychological involvement have clearly increased and may have 
played a role in the increasing number of pensions. However, the rates of increase are not 
sufficient to account for a major share of the increase in pensions during the period under 
question. These medical conditions often develop after another disabling injury has occurred. 
They may be the result of work disability as much as the cause.  
The use of opioids to treat injured workers has also grown considerably over the period 
we considered in this study. It is difficult to sort out the causal relationship between the use of 
these medications and long-term disability and pensions. Is their continuing use a function of the 
degree of pain and impairment for the worker? What is cause and what is effect? However, even 
if this treatment is responsible for increasing the numbers of pensions, our analysis suggests that 
it could not be a major cause of these cases. 
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Other Possible Causes of the Increases in Pensions: Injuries and Illnesses, Frequency and 
Sseverity 
In seeking to explain the upsurge in pension awards beginning in the late 1990s we need 
to rule out some sources that theoretically could be in whole or in part responsible. One possible 
cause could be that there was an increase in the number and/or the severity of occupational 
injuries and illnesses several years before the increase in pensions. Both the U.S. and 
Washington appear to have had consistent long-term downward trends in the incidence rates of 
non-fatal work injuries. It seems very unlikely that the number or the rate of Washington’s 
pensions were the product of more injuries in the decade or so before the upsurge in awards.  
We looked at the data on occupational fatalities on the grounds that if the numbers or 
rates of injuries and illnesses or their severity were increasing, one should find the same in 
fatality rates. We found that from 1993 to 1998, the level of occupational fatalities in 
Washington stayed in a fairly narrow range. After 1998 the number of these fatalities declined, 
reaching its lowest point in 2000. It is important to keep in mind that the size of the workforce in 
Washington was growing over much of this period, even as the number of fatalities was 
declining. Comparing the state’s performance with that of the U.S., Washington’s relative safety 
performance record as judged by the number of fatalities has improved over this time.  
Another possible cause of the upsurge could be that the severity of injuries and illnesses 
has increased even if the number or rate of incidents has not. Some evidence on that matter can 
be obtained by considering the incidence of permanent partial disability. For those claimants who 
did not receive a pension, the number of permanent partial disability recipients has fallen, though 
the proportion of time-loss claims that resulted in permanent partial disability awards has 
steadily moved higher.  
By the latter measure, we could conclude either that the rate of more serious injuries and 
illnesses (but not the level) has increased over time, or that the standards for awarding permanent 
partial disability benefits have been relaxed. Also, the extent of PPD impairment for those who 
were eventually determined to be permanently and totally disabled did not increase over the 
period when the upsurge in pension awards occurred. Overall the findings for the self-insured 
and for the state fund are very similar.  
Making some assessment of the changing degree of severity using permanent partial 
disability ratings is complex. Many pension recipients were not given permanent partial benefits 
and ratings of their impairment are not captured in available data sources. Of those who did get 
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rated and obtained benefits, it is possible that their condition changed between the time they were 
rated for permanent partial disability and their condition at the time they were awarded a 
pension. 
We have not resolved this issue here with certainty though it is instructive to see that the 
average impairment rating—both the mean and the median—associated with permanent partial 
disability awards has steadily declined. We are inclined to believe that the severity of injuries 
and illnesses resulting in permanent disability has not increased. A variety of improvements in 
health care and in safety and prevention practices over this period make it unlikely that the 
average degree of severity increased over time in Washington, although we cannot rule out that 
possibility absolutely.  
Possible Causes of the Increase in Pensions: The Changing Legal Environment  
An obvious place to turn to explain the growth in pensions is the legal environment in 
which workers’ compensation cases are evaluated. We found that neither the statute nor the 
regulations changed in the time period under consideration in a way that accounts for the 
upsurge. The language of the statute itself regarding pensions has remained unchanged for 
decades. Of the many persons we have interviewed, no one has pointed to legislative or 
regulatory change as the reason that more pensions have been awarded.  
Some have suggested that certain judicial decisions (e.g. Leeper 1994) may have been 
significant. Although decisions such as Leeper undoubtedly favored applicants for pensions, 
decisions made far earlier show a relatively tolerant standard by the courts to pension applicants. 
We are not able to conclude whether or not the upswing in pensions may be partly a product of 
the Board or the Courts becoming more “worker friendly.”  
While this is a possibility, as is the possibility that attitudes favoring such determinations 
are the product of changing attitudes at the Department, there is no unambiguous way to show 
that there has been some changing standard for the granting of a pension. However, it is highly 
unlikely that such attitudes changed quickly enough to account for the upsurge in pensions. We 
believe that legislative changes or court decisions, and possibly appeals that derive from these, 
can be the source of diversions that disrupt the usual processing of claims. Any resulting delays 
in processing or managing claims can add to volatility in the number of pensions awarded. If this 
contributes to longer duration claims, it could also lead to some claims becoming pensions that 
otherwise might have been resolved with prompter claims management attention given to them.  
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Possible Causes of the Increase in Pensions: The Second-Injury Fund  
The Second-Injury Fund does not appear to have been a significant driver of pensions for 
state fund cases. However, it plays an extremely important role in the number of pensions 
awarded to workers from self-insured employers. As such, the growth in self-insured pension 
cases, which actually began several years before the sizeable upturn in state fund cases, must be 
viewed as a very important potential consequence of second-injury fund relief provisions which 
were being used with increasing frequency and by a wider assortment of self-insured employers. 
Possible Causes of the Increase in Pensions: The Vocational Rehabilitation Program  
Our primary mission is to determine the source of the upswing in the number of pensions 
awarded. The Vocational Rehabilitation (VR) program plays a critical role in pensions, as 
successful rehabilitation obviates the likelihood that a pension will follow. Our conclusion, based 
on our review of claim files, interviews with staff and providers, and analysis of the available 
data is that VR at L&I has not had a negative impact on service provision to an extent that would 
explain the rapid growth in pensions awarded. This is not to suggest that the VR program is 
problem free. Indeed, a newly grounded pilot program for VR is testimony to the agency’s 
searching for an improved model of service.  
Clearly a VR program can have an impact on the ability of injured workers to return to 
work and its strengths and weaknesses will affect the promptness and effectiveness of return-to-
work efforts. However, there is no evident relationship between the bulge in pension awards 
beginning in the late 1990s and the VR program, per se.  
Possible Causes of the Increase in Pensions: Appeals by Workers 
 As we have noted several times in this report, a correlation between variables is not 
evidence of a causal relationship. A strong correlation exists between the number of appeals filed 
and pensions awarded two years later. Several things could explain this relationship including the 
fact that both measures have a tendency to grow over time (as do many other possible variables.) 
Still, there are some plausible hypotheses that are consistent with this relationship. For one 
example, as claim managers and other agency staff are heavily engaged in responding to appeals, 
they might give less attention to managing other claims, thereby leading to extended durations. 
As stated earlier, we believe that the increase in appeals was a consequence of the upsurge rather 
than a cause. 
  6-27
PREDICTING THE NUMBER OF FUTURE PENSIONS 
 We used information from the L&I data warehouse to estimate a binomial logit model 
that would predict pension receipt among claims that had already received between 3 and 10 
years of time loss payments. Our model predicted the probability that these claims would be 
granted a pension in the six years following based upon their characteristics. The data included 
such factors as time-loss duration, gender, age at injury, county of injury, industry of 
employment, PPD and Social Security offset status, number of appeals, vocational rehabilitation 
plan development, hospital admissions, surgical procedures, opioid prescriptions, neck and back 
conditions, psych treatment, and prior claim status.  
 In our predictive model, the most important determining factor in the likelihood of 
pension is the length of time from the date of the injury. Each additional year since the injury 
increases the odds of a pension by 30 percent. Age at injury was also a very significant factor. 
Each additional year beyond the mean is associated with a nine percent increase in the odds of 
pension, holding other factors constant. Translating this to predicted probabilities, a worker who 
is less than 30 years old and has between 3 and 10 years of time loss has a 15 percent predicted 
probability of pensioning, while a worker with the same characteristics, but between 60 and 65 
years of age has a 78 percent predicted probability of TPD. 
The estimated amount of time loss paid per day also influences the likelihood of pension 
slightly. For each dollar paid over the mean, there is an increase of .90 percent in the odds of 
TPD. For example, $50 over the estimated average daily amount paid in time-loss benefits is 
associated with an increase in pension odds of five percent. Claims from economically distressed 
areas had a 16 percent increased likelihood of TPD over those that are not from distressed areas, 
holding other factors constant.  
Claims with psychological treatment within the first three years of injury had a 40 percent 
increased chance of pension outcome over claims without psychological treatment. Accepted 
back and neck conditions (as defined by ICD-9 codes) were associated with a 30 percent increase 
in odds of pension over claims with conditions other than neck and back. Claims with opioid 
prescriptions showed a 21 percent greater likelihood of pensioning than claims without opioid 
prescriptions.  
Another indicator of whether or not a case will receive a pension is whether or not the 
worker receives a vocational rehabilitation plan. A case with a vocational plan approved is 56 
  6-28
percent less likely to receive a pension than a case without such a plan, other things equal. This 
estimate does not mean that VR treatment will reduce the likelihood of pension by 56 percent, 
but it does indicate that claims selected for VR referral that proceed to VR plan approval are 
much less likely to end up as pension claims.  
If a worker’s benefits are offset due to Social Security payments, the worker is more than 
twice as likely to receive a pension. Presumably this is due to the disability status they have 
demonstrated already, which makes them very unlikely to return to work. Receiving a permanent 
partial disability (PPD) award has a negative effect on the likelihood of pension. Our model 
indicates that the receipt of PPD within the first three years of a claim lowers the probability of 
pension by 17 percent, holding other factors constant. One possible reason for this can be that in 
order to be granted a PPD award, the worker must be rated as to the degree of medical 
impairment. If the medical condition has not stabilized, the worker will not be rated. As a result, 
the absence of a rating may be correlated with a more severe condition, i.e., one that is more 
likely to result in an inability to return to employment and thus, the eventual awarding of a 
pension. Appeals to the BIIA can also signal TPD likelihood, as a case with an appeal has an 
increased likelihood of TPD by 10 percent. 
Industry of employment is also an important factor. In this model we included agriculture 
and construction as two major industries tending to have seasonal effects and relatively high 
workers’ compensation claim incidence. Individuals injured in agriculture and construction may 
have more serious injuries, lower levels of formal education, and more difficulty returning to 
work. Our model estimates that an agricultural worker was 25 percent more likely to receive a 
TPD than other workers, but that construction workers were not statistically different from other 
workers with regard to TPD benefit receipt.  
Our model correctly predicts pension outcomes approximately 70 percent of the time 
based upon the available variables. The predicted pension probability is somewhat lower than the 
ultimate probability of pension predicted by L&I Actuarial Services for claims three or more 
years old. But it is important to note that our pension probability model misses many of those 
likely to be identified by the actuarial models, especially claims older than 10 years. The 
actuarial models are using a different method, employing projections of ultimate counts based on 
the number of active claims and past claim closure rates rather than individual claim 
characteristics, and their numbers are not directly comparable to ours.  
  6-29
In essence, actuarial methods use a macro or system approach, while our model uses a 
micro or individual approach. In addition, our model only explains a portion of the overall 
variation in pension rates due to its restricted range and limited variable set. While we think our 
model could offer a valuable contribution toward understanding the individual factors affecting 
pension likelihood, our model is definitely not a substitute for what actuaries at L&I currently 
employ.  
The value to the Department of Labor and Industries of this model is that it could be used 
to identify cases with a high probability of pension so that a claims management intervention 
could be applied earlier in the claim. This model—or a more highly developed variation of it—
could help the department to evaluate what future pension outcomes are likely to be and what 
will be the characteristics of future pension claims. As such, it would be a complement to the 
existing L&I actuarial forecasting efforts.  
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